



Library of

Mellesley



College.

Presented by Widif. Society

Nº 49997







☞ *The Executive Committee call your special attention to the need of adding to the number of the Society's members, and of Subscriptions being paid in advance, so that the Society may get quickly through the rest of its work. Will you do all you can to bring this about?*

COPIES OF THIS REPORT FOR JUDICIOUS DISTRIBUTION MAY BE OBTAINED  
OF THE SECRETARY.

## The Wyclif Society.

---

MAY, 1892.

THE WYCLIF SOCIETY was founded in 1882 to remove from England the disgrace of having till then left buried in manuscript the most important works of her great early reformer, JOHN WYCLIF. This scandalous neglect extended over nearly 500 years. Wyclif died in 1384. Not till 466 years after was his English Bible printed. Not till 485 years after did his *Select English Works* appear; and not till 1881 were the rest of his ENGLISH works printed.

These publications shew us Wyclif in his purely English aspect, as the first translator of our Bible and THE FATHER OF ENGLISH PROSE, but they help us very little to follow the growth and development of his mind, or to understand his immense influence as the teacher of Huss and the originator of the Reformation in Europe. "No writings so important for the history of doctrine are still buried in manuscript," as Wyclif's, said Dr. Shirley 27 years ago; and their interest is by no means confined to the theologian. The relation of Wyclif's teaching to the later Lollards and to the social fermentation of his own period, may be mentioned as one among many matters in which the publication of his works would be of great service to the historian.

Till the Wyclif Society started, only one treatise of importance, the *Dialogus*, had ever been printed<sup>1</sup> out of the great mass of the Reformer's Latin writings. Published abroad in 1525, and again in 1753, it was edited for the Oxford University Press in 1869 by Dr. Lechler. A few tracts (not 100 pages in all) are contained in Shirley's *Fasciculi Zizaniorum*; and this was all that England had done up to 1882, to make the chief works of this great son of hers accessible.

<sup>1</sup> All the works of his chief opponent, the Carmelite THOMAS NETTER, or WALDEN (because he was of Saffron Walden), have been printed over and over again.

In Germany Dr. Lechler had printed a few short pieces; and two volumes of *Polemical Tracts*, edited by Dr. Rudolf Buddensieg of Dresden, and in part paid for by the King of Saxony, were adopted and issued as the Wyclif Society's volumes for 1882 and 1883. We cannot desire that German scholars and princes should complete the work which falls by right to Englishmen; and even if we had reached that pitch of supine contentment it is unlikely that our wishes would be fulfilled. It is time for us to wake up from our lethargy, and set our hands manfully to the duty before us.

The year 1884 was the 500th anniversary of WYCLIF's death, and a few men then resolved that the *Wyclif Society* should be kept on foot until all the Reformer's genuine writings are given to the world through the Press. Half of them, or rather more, have since been issued by the Society. The rest are nearly all copied, and most of them are in editors' hands, preparing for the press.

If only 400 members can be obtained at a guinea a year for the Society, ten more years will probably see the whole work done.

A full English abstract or digest of each of the Society's volumes is given in it, so as to make reference easy to the student, and to enable the English reader to get a knowledge of the contents. The Society's volumes are in demy 8vo, the size of the works already published by the Oxford Press and the Early English Text Society.

The Subscription to the Society is ONE GUINEA A YEAR, due on every 1st of January. (An immediate (1892) payment of eleven guineas puts a new member in the position of an original subscriber.) Each guinea entitles the subscriber to the Society's publications for the year for which it is paid.<sup>1</sup> Members' names and subscriptions should be sent either to the *Honorary Secretary*, John W. Standerwick, General Post Office, London, E.C., or to Prof. Montagu Burrows, 9, Norham Gardens, Oxford.

Any members who are able and willing to spare the money, will help the Society's work very much by paying five years' subscription in advance, as treatises can then be sent to press directly the Editor has prepared them, and the volumes can be issued as soon as they are finished. Donations will be gladly accepted.

One most important way of helping the cause of theology,

<sup>1</sup> Members incur no liability whatever beyond the guinea for the year they subscribe for.

history and scholarship generally is that of subscribing to the *Wyclif Society* and presenting its issues to some Public Institution. This was done by the late Mr. Samuel Morley on behalf of ten Theological Colleges and other Institutions, and all these subscriptions lapsed at the end of 1887. A few of them have since been taken up by other friends, but the others in these "hard times" know not where to look for the required assistance.

The Committee appeal to all who care for the Religion, the Freedom, the Language, and the History of England, for aid in the work they have undertaken. No party feeling whatever enters into the Society's plan. The only desire is to do England's long-neglected duty to the memory of a great English Worthy.

---

Wyclif's Latin works fall under four main heads :—

1. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, including the relation of Church and State, &c. Of this the chief collection is the *Summa Theologiæ* in twelve books (of which half have been issued by the Society). The rest of the *Summa*, and of its introduction *De Dominio* and *De Dominio Divino*, will take at least seven 8vo. volumes.

2. SERMONS, these have been issued by the Society in four volumes, edited by Professor Loserth.

3. EXPOSITION OF *THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT*, Matthew xxiii.-xxv. containing invective akin to Luther's, now at press, to be finished in 1892.

4. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY. The chief treatise in this section is *De Ente*. Parts of this, with other treatises in this section, were copied by Huss, and his autograph copy is still in the Royal Library at Stockholm. In addition to their influence on the Bohemian movement, these philosophical works are important as being continually referred to by Wyclif in his later writings, and by his opponent Walden. These will probably take five volumes, of which the first (*Logica et Logicæ Continuatio*) is nearly through the press. Besides these main subjects, there are two less ones,

5. PROTESTS, DISPUTATIONS, AND EPISTLES, and

6. CHURCH GOVERNMENT AND ENDOWMENTS, which will probably take two volumes each.



80. *De Religionibus vanus Monachorum, sive De Fundatore Religionis.*
- 81, 82. *De Religione Privata*, I., 11.
84. *De Ordinatione Fratrum.* Shirley's *Concoptatione Fratrum cum secta simplici Christi, sive De Scottis Monachorum.* In four chapters.
85. *De Quatuor Sectis Novellis.* (1. The Priests endowed with lands and lordships; 2. The landed Monastic Orders; 3. The Canons; 4. The Begging Friars.)
86. *De Detectione Perfidiarum Antichristi.*
87. *De Novis Ordinibus.* In three chapters.
88. *De Mentacis Fratrum.*
89. *Descriptio Fratis.*
91. *De Fundatione Sectarum.*
97. *Purgatorium seche Christi, sive contra Religiossa Privatas*, Ashburnham M.S. xxvii. c. ff. 49-50. (This is not in Shirley's Catalogue. It is an exhortation to put down the sects of Friars.)

*B.—Against the Pope.*

72. *De citationibus frivolis et aliis versutijs Antichristi.*
74. *De Dissensione Paparum sive De Schismate* (A.D. 1378). (Also in English, Shirley, No. 59, p. 48. Printed in Arnold, iii. 42.)
75. *Contra Cruciatum Papæ.* In nine chapters. (On the Crusade of the rival Popes against each other during the Great Schism.)
76. *De Christo et suo Adversario Antichristo.* In fifteen chapters.
83. *De Contrarietate duorum dominorum, suarum partium ac etiam regularum.* In eight chapters. (A sharp attack on the Friars.)
93. *De Quatuor Imprecationibus.* (Four conclusions about the state of the English Clergy.)
96. *De Duobus Generibus Hereticorum.*

## WYCLIF'S OTHER WORKS.

- Select English Works of John Wyclif. Ed. T. Arnold, M.A. 3 vols. 8vo. Clarendon Press, 1871. Published at 42s., but now reduced, at the request of the Wyclif Society, to 21s.
- English Works of Wyclif hitherto unprinted. Ed. F. D. Matthew. Early English Text Society, 1879, 21s.; can be had at Members' price, 14s. 6d., through Dr. Furnivall.
- The Holy Bible in the Earliest English Versions, made from the Latin vulgate by John Wycliffe and his Followers. Edited by the Rev. J. Forshall and Sir F. Madden. Clarendon Press, 1850. 4 vols. Royal 4to. 63s.
- The New Testament in English, according to the version by John Wycliffe, about A.D. 1380, and revised by John Purvey, about 1388. With Introduction and Glossary by W. Skeat, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. Clarendon Press, 1879. 6s.
- The Books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon, according to the Wycliffite Version made by Nicholas de Hereford, about A.D. 1381, and revised by John Purvey, about A.D. 1388. With Introduction and Glossary by W. W. Skeat, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. Clarendon Press, 1881. 3s. 6d.
- Joh. de Wyclif "Tractatus de Officio Pastoralis." Ed. Lechler. Lips. 1863. 4s.
- Joannis Wicliff "Trialogus Cum Supplemento Trialogi." Ed. G. Lechler. Clarendon Press, 1869. 8vo. Published at 14s., but now reduced, at the request of the Wycliff Society, to 7s.
- Joh. Wycliff's "de Christo et suo Adversario Anti-Christo." Ein polemischer Tractat, herausgegeben von Dr. Rudolf Buddensieg. F. A. Perthes, Gotha, 1880. 2 Mark (2s.)

## WORKS ON WYCLIF.

- John Wyclif: his Life, Times, and Teaching. By the Rev. A. R. Pennington, M.A., Canon of Lincoln, etc. Fcap. 8vo. cloth boards, 3s. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
- Life of John Wyclif. With a Portrait. By F. D. Matthew. Post 8vo. Limp cloth, 6d. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
- Wyclif and Hus. By Dr. Johann Loserth. Hodder and Stoughton, 7s. 6d.
- John Wycliffe and his English Precursors. By Prof. Lechler. Religious Tract Society. 1884.
- Wyclif's Place in History. By Prof. Montagu Burrows. 2nd Ed. Isbister, 1884. 3s. 6d.

## THE WYCLIF SOCIETY.

By JAMES GAIRDNER, *Editor of the "Calendar of the State Papers of Henry VIII., etc."*

"THE WYCLIF SOCIETY is greatly in need of additional members, and the existing members are urged to do all they can in the way of personal application to their friends to induce others to join. For my part there is no cause which I would so willingly help by such a method; but instead of writing little notes to individual friends, I prefer, with your permission, to point out the special claims of the Society in the columns of the *Athenæum*.

"It is probably thought by many that the substance of WYCLIF's writings is pretty well known by this time, and that even if several remain unprinted, there can be no doubt about their general tendency. The truth is precisely the reverse; the great bulk of WYCLIF's writings remains in MS. to this day, some of them at Cambridge, some at Oxford, and some at Dublin, but most part as far away as Vienna. The handwritings cannot be read without special training, and the best palæographer of the present day could hardly follow the argument until a whole treatise had been carefully transcribed.

"It may be thought, however, that this is a matter for the learned; that there are sure to be enough of special scholars interested in the work; and that it has no interest, after all, outside the region of antiquarian theology. The truth, again, is precisely the reverse. The work is one that ought to interest everybody; but it is very hard, from various causes, to get even a handful of men to subscribe their guinea apiece. For, in the first place, we lose in relation to this particular object the co-operation of a large body of men who in other cases are among the most ready to assist in the diffusion of a taste for early literature. You might just as well ask a Jew to a dinner on pork as invite a Roman Catholic to join with you in helping to propagate writings distinctly labelled as poisonous by the authorities of his own Church. But then this is just one of the points that give them a peculiar interest. The Church of Rome condemned the doctrines of WYCLIF, but then the Church of Rome never put him on his trial for them; for however willing it, no doubt, was to do so, as a matter of fact he never was really called on to defend them while he lived, and he got leave to die unmolested. Moreover, although the Church of Rome did not encourage men to read his writings, it did encourage men to read the answers to them; and unless we are satisfied, as every Romanist is bound to be, that the answers were perfectly fair and conclusive, so that we can read WYCLIF's mind quite sufficiently through the statement of his opinions by his antagonists, it is really incumbent on those who think WYCLIF a great figure in history to inquire what it was that he actually did say. WYCLIF's great opponent was THOMAS NETTER of Walden, who wrote thirty or forty years after his death, and his 'Doctrinale' has been printed over and over again, while the works of WYCLIF have been suffered mostly to remain in MS. Now, without in the least insinuating that THOMAS NETTER of Walden was an unfair controversialist, it is surely not unreasonable to suspect that we cannot get the whole of WYCLIF's mind through such a channel as this. The object of NETTER was simply to seize upon certain propositions, believed to be of a dangerous tendency, which were found in WYCLIF's writings, and to confute them. WYCLIF, if he had been then alive, might possibly, for aught we know, have explained his words otherwise, or even have pointed to other passages in his writings diametrically opposed to the interpretation put upon them by THOMAS of Walden. Moreover there is no doubt that in some points the doctrines of WYCLIF's immediate followers differed materially from his own, and how far this confusion has extended is a matter that requires investigation. It may quite possibly have coloured the interpretation put upon WYCLIF's own words.

"But again it may be thought that the causes which prevent Roman Catholics aiding in this publication must stimulate the energies of Protestants all the more, so that religious zeal may be trusted to get the work accomplished.

Nothing, I fear, could be a greater mistake. Protestants as well as Roman Catholics have their own delusions about WYCLIF; indeed I strongly suspect they have some delusions in common; and neither side, possibly, is very anxious to have those delusions removed. We must, therefore, look mainly to those fearless lovers of truth who are not particularly wedded to any system whatever, or believe firmly in their hearts that the principles which they profess will stand the most rigid inquiry. It is to such men that the Society should look for its principal support—to men not of any particular school of theology, but to men of all views, whether High or Low, dissenting or rationalistic, who are not afraid of the ground they stand on crumbling beneath their feet, and are only anxious to help in the elucidation of a very interesting chapter in the history of opinion.”—JAMES GAIRDNER (*Athenæum*), July 15, 1882.

### OTHER SOCIETIES.

- Chaucer*, founded by Dr. Furnivall in 1868. *Hon. Sec.* W. A. Dalziel, 67, Victoria Road, Finsbury Park, N. £2 2s. a year.
- Early English Text*, founded by Dr. Furnivall in 1864. *Director*, F. J. Furnivall. *Hon. Sec.* W. A. Dalziel, 67, Victoria Road, Finsbury Park, N. £1 1s. a year for the *Original Series* of Prints of MSS. only, and £1 1s. for the *Extra Series* of reprints.
- New Shakspeare*, founded by Dr. Furnivall in 1873. *Hon. Sec.* P. Z. Round, 53, Agamemnon Road, West Hampstead, London, N.W. £1 1s. a year.
- Ballad*, founded by Dr. Furnivall in 1868. *Editor*, The Rev. J. W. Elsworth. *Hon. Sec.* W. A. Dalziel, 67, Victoria Road, London, N. £1 1s. a year.
- Shelley*, founded by Dr. Furnivall in Dec. 1885. *Hon. Sec.* T. J. Wise, 53, Ashley Road, Crouch Hill, London, N. £1 1s. a year.
- Browning*, founded in July, 1881, by Dr. Furnivall and Miss E. H. Hickey. Subscription, £1 1s. a year. *President*, F. J. Furnivall. *Hon. Sec.* E. E. Davies, 2, Wallace Road, Canonbury, London, N.
- Philological*, founded in 1842. *Hon. Sec.* F. J. Furnivall, 3, St. George's Square, Primrose Hill, London, N.W. £1 1s. entrance, and one a year. Vol. I. of the Society's English Dictionary, ed. Dr. J. A. H. Murray, is published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford. Vols. II. and III. are in the press. Mr. Hy. Bradley is now Joint Editor.
- Shakspeare Quarto Facsimiles, 10s. 6d. each, or 6s. if the whole series of forty-three is taken, edited by Dr. Furnivall, Prof. Dowden, Mr. P. A. Daniel, Mr. H. A. Evans, Mr. Arthur Symonds, Mr. T. Tyler, and other Shakspeare scholars. B. Quaritch, 15, Piccadilly, London, W.

# The Wyclif Society.

---

## PRESIDENT.

His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.

## VICE-PRESIDENTS.

Most Rev. Lord Plunket, Archbishop of Dublin.  
 Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells.  
 Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Durham.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of London.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Liverpool.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Peterborough.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of St. Davids.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Lahore.  
 Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Sydney.  
 Right Hon. Lord Ebury.  
 Rev. W. Arthur.

## COMMITTEE.

### LONDON AND GENERAL.

Rudolf Buddensieg, Ph.D.  
 Very Rev. the Dean of Canterbury (Dr. Payne Smith).  
 † F. J. Furnivall, M.A. Cambridge, Hon. Dr. Phil. Berlin.  
 † F. D. Matthew, Esq.  
 Sir James H. Ramsay, Bart., M.A.  
 The Rev. Charles B. Scott, D.D.  
 F. Seeböhm, Esq.  
 Rev. Professor Wace, King's College, London.  
 Professor A. W. Ward, M.A., Owens College.

### OXFORD.

The Warden of Merton (George C. Brodrick).  
 The Principal of Hertford (Dr. Boyd).  
 The Regius Professor of Divinity (Dr. Ince).  
 † The Chichele Professor of Modern History (Montagu Burrows).  
 The Rev. R. B. Girdlestone.  
 The Rev. C. W. Boase, Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College.  
 The Rev. Charles Plummer, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College.  
 The Rev. W. Payne Smith, Senior Student of Christ Church.  
 Mrs. Shirley, Wyaston House, New Inn Hall Street.  
 Reginald Lane Poole, M.A., Ph.D., 5, Beaumont Street.  
 († *These form the Executive Committee.*)

### CAMBRIDGE.

The Master of Clare College (Rev. Dr. Atkinson).  
 The Rev. Professor John E. B. Mayor, M.A., St. John's College.



**HONORARY SECRETARY.**

John W. Standerwick, General Post Office, E.C.

**LOCAL HONORARY SECRETARIES.**

*Ireland* : The Rev. C. H. H. Wright, D.D., Dublin.  
*Scotland* : The Rev. James Kerr, 53, Dixon Avenue, Crosshill, Glasgow.  
*Wales* : Principal Reichel, Bangor.  
*Cheshire* : The Rev. A. MacKenna, Beechwood, Bowdon, Cheshire.  
*Derbyshire* : The Rev. W. R. Linton, Shirley Vicarage, Derby.  
*Essex* : The Rev. O. W. Tancock, Little Waltham, Chelmsford.  
*Gloucester* : The Rev. J. J. Mercier, Kemerton, Tewkesbury.  
*Lancashire* : Jos. Thompson, Esq., 23, Strutt Street, Manchester.  
*Middlesex (West)* : The Rev. E. Chester Britton, Hermosa, Ealing.  
*Yorkshire (East Riding)* : The Rev. Horace Newton, Driffild.  
*Yorkshire (West Riding)* : The Rev. J. N. Worsfold, Haddlesey, Selby.  
*Australia (U.S.W.)* : The Rev. E. Harris, D.D., Sydney.  
*United States* : The Rev. G. R. Crooks, Madison, N.J.

**BANKERS** : London and County Bank, Aldersgate Branch, London, E.C.

**LIST OF MEMBERS (May-April, 1892). 227.**

**HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.**

HER SERENE HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF SAXE WEIMAR,  
The Palace, Weimar.

Aberdeen University Library, c/o Wyllie and Son, Aberdeen, per Hamilton,  
Adams & Co.  
All Souls' College Library, Oxford.  
Amherst, W. A. Tyssen, Didlington Hall, Norfolk.  
Appleton, Rev. R., Trinity College, Cambridge.  
Arthur, Rev. W., Clapham Common, London, S.W., *Vice-President*.  
Atkinson, Rev. Dr. E., Master of Clare College, Cambridge.  
Bailey, W. H., Summerfield, Eccles New Road, Manchester.  
Baker, Thomas, 1, Soho Square, London, W.  
Balliol College Library, Oxford.  
Bath and Wells, The Lord Bishop of, *Vice-President*, The Palace, Wells.  
Beeman, Rev. T. O., 182, Earls Court Road, London, S.W.  
Bell, Edward, M.A., York Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C.  
Berlin Royal Library (by Asher & Co., 13, Bedford Street, London, W.C.)  
Boase, Rev. C. W., M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford.  
Boddington, Henry, Strangways, Manchester.  
Bodleian Library, Oxford.  
Bonn, Royal University Library (per D. Nutt, 270, Strand).  
Boston Public Library, U.S.A. (by Triibner and Co.)  
Boyd, The Rev. Dr., Principal of Hertford College, Oxford.  
Breslau, Royal University Library, Germany (Asher & Co.)  
British and Foreign Bible Society, 146, Queen Victoria Street, E.C.  
British Museum Library.  
Britton, Rev. E. C., Ealing, *Local Hon. Sec. for West Middlesex*.  
Brodrick, Hon. Geo. C., Warden of Merton College, Oxford.  
Buddensieg, Dr., Vitzthum Gymnasium, Dresden.  
Burrows, Prof. Montagu, 9, Norham Gardens, Oxford.  
Bascarlet, Rev. A. F., Charmez, Canton Fribourg.  
Bute, The Most Hon. The Marquis of, 38, Eccleston Square, London, S.W.

- Cambridge University Library.  
 Campbell, J. A., M.P., Stracathro, N.B.  
 Canterbury, The Lord Archbishop of, Lambeth Palace, S.W., *President*.  
 Canterbury, The Very Rev. the Dean of, Deanery, Canterbury.  
 Canterbury Cathedral Library.  
 Cave, The Rev. Alfred, Hackney College, Finchley.  
 Chetham's Library, Hunts Bank, Manchester.  
 Christ Church Library, Oxford.  
 Church of Scotland's Library, General Assembly Hall, Edinburgh.  
 City of London, Library Committee of Corporation of, Guildhall, E.C.  
 Clare College Library, Cambridge.  
 Clark, Rev. Wm. (M.A. Oxford), Trinity College, Toronto.  
 Clarke, Percy, 13, Fleet Street, London, E.C.  
 Clifton College Library, Clifton, Bristol.  
 Colditz, H. S., Dresden.  
 Colman, J. J., M.P., Carrow House, Norwich.  
 Congregational Union of England and Wales, Farringdon Street, E.C.  
 Cooke, Rev. William, Hon. Canon of Chester, 6, Clifton Place, Sussex Square, Hyde Park, W.  
 Cooper, John Forster, City Bank Chambers, Threadneedle Street, E.C.  
 Copenhagen Royal Library.  
 Corbett, John, M.P., Imprey, Droitwich.  
 Corpus Christi College Library, Cambridge.  
 Corpus Christi College Library, Oxford.  
 Crossley, W. J., Glenfield, Bowdon.
- Didsbury College, Manchester.  
 Dimock, Rev. N., 44, Upperton Gardens, Eastbourne.  
 Dublin, The Lord Archbishop of, The Palace, St. Stephen's Green, Dublin.  
 Durham Cathedral Library.  
 Durham, The Lord Bishop of, Auckland Castle, Bishop Auckland, *Vice-President*.  
 Durham University College Library.
- Ebury, The Right Hon. Lord, *Vice-President*, Moor Park, Rickmansworth.  
 Edinburgh University Library.  
 Ellice, W., 27, Upper Brook Street, London, W.  
 Erlangen, Royal University Library, Germany.  
 Evans, Sir T. W., Bart., M.P., Dartmouth House, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.  
 Exeter College Library, Oxford.
- Forster, Mrs. W. E., Burley-in-Wharfedale.  
 Free Church College Library, Glasgow.  
 Fuller, Rev. J. M., the Vicarage, Bexley.  
 Furnivall, F. J., 3, St. George's Square, Primrose Hill, London, N.W.
- Gairdner, Jas., 31, Carlingford Road, Hampstead, N.W.  
 Gautier, Prof. Lucien, Ph. D. Lausanne.  
 General Post Office, London (free).  
 Geneva, Bibliothèque Publique, Promenade des Bastions, Genève, Switzerland.  
 Gibbs, Henry Hucks, M.P., St. Dunstan's, Regent's Park, London, N.W.  
 Giessen, Royal University Library, Germany.  
 Gilliat, Rev. E., Harrow-on-the-Hill.  
 Girdlestone, Rev. R. B., 4, Foley Avenue, Hampstead, London, N.W.  
 Glasgow University Library (care of Maclehose, 61, St. Vincent Street, Glasgow).  
 Göttingen Royal University Library (care of Asher and Co., Bedford Street, Covent Garden, W.C.).  
 Graz, Royal University Library.

- Hackney College, Finchley (per George Williams, Esq.).  
 Halle, Royal University of, Prussia.  
 Hambly, C. H. Burbidge, Holmeside, Hazelwood, Derby.  
 Harris, Rev. E., D.D., King's School, Paramatta, Sydney, N.S.W.  
 Harrow School, per J. C. Wilbee, Harrow.  
 Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. (by Trübner and Co.).  
 Hassé, Rev. A. C., Ockbrook, Derby.  
 Haworth, A., J.P., Hilstone House, Bowdon, Cheshire.  
 Haworth, Jesse, Fair Lea, Bowdon, Cheshire.  
 Heidelberg, Grand-Ducal University Library of, Germany.  
 Hirschfeld, Bros., Bream's Buildings, London, E.C.  
 Hodgson, Shadworth, 45, Conduit Street, W.  
 Holder, Thos., Elmfield, Ullet Road, Liverpool.  
 Holt, J. M., Esq., Balham Hill.  
 Hooper, G. N., Elmleigh, Hayne Road, Beckenham.  
 Hooper, Mrs. H., Vanburgh Manor Road, Beckenham.  
 Hort, Rev. Fenton J., D.D., Cambridge.  
 Hunt, A. R., Southwood, Torquay
- Ince, The Rev. Dr., Regius Professor of Divinity, Oxford.
- Jackson, Rev. S. M., Bible House, New York.  
 Jenkins, Rev. Canon, Lyminge Rectory, Hythe.  
 Jesus College Library, Oxford.  
 Jowett, The Rev. B., M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford.
- Kerr, Rev. James, *Local Hon. Sec. for Scotland*, 81, St. George's Place, Glasgow.  
 Kerr, Russell James, The Haie, Newnham-on-Severn.  
 Königsberg, Royal University Library, Germany (Asher).
- Lahore, The Right Rev. Bishop of, Simla.  
 Lancashire Independent College, Whalley Range, Manchester.  
 Lee, Henry, 25, Highbury Quadrant, N.  
 Leicester Free Library, Wellington Street, Leicester.  
 Leipzig, Royal University Library.  
 Leith, Rev. W. Forbes, Bildeston, Suffolk.  
 Lindsay, Rev. Prof., D.D., 37, Westbourne Gardens, Glasgow.  
 Linton, Rev. W. R., Shirley Vicarage, Derby, *Local Hon. Sec. for Derbyshire*.  
 Liverpool Free Public Library.  
 Liverpool, The Lord Bishop of, Palace, near Liverpool, *Vice-President*.  
 London, Bishop of, Fulham Palace, London, S.W.  
 London Library, St. James's Square, London, S.W.  
 Loserth, Professor, Czernowitz, Austria.
- MacArthur, Alex., M.P., 79, Holland Park, W.  
 Macaulay, Rev. G., Free Church Manse, Bowling, Dumbarton.  
 MacGregor, John, Blackheath.  
 MacKinnal, D.D., Rev. Alexander, Beechwood, Bowdon, Cheshire, *Local Hon. Sec. for Cheshire*.  
 Mackray, W., Woodstock, Upper Addiscombe Road, Croydon.  
 Macmillan and Bowes, c/o Foster's, Bennet's Hill, St. Pauls.  
 Madison University, U.S.A. (by Sotheran & Co., Piccadilly, W.)  
 Magdalen College Library, Oxford.  
 Manchester Free Public Library.  
 Mansfield College, Oxford.  
 Marburg, Royal University Library, Germany.  
 Matthew, F. D., 4, Lancaster Place, Belsize Park, London, N.W.  
 Matthew, E. B., 26 Elsworth Road, London, N.W.  
 Matthew, J. E., 129, King Henry's Road, London, N.W.

- Matthew, J. W., 92, Finchley Road, N.W.  
 Mayor, Rev. Prof. J. E. B., St. John's College, Cambridge.  
 Mercier, Rev. J. J., Kemerton, Tewkesbury, *Local Hon. Sec. for Gloucestershire*.  
 Merton College, Oxford.  
 Methodist College Library, Belfast.  
 Miley, Mrs., The Cottage, Boundstone, near Farnham.  
 Mitchell, Rev. Alex. F., D.D., St. Andrew's, Fife, N.B.  
 Moewes, Carl, Schloss, Falkenau, Silesia.  
 Moulton, The Rev. Dr. W. F., The Leys, Cambridge.  
 Muller, O. J., Herrnhut.  
 Munich Royal Library, (c/o Trübner and Co., 57, Ludgate Hill.)  
 Munich, University Library, Germany (c/o Langstaff, Ehrenberg, and Pollak, Leadenhall Buildings).  
  
 Newton, Rev. Horace, Duffield, *Local Hon. Sec. for Yorkshire, East Riding*.  
 Nonconformist Grammar School, Bishop Stortford.  
 Norwich, The Dean and Chapter of (by Archdeacon Nevill).  
 Nutt, David, 270, Strand, W.C.  
  
 Olmütz, K. K., Studienbibliothek, Austria.  
 Owens College, Manchester (J. E. Cornish, 33, Piccadilly, Manchester ; c/o Haydon, Warwick Square, E.C.).  
  
 Palmer, The Ven. Archdeacon, Oxford.  
 Paris, La Bibliothèque Nationale de.  
 Peabody Institute, (c/o Allen, Henrietta Street).  
 Pearson, The Rev. S., M.A., Woburn Lodge, Upper Park Road, Broughton Park, Manchester.  
 Peterborough, Right Rev. The Lord Bishop, The Palace, Peterborough.  
 Plummer, The Rev. A., D.D., Master of University College, Durham.  
 Plummer, The Rev. Charles, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.  
 Poole, Reginald Lane, 5, Beaumont Street, Oxford.  
 Prague, The University of (by Trübner & Co., 57, Ludgate Hill, E.C.).  
 Protestant Alliance, 9, Strand, W.C.  
  
 Queen's College Library, Cambridge.  
 Queen's College Library, Oxford.  
  
 Raigern, Benedict Stiftsbibliothek, Germany.  
 Ramsay, Sir James H., Banff, Alyth, N.B.  
 Rannie, D. W., Conheath, Dumfries, N.B.  
 Rathbone, William, M.P., 18, Princes Gardens, South Kensington.  
 Reichel, H. R., University College of North Wales, Bangor, *Local Hon. Sec. for Wales*.  
 Religious Tract Society, Library of the, London.  
 Richardson, Miss, Rose Cottage, Selby.  
 Ridley Hall Library, Cambridge.  
  
 Saint Andrew's University Library, Fife, N.B.  
 Saint David's, The Lord Bishop of, Abergwili, Carmarthen, *Vice-President*.  
 Saint John's College Library, Cambridge.  
 Saint John's College, Oxford.  
 Saint John's Hall, Highbury, N.  
 Saint Thomas Church Library, Leipzig.  
 Salmon, Rev. Professor, Trinity College, Dublin.  
 Scott, The Rev. Dr. C. B., Ottershaw, Bournemouth.  
 Scott, Rev. R. S., D.D., 16, Victoria Crescent, Glasgow.

- Seeborn, F., The Hermitage, Hitchin.  
 Shadwell, T. M., Burnham Lodge, Goldsmith's Gardens, Acton.  
 Shirley, Mrs., Wyaston House, New Inn Hall Street, Oxford.  
 Sion College Library, Thames Embankment.  
 Smith, Bryce, Nicholas Street, Manchester.  
 Smith, The Rev. W. Payne, 4, Hillmarton Road, Rugby.  
 Some, Mrs. Annery, Bideford.  
 Standerwick, John W., General Post Office, E.C., *Hon. Sec.*  
 Strassburg, Imperial & Provincial Library, Germany.  
 Students' Library, Old Clarendon Buildings, Oxford.  
 Stuttgart Public Library, per Asher, 13, Belford Street, W.C.  
 Sydney, Right Rev. Lord Bishop of, N.S.W.
- Tancock, Rev. O. W., Little Waltham, Chelmsford, *Local Hon. Sec. for Essex.*  
 Tattersall, John, Waterden, Bickley.  
 Taylor, J. G., 5, Moor View, Newcastle-on-Tyne.  
 Thompson, Alderman Joseph, Wilmslow, Cheshire, *Local Hon. Sec. for Lancashire.*  
 Thomson, John, Beech Bank, Bowdon, Cheshire.  
 Tildesley, E., 11, Iron Gate Wharf, Paddington.  
 Tozer, Rev. H. F. (M.A., Oxford), 18, Norham Gardens, Oxford.  
 Trinity College Library, Cambridge.  
 Trinity College Library, Dublin.  
 Trinity College, Toronto.  
 Tübingen University, c/o Trübner and Co.
- United Presbyterian College Library, Edinburgh.
- Wace, The Rev. Professor, B.D., King's College, London, W.C.  
 Walter, J., Bearwood Park, Wokingham.  
 Ward, Professor A. W., 7, Ladybarn Road, Fallowfield, Manchester.  
 Webster, Miss, 9, Severn Street, Leicester.  
 Wesleyan Training College, Westminster, S.W.  
 Whidborne, Miss A. M., Charentè, Torquay.  
 Whitney, Rev. J. P., Hempstead Stalham, Norwich.  
 Williams's Library, Dr. Daniel, Gordon Square, W.C.  
 Winchester, Dean and Chapter of, c/o J. Wells, College Street, Winchester.  
 Witherby, H. F., 48, Lee Terrace, Blackheath.  
 Wolfenbüttel Ducal Library, Germany.  
 Worcester College Library, Oxford.  
 Worsfold, Rev. J. N., Haddesley Rectory, near Selby, Yorkshire, *Local Hon. Sec. for Yorkshire, West Riding.*  
 Wratislaw, Rev. A. H., Clairville, Merton Road, Southsea.  
 Wright, Rev. Arthur, Queen's College, Cambridge.  
 Wright, Rev. C. H. H., D.D., 33, Mespil Road, Dublin, *Local Hon. Sec. for Ireland.*  
 Wycliffe College, Toronto.  
 Wylie and Sons, c/o Roberts and Co., 20, Hamsell Street, E.C.
- Yale College, Boston, U.S., c/o Allen, Henrietta Street, W.C.  
 Youle, Frederick, 4, Montague St., Russell Square, W.C.  
 Young, Arthur W., 12, Hyde Park Terrace, W.  
 Young, Rev. Forrest Fulton, The Manse, Wark-on-Tyne.  
 Young, Miss M. L., 12, Hyde Park Terrace, W.
- Zürich, Kantonsbibliothek, Switzerland.

# RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS OF THE WYCLIF SOCIETY, FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST DECEMBER, 1891.

RECEIPTS.		PAYMENTS.	
	£ s. d.		£ s. d.
1891.		To Copying and Editing .....	57 0 0
By Balance, 31 December, 1890.....	37 15 3	To Printing and Binding .....	439 15 0
By 446* Subscriptions of £1 1s. each	468 6 0	To Postages .....	3 14 4
Less Bookseller's Commissions	1 15 0	To Bankers' Commissions .....	8 3
By Credit on Country Cheque .....	466 11 0	To Balance, 31 December, 1891 .....	6 17 8
By Donations .....	3 8 6		
* Subscriptions for 1888 2			
1889 4			
" 1890 14			
" 1891 169			
" 1892 113			
" 1893 101			
" 1894 11			
" 1895 10			
" 1896 10			
" 1897 3			
" 1898 3			
" 1899 3			
" 1900 3			
Total 446†			
	£597 15 3		£597 15 3

† During the 10 years of the Wyclif Society's existence 1882-91 it has spent as follows:—

In Copying and Editing 1197 2 6 or 32.3 per cent.  
In Printing and Binding 2422 12 2 or 65.4 "

3619 14 8

Miscellaneous Expenses  
and for Cheques re-  
turned for correction  
of informalities :  
which with a balance of

76 2 2 or 2.1 "  
6 17 8 or 0.2 "  
amounts to £3702 14 6 or 100.0 "

£597 15 3

April, 1892. Examined and found correct, { JOHN B. M. BRAMALL.  
B. DIXON MELLOR.

† The Auditors are not responsible for these particulars.

# EARLY ENGLISH TEXT SOCIETY.

## Committee of Management:

Director: DR. FREDERICK J. FURNIVALL, M.A.

Treasurer: HENRY B. WHEATLEY, Esq.

Hon. Sec.: W. A. DALZIEL, Esq., 67, VICTORIA ROAD, FINSBURY PARK, N.

Hon. Sec. for America: PROF. F. J. CHILD, Harvard Coll., Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.

H. HUCKS GIBBS, M.A., M.P.

DR. J. A. H. MURRAY, M.A.

PROF. E. KÖLBING, Ph.D.

PROF. NAPIER, M.A., Ph.D.

S. L. LEE, B.A.

EDWARD B. PEACOCK, Esq.

REV. PROF. J. RAWSON LUMBY, D.D.

REV. PROF. W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D.

REV. PROF. J. E. B. MAYOR, M.A.

DR. HENRY SWEET, M.A.

REV. DR. RICHARD MORRIS, M.A.

DR. W. ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A.

PROF. J. ZUPITZA, Ph.D.

(With power to add *Workers to their number.*)

Bankers: THE UNION BANK OF LONDON, 2, PRINCES STREET, E.C.

THE EARLY ENGLISH TEXT SOCIETY was started by Dr. Furnivall in 1864 for the purpose of bringing the mass of Old English Literature within the reach of the ordinary student, and of wiping away the reproach under which England had long rested, of having felt little interest in the monuments of her early life and language.

On the starting of the Society, so many Texts of importance were at once taken in hand by its Editors, that it became necessary in 1867 to open, besides the *Original Series* with which the Society began, an *Extra Series* which should be mainly devoted to fresh editions of all that is most valuable in printed MSS. and Caxton's and other black-letter books, though first editions of MSS. will not be excluded when the convenience of issuing completed Texts demands their inclusion in the *Extra Series*.

During the twenty-eight years of the Society's existence, it has produced, with whatever shortcomings, an amount of good solid work for which all students of our Language, and some of our Literature, must be grateful, and which has rendered possible the beginnings (at least) of proper Histories and Dictionaries of that Language and Literature, and has illustrated the thoughts, the life, the manners and customs of our forefathers.

But the Society's experience has shown the very small number of those inheritors of the speech of Cynewulf, Chaucer, and Shakspeare who care two guineas a year for the records of that speech. 'Let the dead past bury its dead' is still the cry of Great Britain and her Colonies, and of America, in the matter of language. The Society has never had money enough to produce the Texts that could easily have been got ready for it; and many Editors are now anxious to send to press the work they have prepared. The necessity has therefore arisen for trying whether more texts can be got out by the plan of issuing them in advance of the current year, so that those Members who like to pay for them by advance Subscriptions, can do so, while those who prefer to wait for the year for which the volumes are markt, can do so too. To such waiters, the plan will be no injury, but a gain, as every year's Texts will then be ready on the New Year's Day on which the Subscription for them is paid.

The success of this plan will depend on the support it receives from Members, as it is obvious that the Society's printers must be paid half or two-thirds of their bill for a Text within a few months of its production. Appeal is therefore made to all members who can spare advance Subscriptions, to pay them as soon as they get notice that the Texts for any future year are ready. In 1892, the Texts for 1893 and 1894 will be ready, and also perhaps some for 1895.

The Subscription to the Society, which constitutes membership, is £1 1s. a year [and £1 1s. additional for the *EXTRA SERIES*], due in advance on the 1st of JANUARY, and should be paid either to the Society's Account at the Head Office of the Union Bank of London, Princes Street, London, E.C., or by Cheque, Postal Order, or Money-Order to the Hon. Secretary, W. A. DALZIEL, Esq., 67, Victoria Road, Finsbury Park, London, N., and crossed 'Union Bank of London.' (United-States Subscribers must pay for postage 1s. 3d. a year extra for the *Original Series*, and 1s. a year for the *Extra Series*.) The Society's Texts are also sold separately at the prices put after them in the Lists.





# JOHANNIS WYCLIF

TRACTATUS

DE LOGICA.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE VIENNA AND PRAGUE MSS.

(VIENNA 4352; UNIV. PRAG. V. E. 14.)

BY

MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI.

VOL. I.

LONDON.

PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRÜBNER & CO  
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHURCH LANE, CHURCH CROSS ROAD.

1893.

## Contents of the Introduction.

	pag.
I. The Manuscripts and the Edition . . . . .	III
II. Authenticity and date of the work . . . . .	V
III. Contents: <i>a)</i> General survey of the whole . . . . .	VIII
<i>b)</i> Detailed examination of each part . . . . .	XI

49997

## INTRODUCTION.

---

### I. The Manuscripts and the Edition.

In the summer of 1890, I travelled to Vienna, in order to finish the collation of *De Blasphemia*, which has since been published, and also to collate the MS. of *Logica*, of which I possessed a copy from the unique Vienna MS. 4523, ff. 1—16; also to copy out *Logicae Continuatio*, ff. 16—58, of the same MS. I had the MS. of Prague University V. E. 14. sent to the Imperial Library, Vienna, and began to collate *Logicae Continuatio*, of which I knew that it contained a part. I soon found that it must be considerably longer than the Vienna Codex, since Wyclif's *Logicae Continuatio* occupied from f. 1 to f. 176 of the Prague MS. I have lettered the Vienna and the Prague MSS., A and B respectively in the various readings. It will be seen that A, unique to the end of the first part of *Logica* (f. 58; p. 74 of the present work) is checked and often corrected by B as far as p. 176; and the rest of this volume is copied from A alone. 132 pages are consequently unchecked, the MS. A being so far unique; and unfortunately A, though perhaps in a more distinct handwriting, is the less correct of the two MSS. This may account for, and perhaps to a slight extent excuse some slips and errors of mine; while the abstruse nature of the subject may explain certain others.

A few words may be added as to my work in the Imperial Library of Vienna. I was sent to collate as many as possible of the Wyclif MSS.; but at the discovery of the 176 closely-written folios of *Logicae Continuatio*, I saw that it would be necessary to abandon the idea of any other work, if I wished to copy them out. I was even obliged to obtain leave to work during the six weeks' vacation,

when the Library is not open to the general public; but at last I succeeded in getting through the whole of the MS. It is needless to complain of the crabbed writing, which for illegibility surpasses anything I had yet seen, and equals anything I have seen since, even amongst the worst of the Prague MSS. This is a difficulty which all transcribers of Wyclif will by this time have learned to take as a matter of course. And yet it is but fair to point out that in difficult passages, such as abound in *Logica* from beginning to end, this very greatly increases the perplexity of the editor. More than once — and I might say, more than fifty times — I have been obliged to note down the abbreviations of the MS. with the unuttered reservation: Unless the sign stands for something quite different! A reservation that is by no means unjustifiable. When to the utmost slovenliness of rapid handwriting are added such stenographic contractions as *g<sup>sm</sup>* for *consequens falsum* (!), it becomes the editor's duty to point out the reader the real facts of the situation, and the doubts that necessarily beset the text on every side.<sup>1</sup>

Both A and B are described in the works that have appeared. I may, however, insert here a more detailed description of B, which happens to be at hand; that of A, which I also made at the time I collated and copied from it, has unfortunately been mislaid.

A = MS. Univ. Prag. V. E. 14. Bound in wooden boards, covered with parchment. The whole of the MS. is of paper, enclosed at the beginning and end in two leaves of parchment. Before the first of these leaves, on the inner side of the first board, we find written in a modern hand: “1<sup>o</sup> Joan. Viclephi de probandis propositionibus a folio 1<sup>mo</sup> usque ad folium 32. — 2<sup>do</sup> Eiusdem de Hypocrisi [sic!] a folio 33 usque ad folium 176. — 3<sup>o</sup> Questio de creatione mundi et utrum Deus in Primo instanti temporis potuit producere a folio 117 usque ad folium 220.” ‘Hypocrisi’ is evidently a misreading for Hypotheticis.

The handwriting belongs to the end of the XIV<sup>th</sup> or the beginning of the XV<sup>th</sup> century; it is very much abbreviated and very illegible, especially towards the end. It seems to have been written in several different hands; one of them is very flourishing and hard to decipher. It is

<sup>1</sup> See *De Ente Predicamentali*, Int. XXII.

stained with damp from f. 197 and very much stained after f. 203. There are very few side-notes. All through there are free spaces left for initial letters to be put in. Each page consists of one column only. — The first leaf after the parchment cover (marked f. 1, but not entering into the pagination of the Wyclif MS.) has a few rules of grammar written upon it.

I must not omit to acknowledge the cordial help which Drs. Rudolph Beer and Herzberg-Fränkell gave me when in Vienna. I should undoubtedly be wanting in courtesy, if I forgot Herr Hofrath Ritter von Birk, the head Librarian, who kindly allowed me to work in the Imperial Library during the holidays. And on that account my sincere thanks are all the more due to the *causa causae* (as Schoolmen would have said) of that privilege — Sir Augustus B. Paget, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Vienna, whose influence fortunately prevailed.

As regards the edition itself, as well as the work of transcribing &c., Dr. Furnivall's energetic and friendly encouragements have all along been at hand. But above all, Mr. Matthew's suggestions and corrections, modestly and diffidently set forth though they were, have been of very great practical use to me, and I am very glad here to acknowledge at least a debt of gratitude that I shall never be able to repay.

## II. Authenticity and date of the work.

There is not a shadow of doubt that this volume, as well as the two larger forthcoming ones, containing the third tractate of *Logicae Continuatio*, and now in the publisher's hands, is the genuine production of Wyclif. In the very earliest and almost contemporary catalogues of his writings, we find mention made of *Logica*. He himself mentions it, notably in *De Apostasia*,<sup>1</sup> where he alludes to his own doctrine of the so-called 'insolubles', very fully set forth in the third part of *Logica*; and he even uses the very words, *logica scripture*,<sup>2</sup> which he applies to the present work.<sup>3</sup> But a still better proof is to be found in the unity of his doctrine with that of the

<sup>1</sup> *De Apostasia*, p. 34, l. 26 et seqq.  
Also *De Benedicta Incarnatione*, pp. 12, 20.

<sup>2</sup> *De Apostasia*, p. 84, l. 22, 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Logica*, p. 1

other philosophical works not yet published, which I have repeatedly had occasion to collate. Of course, in each treatise there occur a good many sidetheories that are not to be found elsewhere; but wherever the same difficulty presents itself, it is solved in the other treatises where it crops up, by the same principles, and almost in the same words as in the present work. Allowing for the gradual development of Wyclif's doctrines, this striking unity is, I think, sufficient to complete the proof of the authenticity of *Logica*, and of all the other works that, having as much extrinsic evidence in their favour, are also able to stand this test. Take, for instance, the way in which our author, in the little summary of Logic with which the work begins, sets us from the outset on our guard against the 'suppositorial' syllogism.<sup>1</sup> Now, in almost every one of the other works, there occurs this very same great objection of Wyclif's adversaries, *answered on the very same lines*. "They said: According to you, the real Universal Man is identical with Peter; this same real Universal Man is identical with Paul: if so, then Peter is Paul". Wyclif replies here that 'hoc' (i. e. the Universal Man, who being real, may be pointed out by a demonstrative pronoun) has not the same supposition in the major premise as in the minor; and in *De Universalibus*, *De Tempore*, *De Ideis*, *De Materia et Forma*, and other works where the same objection recurs under various forms, the same answer is repeated with developments adapted to the subject-matter. Instances of the same sort might be almost indefinitely multiplied, but for the fact that no competent judge will, after reading the present volume through, hesitate for one instant to set it down to Wyclif.

As for the date of the work, that is — as is usual with most of our author's productions — quite another affair. Judging from his tone, certain hesitations here and there in the work, the somewhat diffident way in which he acknowledges that some ideas of his are not agreeable to the young students, his admission of annihilation as a hypothesis against which he makes no protest<sup>2</sup> here, but which he afterwards in the third part of *Logica*, denies as improbable, and in *De Universalibus*, as absolutely impossible, together with an example he gives (*Deus potest facere quod ego non sum nec*

<sup>1</sup> *Logica*, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Si deus adnichilaret omnem creaturam*, p. 196, l. 36.

fui futurus quadragenarius in hoc instanti<sup>1</sup>), would incline me to place *Logica* quite at the beginning of Wyclif's Oxford career, and consequently at about the same period as the *Questiones XIII* recently edited by Dr. Beer.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Buddensieg, who has debated the question of the period ad which Wyclif first denied the possibility of annihilation, would concur in placing the date of the work before 1362.<sup>3</sup> Wyclif, if born in 1324, as is usually believed, was only 37 in 1361, and could, therefore, say with truth: 'Sum futurus quadragenarius in hoc instanti'; though, of course, this argument would have but little value by itself, and the uncertainty of the date of his birth tends yet more to diminish its value.

On the other hand, it is not generally supposed that Wyclif's system had even begun to develop into theological heterodoxy at such an early date; yet we find<sup>4</sup> this proposition given as an example in the present volume: *Anticristus est Rome*; an example which, however insignificant by itself, becomes strikingly significant when viewed in connection with the writer's later opinions on the Pope and the Papacy. Again, we have<sup>5</sup> as an instance of argument by analogy: 'Sicut vixerunt Apostoli in ecclesia primitiva, sic eciam tenentur episcopi vivere circa finem mundi.' This is the very doctrine that Wyclif was destined to maintain with such energy in his theological works; for of course, if poverty is a duty for bishops, it is still more so for the inferior priesthood. Moreover, towards the end of the third part (I believe in the last chapter, but am not able to quote the passage, the MS. being now in the printer's hands) Wyclif speaks of himself as an old man, 'senex', and not going to give up his opinions. I need not mention a date given in the last chapter of the same third part, as that of the very year at which he was then writing; for it is, so far as I can remember, 1383 or 1385! It is indeed possible that this great treatise was left unfinished until the last years of Wyclif's life; which would account both for the expression 'senex' and for the date; so we must not necessarily conclude that the number given is wrong. But it is much more likely that it may have been changed from 1361 (?) by the ignorant correction of a scribe writing in 1383. As to the allusion

<sup>1</sup> P. 169.<sup>2</sup> See *De Ente Praedicamentali*, Int. XXII.sieg, *Johann Wiclif und seine Zeit*, p. 180.<sup>4</sup> P. 69.<sup>3</sup> See Budden-<sup>5</sup> P. 35.

to Antichrist, and the doctrine of evangelical poverty, they may be set aside as mere coincidences; but I prefer to think that the germs of the whole of Wyclif's system were already in his mind at the age of 37, if he wrote *Logica* then; and that he brought them forward sometimes (as here) tentatively and in the shape of examples, in order to accustom his disciples, over whom he already had some influence,<sup>1</sup> to follow in his wake.

*Logica* thus seems to me to be decidedly one of Wyclif's very first works. The appearances to the contrary may easily be explained; and besides the intrinsic and extrinsic proofs of its early date, we must remember the universal habit of Schoolmen. They always began, as it is indeed quite natural to begin, the whole course of philosophical studies and teaching, by a three years' course of Logic.

### III. Contents of the work.

#### *a) General Survey of the whole.*

*Logica* is curious from more than one point of view. The modern logician will find himself completely at sea. Induction, the grand *cheral de bataille* of most writers on Logic at the present day, is dismissed (contemptuously, I might say, but that Wyclif had certainly not that feeling) in the short space of two lines and a half. Not quite without reason from his own point of view, which is also to some extent that of the editor. That the study of deductive Logic is of use to those who engage in abstruse metaphysical and ethical pursuits; that it is far from useless even in politics and debate, can hardly be called in question by any man of average intelligence. But, if we ask whether any scientific investigator ever prepared himself for his career by a careful study of the intricate rules of Induction, or found himself better enabled to discover the laws of Nature by their aid, the answer will at the best be very doubtful indeed. As a fact, the rules of Induction, cleverly formulated as they may be, are scarcely more than mere curiosities in themselves, and are based upon long deductive processes. Given two men, both equally intelligent, equally inclined to study natural Science,

<sup>1</sup> *Malo me et meos sequaces . . . preterire, p. 152, l. 30 . . . Relinquo juvenibus partem plus consonam sustinendam, p. 195, l. 28, 29.*



and equally ignorant of the laws of Induction, but one versed in deductive Logic, and the other not: most assuredly the logician would far surpass the other. Could we say the same in a parallel case, supposing the only difference between the two men were to be the knowledge of the laws of Induction? That the old Scholastics made little or no progress in scientific discovery proves nothing; Aristotle, the greatest of logicians, was no less great in the sciences of observation and experiment. They did not care for those fields of knowledge; others, to them far more important, absorbed their attention: that accounts for all. But the proof that this view of Induction is the right one would be foreign to the scope of the present Introduction. Wyclif thought as all Schoolmen thought at that time, and there are reasons to believe that they were, and that he was, right.

The plan of Wyclif's *Logica*, however, may seem strange even to those acquainted with the works of Scholastics. They generally proceed from the more simple to the more complex. First of all, terms are dealt with; then propositions, which are but terms combined together by an affirmative or negative copula; then argument, which is made up of propositions; and lastly knowledge, or rather science (*scientia*), usually the result of a series of arguments. Wyclif, in the short abstract with which the work begins, says indeed a good deal about terms and proposition, but dismisses argument in three pages (p. 35—38) and says little enough about knowledge (doubt, &c.), form a separate class. He then, at p. 75, sets about the three treatises that together form *Logicae Continuatio*. The first (75—121) deals with propositions that are purely categorical affirmations or negations, without any expressed idea to modify them. The second (from p. 121 to the end of this volume) has to do with propositions in which the negation or affirmation is more or less modified, though it still remains to some degree categorical. The third deals at great length with the seven forms of hypothetical propositions: it contains an amount of matter about three times as great as this publication, and will fill two more large volumes. Setting aside then the first 74 pages, which were no doubt written as a convenient manual for beginners, Wyclif's *Logica* might be entitled: *Of the various*

*sorts of propositions, and especially of those called hypothetical.*' He himself points out that the third treatise goes more into the questions connected with hypothetical propositions than the work of any other logician before him.<sup>1</sup>

It may be asked why the plan of Wyclif so completely leaves out argumentation and syllogisms, when these formed so vital a part of the old Scholastic system. The answer is obvious: they were not required. His 'manual for beginners' — as I may call the first pages — contains, very concisely and briefly, it is true, all that was absolutely requisite. But the rest of the work is not addressed to beginners, but to men who were perfectly at home in all the figures and moods of syllogisms, and only wanted to see their way to take a Realistic view of Logic, then very much obscured by the objections which the prevailing Nominalism had piled up on all sides. Wyclif's work was written to supply a want, and not to repeat what everybody knew.

I cannot even help fancying, as I said above, that from the beginning Wyclif had some vague idea of reacting, not only against Nominalism, but also against many theological doctrines then in vogue. He wanted to form a band of devoted followers among the students in the schools of Oxford; and we find on the very first page of his work the motto of all his later controversies and conflicts; the motto which gained for him amongst his disciples the title of *Doctor Evangelicus*. The work he composed is, he declares in the Proemium, the *Logic of Holy Writ*. From the beginning of his career (if *Logica* is, as I believe, one of his first works) he raises his standard with a determined hand, and no doubt, as we may infer from the tone of the Proemium, expects many zealous followers to crowd round it. We shall not be far wrong then, I think, if we consider *Logica* as but the first commencement of a concerted movement, partly instinctive perhaps, but not blindly so; cognizant of the road taken, though not of the goal to which it would lead; and recognizing as the rule, both of faith and of right reasoning, the Holy Scriptures above all things.

We must not, however, imagine that Wyclif keeps strictly all through to what we should call the proper field of Logic. Perhaps

<sup>1</sup> Tercius . . . declarat diffusius priorum logicorum sententiis, p. 75.

no writer is so much given to digressions as he. In the first, and still more in the second tractate of *Logicae Continuatio*, they begin to appear; though he probably was of opinion that, writing of the Infinite, he was only dealing with the effect which that term has upon the proposition into which it is brought. But to deal with that effect, the *meaning* of the word, i. e. the thing itself, has to be considered; and thus, treating of *otherness* and *difference*, of *beginning* and *ending*, &c., he manages to put a great deal of Metaphysic into his Logic. He goes still further in the third Tractate; questions of political economy, of optics, of anatomy, of astronomy, and what not, are discussed in connection with the different hypothetical propositions.

In this respect, Wyclif's *Logica* differs immensely from the work of Occam that bears the same name. There, all is in strict order; the book is divided, subdivided and re-subdivided, until we get to each individual proposition forming a link in the long and massive chain formed by the great Nominalist: the proposition is posited and demonstrated; each objection against it is in turn propounded and solved. Yet Wyclif is far more interesting, even when we must admit that his digressions go beyond all bounds; without Occam's affectation of mathematical order, Wyclif has as much of the true philosophical spirit as he: as for subtlety and originality of views, he perhaps has more.

### *b) Detailed Examination of each part.*

We may now proceed to examine the whole of the preliminary abstract and of the two first treatises, chapter by chapter. With regard to the abstract, and also more or less to the rest, it will be useless to go into details. The abstract of an abstract, if intelligible at all, would be hardly readable; and to explain every difficulty at length would be to write a treatise, not an Introduction. I shall, therefore, confine myself to noting the general plan on which Wyclif proceeds; stopping to give explanations, so far as I am able to give any (which unfortunately I cannot always do) whenever anything particularly important and hard of understanding occurs.

*Preface* (p. 1). "This work is to be the logic of Holy Writ. Many who had begun to learn Logic, in order to know God's law

better, have been disgusted with it, on account of its heathenish technical expressions. So I propose to give proofs of propositions that shall be taken from Scripture. After the study of terms and their properties, of universals and categories, I shall take up propositions, the various descriptions of argument, and lastly examine the subject of knowledge.”

We may here notice by-the-by, that the last promised head is nowhere to be found in this abstract; nor indeed is anything corresponding to it met with anywhere else. If we remark that the last example given,<sup>1</sup> concerning the logical exercise called obligation, breaks off suddenly without any solution of the difficulty, we may infer that possibly there is here something wanting; perhaps more than a whole chapter. There is, however, only one blank line on the MS. A between the last words of the Abstract, *quam Petrus*, and the first ones of the Continuatio: *Juvenum rogatibus*.

Chap. I (p. 2—8) deals with *Terms*, and contains a full but concise summary of their different classifications and subclassifications. We may say a word about resolvable, explicable and official terms, as they frequently occur further on; and also about terms of the first and second intention and imposition, as these expressions are very little used at the present day, and liable to be confusing. In ‘A *man* is mortal’, *man* is a resolvable term, because it can be analyzed into its singulars: the man A is mortal; the man B ditto; and so on. In ‘Man *alone* is rational’, *alone* is an explicable term, because its sense can be expounded in two propositions, ‘Man is rational’, and ‘What is not man is not rational’. An official term in a proposition posits that proposition as an act of the mind or will: as ‘I know that I exist’; i. e. ‘The proposition, *I exist*, is known by me’. As it was believed that the first intention or act of the mind concerns the objects themselves, without any reflection upon their universality or particularity, all such objects belong to the *first* intention, as: God, angel, man, etc.; while the reflection upon the degree of universality or particularity of these objects constitutes the *second* intention; as when we say: *Man* is a species, *Angel* is a genus, *this man*, *that angel* are individual beings. Here *species*,

*genus, individual*, are of the second intention; and so also are *man, angel*, in so far as they are here considered as universal or singular. — Terms of the first or second *imposition* differ in so far as the first have some ‘raison d’être’ in their objects themselves, and the second are merely imposed by the developement of human language. They are, in short, mere grammatical expressions. Thus: *man*, in *Man is mortal*, is a term of the first intention and imposition; in *Man is a species*, it is a term of the second intention but the first, imposition; and in *Man is a substantive*, it becomes a term of the second imposition.

Chap. II. *Of Universals* (p. 8—11). There are, says Wyclif, three sorts of universal things: things that *cause* universally, as God; things that *communicate themselves* universally, as *humanity* to each individual man; and things that *represent* universally, as all *general* terms, written or uttered. Logic has to do with the last class only, of which there is a five-fold division, famous under the name of Predicables. First, the *Genus*, which answers the question *What?* for many species. — Second, the *Species*, that answers the question *What?* for many individuals. — Third, the *Difference*, answering the question *How?* and separating one species from all others. Man is an animated being; that is the genus. How is he animated so as to distinguish him from all others? By rationality. Rationality, present in man, absent in all others, is the species-making or *specific* difference. — Fourth, the *Property* (proprium) or characteristic, is a mark by which alone we can distinguish a species; for it extends as far as the specific difference itself. Wyclif gives *laughter* as the characteristic of man: which might be objected to, since men deprived of reason ought to have the faculty of laughing also taken away: whereas such is not the case. But it is enough to have pointed out what the ‘proprium’ means. — Fifth and last, the *Accident*. This is defined as a mere happening, a phenomenon that is not always present in the same subject; or, if always, that may be present in others as well.

The note on Identity, which ends the chapter, is instructive. All things, God and His creatures, says Wyclif, are identical analogically.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> . . . et sic omnia sunt idem in entitate, p. 10.

Here I must point out the difference between Wyclif's system and that of more moderate Realists. But I shall ask to be believed provisionally, because the essence of his doctrine is not sufficiently set forth in this volume to help the reader by references to any particular place where it is to be found, and it would be too long to quote extracts from his hitherto unpublished works. Moderate Realists would admit analogical identity; but they would maintain that, being analogical, it is not real, except in the mind of the subject who thinks of it, with some sort of foundation in the nature of things. But Wyclif goes further. God is not the creature; and yet He is identical with the creature, in so far as mere 'being' goes. God is Being; the creature is also a being; and to that extent they are identical. But Being is only *that which* is God, as it is only *that which* is the creature. Now, it is impossible logically to conclude that if *that which* is A is *that which* is B, then A is B, because in the conclusion, *that which*, concreted in A, has no longer the same meaning as *that which*, concreted in B. This is the substance of Wyclif's reply to the objection that accuses him of identifying God with His creature, making substance to be accident, *et quodlibet quidlibet*. He makes a very strong point of the mystery of the Trinity, in which *that which* is the Father (*viz.* God) is *that which* is the Son; yet the Father is not the Son. But perhaps his point of view will be clearer to the reader, if we take a less mysterious instance. Glass is that which is *hard*; hardness is a real quality; it is also that which is transparent, and transparency is also a real quality. And yet hardness is not transparency.

The second degree is generic identity, which obtains between two species. Men and beasts are really identical in substantiality. The third is specific identity, between two individuals. Socrates and Plato are really identical in humanity. And the fourth degree is numerical identity, which exists between the various parts of one and the same being. Memory, for instance, reason and will are different, but numerically identical in each individual soul. And to all the objections urged against this real identity, Wyclif replies by considering Universal Being, or Substance, or Humanity, or an individual soul, as a real subject, *that which* possesses the attributes that come under its extension. Deity and 'createdness' in one case;

humanity and brute nature in the other; in the third — if I may be allowed to use such terms — Socrateity and Platoneity; and in the last, the memory, the reason, and the will. And he stoutly maintains all through that to admit as valid the objection already noticed would necessarily bring us to deny the Trinity, Christ's Incarnation, and even all human science.

Chap. III. *Of Categories* (p. 11, 12). Being is divided into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, locality, time, position and belonging. Wyclif continues here to deal with the Universals; but these categories, or predicaments, have objective existence, and come under the 'first intention' of the mind; whilst the former class (predicables) exist in thought alone, and belong to the second intention: a genus, a species, &c. does not exist by itself as a substance does.

Wyclif, with all the Scholastics, follows Aristotle closely; but as Aristotle has been ridiculed for his enumeration of categories, which J. S. Mill says "is like a division of animals into men, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies",<sup>1</sup> I may perhaps be allowed to give a justification of its adequacy that I remember to have read in Father Liberatore's *Logica*; though, not having the work by me, I do not want to render the author responsible for any shortcomings of my own. Whether Aristotle understood his own classification in the same light, matters little; but so determined a Thomist as Father Liberatore is surely entitled to speak for the Schoolmen on this point.

All Being is either a subject of attributes, or one of the attributes themselves. In the former case, it is *Substance*. In the latter, the attribute's existence is either in itself or in other beings. If in itself, and at the same time it gives its subjects intensive parts or degrees, either of entity or of imperfection, it is called *Quality*. If the subject receives from it only extensive parts, which differ from quality by being mutually exclusive, each one outside of the other (*partes extra partes*) we have *Quantity*. If the attribute only exists in (or for) other beings (*ad aliud*, *πρός τι*) it either indicates a change or a fixed state. If a change, we have the two corresponding,

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, Book I, ch. 3, § 1.

but mutually exclusive categories of *Action* and *Passion*, answering to that *by* which the change is produced, and to the change itself as produced. If a fixed state, it either abstracts from space and time, and is then called *Relation*; or from space alone, and then takes the name of *Quandality* (*quando*, time) or from time alone, or from neither. If it abstracts from time alone and not from space, it either relates only to a certain part of space, and is *Locality*; or it refers to other bodies existing in space, and in that connection is called *Position*. If the attribute includes both space and time, it is a mere extrinsical denomination, and no name can be found for it but *Belonging*. Thus, in the idea of an armed man, the attribute of *defence* exists not in itself, but in the man and in the arms; it is a state that requires certain conditions to be complied with. The man must at a given *time* have a certain fixed *spatial* relation of proximity with his arms. And thus we see the whole of the categories accounted for, mutually exclusive, and together inclusive of all that can bear the name of Being.

Whether Aristotle understood the completeness of his own categories, we need not examine. He indeed does not enter into any proof that they are complete. But of all men Aristotle is the most given to putting into practice the maxim: *Intelligenti pauca*. He writes neither for cavillers nor for fools, but for quick-witted disciples.

Chap. IV. *The First Principle* (p. 13). In each predicament there is one first principle of all. We may pass over the enumeration of those first principles, except those of locality and time. The mathematical point, says Wyclif, is the first principle of the former; the indivisible instant, that of the latter. This by itself may be understood in a manner that has nothing original; but he goes on to say that the whole world is made up of points, and time likewise of indivisible instants. 'Totus situs mundi componitur ex sitibus punctalibus . . . Sicut mundus componitur ex punctalibus, sic tempus componitur ex instantibus.' What is more, as we shall see in another volume of this work, the points are 'immediata', i. e. touch one another, and the instants follow one another directly; yet, though the former have no size, they make up lines, surfaces and volumes by their contact; and though the latter have no duration whatever, they



produce duration by their successive existence. Mathematicians protest; but mathematicians are ruled out of court in a metaphysical disquisition. More of this, however, is to come in its time and place.

Chap. V. *Of Propositions* (p. 14-18). They are defined as grammatical (congrua) forms of speech, that are indicative, have a false or true signification, and can be perfectly understood. There is the natural signification of propositions, by which any proposition means its own existence. *God exists* in its natural signification means nothing but: *This is a proposition: God exists*. But in its artificial signification, it means: *The proposition: God exists, is true*.

In the five-fold division of propositions into mental, vocal, written, real, and true, the real proposition alone calls for comment. Any individual being forms, according to Wyclif, if I mistake not, a proposition of a peculiar sort. The person (or concrete being) is the subject;<sup>1</sup> his essence is the copula or affirmation;<sup>2</sup> so that in the place of subject, verb, and predicate, we have respectively the person of this or that individual man, his individual essence or entity, and his universal (?) human nature. I do not see any other explanation of the text, though the distinction between *essencia istius hominis* and *sua natura* is not clear. It has been suggested by Mr. Matthew that Wyclif considers the words, *iste homo, iste lapis* (l. 12) as equivalent to propositions, though they only name singular objects, because their universal is understood.<sup>3</sup> The explanation did not seem to me to account sufficiently for the expressions employed; but I wish the students of Wyclif not to lose the benefit of Mr. Matthew's suggestion.

The division of propositions continues. Some are hypothetical, some categorical; the latter class has one subject, one predicate, and one principal copula (for a proposition may be categorical that has more than one copula, if one of the two depends on the other). Categorical propositions differ in *quality*, being either affirmative or nega-

<sup>1</sup> Est dare istam personam . . . que est tanquam subiectum. P. 15, l. 15, 16

<sup>2</sup> . . . Que est realis copula, copulans istam hominem cum sua nature. *Ib.* l. 19, 20.

<sup>3</sup> In ista proposicione reali, *iste homo* est realiter et essentialiter natura humana. *Ib.* l. 22.

tive; or in *quantity*, being either universal, designated by *omnis* or *nullus*, as the case may be; or particular, when they are designated by *aliquis*; or indefinite, when preceded by no sign at all; or lastly, singular, preceded (when the subject is not a proper noun) by a demonstrative pronoun.

Chap. VI. *Of Opposites* (p. 18—22). This concerns the opposition possible in different propositions having the same terms as subject and predicate, and differing only in quality, quantity, or both. There is nothing new in this chapter, and the 'square of opposition', given in the diagram on p. 18, is well-known even to modern logicians. Prof. Bain especially<sup>1</sup> has a fuller explanation of opposition than our author, who devotes less than four pages to it. What Prof. Bain objects to most, is the use of 'contradictory' by Schoolmen to denote a less considerable opposition than the term 'contrary'. This, however, is a mere question of words; and if Wyclif were now living, he might have said that contradictories (such as 'Every A is B', 'Some A is not B') seem to be less opposed than contraries ('Every A is B', 'No A is B'); but they are really more so. For the former differ both in quality and in quantity; and it is impossible, so great is their difference, to class both of them either among true or among false propositions.

We may, therefore, pass over this chapter, merely noting down the laws stated by Wyclif and all other logicians: (1.) *Contraries*.<sup>2</sup> Both cannot be true, but there are cases<sup>3</sup> when both may be false. (2.) *Subcontraries*<sup>4</sup> may be both true and both false ('Some A is B'; 'Some A is not B'). (3.) *Contradictories*. Neither can both be false nor both true. (4) *Subalternates*. If the universal proposition be true, its particular will be so too; but not *vice versa*. Wyclif omits to add: If the less universal be false, the more universal will be so; but not *vice versa* ('Every A is B'; 'some A is B').

The chapter closes with a few remarks on the predication of the 'three adjacents'. If a proposition is in three or more words, it predicates the third adjacent, as: 'Man is mortal'. If in two, as: 'Man is', it predicates the second adjacent; the predicate 'existing'

<sup>1</sup> Logic, Part. I. pp. 92 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> P. 18, l. 5.

<sup>3</sup> P. 19, l. 25.

P. 19, l. 35.

or 'being', is understood. And the first adjacent is predicated by a proposition in *one* word, as 'Sum', 'scribit', &c.

Chap. VII. *Of Equipollence* (p. 22, 23). It is the process of changing the form of a proposition so as to keep the sense unchanged. This evidently depends upon the doctrine of opposition. If 'some A is B', then 'not every A is not B'. If 'every A is not B', then 'no A is B'. If 'some A is not B', then 'not every A is B'. And so on.

Chap. VIII. (p. 24—29) may be passed over in few words; for it deals with those modal propositions which are *necessary* or *impossible*, and gives different significations of those two words, which significations are repeated on p. 156 and the following ones, with many details. What has to be said of them will be said better at that place. The chapter ends with a remark that might seem startling. He says<sup>1</sup> that any attribute of God which is not essential might, absolutely speaking, be wanting. At first sight some might think that everything is essential in God, since He is immutable. But Wyclif is thinking of God as v. g. Creator, Judge, Saviour, &c. all of which attributes would be wanting if there had never been any creature in existence; and, therefore, he calls them, with doubtful propriety, non-essential attributes. I say, 'with doubtful propriety', because the words 'non essentialiter inest', seem to indicate that something may exist in God after the manner of an accident that comes and goes, thus implying change: which was certainly not Wyclif's opinion.

Chap. IX. *Of Hypothetical Propositions* (p. 29—33). Two or more propositions, united together by a particle, are called hypothetical; though more than one, their principal idea is one, and depends on the relation between each of the propositions and the particle. Their specific difference thus depends on the particle itself; and as there are *seven* (and, or, if, because, more than, where, when) there are also seven sorts of hypothetical propositions: the *copulative*, the *disjunctive*, the *conditional*, the *causal*, the *comparative*, the *local*, and the *temporal*. But, as Wyclif himself admits (though he sustains elsewhere<sup>2</sup> that the number of their species is neither more nor less

<sup>1</sup> P. 28.

<sup>2</sup> P. 7 of the Third Tractate, of which I have just seen the first proofs.

than seven) the comparative hypothetical<sup>1</sup> often differs from a categorical merely in form; 'A is more B than C is' comes to just the same as 'A is more B than C'. And I believe that all such hypotheticals may be turned into categoricals with but little difficulty.

Coming to the local and temporal propositions, Wyclif propounds a theory which is true, and which yet might easily open a vast field for sophistical juggles. What is meant by *where*, and what by *when*? The general meaning implies co-existence in a certain restricted part of space or time. 'He is where I am'; i. e. in London. 'Napoleon I. and Cetewayo lived at the same epoch', i. e. during the XIX<sup>th</sup> century. But in the strictest sense, there should be exact co-existence in the very same part of space or time. Now two persons cannot thus co-exist in space, nor perhaps in time. On the other hand, in the widest possible sense, *where* refers to the whole of infinite space; *when* to the whole of infinite duration, or eternity. In this sense (to take Wyclif's examples) it is true to say '*The sun is where the moon is*', both being in the same universe; and '*I existed when my mother was as yet a virgin, and when Adam was in Paradise*'; these three facts co-existing in the same lapse of eternal duration.

Chap. X. *Of Conversion* (p. 33, 34). This is putting the subject into the place of the predicate, and *vice versa*. Universal negatives and particular affirmatives may be converted *simply*, by a mere change of place. 'No A is B ∴ No B is A'. 'Some A is B ∴ some A is B'. — Universal affirmatives and negatives are converted *by accident*, that is, by changing the proposition into a particular one. 'Every A is B ∴ some B is A'. 'No A is B ∴ some B is not A'. — The universal affirmative may also be converted by counterposition, keeping the same quality and quantity, and prefixing the negation *not* to both subject and predicate. 'Every A is B ∴ Every not-B is a not-A'. — And according to scholastic logicians, even at the present time, the particular negative *cannot be otherwise* converted: 'Some A is not B ∴ Some not-B is not not-A'. In a foot-note I have suggested a simpler process and a less crabbed form of expressing the result. When I wrote it, I had not noticed that

<sup>1</sup> P. 30.

Prof. Bain gives the very same process: *first*, what he calls obversion, and *second*, simple conversion.<sup>1</sup> Wyclif remarks very truly that there is more difficulty about the conversion of terms that include the past and the future. He recommends changing the verb *fuit* into *est vel fuit; erit* into *est vel erit*; with what success, the reader may see in the text and foot-note. I think that in every case it is enough to analyze the verb in the past or future into a present verb with a past or future participle; and then proceed as before.

Chap. XI. *Of Argument* (p. 35—38). Much has already been said in the general survey, of Wyclif's curt manner of dealing with this part of his subject. We need not return to it, unless to point out more fully than before, what the 'expository' syllogism is. It is a syllogism in which the middle term, instead of being universal, is singular; which amounts to the same, as: 'This person is Victoria; this same person is Queen of England; therefore, Victoria is Queen of England'. We have given an instance in the third figure, in which it was much employed, says Wyclif.<sup>2</sup> But he denies its power, when applied to a Universal reality. 'This real thing (meaning the Universal Man) is Peter; this same real thing is Paul. ∴ Peter is Paul.

Chap. XII. *Of Supposition* (p. 38--43). This is a point which is pretty nearly unknown, at least by name, to modern logicians, and so far as I am aware, in substance also. Scholastic authors generally deal with it immediately before Opposition, Equipollence, Conversion and Argument, as it helps to elucidate those processes, giving the reason why, for instance, the universal negative can be converted simply (see above) and not the universal affirmative. We must explain this chapter in some detail, both because the chapter is little known, and because it is important for the sequel; whereas the short notice given by Wyclif is quite inadequate, at least for us.

Supposition is here defined as the signification of one categorical extremity of a proposition (subject or predicate) compared with the other. The usual definition of the School is perhaps clearer, and serves to explain the former: Supposition is the use of a term for anything whatever. So long as a term stands alone, it

<sup>1</sup> See Bain's *Logic*, First Part, p. 112, 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Maxime usitatus*, p. 37.

has no meaning nor supposition; it only has one when used, and consequently when forming part of a proposition. It may be *improper* when one term is used for another, as in figurative speech: I have drunk a *cup of wine*. If the supposition is proper, it may be *material*, when the term stands for itself: 'Ass is a word of three letters'; or *formal* when it stands for the meaning of the term. If formal, it may be abstract (simplex) standing for the Universal which it represents: '*Man* can be predicated of every individual of the species'; or *personal* (personalis) standing for one or more of the objects that belong to the abstract notion. If for one only in particular, it is called *singular*; if for more, it is *common*. In the latter case, it may stand for many together, and is called *collective*, or for many separately; it is then universal, and becomes — according as the affirmation or the negation to *all* of those many, or to some one or other that cannot be pointed out — either distributive or indefinite (*confusa tantum*).<sup>1</sup> But the words *confusa tantum* may be understood in two senses, which other Schoolmen (I know not if earlier or later than Wyclif) distinguished thus. In one sense, the term in question is affirmed only of a certain number of objects, which are not known, but which exclude all others from the affirmation of that term. Thus: 'Some men are white'. If a certain number only of given men are white, the rest cannot be so. This is properly called *Indefinite* supposition. But if we say: 'Some craft is necessary for seafaring,' the term 'necessary for seafaring' is affirmed equally well of one ship as of another. This supposition alone receives properly the name of *Confused*.

Thus there are four sorts of personal supposition: *distributive*, *collective*, *indefinite*, and *confused*. But as the words *confusa tantum* will occur very frequently throughout this work, I must remark that though in the side-notes I have made them generally bear the meaning of *indefinite*, they are rarely tantamount to the present sense of *Confused*.

Corresponding to this fourfold division of personal supposition, there is a fourfold analytical descent from a general proposition to its singulars. Wyclif does not mention it, though, all along there are

<sup>1</sup> See p. 39, l. 33.

allusions<sup>1</sup> to something very like it. It is necessary to say something of this.

(1.) A proposition the supposition of whose subject is *distributive* (All men are mortal) is analyzed into its component parts by enumerating each of the singulars, *repeating the verb and predicate after each*, and joining each of the propositions by *and*. This is called the *copulative* descent. *Ex*: The man A is mortal, *and* the man B is mortal, *and* . . . . the man Z is mortal ∴ *All men are mortal*. The whole of the component propositions together make up the universal one.

(2.) A proposition the supposition of whose subject is *collective* (all the Apostles are twelve) is analyzed to some extent into its singulars by enumerating each singular that makes up the subject, *adding the verb and predicate once only*, when the enumeration is ended, having previously joined each singular term by *and*. This is called the *copulate* descent. *Ex*: Peter, and James, and Matthew . . . and Judas Iscariot are twelve ∴ *All the Apostles are twelve*. It is seen that there is in reality but one proposition here: analysis only separates the singular parts of the subject.

(3.) A proposition the supposition of whose subject is *indefinite* (Some men are slaves) is analyzed into its singulars by enumerating all of them, *adding the verb and predicate after each*, and joining every one of these new propositions by *or*. This is called the *disjunctive* descent. *Ex*: Either the man A is a slave, *or* the man B is a slave, *or* . . . *or* the man Z is a slave ∴ *Some men are slaves*. The whole of the singular propositions together make up the particular one.

(4.) A proposition the supposition of whose subject is *confused* (Some craft is necessary for seafaring) is to some extent analyzed into its singulars by enumerating all the singulars of its subject, and *adding the verb and predicate at the close of the enumeration*, having previously joined each of the singulars by *or*. This is called *disjunct* descent. *Ex*: The craft A, *or* the craft B, *or* the craft C . . . *or* the craft Z is necessary for seafaring ∴ *Some craft is necessary*.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 37 in particular, and the examples of exposition all through the work.

*for seafaring*. It is plain that there is in reality but one proposition here; analysis separates only the singular parts of the subject.

With this full explanation in our minds, we may now examine the note<sup>1</sup> with which this chapter closes. In every universal affirmative, the subject has distributive supposition; if it had not, it would be collective; but the predicate is not distributive; it may be *indefinite*, as in 'Every man is (some) mortal'; for we have by accidental conversion, 'Some mortal is a man', which gives, by disjunctive descent: The mortal A is a man, or the mortal B is a man . . . . or the mortal Z is a man . . . Some mortal is a man; Or *confused*, as in 'Every vessel necessary to seafaring is a craft'. Here the proposition is merely the example given above, converted and rendered universal; by converting it back again, we see that it requires the disjunct analysis. In the universal negative, both subject and predicate have distributive suppositions. In the particular affirmative, both have indefinite suppositions. This is evident, notwithstanding that the text 'determinate'<sup>2</sup> contradicts it flatly. While this part of the work was in proof, I did not see my way to correct it by prefixing *in* to *determinate*; but now I think the expression is merely a mistake of the copyist. — In the case of the particular negative, the subject has indefinite, the predicate, distributive supposition.

Chap. XIII. *Of Consequence* (p. 42—49). Consequence is to be distinguished from the *consequent*, or conclusion of an argument; it may be styled 'the power of an argument to conclude'. Wyclif's definition seems less clear: 'a relation between antecedent and consequent expressed by the conclusive particle (*ergo*)'. Though I am doubtful whether *expressed by* renders the Latin *cum*.

The chapter lays down 22 rules for judging whether an argument is conclusive or not. (1.) When the conclusion is formally understood in the antecedent, the consequence is good. (2.) It is also good when, by contradicting the conclusion, we contradict the antecedent, or (3.) get a proposition that is incompatible with it. (4.) The antecedent of the antecedent is the antecedent of the consequent. (5.) When, in a chain of antecedents and consequents, each

<sup>1</sup> P. 40, 41.

<sup>2</sup> P. 42, l. 11, 13, 17.



particular consequence is good and each consequent really the antecedent of the next argument, the consequence of the whole is good. (6.) From a universal proposition to its subalternate, (7.) from a particular to its corresponding indefinite, and (8.) from the general to the particular, the consequence is legitimate. (9.) Truth may follow from falsehood, and (10.) the necessary from the contingent, but not *vice versa* in either case. (11.) A universal negative implies its corresponding singular proposition. (12.) A superior proposition implies its inferior; but there are different, and even opposed, sorts of superiority and inferiority. (13.) We cannot at once conclude from the inferior to its superior. There are five sorts of fallacies that occur in such conclusions. (14.) A more general conclusion does not imply a less general one, unless the sign *all* be prefixed; (15.) but then it does; also when implicitly or explicitly negative. (16.) When an argument from an inferior supposition to its superior is good, and the consequent universal, the antecedent is so too. (17.) To deny the conclusion, admitting one premise of a regular syllogism, is to deny the other premise. (18.) Of one of two contradictory terms anything may be predicated; but nothing of both together. (19.) A proposition being true, it remains true if its verb be put in the infinitive. (20.) From an affirmative proposition with a negative predicate (A is not-B) to the same proposition with the negation transferred to the verb (A is not B), the consequence is good; but only for the present of the verb *to be*. (21.) *A is not B and A is ∴ A is not-B*, is a true conclusion. (22.) From an affirmative proposition with a privative predicate (unjust, unwilling, &c.) to a negative with a corresponding positive predicate, the consequence is good.

Chap. XIV. *Of Exclusive propositions* (p. 49—53). We may leave aside the rules of exposition relative to them, because they come again in *Logicae Continuatio*.<sup>1</sup> The other rules are: If only A is B, every B is A. If only A is B, then A is B, no not-A is B, and no B is not-A. If only A is B, both its exponents must be true; if either of its exponents are false, the proposition is not true. From the truth of the exclusion itself, we cannot argue the truth of a negative proposition, *minus* the exclusive particle; but the reverse

<sup>1</sup> P. 128.

of that process is right. Not only men are mortal . . . no men are mortal. No man is a plant . . . not only men are plants. — We may notice here that *not* should be taken as modifying the whole proposition, not the adverb *only*; thus signifying: It is *not* true that *only* . . . .

Chap. XV. *Of Exceptive Propositions* (p. 53—56). The same observation as before applies to the present chapter. Three rules besides those of exposition are given. (1.) Any exceptive proposition (Every A but B is C) is incompatible with its preajacent (Every A is C). (2.) From an exceptive affirmative proposition we may conclude a negative (*exceptivam negativam* in the text; but this does not agree with the examples); and from a negative exceptive, an affirmative: 'Every A but B is C . . . B is not C. No A but B is C . . . B is C'. (3.) Any proposition may be true by making it except all that it does not truly include.

Chap. XVI. *Of Copulative Propositions* (p. 56—57). This chapter and the following one seem to be slightly out of their place. Copulative and disjunctive propositions, being hypothetical, belong to the Third Tractate; and the author has not yet terminated his summary of categorical propositions, that are dealt with at length in the First and Second Tractate. The rules given are: (1.) If one part of a copulative (A is B and C is D) is false, so is the whole proposition, unless it be negative, with *not* prefixed to the whole. (2.) If the whole be true, each part is true. (3.) From one part of a copulative to the whole, we have a false inference, unless the second inferred part be implied by the other. (4.) The contradictory to a copulative is a disjunctive made out of the contradictories to each part: 'A is B and C is D: either A is not B or C is not D.'

Chap. XVII. *Of Disjunctive Propositions* (p. 58, 59). Rules: (1.) If we admit a disjunctive: 'Either A is B or C is D', and deny one part: 'C is D. we have the true inference: 'A is B'. (2.) We cannot generally thus infer one part unless we deny the other; there are exceptions nevertheless. (3.) The contradictory to a disjunctive is a copulative made of the contradictories to each part: 'Either A is B or C is D: A is not B and C is not D.'

Very little is to be said of Chaps. XVIII, XIX and XX (60—67). Chap. XVIII shows how to expound propositions and take their

contradictories; all which is more fully explained in different parts of *Logicae Continuatio*. Chap. XIX has a few remarks about difference and 'otherness', to be developed later.<sup>1</sup> Chap. XX deals shortly with 'beginning', 'ending', and comparative propositions; all this is completely developed hereafter.<sup>2</sup>

Chap. XXI. *Of 'Official' Terms*. They have been already defined as expressing an act of the mind or will on the abstract meaning of the proposition that contains them. There are elsewhere<sup>3</sup> further developments about the sense of *scire*, *dubitare*, &c.; but nothing, as I said before, that can properly be construed as '*materia de scire*', that was promised us in the Proemium. — To expound this proposition: 'I know that God exists', we must develop it thus: 'This proposition, *God exists*, whose primary signification is the affirmation of God's existence, is known to me.' We must in like manner expound similar propositions, such as: I understand . . . it is true . . . it is false, &c. The reason of this roundabout way of developing them is probably the requirements of argumentation. Suppose, for instance, that in a public dispute this point had been proved: 'All men know that God exists'; the opponent might perhaps protest, if the defender suddenly jumped from this conclusion to the other. 'God exists'. But by analysing the proposition, and pointing out that 'what is known is true', and that consequently God exists, one can easily get out of this verbal difficulty. In their public 'disputations', the Scholastics used to be particularly severe about all arguments being in strict, nay, in ultrastrict form. '*Aliquis homo est mulier*' would have been attacked as implying self-contradiction, *aliquis* meaning only the masculine sex.<sup>4</sup>

Chap. XXII. *Of Obligation* (p. 69—75). This is a curious exercise about which I have not been able to gather anything in modern works, even of Scholastic logic, nor indeed in any that I have read. Possibly it was a transient fashion in Oxford at that time. It certainly served a good deal towards sharpening the wits, and must have been used mainly for that purpose alone; for it is of little

<sup>1</sup> P. 121—128.    <sup>2</sup> P. 191—203; p. 217—229.    <sup>3</sup> P. 177.    <sup>4</sup> See p. 88, l. 21—25. On the other hand, see p. 93, l. 30—36, where Wyclif seems to part company with such grammatical exaggerations of strictness.

value besides; whereas it was generally admitted that by regular argumentation, still in use now-a-days in many Catholic seminaries, it was possible to arrive at the truth. In the latter exercise, one proposition out of the theses publicly sustained by the defender was selected to be attacked. The opponent affirmed the contrary or the contradictory, and proved his affirmation in *one single* syllogism; more were not allowed. The defender, having denied or distinguished whichever of the opponent's premises he thought fit, the opponent had to prove (again in one single syllogism) the proposition denied, or denied as distinguished; of course not overlooking the distinction. This process went on until the opponent had to give up, not being able to urge his point any further, or until the defender was run into a corner, and obliged to deny one or another of two self-evident truths.

I myself have seen a defender, having denied that '*Bellum est contrarium virtuti morali*', met by an argument like this: '*Quod est contrarium paci, est contrarium virtuti morali*'; atqui bellum est contrarium paci: *ergo*'. Unable to deny the minor, and not very well understanding the major premise, it was the latter he denied. His opponent had him at once. '*Si pax est virtus moralis, contrarium pacis est contrarium virtuti morali . . . etc.*' — A much more skilful antagonist was sorely puzzled at the following: '*Qui habet infinite perfectionem creaturae, habet infinite perfectionem meae personalitatis; sed Deus non habet infinite perfectionem meae personalitatis: ergo.*' The minor, denied, was proved thus: '*Qui habet infinite perfectionem meae personalitatis, est plus ego quam ego ipse: atqui Deus non est plus ego quam ego ipse; ergo*'. The major was seemingly easy of proof: for my *ego* is not a perfection possessed infinitely by me; and the minor, if denied, would have been an affirmation of Pantheism. Happily for the student, the professor was at hand, and ready to help him out of the difficulty.

Obligation is a quite different, though not a more easy exercise. It may be called '*An Exercise in Consistency*', Any assertion was proposed to the respondent by his antagonist; and by a common understanding, admitted, if not self-contradictory. Then, during the whole time of the exercise, the respondent was to answer as if that proposition were true, denying any other that was incompatible

with it, admitting any that its admission implied, and answering irrelevant propositions according to their truth or falsehood. The following instances, given by Wyclif, may suffice to prove that it was not always easy to determine when a proposition was consequent to or incompatible with another, or merely irrelevant.

*Every man is in Rome* is the assertion put forward. Though false, it is possible; therefore granted. Then: 'You are in Rome'. — Denied, as irrelevant and false. — 'You are a man'. — Denied too, as incompatible with the proposition already granted.

'*You are dead*' is not absolutely self-contradictory (though in contradiction with facts), so it is granted. — 'You are alive'. — Denied. — 'You deny your own act then'. — No, for if dead I have no act at all, and am not answering you now. — Many will doubtless think that this custom of consistently maintaining a falsehood to its utmost limits must have been confusing to the moral sense of truth and untruth. I do not see that it was necessarily so; at any rate, Wyclif cannot be blamed for teaching the rules of an exercise which he found established.

'Some hand of yours does not exist.' — Granted. — 'Some hand of yours does exist.' — Granted, as true and irrelevant. 'Which hand exists, the right one or the left?' — The right one. — 'If so, your right hand is every hand of yours (*omnis manus tua*)<sup>1</sup>; so every hand of yours exists; which contradicts the first proposition that was granted. The answer, says Wyclif, is to deny the consequence in this case; or if *some hand* in this case means *every hand*, to deny that any hand exists.

'No proposition is put to you'. — Granted. — 'Some proposition is put to you.' — Denied as contradictory. — 'This proposition is put to you! — Also denied. The opponent urges: 'I put the present proposition to you: therefore it is propounded.' — It would certainly follow, is the answer; but the fact is denied.

These intellectual gymnastics may appear puerile, as gymnastics generally do; but I think that, owing to the traces throughout *Logica* of the importance then given to the exercise, I could not give it less space here. It was besides sometimes used for serious questions.

<sup>1</sup> P. 72, l. 16.

Wyclif gives us one concerning the Incarnation, and another relative to his own theory of 'indivisible degrees of perfection'. Both are worth stating.

'God is man.' — Granted. — 'God is immortal.' — Granted too. — 'This same God (Christ) is immortal and mortal: a contradiction.' Here a distinction is given: immortal in His Godhead, mortal in His humanity. — 'The same being then is immortal and mortal.' — The contradiction is denied: the same being, yes; from the same point of view, no.

'Peter and Paul are both equally full of love to God during one hour, when they both acquire an equal amount of that virtue; at the end, Peter dies, and Paul is yet living.' — Granted. — Then the opponent says. 'Peter and Paul will be equally perfect.' If this be granted: it is objected that in the last instant (at which Peter is dead and Paul living) the former does not continue to merit, while the latter does. If it be denied, the opponent points out that the indivisible quality acquired by Paul during *one* instant is infinitely small, and adds nothing to his merits. Most people at the present day would think so too. If there be not a gap here in the text, Wyclif leaves the question unsettled. But in the Third Part of *Logica*, he very distinctly decides it in the former way. The infinitely Small is, in his opinion, not nothing; far from it; it is only a thing so small that nothing can be smaller. A point takes up no space, but still it has entity — position, which no other point can occupy. A second point, even though touching it, would not be in the same place.

*Logicae Continuatio. Proemium* (p. 75). This second preface is a very brief summary of the two tractates contained in the rest of this volume, and of the third tractate, which will fill up two more. It has already been noticed in the General Survey of this work.<sup>1</sup>

Chap. I. *Of Truth* (76—79). Truth is the correspondence of a proposition to that which it signifies in the first place: i. e., the most general signification of the words. What they may signify secondarily by stretching the sense descending from the universal to the particular, or linking one idea to another by association, is, therefore, quite foreign to truth; for by that means any proposition, however false, might be true, and any true one false. Again, the same proposition, understood in two different ways, is neither true

<sup>1</sup> P. IX.

nor false; or rather, both at once. And, according as the primary signification admits the idea of *necessary* or *contingent* truth, or *impossibility*, the proposition itself belongs to one or other of these three classes. Thus truth, according to Aristotle, is the fact of a proposition, meaning the *thing* that is; but to those who deny the Universals, it means only ideas, not *things*.

Chap. II. *Of Demonstration* (p. 79—82). Sense, or intuition, or inference from both, is the source of all proof. Mediate inference may proceed: *a) A Priori*, as the inference of an effect from its cause; *b) A Posteriori*, as the demonstration of a cause by its effects; *c) Ab Aequo*, proving one thing by another that comes to the same; and *d) Ab Absurdo*, proving that the contradictory proposition is self-contradictory. Sometimes one sort of proof is preferable, sometimes another; any true proposition can be proved; and we are always free to grant a proposition, if one of its primary senses be true.

Chap. III. *Distinctions of Terms* (p. 82—85). Some terms can be analyzed completely, i. e. down to their singulars; others are only explicable into the propositions which they imply. 'Official' terms merely determine the supposition of the other terms in the proposition: the foregoing distinctions are nevertheless not mutually exclusive. A universal proposition may be the same as its exponents, but is not always so; in some cases there is more absolute truth on one side. Official terms must be carefully repeated in the exposition, that confusion may be avoided; and terms, when we repeat them, must always be understood in the same sense.

Chap. IV. *Of the Universal Affirmative* (p. 85—100). Every such proposition may be proved (1.) *A Priori*, (2.) *A Posteriori*, as already noticed, or (3.) by proving the falsity of its opposite; or (4.) *Ex aequo*; that is by expounding it. We prove, for instance, that 'Every A is B', if we prove that 'Some A is B', and that 'No A is not B'. This method is the most employed of all. Wyclif, however points out that 'No A is not B' is merely the universal affirmative under a negative form.

This exposition undergoes four sorts of variations. *a)* According as the quantifying sign is of different genders, or common (*quisque*, *quaeque*, or *omnis*); *b)* According as the subject is simple or compound; it may also be of one or other of the genders, or epicene;

it may be made up of several partial subjects, copulated or disjunct, and some part may not be in the nominative.

Here we may stop to notice a curious conclusion to which Wyclif's Realism leads him. He says<sup>1</sup> that 'All twos and threes are five' is not true, any more than that all two men and two animals are four; because neither two nor three are five, but together they make up five. Two men *are* two animals (i. e. animated beings), yet they do not make four, but three; the third is the universal *Animal* (or *man*, as I put it in the foot-note on that page) present in each, yet really distinct from each. Further on,<sup>2</sup> he repeats the same theory, and devotes a chapter in *De Universalibus*<sup>3</sup> to explain and defend his idea. Each singular differs really from its universal, only by the 'Hypostasis', called personality in intelligent beings. Thus, there being a real difference, the universal and one of its singulars make two. That the hypostasis is something real, superadded to the substance is a well-known doctrine of the Thomists, opposed by Scotus; but even the most uncompromising Thomists affirm only the real difference between one singular and another; and asserting the real existence of one Universal Man, *conceived* as really the same in all, they denied that this concept was any more than an abstraction. Wyclif's Realism is therefore not of the moderate type. Yet neither does it go to the extravagant Pantheistic reveries of some Medieval philosophers. The more I study it, the more I feel convinced that, though at the time this work was written Wyclif had thought out the main points of his doctrine, both theological and philosophical, he did not yet see how absolutely and inexorably it bore him onwards to the denial of annihilation, thence of Transubstantiation, and thence to an insurrection against the power of Rome.

But to return to the point in discussion. If the subject is disjunct, i. e. divided into parts joined by the conjunction *or*, it may mean the same as if it were copulated. As for copulated subjects, we must note the sense well, to see whether they must be taken together or no; especially as Latin adjectives are often substantives

<sup>1</sup> P. 89.

<sup>2</sup> P. 93, L. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *De Universalibus* (as yet unpublished) Chap. IX (incipit). *Consequens est videre quomodo universalis et singularis ponunt in numerum.*



too. 'Homo justus et grammaticus' may mean 'a righteous man *who* is a grammarian', or 'a righteous man, together with a grammarian'; in the second case, the verb must be in the plural. Punctuation may also affect the sense; as: 'Homo-futurus est', which is false; and 'Homo futur<sup>us</sup>-est', which is true. Such propositions Wyclif calls partitive, and he adds some remarks on so-called implicative propositions. Ablatives absolute can be turned into incidental propositions.

The subject containing a term not in the nominative is next examined and expounded. The rule is that the genitive (or other case not the nominative) becomes universal in the second or negative exponent, v. g. 'Every A of any B is C ∴ Some A of some B is C, and no A of *any* B is not C.' This Wyclif proves by analysis of the proposition. There are, however, cases when this is not true: as 'Every servant obedient to *his* master is liked by you. Or 'He is the master of *an* obedient servant.' If the genitive precede the nominative, then the term that comes first is alone universal.

I must here correct a foot-note on p. 93 that was not sufficiently considered. Wyclif (l. 37) points out that this proposition is false: 'Every proposition or its contradictory is true;' the reason is that 'Every proposition' *comprises* contradictories too; so the opposition implied by *or* cannot be posited.

c) The sense of the proposition varies with the verb. *First*, if the verb be in the present, it may be 'ampliative' or not 'ampliative.' To amplify, in the technical sense here followed, means to extend the meaning to mere possibility or to an intellectual process. Wyclif says that we must, in expounding such a proposition, give to the negative exponent the substantive verb, together with the ampliative one; as: 'Every A *can be* B ∴ Some A *is* B, and no A *is or can be* that cannot be B.' Or 'Every A *begins to be* B ∴ Some A *begins to be* B, and no A *is or begins to be* that does not begin to be B.' I confess I see no use in all this complexity. But again, we know too little of the philosophical currents of the period to be able to judge, or even to be sure that we understand aright. These precautions *may* have been a safeguard against some sophistical trap. Negative propositions belonging to this category (*Ex*: 'All that is not will be or was) present particular difficulty, that can indeed be

overcome, but is better eluded by taking the contradictories of such propositions, and proving their falsity.

A similar process is to be followed, if the verb is in the past or the future tense. The first exponent is affirmative, and contains the verb in the past or future; the second, negative, has the verb in the present, disjoined by *or* from the same verb repeated in the past or future, as the case may be. Wyclif adds<sup>1</sup> a few observations on the *descensus ad singularia*, for which I may refer the reader to the foot-note, and to what has already been said on the subject.

d) The predicate may vary the sense in as many ways as the subject. The relative pronoun often causes confusion, as in this case: 'Omnis pater generat individuum de sua substantia, cui est similis specie.' For men of the present day, it is rather a grammatical than a logical quibble. Wyclif lays down the rule that the relative should stand for its nearest antecedent, unless the sense be unmistakably clear, and closes the chapter by mentioning the fallacy called Amphibology.

Chap. V. *Of the Universal Negative* (p. 100—107). The four sorts of demonstration come in here, as in the case of the universal affirmative. The singulars of any universal negative are found by taking the singular affirmative and prefixing *not*. A universal negative needs no middle term to descend to its singulars by; because, as we may remember, it can be converted simply: so it cannot be properly expounded. Each singular, however, of a universal negative may be true; and yet the universal may be impossible; v. g.: 'This animal is not of a certain size' . . . 'This other, ditto' . . . and so on, until every singular animal is enumerated. All are true, yet the universal, 'No animal is of *any* size,' is evidently false. Wyclif explains this difficulty with particular care.

In the third sort of proof -- argument *ab absurdo* -- there occur specimens of logical juggles. Sophists take up this principle: 'Whatever is opposed to a certain universal is false; therefore that universal is true.' One example may suffice. '*Nothing*' can work as many miracles as God; for, if not, then *something* could; which is false. '*Nothing*' is therefore as powerful as God. We must observe that

<sup>1</sup> P. 97.

Wyclif admits that 'nothing' was the matter out of which God made the world.<sup>1</sup> But this expression does not necessarily imply that he gives an entity to nothingness; and I have nowhere else seen, so far as I can remember, that he understands it in this sense. Wyclif's fondness for out-of-the-way modes of expression may no doubt be answerable for many opinions that have been ascribed to him.

Chap. VI. *Of the Particular Affirmative* (p. 107—114). I believe the reader has been sufficiently edified as to the manner of analyzing or of expounding propositions in the former chapters. In future therefore, we may set aside what relates to exposition, and confine ourselves to matters of more general interest.

Wyclif here again continues to follow the plan already laid down: proofs *a priori*, *a posteriori*, *ab opposito* and *ex aequo*, though he scarcely bestows a sentence each on the two last. The most important passage is on p. 109, where the signification of Being is debated. Some only admit that the word applies to what exists actually; others extend it to all that is possible, and even beyond, to whatever is intelligible in any way. Wyclif is of course of the latter opinion, and points out that when we speak of the Impossible, even to say: 'This impossible thing is impossible', we cannot find any other verb but *to be*, that expresses our meaning. Extending thus the sense of *to be*, we can admit that 'what will be an ass at one time will be a man at another' (as to the body, of course); 'the same thing (*hoc*<sup>2</sup>) will be at such a time an ass, and at such another not an ass'; and at the latter time will differ from an ass. Translated into modern language, this would perhaps become: It is possible that every atom that at one time makes up the body of a man will at another form the body of an ass. If there were no one in the world but a pregnant woman, it would be true to say of her: 'This will be all men'; but not: 'All men will be this.'

If we consider<sup>3</sup> a man receiving a quality more and more intense until his death, we have an affirmation of being which coincides with the very cessation of his actuality: another reason for affirming that the sense of *being* should be extended. For, at the very moment he is *no more*, he is as old as ever he will be.

<sup>1</sup> P. 105, l. 19, 20, 23, 24.

<sup>2</sup> L. 10, 18, 19.

<sup>3</sup> P. 111, See p. 75.

Many fallacies can be solved by such extension of meaning. 'A bishop (that is to be) will see Socrates, who will never be seen by a bishop (that is so *now*)' &c.; the sense of the verb is here amplified as to time, and that ought to be borne in mind. So of the other fallacies given on p. 112, 113.

Chap. VII. *Of the Particular Negative* (p. 116—121). The salient point of this chapter is a fifth sort of proof brought forward under the name of *captio*, and refuted. Wyclif has just said that 'what is not intelligible to me cannot be understood by me.' It is objected that 'something *unintelligible* is understood by me,' since I understand its absurdity. So 'I understand what is not intelligible to me.' But the fact is that we do not know the sense of the proposition, for it has none. All we know is that it has no sense. And: thus the fifth sort, *captious proof*, is valueless.

*Second Tractate.* Chap. VIII. *Of Difference and Otherness* (p. 121—128). To differ, according to Wyclif, is thus expounded: 'A differs from B ∴ A is, B is at the same time, and A is not B.' There can be no difference, if there be not a certain simultaneity. Some of the conclusions which he indicates rather than proves are curious, and remind us of certain modern philosophers. For instance, the *Sixth Conclusion*.<sup>1</sup> 'A man may differ from an ass, but not every ass would differ from him; for if he differs and they differ at the same instant, the very fact would prove a certain identity. — *Seventh Conclusion*. 'A man may differ from every man, and yet not from every man past, present, and future.' *Eighth Conclusion*. 'A man may differ from that which is white, and yet never come to differ, nor even be able to differ from that which is white,' because<sup>2</sup> 'that which is white' has particular extension, not universal, in the present tense, and a universal one in the past and future. *That which* differs is *that which* will not differ; *that which* is other than true will be true. The supposition, it is seen, bears upon the *that which*, the mysterious subject of all changes and differences. Many Hegelian ideas are here undeveloped, and wrapped up in Scholastic phraseology; but I think it more than doubtful whether Wyclif ever developed them, even in his mind. He was carried away in another direction.

<sup>1</sup> P. 125.

<sup>2</sup> P. 124, l. 10.

Chap. IX. *Of Exclusive Propositions* (p. 128—142). In Latin, as in English, the place of the exclusive, particle (Only A is B; A is only B) makes a great difference. In the first case we must expound by 'A is B, and what is not A is not B'. There are of course variations in the rule, according as the subject, verb, or predicate vary; and many fallacies are based upon these variations. Certain sentences are meaningless or impossible, such as 'Only every man is an animal'. When the exclusive is negative (Only A is not B) the minor exponent is a double negative (No not-A is not-B). Such exclusive negatives contain within them an affirmation, and have therefore aptly been called *pregnant*. But they are impossible whenever the subject is positive and the predicate not transcendent. 'Transcendent' means in Scholastic language, any of the six following terms: *ens*, *res*, *aliquid*, *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*, which may each be predicated of *everything*. I do not quite see that Wyclif is right here, with the brief explanation he gives. 'Only man does not run', one of his instances, is certainly false. But 'Only the material world is not intelligent' may be disputed, it is true, but not at once set aside as impossible. Yet here the predicate is not transcendent.

If the subject contains the idea of number, the proposition ought to be expounded by *more*: 'Only 4 A's are not B's: minor exponent: All things that are more than 4 A's are B's.' *Other* may also be employed, or the usual exposition followed. — When *only* determines the verb and predicate, it may be placed either after or before the verb: Wyclif does not like, for a logical reason, to admit any difference between 'You only love man,' and 'You love only man';<sup>1</sup> the exposition is in this case the same as before. In many cases, such propositions are impossible. A man, as to space, is always *alone*, strictly speaking, for no other body is in the same space; but, thus alone, his acts are multiple. We may say that he lives *alone*, but not that he *only* lives, since he does many other things. No man, according to the ancients,<sup>2</sup> is *only* white; he is more: *musical*, *standing*, &c. And so on of the infinite multitude of qualities every concrete being must possess.<sup>3</sup> Every exclusive may be expounded by

<sup>1</sup> P. 135, l. 35.      <sup>2</sup> P. 137, l. 27.      <sup>3</sup> P. 138, l. 2, 6. — quod secundum eos (viz. ponentes universalis ex parte rei) est falsum.

the term 'more'; but some authors, instead of 'only', employ 'purely' or 'merely', in order to avoid this sort of exposition. It is of great importance whether the exclusive particle precedes or follows the negative, as: 'A is only not B', and 'A is not only B'.

Chap. X. *Of Exceptive Propositions* (142—156). These are such as contain an exceptive clause, indicated by an exceptive particle, the place of which does not matter. All are universal, but some negatively and some positively. They may be expounded by *not* or by *other*; but Wyclif points out cases in which the latter exposition strains the sense very much.<sup>1</sup> — The variations that occur, and their causes, are next enumerated. The proposition amounts to a universal one,<sup>2</sup> if the exception regards only a few singulars. 'All men but A and B are in Oxford: all men are in Oxford.' It is what modern scholastics would call an imperfect universal. We may make any proposition perfectly true by excepting the cases in which it is not true, whether those cases exist or not. And this is not superfluous; at least not more so than many other modes of expression now employed. Note that the exceptive, 'Every A but B is C', and its prejacents, 'Every A is C', are subcontraries in the sense that both may be false and both true. It may be denied that there is any opposition between them, as in the case when the predicate is particular; as: 'A man does not see a man except himself;' but we must take it to mean: *Any* man; and then the proposition is universal: otherwise it is not exceptive. Or, if it be urged that we can say, 'Everybody except Socrates, is excepted; so here the prejacents (Everybody is excepted) comes to the same as the whole proposition, and there is no contrariety: Wyclif answers that the proposition, as it stands, contradicts itself.

We ought to expound certain exceptive propositions by the idea of plurality. 'I have given none save 4,' means 'I have given 4, and not more.' But we have an impossible conclusion, if we expound this by 'not anything else than 4;' or by 'not — not four'. For we have given 1, 2, and 3 before giving the unit that makes four. This part of the subject closes with some notes about the supposition of exceptive terms.

<sup>1</sup> P. 143, end.

<sup>2</sup> P. 145, l. 4.

Exceptive propositions may be turned into universal affirmatives or exclusives with the same sense. 'Nothing except B is C'; 'Only B is C'; 'Every C is B.' There are difficulties in making these conversions, when dealing with complex and copulated terms. Wyclif meets them very conscientiously, and I have followed him as well as I could in the side-notes. But perhaps the general reader will be satisfied with the fact, and those who are more curious ought to refer to the text itself, to which it is impossible to do full justice in so short a synopsis as this must necessarily be.

Chap. XI. Of the *Necessary and the Impossible* (p. 156—166). These terms are taken together, because contraries follow the same rule. 'Necessary' is 'impossible not to be'; 'impossible' is 'necessary not to be.' 'Necessary' is said of what is useful, of God, of any absolute truth, of conditioned truth, and stands also for 'must'. Waiving the two first senses as irrelevant, the *absolutely necessary* is either 1<sup>st</sup>, Primordial, i. e. the truth of God's existence; or 2<sup>nd</sup>, Secondary, but self-necessary; as geometrical theorems; or 3<sup>rd</sup>, What now cannot have not been: as all past facts.

The *relatively necessary* is *Antecedent*, i. e. that of a cause relatively to an effect; or *Consequent*, caused by antecedent necessity; or *Concomitant*, when it merely coexists with something else. The same thing may possess all three necessities at once; they are not even opposed to Contingency. Antecedent necessity is *voluntary*, *natural*, or *coerced*. The divisions of the Impossible are similar.

Wyclif then proceeds to expound such propositions; but he notes that in some cases, 'necessary' being a substantive, the whole proposition is purely categorical. When modal, and out of several senses of 'necessary,' one is true, we may grant it, even in such a case as 'necessarily something is, which is not necessary.'<sup>1</sup> And we also grant that something that is not now necessary will be so some day, when it *has* happened; in this theory it may be that God, creating me, does not exist; i. e. at any instant of time other than my creation. It will be true that I have a son; then God *is* not creating my son, while He *can* be so; therefore, something contingent is in God.<sup>2</sup> Yet this is false. — I notice this only to call attention

<sup>1</sup> P. 161, l. 20.

<sup>2</sup> P. 163, l. 3—20.

to the confusing manner in which Wyclif sometimes, after having granted a whole series of propositions from a given principle which he certainly seems to admit, stops us with: *Hoc est falsum*, or *impossibile*. He concludes the chapter with a short mention of the usual four sorts of proof, and affirms that he does not value much the fallacies that exist on that subject: an assertion with which most people will heartily agree.

Chap. XII. *Of the Contingent* (p. 166—177). There is the contingent of indetermination (*ad utrumlibet*), an effect depending on free-will; then the contingent called 'natural', that does not thus depend. The latter is an effect that happens *always*. or in *most cases*, or in *few*.

Here Wyclif opens a long parenthesis to bring in his theory of determinate and indeterminate truth, the latter pertaining to the Contingent of Indetermination, and not without influence on the doctrine of free-will. It may be briefly stated thus: Everything that is true at a given time is so determinately; what may be true without any precise fixation of time, is indeterminate truth. All indetermination depends upon the future, for the present and the past are determined. God is the ultimate cause of indetermination,<sup>1</sup> and the human will is the immediate cause; for the contingent of indetermination is alone indeterminately true. And such contingent truths depend on the will.<sup>2</sup> Returning to the main point, we find that the Contingent in *all cases* has an unfailing cause; that the Contingent in *most cases* has a cause which is natural, but not unfailing: and that the Contingent in *few cases* has a cause, but not one naturally ordered to produce that effect. Here we touch the vexed question as to whether monsters are intended by nature. Wyclif thinks they are, and very keenly points out<sup>3</sup> that if not intended by nature, because they occur in the minority of cases, then children would also not be intended by nature; for the causes having been posited, they certainly do not come into the world in the majority of cases.

We next come to the question of chance. Chance points to a cause that occasions a thing happening in the minority of cases, and

<sup>1</sup> P. 168, l. 35; 169, l. 1.

<sup>2</sup> P. 169, l. 15—35.

<sup>3</sup> P. 171, l. 14, 15.



quite aside from the natural tendency of the cause. If out of a hundred balls, ten are white, and ninety black, a man that draws a white ball does so by chance; if fifty were white and fifty black, it would not happen in the minority of cases that the white ball is drawn; so it would no longer be by chance; and if sixty were white and the rest black, it would be still less the result of chance, for here we have a decided cause: the superior number of white balls that make for the drawing of a white one. This is of course far from the modern definition of chance. — But the same thing may occur by chance and not by chance; as the meeting of a debtor with his creditor. Chance and fortune differ, in that the latter supposes a being working to overcome chance.<sup>1</sup> ‘Naturally,’ ‘by chance,’ ‘violently,’ ‘supernaturally,’ ‘volitionally’ and ‘artificially’ are not, according to Wyclif, terms mutually incompatible. Yet he notices that some think that they are.

As we have already seen, Wyclif also thinks that necessity and contingency are not absolutely opposed; this is a sequel of his system. God creates men necessarily; it does not follow that the creation is not also contingent. All these words are contradictory only when taken in similar senses.

It is well known that Wyclif’s doctrines of necessity were condemned at the Council of Constance. I do not deny that the manner in which he expresses himself, taken according to the usual meaning of words, lays itself open to the charge of heterodoxy. But in most of what I have seen of his *philosophical* works, he explains his meaning with sufficient lucidity to clear him from the charge. Whether, in those of his theological treatises that followed and were condemned, he goes a step further, I do not pretend to say here. But indeed the Church usually, condemning propositions in the literal sense (*quatenus verba sonant*), looks less to the meaning of the author than to that which they are likely to convey, and to the danger that may result therefrom. When Wyclif tells us that sin occurs necessarily, and means that, given God’s foreknowledge of sin to exist, sin must also exist at some time, it was quite natural that people who did not understand his meaning should have been

<sup>1</sup> P. 172, l. 7, 8.

alarmed at the words. In the course of my collating and copying, I once came across a passage in which Wyclif says that God does not help the sinner whom he foreknows to be damned, not because He is not willing, but because He foreknows that the sinner will not accept the grace if given. This might be explained in some way or other; but the language as it stands does not produce a good effect. We may again set it down to our author's fondness for seemingly paradoxical ideas.

Chap. XIII. *Of Knowledge, Doubt, etc.* (p. 177—191). This chapter is one of the least satisfactory in the work: we may therefore review it rapidly. It contains first of all several distinctions of the sense in which 'Knowledge' is to be understood; *actual* or *habitual*; *experimental*, *intuitive*, *deductive*, *confused*, or *distinct*. Actual knowledge is an act of unhesitating belief in the truth. Thus the unlettered may often know, where the philosopher, seeking to prove all, is in doubt, even of the evidence of his senses. These two factors are necessary; unhesitating belief, and the truth of the object.

After this there comes a series of fallacies, propounded and solved, of which some are explained in foot-notes, others in side-notes only, and others I have not been able to understand at all. The fundamental idea in them all seems to be the well-known question: *Do you know what you do not know?* — Knowledge, doubt, ignorance, will, desire, are, as Wyclif says shortly afterwards,<sup>1</sup> terms that admit of more fallacies than those of understanding, imagination, apprehension and conception. And he instances another difficulty for the will, tending to one thing conditionally, and absolutely to its opposite.<sup>2</sup>

Chap. XIV. *Of Beginning and Cessation* (p. 191—203.) Beginning and cessation are, and always have been, a puzzle to logicians. Is the beginning of a line, a line or no? At the very instant of death, does the subject exist? If so, we can affirm that *he* dies; but then, how can that be true, if *he* exists? There are endless subtleties on the matter. *To begin* means the last *now* of non-being, and the first of being; vice versa, *to end* is the last *now* of being, and the first of

<sup>1</sup> P. 188.

<sup>2</sup> P. 188, 189.

non-being.<sup>1</sup> But here comes the difficulty. Are these *Nouns* separate instants? Wyclif says that such as do not admit his system of 'indivisible' points etc., are obliged to say that death takes place in two separate instants!<sup>2</sup> 'Instant' may mean eternity,<sup>3</sup> which is not successive, but is indivisible. If anything begins, its beginning also begins; and where movement to and fro ceases, there is a point where both movement and rest begin and end.

On p. 195 Wyclif affirms his position, which he proves only in the Third Tractate, towards the end. 'The Continuous is made up of 'indivisibles'; time, of instants; the line, of points; the surface of lines; the volume, of surfaces; and movement, of acts of change (ex mutari). This opinion maintains that nothing can possibly begin or cease to be except at some present time; and so the two instants touch one another (sunt immediata). We may here leave the subject.

The rest of the chapter consists of rules and conclusions which are not very easy to understand: In some places, Wyclif seems to contradict himself.<sup>4</sup> However, there are two difficulties that deserve notice; one<sup>5</sup> concerning the beginning of time at creation, whether there was, or was not, a cessation of *non-entity* when the world was created. The other<sup>6</sup> is whether God was Lord of all, or not Lord of all, before the Creation. The answer is, that *Not-Lord* and *not Lord* are two very different things.

Chap. XV. *Of Per Se and Per Accidens* (p. 203—212). It is very difficult to analyze this chapter. It consists of a multitude of details, distinctions and remarks, undoubtedly very useful to students of Scholastic logic, but hard to condense. The side notes being full, here as everywhere else, I may refer the reader to them, and say a few words about the general definitions only, as here laid down.

*Per Se* applies either to a *genus*, or the abstract *Substance*, or a *concrete* being, or to the *Uncaused* Being. *Per Accidens* answers to the different meanings of *Accident*. Some are separable, others inseparable. To say that A is B *per se*, means that it is B because it is A; but it may be so more or less directly. A is *per se* a man, a living being, a substance; he is a man directly. *Per*

<sup>1</sup> P. 193, l. 57.<sup>2</sup> P. 198, l. 24.<sup>3</sup> P. 192, l. 31.<sup>4</sup> See foot-

note, p. 197.

<sup>5</sup> P. 196.<sup>6</sup> P. 198, 199.

*accidens* is, not always but sometimes, opposed to *per se*. A musician builds *per accidens*, an architect, *per se*.<sup>1</sup> Here there is opposition; both expressions are tantamount to non reduplicative and reduplicative propositions respectively (A, though not *as* A, is B; A, *as* A, is B).

Chap. XVI.: Of the *Infinitely great and small* (p. 212—217). In the explanation of these terms, Wyclif largely draws upon his system of the 'indivisibles'. A is infinitely B, means, A is B, and nothing else is B that A does not exceed in this respect. Wyclif has hit upon the true definition — a negative one — the 'immeasurable increase' of modern mathematicians. — Is a line, if infinitely long, infinitely great? If so, we have something that is greater than the Infinite; for instance a surface bounded by the same line. If we admit that every line consists of points, we must deny that any line can be infinite. Every line, however long, contains a fixed though immense number of points; so does a surface; thus a line may be equal to a great surface, and yet not infinite for all that. If, on the contrary, we deny that system, we must admit that one Infinite can be greater than another, as differing in kind.

'Immediate', i. e. touching, infinitely near, or small as to distance, is infinite in a certain sense, and must be expounded in like manner; it is a passing beyond all finite degrees of propinquity in space or time. Yet two things, thus touching each other, are not identical; and 'infinitely near' does not mean simply Infinite.

Chap. XVII. Of *Comparative Propositions* (217—220) I. Comparisons of equality, viz., with the positive degree of comparison.<sup>2</sup> 'A is as great as B .'. A is great, and B is great, and neither is greater'. Note, by the by, that the comparative is used here; further on the positive is used to expound the comparative. The fact is that the idea of *comparison* is fundamental in all thought, and not analyzable.<sup>3</sup> — A curious difficulty is propounded by Wyclif on p. 218. — A is an infinite line. Now there are an infinite multitude of finite lines of all lengths, none being the longest of all. Is any as long as A? No, for then one would be the longest. And yet in an infinite multitude of lines of *all lengths*, some one must be infinite. Here it is evident that the question itself is absurd. The

<sup>1</sup> P. 206, l. 17—24.<sup>2</sup> P. 217—220.<sup>3</sup> See pp. 221, 227.

reader must however observe that this seemingly useless question of mathematics, is nothing but the diagrammatic form of a question that long ago vexed the philosophical world; I mean the great problem of the *Possibles*. Possible creatures in unlimited multitude and of all degrees of perfection being conceivable, is any one of them equal to God? The answer is here shown clearly: the very data of the question are absurd. If creatures, none can be supreme; if unlimited in perfections, some one of them *must* be. I know of no case in which mathematical figures are more happily brought in to assist the mind.

II. *Comparison of inequality, viz, with the comparative degree.*<sup>1</sup> There is no difficulty with the exposition or quasi-exposition of usual propositions; but those about 'beginning and ending' give trouble. Can we say, 'A is whiter than B begins to be?' Wyclif, perhaps inconsistently<sup>2</sup>, denies that *beginning* and *being* are comparable.

III. *Superlatives.*<sup>3</sup> What is required here is, that both the ideas compared should belong to the same class: no positive comparison can go so far as a superlative. We say much, if we say: 'A is as strong as any man'; but not so much as 'A is the strongest of men'. We cannot say 'A is wiser than every man', which is self-contradictory; but, 'than any other man'. In like manner it would be absurd to say, 'A is the wisest of *these* men', if he is the wisest of *all* men.

The chapter ends with some unimportant remarks on the lax use of certain comparative expressions.

Chap. XVIII. *Of Terms in the Plural* (228 to *end*). I do not know whether Logicians have made much progress in the art of setting things forth briefly, since Wyclif's time, but except for a paragraph or two concerning the conjoint action of several causes, the chapter may be summed up very shortly. All the terms of which he speaks are merely collective terms, and a collective term is equivalent to a singular. In fact Wyclif, after long explanations, says pretty nearly the same,<sup>4</sup> though in a somewhat ambiguous manner. All syllogisms with collective terms follow very simple rules; above all,

<sup>1</sup> P. 220—221.<sup>2</sup> P. 222, foot-note<sup>3</sup> P. 223—228.<sup>4</sup> P. 233.

it must be recollected that the predicate is true only of the *whole* subject.

As for the question whether, when several agents work together to produce the same effect, they are or are not all causes of the effect, Wyclif says there are three answers, the second of which he prefers. *First*: The last agent produces the effect, the others only predisposing towards that last effect by the foregoing ones. The last straw breaks the camel's back. This, notwithstanding the authority of the proverb, is a somewhat exaggerated view. *Second*: Whoever intends to make, or do a whole thing or action, and makes or does a part thereof, makes or does it partially. This is Wyclif's view, from the standpoint of common sense. *Third*: The last straw indeed breaks the camel's back, but produces none of the previous effects of fatigue. Wyclif also admits<sup>1</sup> that where many forces work together, they each produce the movement, though none may be at work for the whole time. — The whole of the rest of the chapter<sup>2</sup> is devoted to clearing away misconceptions, that can arise only by confusing a collective with a distributive or universal subject.

Such is, briefly and imperfectly given, the synopsis of *Logica* and the first two tractates of *Logicae Continuatio*. In one of the reports of the Wyclif Society, Dr. Furnivall says, quoting a letter of mine, that *Logica* is the most generally interesting of Wyclif's philosophical works. From my point of view, this would be true to a certain extent, even of the present volume, but I meant specially to allude to the two others that are forthcoming. I should very much regret that any reader should be disappointed with this volume, and I am sure that any man who has studied Logic with real interest will admire the keen thought, the acumen and depth of views, and the quaint originality of our author.

<sup>1</sup> P. 231.

<sup>2</sup> P. 232 to *end.*







## PROEMIUM.

1<sup>a</sup> | Motus sum per quosdam legis dei amicos certum  
tractatum ad declarandam logicam sacre scripture com-  
pilare. Nam videns multos ad logicam transeuntes, qui  
5 per illam proposuerant legem dei melius cognovisse, et  
propter insipidam terminorum mixtionem gentilium in  
omni probacione proposicionum propter vacuitatem operis  
eam deserentes, propono ad acuendum mentes fidelium  
ponere probaciones proposicionum que debent elici ex  
10 scripturis. Et primo, cum tota variacio probacionis  
proposicionum habeat ortum ex terminis, diversorum  
terminorum proprietates et passiones intendo declarare;  
dein ad universalitatem et praedicamenta respiciam; et  
dein summulas, supposiciones, consequencias et obliga-  
15 toria componam; et demum ad materiam de *scire* propter  
finem et perfeccionem tocius operis specialiter me  
convertam.

This work is  
the Logic of  
Holy Writ.

*Division:*  
*a)* Terms and  
their properties;  
*b)* universals  
and categories;  
*c)* reasoning;  
*d)* knowledge.

1. Titulus et Proemium *desunt*. 2. Small Vignette for Initial M.

1. The text is that of Cod. Vind. 4523, subsequently lettered A. The MS. being unique as far as *Logicae Continuatio*, there is no need to indicate it by a letter here.

## CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

A term is simple or compound, according as it stands for one idea or for many.

Terminus, large loquendo, est diccio artificialiter inventa propter compositionem propositionis; et sic omne tale quod est diccio in grammatica est terminus in logica. 5

Sed terminorum aliqui sunt simplices et aliqui compositi. Terminus simplex est diccio cui unicus conceptus correspondet in anima, ut *homo*; terminus compositus est diccio cui multi conceptus non synonymi correspondent, ut *homo sanctus*, *animal virum* etc. 10

If simple, it is categorical or syncategorical, according as it has, or has not, meaning by itself.

Terminorum simplicium quidam est categorema, et quidam est syncategorema. Categorema est, cui correspondent intencio in anima, significans pro re, convertibilis cum eodem termino; ut isti termino. *homo*, in scripto vel in voce correspondet hec intencio, *homo*, in anima; et ista intencio, *homo*, in anima, est convertibilis cum illo termino, *homo*, in scripto vel in voce. Igitur etc. Syncategorema est terminus consignificans, cui non correspondet intencio in animo de significato; ut iste terminus, *omnis*, *quilibet*, *si*, *non*, *pro*, etc. 15 20

If categorical, it is general or individual, according as it stands for the nature of a thing or for the thing itself; it is general, equivocal, transcendental, or univocal.

Cathegoricum quoddam est commune, ut *homo*, *animal*, *canis*. Et dicitur terminus communis, quia principaliter significat naturam communem ad extra, sicut iste terminus, *homo*, principaliter significat naturam humanam, et iste terminus, *canis*, principaliter significat naturam caninam, et iste terminus *animal* principaliter significat naturam animalis, scilicet, animalitatem; et iste terminus, *Deus*, principaliter significat naturam divinam, que est communis tribus personis in divinis. 25

Et cathegoricum quoddam est discretum, ut hoc pronomen, *hoc*, et alia pronomina demonstrativa, vel similiter propria nomina, ut *Johannes*, *Robertus* etc. Sed adhuc terminus discretus potest capi singulariter, ut *hic*, 30

*iste*, et pluraliter, ut *hii*, *isti*. Si enim sit terminus communis, vel est terminus univocus vel equivocus. Si sit equivocus, vel est transscendens, quod est predicabile de omnibus entibus, sicut iste terminus *ens*, vel *unum*,  
 5 vel *res* vel *aliquid*, quia omne quod est, est ens, et unum, et res, et aliquid (et ideo dicitur terminus transscendens); vel aliter est terminus univocus et non transscendens; sicut iste terminus, *angelus*, vel *homo*, vel *animal*.

Terminus substantialis est terminus qui significat naturam rei sine connotacione accidentalis proprietatis; ut iste terminus, *homo*, significat essenciam humanam sine connotacione extranea. Et iste terminus, *Angelus*, principaliter significat naturam vel essenciam angelicam sine connotacione extranea. Sed terminus accidentalis  
 15 est diccio significans essenciam rei, connotando accidentalem proprietatem: | sicut iste terminus, *albus*, significat substantiam et similiter albedinem, que est proprietas extranea ab essencia, que est substantia; et iste terminus, *sacerdos*, vel *episcopus*, est terminus accidentalis, quia  
 20 significat hominem, et aliam proprietatem ultra, que est sacerdocium, vel episcopatus. Et dicitur terminus substantialis, quia quicquid est huiusmodi, sicut significatur principaliter per istum terminum, tunc necessario erit ipsum huiusmodi, dummodo ipsum erit; sicut, si aliquis  
 25 sit homo, tunc ipse non potest esse, nisi fuerit homo; et hac de causa dicitur iste terminus, *homo*, substantialis. Et dicitur terminus accidentalis quia, quamvis aliquid sit huiusmodi, sicut significatur per illum terminum, tamen potest esse quod ipsum sit, quamvis non sit huiusmodi;  
 30 sicut, quamvis aliquis sit clericus vel sacerdos, idem tamen potest esse postea cum hoc quod non sit clericus, vel sacerdos.

Aliquando tenetur terminus in recto, et aliquando in obliquo. Tenetur in recto, quando tenetur in nominativo  
 35 casu; tenetur in obliquo, quando tenetur in alio casu quam in nominativo. Similiter, quodlibet verbum presentis temporis est rectum, et quodlibet verbum alterius temporis quam presentis est obliquum. Similiter, iste terminus qui dicitur suppositum in grammatica, dicitur

A term is called *substantial* or *accidental*, according as it stands for the substance or the accident which belongs to it.

When *accidental*, it denotes in its object a quality that can be removed; when *substantial*, it denotes one that cannot.

It varies in sense according to its case, when a *substantive*; according to its tense, when a *verb*; and is called *subject*, *copula* or *predicate*.

32. *Sacerdos*. Wyclif is logically right; but a Catholic theologian would have put 'antea' instead of 'postea'. The axiom is: *Once a priest, always a priest*. Mortal sin, according to Wyclif's later developed system, destroys the priesthood.

subiectum in logica. Et oppositum vocatur predicatum; et verbum illos duos terminos copulans, dicitur copula. Et aliquando subiectum et predicatum expresse ponitur, et aliquando subintelligitur; verbi gratia, in hac oratione: *video hominem*, subintelliguntur tam subiectum quam 5 predicatum. Sed in ista oratione, *ego sum videns hominem*, exprimitur utrumque. Nam iste terminus, *ego*, est subiectum; et hoc verbum, *sum*, est copula; et iste terminus, *videns hominem*, est predicatum. Nota etiam quod omnis terminus vocatur 'in contextu', et omnis 10 oratio vocatur 'contextum'.

A term, may be *universal*, *particular*, *common*, or *singular*.

Terminorum aliqui sunt universales, aliqui particulares, aliqui communes, aliqui singulares. Termini universales sunt isti, *omnis*, *nichil*, *nullus*, *uterque*, *quilibet*, *neuter* et *unusquisque*. Termini particulares sunt isti, *quidam*, 15 *aliquis*, *alius*, *alter* et *unus*. Termini communes sunt tales, *homo*, *angelus*, et *animal* etc. Termini singulares vel discreti sunt omnia nomina propria, vel pronomina, vel adverbium demonstrativa, ut *Petrus*, *Paulus*, *ego*, *tu*, *ille*, *hic*, *ibi*, *tunc*, *nunc*, *sicut* et *idem*. 20

If singular, it is *immediate*: if common, *mediate*, because it can receive a sort of demonstration.

Et termini communes dicuntur mediati, et termini discreti, immediati. Et dicitur terminus mediatum, quia habet terminum inferiorem se per quem potest probari. Sicut in ista propositione *homo est*, hoc signum, *homo*, est terminus mediatum, quia habet pronomen inferius, 25 per quod potest probari, resolvendo istum terminum communem, *homo*, per unum terminum singularem, sic: *hoc est* (demonstrando *Petrum*): et *hoc est homo*: ergo *homo est*. Terminus immediatus est talis terminus, qui non habet aliquem terminum inferiorem se per quem potest probari. Sic est quodlibet pronomen demonstrativum.

A term is *univocal*, if it is applied to different things in the same sense; *equivocal*, if it is applied to different things in different senses.

Terminus univocus est qui per eandem nominis rationem significat res diversas: sicut iste terminus, *homo*, significat omnem hominem sub ista ratione que 35 est *animal rationale*. Et iste terminus, *animal*, significat omne animal sub ista ratione qua est *substantia animata sensibilis*; quia omnis homo est animal rationale, et omne animal est substantia animata sensibilis. Terminus equivocus est, qui propter rationes diversas significat res 40 diversas, sive ipsa sint diversarum specierum (sicut *animal latrabile*, *marina bellua*, et *celeste sidus*, quorum quodlibet sit iste terminus *canis*, secundum diversas rationes specificas), sive sint eiusdem speciei. Et sic iste terminus,

*Johannes*, significat equivoce *Johannem* existentem Oxonie et *Johannem* existentem Rome; quia nulla est ratio secundum quam quodlibet illorum est *Joannes*. Et ideo talia propria nomina sunt termini precipue equivoci.

- 5 Terminus denominatus est, qui imponitur alicui aliene  
 21 rei ab arte, vel ab habitu, vel ab officio, vel a potencia  
 sive a proprietate alia, et habet consimile principium  
 et dissimilem finem ab illo termino a quo dicitur; ut  
 a *grammatica* dicitur *grammaticus*, tanquam ab arte, et  
 10 a *fortitudine* dicitur *fortis*, tanquam ad habitu, et a  
*sacerdotio* dicitur *sacerdos*, tanquam ab officio, et a cursu  
 dicitur homo *cursor*, tanquam a potencia.

A *denominated* term is one which is derived from another term.

- Terminorum alius est concretus, alius abstractus.  
 Terminus concretus est terminus significans rem que  
 15 indifferenter potest contrahi ad suppositionem simplicem  
 vel personalem; sicut iste terminus, *homo*, significat in  
 propositione tam personaliter pro persona, quam eciam  
 simpliciter pro natura. Sed terminus abstractus significat  
 pure essenciam rei sine connotatione aliqua ad suppo-  
 20 situm cui inest, sicut iste terminus *deitas*, *humanitas*,  
*albedo*, *canitas* etc. et sic *homo* est concretum, et  
*humanitas* abstractum; et *Deus* est concretum et *deitas*  
 abstractum; *album* est concretum, et *albedo* abstractum.  
 Et sic ex omnibus terminis concretis possunt abstracta  
 25 capi.

A *concrete* term is one that can stand either for the thing or for the nature of the thing; an *abstract* term stands only for the latter.

- Terminorum alii sunt finiti, alii infiniti, alii privativi,  
 et alii distrahentes, et alii ampliativi. Termini finiti  
 sunt termini sumpti sine negacionibus, ut: *Deus*, *homo*.  
 Termini infiniti sunt tales qui sunt sumpti cum nega-  
 30 cionibus, ut: *non-homo*, *non-Deus*, *non-animal*, *non-*  
*Cicero*, etc. Termini privativi sunt tales, ut: *iniustum*,  
*insipiens*, *indivisibile* etc. Et dicuntur termini priva-  
 tivi, quia hec prepositio *in*, in talibus dictionibus,  
 privat suum subsequens; sicut, si *Johannes sit insipiens*,

*Definite* and *indefinite* terms: without or with the prefix *not*:

*Privative* terms, with the prefix *in*:

2. ratione *pro* Rome. 33. propositionibus *struck out after* talibus.

15. As we shall frequently meet with this word 'suppositio' in the course of the work, it may be as well to remind the reader of its technical meaning before we come to its exposition, many pages further on. It is 'the use of a term for any thing whatever', which of course depends to some extent on the intention of the user. Thus: '*man* is a word of five syllables'; '*man* is an eternal idea'; '*man* is a substance', and 'I am a *man*'; are four sentences, in each of which the supposition differs.

in hac preposicione hec propositio *in* privat sapienciam  
 terms signifying a Johanne. Termini distrahentes sunt isti termini:  
*absence;* *mortuum, corruptum, falsum* etc. Termini ampliativi sunt  
*extension or* qui secundum suam significacionem extendunt universaliter  
*modification of* ad futura vel ad praeterita vel ad possibilium vel aliquando 5  
 ad impossibilia; ut isti termini, *fuit, erit, opinabile, im-*  
*another term;* *possibile, intelligibile, significabile, potest, significat*, etc.  
 Termini modales sunt isti: *possibile, impossibile, necessa-*  
*rium, contingens* et eorum adverbia; ut *possibiliter, impossi-*  
*biliter, necessario, contingenter*, et quilibet terminus qui 10  
 modificat significacionem alicuius oracionis, sicut hic:  
*contingit hominem currere, vel contingenter homo currit*

Terminorum alii sunt impertinentes, alii converti-  
 biles; et alii quorum unus est inferior ad alium.  
 Termini impertinentes sunt; ut, *homo, lapis*; termini 15  
 convertibiles; ut, *homo, risibile, Deus et omnipotens*, quia  
 quicquid significat unus illorum duorum terminorum,  
 significat et alius: et sic de duobus aliis. Et non refert  
 ponere istum terminum, *Deus*, loco istius termini, *omni-*  
*potens*, nec econtra, quantum ad veritatem vel falsitatem 20  
 propositionis, servata congruitate. Termini inferiores et  
 superiores sunt, *homo, animal, substantia*, etc.; ut si quis  
 intelligit hominem, intelligit animal, et non e converso.

Terminorum aliqui sunt resolubiles, et aliqui exponibiles.  
 et aliqui officiales. Termini resolubiles sunt termini com- 25  
 munes qui possunt resolvi usque ad terminos singulares;  
 ut isti termini, *animal, homo* etc.; nam animalium aliud  
 est rationale et aliud irrationale; et rationalium aliud  
 est angelus et aliud est homo; et hominum, alius est  
 Sor et alius Plato. Termini exponibiles sunt omnes dic- 30  
 ciones exclusive; ut, *tantum, solum, solummodo, precise,*  
 et *dumtaxat*; et termini exceptivi; ut *preter, preterquam,*  
 et *nisi* etc. et *omne*, signum universale affirmativum.  
 Similiter dicitur *aliud, incipit | desunt, omnis* etc. com- 2<sup>b</sup>  
 parativus gradus et superlativus, et omnes termini redu- 35  
 plicativi; sicut sunt isti: *homo in quantum homo, Deus*  
*secundum quod Deus, Cristus in eo quod homo vel quantum*  
*est homo*; et sic de similibus terminis habentibus vim

8. *Impossibile* is here reckoned both amongst the ampliative and the modal terms, because it both extends the scope of signification and profoundly modifies it; as, *a circle is an impossible square*; here the subject "circle" is extended to "square", and the meaning of "square" is modified.

negacionis. Termini officiales sunt omnes termini morales and terms that  
et termini concernentes actum mentis; ut, *scire, credere, represent*  
*intelligere, precipere, dubitare, imaginari, appetere.* *functions of*  
*(officiales);*

Item, terminorum aliqui sunt termini prime intencionis terms having a  
5 et aliqui secunde intencioni; et aliqui prime imposicionis sense  
et aliqui secunde imposicionis. Vocatur enim terminus independent of  
prime intencionis signum quod significat suum signifi- or dependent on  
catum, non connotando rationem singularitatis aut their  
universalitatis, ut isti termini: *Deus, angelus, homo* etc. universality;  
10 Terminus secunde intencionis est terminus qui connotat  
singularitatem vel universalitatem, sicut isti termini:  
*universale, singulare, genus, species, substantia prima,*  
*substantia secunda.* Sed terminus prime imposicionis  
vocatur terminus quicunque significans primarie signi- signifying an  
15 catum quod non est signum artificiale; ut iste terminus: idea, or  
*homo, animal, universale, genus, species* etc. Terminus conventional  
secunde imposicionis est terminus significans primarie signs of an  
signum humanitus inventum, ut sunt talia: *nomen, verbum,* idea,  
*adverbium,* etc. Termini analogi sunt isti: *ens, unum,*  
20 *universale, singulare, particulare, genus* etc. Et notandum  
quod terminus aliquid significat primarie et aliquid  
secundarie. Terminus significat primarie illud quod  
principaliter apprehenditur per illum; sicut iste terminus,  
*homo,* primarie vel principaliter significat hominem, sci-  
25 licet naturam humanam, et secundarie significat *Johannem*  
vel *Robertum.* Et iste terminus, *angelus,* primarie significat  
naturam angelicam, et secundarie *Gabrielem, Michaellem,*  
et alium angelum.

20. participium.

10. *Prime — secunde intencionis.* 'Intention' is here a technical Scholastic term, signifying pretty nearly the same as 'attention' in our days. We attend *in the first place* to things, and *afterwards* to our thoughts of things.

## CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

'Universal' has three meanings, according as it causes, communicates itself, or represents anything universally.

Iam consequenter dicendum est de universalibus, supponendo primo quod tripliciter dicitur universale: primum est universale *causacione*, ut *Deus, sol, luna* etc.; secundum est universale *communicacione*, ut *natura humana*, sive *angelica*. etc.; et dicuntur universalia *communicacione*, quia sunt universales nature, communicate pluribus suppositis. Et sic *natura humana* communicatur omnibus individuis speciei humane, quia inest omni homini quod sit homo. Et hec *natura angelica* communicatur omnibus angelis, quia inest cuilibet angelo quod essentialiter sit angelus. Tercium est universale *representacione*; sicut isti termini, *homo, animal, lapis*, sive sint termini scripti, sive termini vocales, sive intenciones in anima cum illis convertibiles. Et dicuntur universalia *representacione*, quia principaliter representant universalia a parte rei, sicut iste terminus, *homo*, representat principaliter vel primarie naturam humanam, que natura est species universalis omnium hominum, et universale a parte rei; et sic omnis talis terminus est signum et principaliter signatum per istum terminum significatum.

Five sorts of universals in the last sense (*predicables*): 1) the *genus*, that answers the question *What?* for many distinct species,

Sed notandum est quod quinque sunt universalia *communicacione*, scilicet: *genus, species, diferencia, proprium* et *accidens*. *Genus* est universale *in quid*, predicabile de multis in quid *specifice distinctis*; ut, hoc *genus, animal*, predicatur *in quid*, de homine, de equo et leone; et ista tria animalia sunt *specifice distincta*. Et dicitur *animal in quid* predicari de homine et leone, quia hoc *genus, animal*, est pars quidditativa istius speciei, *homo*, et similiter istius speciei *leo*; et sic de ceteris speciebus animalium; nam querendo questionem de quidditate hominis, sic dicendo: *quid* est homo? consequens responsio est dicere quod sit animal: — *quid* est leo? — animal, etc.

1. cap. *deest*. 2. Initial I in red ink and Tractatus de universalibus in marg. 3. individuis — angelus bottom of page.



Et hic nota quod aliquis terminus interrogativus est pro personis, ut *quis?* ut querendo, quis est iste? consequens responsio est dicere, quod est Johannes vel Vilhelmus, etc. Et aliquis est terminus interrogativus pro quidditate et pro essentia rei, ut iste terminus *quid?* ut querendo quid est animal, respondendum est quod est substantia. Item, aliquis est terminus interrogativus pro qualitate vel modo; ut querendo *qualis* est homo? respondendum est quod est rationalis, vel albus, vel sacerdos; quia *rationalis* est qualitas essentialis hominis, et similiter angeli; et albedo est qualitas accidentalis substantie albe. Item, aliquis est terminus interrogativus pro quantitate; ut iste terminus *quantum*; ut, querendo *quantum* est hoc corpus? respondendum est quod est pedalis, vel septipedalis quantitatis.

*Species* est universale in *quid*, predicabile de pluribus solum *differentibus numero*; sicut hec species, *homo*, predicatur essentialiter de omnibus hominibus qui non differunt specie, sed solum *numero*; et sicut genus est pars quidditativa speciei, sic species est pars quidditativa individui vel suppositi; ut, querendo quid est hoc? demonstrando Johannem, consequens responsio est dicere quod est homo.

Differentia est universale in *quale*, predicabile de multis specie distinctis, ut hec differentia, *rationale*, predicatur in *quale*, tam de homine quam de angelo; et illa sunt specie distincta. Eciam differentia vocatur *specific* differentia, quia constituit speciem; quia *rationale*, adveniens animali, facit hominem; et sic *irrationale*, adveniens animali, facit equum, asinum vel leonem: et sic de ceteris.

*Proprium* est universale *per se* predicabile convertibiliter cum specie: sicut *risibile* predicatur de homine, et hoc convertibiliter, quia quicquid est risibile est homo, et e contra. Et non refert ponere istum terminum, *homo*, in loco istius termini, *risibile*, nec e contra, quantum ad veritatem preposicionis. *Rudibile* eciam est proprium asini et *hinnibile* est proprium equo; et sic omnis species habet proprium (si quis illud cognosceret) quod est convertibile cum eadem specie.

*Accidens* est universale quod per accidens et non *per se* inest subiecto; ut *albedo*, *nigredo*, *gressio*, *comestio*, *amor*, *odium* etc. Quia quamvis aliquid sit album vel

30. enim *pro* eciam.

(the question *What?* or *Who?* seeking the essence, or the person;

the question *How?* seeking the quality, essential or not;

and the question *How great?* seeking the quantity).

2) The *species*, answering the question *What?* for many distinct individuals.

3) The *difference*, answering the question *How?* for many species.

4) The *property*, belonging essentially to one whole species, and to only one.

5) And the *accident*, that only happens to be present in the individuals.

nigrum, illud tamen potest esse cum hoc quod non sit album nec nigrum: et sic de ceteris.

Four sorts of identity: analogical, generic, specific and numerical. *Analogical* identity unites the ultimate divisions of being; *Generic* identity, all the species of the same genus; *specific* identity, all the individuals of the same species; *numerical* identity, the different parts of the same substance.

Sed notandum quod quadruplex est identitas; scilicet, analogica, generalis, specialis et numeralis. Identitas analogica est inter primam causam et causatum, est inter 5 substantiam et accidens; quia quamvis Deus, substantia et accidens non communicant in aliquo genere, tamen conveniunt in ente transcendente et analogo, quia omnia que sunt, sunt encia analogice; et sic omnia sunt idem in entitate. Alia est identitas generalis, sicut inter ho- 10 minem et angelum et inter asinum et leonem, et inter lapidem et arborem; nam homo et angelus sunt idem in *substantia*, que est genus generatum; et asinus et leo sunt idem in hoc genere *animal*, et lapis et arbor sunt idem in hoc genere *corpus*. Alia est identitas specifica, sicut 15 inter Sor et Platonem et inter unum angelum et alium, quia Sor et Plato sunt idem in specie humana, et duo angeli sunt idem in specie angelica, et sic de ceteris. Alia identitas numeralis, sicut est de Christo et humanitate eiusdem, et de anima hominis et persona eiusdem; 20 nam eadem persona in numero est *Christus* et eius *humanitas*, et eadem persona numero est iste *homo* et *anima* eiusdem: et sic racio, voluntas et memoria sunt eadem anima in numero.

4. et generalis. 11. idem *after* sunt *deest*.

9. *Idem*. This word points out the author's Realistic tendency. Having just admitted that there is only analogy between the supreme genera of beings, another man would have written: *Omnia sunt similia in entitate*. The whole of this passage is instructive. 24. *Numero*. In *De Apostasia* (p. 115, l. 19, 20) Wyclif narrows his definition of numerical identity very much. "There must be neither real nor even thinkable (rationis) distinction, where there is numerical identity. The sole difference is in name."

## CAPITULUM TERCIMUM.

Dicto jam de universalibus et identitate quadruplici Ten categories:  
tractandum est de decem predicamentis. Et notandum one for  
quod decem sunt predicamenta; scilicet: *Substancia*, substance, nine  
5 *quantitas*, *qualitas*, *relacio*, *accio*, *passio*, *ubi*, *quando*, for the  
*habitus* et *posicio*; et ex istis X predicamentis solum accidents.  
unum est genus substancie, et novem sunt genera acci- Three are  
dencium et tria istorum predicamentorum sunt encia abso- absolute, seven  
luta, scilicet: *substancia*, *qualitas* et *quantitas*, et septem relative.  
10 sunt encia respectiva, sicut sunt septem alia. Et dicitur ens  
absolutum vel quia potest per se esse, sicut est substancia,  
3<sup>h</sup> vel quia est ens non requirens aliud localiter | extrinsecum  
pro sua essencia, sicut quantitas vel qualitas. Et dicitur Why substance,  
ens respectivum, quia est respectus inter duo, sicut accio quantity and  
15 et passio est inter agens et passum; et quia non potest quality are  
agere, nisi agat in aliquod passum, sic omnis relacio est absolute and the  
inter dua relata, ut similitudo inter dua res, et differencia others not.  
est inter duas.

Substancia est *ens per se stans, et accidentibus absolutis* Definition of  
20 *substans*; sicut homo est subiectum albedinis, quantitatis,  
coloris et sciencie; et ista sunt accidentia absoluta, etc. substance,  
quantity.

Quantitas est *forma denominans substanciam esse formaliter quantam*; ut: linea, superficies.

Qualitas est *forma denominans subiectum esse formaliter* quality.  
25 *quale*, ut color, albedo, caliditas, etc. relation.

Relacio est *respectus formaliter referens aliqua ad in-*  
*ricem*; ut: similitudo, fraternitas, differencia etc.

1. Capitulum Tercium deest; Sequitur de predicamentis in red ink in marg., 2. Initial V in blue ink.

9. *Quantitatis*. Notice that Wyclif admits as yet the existence of 'absolute accidents'; though as, in the third part of *Logica*, he speaks doubtfully of the possibility of their self-subsistence, he probably merely intends here to oppose *absolute* and *relative* accidents.

- action, Accio est *respectus denominans subiectum formaliter agere*; ut: calefacio, frigefacio, secacio.
- passion, Passio est *respectus denominans substanciam formaliter pati*; ut: secari, uri; quia adustio passiva denominat substanciam formaliter aduri etc. 5
- locality, Locus est *respectus denominans substanciam formaliter locari*.
- time, Quando est *respectus denominans subiectum esse in tempore*; ut: hora, dies, annus.
- belonging, Habitus est *respectus denominans subiectum formaliter 10 habituari*; ut armacio denominat hominem armari; calceacio denominat hominem calceari.
- and position, Posicio est *respectus denominans aliquem formaliter poni*; ut sessio, stacio etc.

14. It may be interesting to quote here the mnemonic distich that contains the ten *predicamenta* or categories: *Arbor* (Subst.) *sex* (Quant.) *servos* (Rel.) *ardore* (Qual.) *refrigerat* (Act.) *ustos* (Pass.); *Ruri* (loc.) *cras* (time) *stabo* (position), *sed tunicatus ero* (belonging).

## CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

10	<p>In omni predicamento est dare unum principium, quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum contentorum in illo predicamento: sicut primum principium de predi-</p> <p>5 camento substancie est <i>deus</i>, et ipse est super omnem substanciam creatam; primum principium de predicamento quantitatis est <i>unitas</i>, quia unitas est principium tam quantitatis continue quam discrete; primum princi-</p> <p>10 pium de predicamento qualitatis est <i>gradus</i>, quia omnis latitudo qualitatis componitur ex gradibus; primum princi-</p> <p>pium de predicamento relacionis est <i>dependencia</i>; primum principium de predicamento accionis est <i>contemplacio</i></p> <p><i>intelligencie</i>, quia per illam accionem formabitur alia</p> <p>15 omnis accio; primum principium de predicamento pas-</p> <p>sionis est <i>receptio prime materie</i>; primum principium de predicamento 'ubi' est <i>situs puncti</i>, quia totus situs mundi</p> <p>componitur ex sitibus punctalibus; primum principium de predicamento 'quando' est <i>indivisible instans</i>, quia,</p> <p>20 sicut mundus componitur ex punctalibus, sic tempus componitur ex instantibus; primum principium posicio-</p> <p>nis est <i>situs centri</i>, quia posicio est respectus inter corpus positum et illum situm; primum principium habitus est habitus vel <i>habere</i>.</p>	<p>In each predicament, there is a first principle of all:</p> <p>for <i>substance</i>, God;</p> <p>for <i>quantity</i>, the unit;</p> <p>for <i>quality</i>, degree;</p> <p>for <i>relation</i>, dependency;</p> <p>for <i>action</i>, thought;</p> <p>for <i>passion</i>, the receptivity of primal matter;</p> <p>for <i>locality</i>, the point;</p> <p>for <i>time</i>, the instant;</p> <p>for <i>position</i>, the centre;</p> <p>and for <i>belonging</i>, to have.</p>
----	--	---

## CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

*Propositions in  
general.*

Propositio large loquendo est *ens complexe significans*; et sic, quia omne quod est significat complexe se esse, omne quod est satis bene potest dici propositio. Sed multo contraccius diffinitur propositio vel describitur, 5 secundum quod est oratio artificialiter inventa, sic: propositio est *oratio indicativa, congrua, verum vel falsum significans. et perfectum intellectum reddens*. Vel: propositio est *ratio indicativa, congrua, significans complexe sicut est vel sicut non est*; ut ista propositio: *homo est*, 10 signat primarie sicut est et complexe; et ideo est vera; et hec propositio, 'nemo est' significat primarie complexe sicut *non est*; et ideo illa est falsa. Sed notandum quod duplex est primaria significatio: scilicet, naturalis et

A proposition,  
widely and  
strictly defined;  
always true in  
so far as it  
always means  
something;  
but it may mean  
what is not.

artificialis. Primaria significatio naturalis propositionis est 15 illa mediante qua propositio significat naturaliter se ipsam. Primaria significatio artificialis est illa mediante qua propositio significat ex imposicione idiomatis veritatem sicut est, vel sicut non est; sed hec propositio, *Deus est*, primarie ex imposicione significat istam veri- 20 tatem, scilicet, *Deum esse*; et ista propositio, *homo est*, primarie ex imposicione significat *hominem esse*; et ista 4<sup>n</sup> propositio, *nullus Deus est*, significat primarie ex imposicione sicut non est, nec possibile est esse.

Sed notandum quod quintuplex est propositio, scilicet: 25 *mentalis, vocalis et scripta* propositio; *realis*, ut quolibet res movens ad componendum vere vel false; et quinta propositio est sic esse sicut propositio significat.

*Divisions:*  
mental, verbal,  
written, real,  
and true  
propositions.  
A mental  
proposition  
may mean four  
different things.

Propositio mentalis est in anima, et ipsa potest intelligi quadrupliciter. Aliquando capitur pro intencionibus ade- 30 quate et complete inclinantibus ad aliquam componendum vel dividendum. Secundo modo capitur pro actibus aggregatis, que sunt circa proposicionem compositam ex

intencionibus. Tercio modo capitur pro actu complexo correspondenti toti proposicioni. Et quarto, accipitur proposicio mentalis pro illa anima.

Proposicio in voce componitur ex vocibus successive prolatis etc. A verbal proposition exists while any one of its parts, successively uttered, exists. Proposicio in voce est quamdiu aliqua pars eius est, quia non est res successiva, sicut tempus. A written proposition has its own meaning; if not to us, to God.

Proposicio scripta est aggregatum ex terminis scriptis, cum significacione sua complexa. Et quamvis proposicio scripta non significat nobis, tamen continue significat se ipsam Deo, et similiter qualiter imponitur ad significandum primarie.

Proposicio realis est, ut *iste homo, iste lapis* etc. quia sicut in alia proposicione est subiectum et predicatum et copula, sic in *isto homine* est dare istam personam, que est pars subiecta speciei humane, que est tamquam subiectum; et est dare similiter naturam humanam, que essentialiter inest isti homini tamquam predicatum, et realiter predicatur de isto homine. Et est dare essenciam istius hominis, que est realis copula copulans istum hominem cum sua natura. Et sicut in proposicione artificiali predicatum dicitur de subiecto, sic in ista proposicione reali, *iste homo*, est essentialiter et realiter natura humana. A real, or thing-proposition is any individual; the hypostasis is the subject, the specific nature the attribute and the individual nature (istius hominis) the copula.

Quinta proposicio est veritas significata a parte rei, sicut ista veritas: *hominem esse*, est veritas complexe, quia verum complexum; et hec est causa qualiter debet dici proposicio. A true proposition agrees with the thing it represents.

Proposicionum alia categorica, alia ypothetica. Categorica est illa que habet unum subiectum et unum predicatum, et unicam copulam principalem, sicut est talis: *Homo est animal*. *Ly* "homo" est subiectum et *ly* "animal" predicatum, et hoc verbum, *est*, est copula. Et dico, principalis copula, quia aliquando sunt due copule in proposicione categorica; ut: *hic Sor qui vivit est animal*. Hec sunt duo verba, scilicet *vivit* et hoc verbum *est*, quorum quodlibet est copula; sed primum verbum non est copula principalis, sed secundum verbum, Propositions in particular: Categorical and hypothetical; categorical, when there is but one subject, predicate and principal copula; but the copula never can be principal when the subject is a relative.

24. quam *pro* quia.

11. *Significat — deo*. This may allude to obscure passages of Holy Writ, of which the present work is intended to be the Logic.

22. *Iste homo*. We must not suppose that Wyclif considers the demonstrative mention of a man to be a real proposition. He means the man himself, *qua* giving grounds for some affirmation or other. Cf. p. 14, l. 26, 27. 29. *Ly* is old French for *the* = the word; its use in philosophical and theological works was common at one time. St. Thomas employs it very often.

scilicet hoc verbum, *est*; quia nullum tale verbum cui relativum reddit suppositum est principale verbum.

Different sorts  
of categorical  
propositions;  
compound or  
simple;

Aliquando componitur propositio categorica ex subiecto simplici et predicato simplici: ut, *hic homo est animal*. Aliquando componitur ex subiecto composito et 5 predicato composito; ut: *homo virtuosus est bonum animal*; quia in hac propositione iste terminus, *homo*, non est subiectum vel suppositum, sed totus iste terminus compositus: *homo virtuosus*, quia totum subiectum supponit, et nulla eius pars; et eodem modo dicendum est de 10 predicato. Sciendum eciam est quod nullum syncategorema est subiectum vel pars subiecti; ut quando dicitur *omnis homo currit*, hoc syncategorema, *omnis*, non est subiectum nec pars subiecti; et sic de universali negativa.

*affirmative* or  
*negative*:  
affirmative,  
when the  
principal verb  
is affirmed,  
negative in the  
contrary case.

Propositionum alia affirmativa, alia negativa. Affirma- 15 tiva est illa, in qua principale verbum affirmatur; ut: *Deus qui non movetur, est immobilis*. Hic sunt duo verba, quorum unum affirmatur et aliud negatur; sed quia hoc unum, *est*, est principale verbum, et illud affirmatur; ideo propositio debet dici affirmativa. Negativa est illa in 20 qua principale verbum negatur: ut hic; *Deus qui causat non est causatus*. In hac propositione, hoc verbum *est* est principale verbum; et quia illud negatur, tota propositio debet dici negativa. Et sic de ceteris.

A proposition is  
*universal*, when  
the subject, a  
general term,  
is affirmed or  
denied distribu-  
tively by *omnis*  
or *nullus*;

Propositionum alia *universalis*, alia *particularis*; alia 25 *indefinita*, alia *singularis*. Universalis est illa in qua subiicitur terminus communis signo universali | determi- 4<sup>b</sup> natus: ut; *omnis homo est animal*, et; *nullus homo est animal*; in illa propositione affirmativa hoc subiectum, *homo*, distribuitur per hoc signum universale, *omnis*; 30 et in universali negativa distribuitur hoc subiectum, *homo*, per hoc signum universale, *nullus*.

*particular*,  
when the subject  
is affirmed, &c.  
distributively by  
*aliquis*;

Particularis est illa in qua subiicitur terminus com-  
munis, signo particulari determinatus; ut, *aliquis homo*  
est sanctus. In ista propositione, hoc subiectum, *homo*, 35  
determinatur per hoc signum particulare, *aliquis*, ad  
supponendum particulariter.

*indefinite*, when  
it is preceded  
by no sign;

Propositio indefinita est illa in quod subiicitur ter-  
minus communis sine signo aliquo universali vel parti-

12. pars subiicitur *pro* pars subiecti.

2. *Cui . . . suppositum.*" A verb to which a relative renders the subject. In *Sor qui vivit*, *Sor* becomes the subject of *vivit* by means of *qui*.



ulari precedente; et iste terminus, *homo*, est terminus communis.

Proposicio singularis est illa in qua subiicitur terminus distinctus vel singularis; [*distinctus*,] ut in ista proposicione, *Sor currit*; *singularis*, ut in ista proposicione, *hic currit*; quia, ut dictum est, propria nomina sunt termini discreti, et pronomina demonstrativa sunt termini singulares.

*singular*, when it is either a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun.

Et sciendum quod alia est *qualitas* proposicionis, et alia *quantitas*. Qualitas proposicionis est affirmacio vel negacio. Sed quantitas proposicionis est universalitas, particularitas, indefiniteitas vel singularitas; et ideo oportet diversimode respondere ad questiones quesitas de proposicionibus. Ut, si queratur *quanta* est ista? respondendum est quod *universalis*, vel *particularis*, vel indefinita, vel singularis, secundum quod proposicio habet se in quantitate. Et si queratur, que est ista? respondendum est *cathegorica* vel *hypothetica*. Et si queratur *qualis* est ista? de aliqua proposicione, respondendum est quod affirmativa vel *negativa*. Ad cognoscendum hoc datur versus:

The *quality* of a proposition is its affirmation or denial; the *quantity* is the degree of its universality.


Que? *ka*, vel *ip*; qualis? *ne* vel *aff*; et quanta: *par*, *in*, *sin*.

1. distinctus *deest*. 9. aliqua.

23. The explanation of this hexameter is as follows: *Ka* = cathegorica; *ip* = hypothetica; *ne* = negativa; *aff* = affirmativa; *par* = particularis; *in* = indefinita (it is perhaps a slip of the pen for *un* (universalis); and *sin* = singulare. It is seen that one form of the quantity of propositions is here left out.

## CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Ad cognoscendum repugnanciam vel contrarietatem inter propositiones, tam singularis numeri quam pluralis, datur talis figura:



Lex et natura contrariarum talis est, quod si una sit <sup>5</sup> vera, reliqua erit falsa, tam in terminis substantialibus quam in terminis accidentalibus; ut, si hec sit vera: *omnis sapiencia a domino deo est*, hec est falsa: *nulla*

*sapientia a domino deo est; et e contra. Similiter si hec sunt vera: omnia per ipsum facta sunt; hec erit falsa: nulla per ipsum facta sunt, et e contra. Si hec vera: nulla per ipsum facta sunt, hec erit falsa. omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Sed ista non potest esse falsa: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, de potestate Dei ordinata.*

*Contrary propositions cannot both be true unless the sense is changed.*

Et si arguitur quod sic, quia aliqua per ipsum facta non sunt, ergo non sunt per ipsum omnia facta: hic dicitur negando consequenciam propter equivocacionem.

10 Et arguitur ulterius, probando quod aliqua per ipsum facta non sunt, per hoc quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt aliqua, et illa per ipsum facta non sunt: ergo aliqua per ipsum facta non sunt. Dicitur, concedendo quod "omnia per ipsum facta sunt", et negando quod

15 "aliqua per ipsum facta non sunt" si iste terminus, aliqua, supponit precise pro illis distributive, pro quibus supponit subiectum in universali distributive; quia in ista proposicione, omnia per ipsum facta sunt, distribuitur hoc subiectum implicite, res, solum pro causatis; ita

20 quod iste sit sensus: omnes creature per ipsum facte sunt; et hoc est verum. Et si subiectum in suo contradictorio supponat precise pro eisdem distributive, tunc illa est falsa, quia tunc illa ita significat quod aliquae creature per ipsum facte non sunt; et illa est falsa.

*Example of an argument in which the word res is taken to mean being and creature, and therefore not taken in the same sense.*

25 Sed notandum quod in predicacione indirecta et in terminis accidentalibus possunt simul duo contraria esse falsa. Exemplum primum est tale; ista duo contraria sunt simul falsa: Omnis homo est episcopus; et: nemo

5<sup>a</sup> est episcopus; quia iste terminus episcopus est simul

30 terminus accidentalis. Predicacio directa est quando terminus inferior subiicitur et terminus superior predicatur; ut: homo est animal; predicacio indirecta est quando terminus superior est subiectum et terminus inferior est predicatum; ut: hoc animal est homo.

*Contrary propositions may be both false, when the predicate is an accidental term.*

35 Lex et natura subcontrariarum est, quod si una est vera, reliqua erit falsa, in omnibus terminis substancialibus; ut, si hec sit vera: aliquod animal est, hec erit falsa: aliquod animal non est. Sed in terminis accidentalibus possunt simul esse vere, vel simul false; ut, si

*Subcontrary propositions, when the terms are accidental, may both be either true or false.*

8. sicut pro hic.

6. *Ordinata.* This means that, though God's essence did not necessitate Him to create, His Wisdom did; which I believe is an idea peculiar to Wyclif.

aliquis homo currat et aliquis homo sedeat, tunc sunt iste due vere: *aliquis homo currit*, et *aliquis homo non currit*, et si quilibet homo currit, tunc est una vera et alia falsa.

Of two contradictory propositions, one is always true and the other false.

The truth of subalternate propositions depends on that of the more universal of the two.

Lex et natura contradictoriarum talis est quod, si <sup>5</sup> una est vera, reliqua erit falsa in omnibus terminis, et nulla est excepcio: ut si hec est vera: *quilibet homo est virtuosus*, hec erit falsa: *aliquis homo non est virtuosus*.

Lex et natura subalternarum talis est quod si universalis est vera, sua particularis erit vera et non e contra; <sup>10</sup> ut si hec sit vera: *omnis sapiencia a Domino Deo est*, hec erit vera: *aliqua sapiencia a Domino Deo est*; et si hec erit vera: *omnia per ipsum facta sunt*, hec erit vera: *aliqua per ipsum facta sunt*; et sic de negativis.

Rules for judging when, and in what place, any two propositions can be put in the above diagram.

Et notanda est una regula generalis ad respondendum <sup>15</sup> ad tales proposiciones qualiter stant in figura; et querendo quomodo stant in figura? *Omnis sapiencia a domino deo est*; et: *nulla sapiencia a Domino Deo est*, dicitur quod contrarie. quia universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa de consimilibus predicatis subiectis et copulis <sup>20</sup> et terminis precise pro eisdem supposicionibus contrarie stant in figura. Et sic respondetur de aliis figuris secundum quantitates proposicionum. Et hoc nota quod oportet quod talia que stant in figura fiant de consimilibus subiectis, predicatis et copulis; quia talia non stant in <sup>25</sup> figura: *omnis sapiencia a domino deo est*, et *nulla virtus a domino deo est*, quia ista duo subiecta, scilicet *sapiencia* et *virtus*, non sunt termini synonymi. Et oportet ulterius quod termini precise pro eisdem supponant, quia ista non stant in figura: *omnis homo est* et *aliquis homo non* <sup>30</sup> *est*; quia subiectum in universali supponit tam pro masculis quam femellis; quia tam signum universale quam subiectum per ipsum distributum est omnis generis, sed subiectum in particulari non supponit nisi solis pro masculis; quia hoc signum particulare *aliquis* est solum <sup>35</sup> masculini generis. Et per hoc determinatur hoc subiectum, *homo*, ad supponendum solum pro masculis.

A proposition of two words is categorical;

Et notandum, cum queritur: Que est ista, *homo est*? respondendum: *Est categorica*. Sed contra; categorica est

1.1. *Negativis*. We may add that the falsity of subalternate propositions depends on that of the less universal of the two. For instance, *all men are quadrupeds*, and *some men are quadrupeds*.

illa que habet unicum subiectum et unicum predicatum et copulam; sed hic deficit predicatum: ergo hec non est categorica. Illic dicitur quod hec propositio habet predicatum, quia hoc verbum, *est*, in ista propositio-  
 5 in omni simili ubi nichil sequitur, idem est copula quod predicatum; quia secundum communes regulas, aliquando hoc verbum, *est*, predicat secundum adiacens et ali-  
 quando tertium adiacens; predicat secundum adiacens, quando nullus terminus subsequitur illud verbum, ut hic:  
 10 *homo est*. Et predicat tertium adiacens quando est aliquid predicatum signans, ut hic: *homo est animal*. Nota quod tria sunt adiacencia in propositioe, quamvis non in omni. Primum adiacens est subiectum, secundum adiacens est copula, et tertium adiacens predicatum. Sed in  
 15 ista propositioe, *homo est*, hic verbum, *est*, predicat secundum adiacens, sed non est secundum adiacens nisi se ipsum: ergo predicat se ipsum. Et si predicat se ipsum, tunc est predicatum a se ipso et per consequens predicatum.

for its verb comprises the predicate and in then said to predicate the second adjacent: the three adjacents being the subject, the copula, and the predicate respectively; a man is, signifies, a man is being.

16. *nomē pro non.*

19. Wyclif omits as unnecessary to his subject to notice that in some cases a whole proposition is made up of one word, the verb is said to 'be of the first adjacent'. We may note that what he says here is often applied in the *Logicæ Continuatio*.

## CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Equipollence is the equivalence of two propositions to each other, caused by a negation:

Equipollencia est *equivalencia* duarum *proposicionum* ad *invicem*, *causata per negacionem*. Et hoc contingit tripliciter; vel sic quod negacio preponatur, vel postponatur, vel 3<sup>o</sup> quod sit negacio tam preposita quam postposita; 5 ut patet per istum versum:

*Pre*, contradic; *post*, contra; *pre* *postque*, subalter.

A negation placed *before* the subject of a proposition gives it a contradictory meaning; when placed *after*, it renders the meaning contrary:

Qui versus sic intelligitur. | *Pre*, *contradic*. Ille est, 5<sup>b</sup> quando negacio preponitur signo universali vel particulari in aliqua proposicione, tunc facit proposicionem equi- 10 pollere illi proposicioni que fuit contradictorium ante adventum illius negacionis, ut hec proposicio: *Non omnis, qui dicit mihi, domine, domine, introibit in regnum celorum*; equipollet huic: *Aliquis homo, qui dicit mihi: domine, domine! non introibit in regnum celorum*. Et ista 15 proposicio, *non nulli sunt fatui*, equipollet huic: *Aliqui vel multi sunt fatui*. — *Post contra*. Hoc est, quando negacio postponitur signo universali immediate ante verbum principale, equipollet suo contrario; ut ista proposicio: *Omnis egenus et mendicus non erit inter vos*, equipollent huic: 20 *Nullomodo egenus et mendicus erit inter vos*: quia isti duo termini omnino convertuntur. Et ista proposicio: *Omne opus servile non facietis in sabbato*, equipollet huic: *Nullum opus servile facietis in sabbato*. Et ista proposicio: *Omne mendacium ex veritate non est*, equipollet huic: 25 *Nullum mendacium ex veritate est*. Et ista proposicio: *Omnis fornicator aut invidus aut ararus non habet partem in regno Dei*, equipollet huic: *Nullus fornicator aut invidus aut ararus habet partem in regno Dei*. — *Pre* *postque*

1. Cap. deest.      2. Initial E in blue ink.      21. n<sup>o</sup>.

29. These examples, taken from Scripture, serve to justify Wyclif's assertion (*see Proemium*) that this work is the Logic of Holy Writ. There are plenty of them throughout the book.

*subalter.* Hoc est: quando negacio preponitur et post- placed *before*  
ponitur signo universali aut particulari, equipollet huic and *after*, it  
proposicioni, que fuit subalterna illius ante adventum turns it into  
negacionum, ut ista proposicio: *Non omnis angelus non* a subalternate.  
5 *est virtuosus* equipollet huic: aliquis angelus est virtuo-  
sus. Et ista proposicio: *Non nullus angelus non est vir-*  
*tuosus*, equipollet huic: *Aliquis angelus non est virtuosus.*

1. non est.

## CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

*Essential and modal propositions defined.*

Notandum quod aliqua propositio est *de inesse*, et aliqua modalis. Propositio *de inesse* est oratio *indicativa congrua non determinata modo modalī*, ut hec: *Deus est, homo est* etc. Propositio modalis est, *cui additur terminus modalis modificans compositionem indicativam vel infinitivam*; ut sic, *necessario homo est*; vel sic: *necesse est hominem esse*; *necesse est ut veniant scandala*, vel sic: *Impossibile est quod non veniant scandala*. Omnes tales sunt propositiones modales.

10

Modal terms render propositions properly modal, only when taken in the compound, not in the *divided* sense.

Sed notandum quod de talibus propositiōibus, in quibus ponitur terminus modalis, aliqua sumuntur in *sensu composito* et aliqua in *sensu diviso*; quia quando-  
cunque terminus modalis aut officialis precedit totaliter in propositione et finaliter sequitur, vel mediate; si illa propositio verificatur pro aliquo communi, tunc est *sensus compositus*. Ut: *necessario homo est, homo necessario est*, et *hominem esse est necessario*; quolibet istarum verificatur pro natura humana communi, quod illa necessario est. Sed si talis propositio verificetur pro singulari et pro isto vel pro isto homine, tunc est *sensus divinus*, ut hic: *Aliquem hominem necesse est esse*, quia ista sic debet probari: *istum necesse est esse*, et *iste est aliquis homo*: ergo etc. Sed ista, *necessario homo est* debet sic probari: *homo est*, et (de via nature) *non potest esse quin homo sit*, ergo *necessario homo est*.

20

And they are known to be taken in the compound sense if the sentence means the same in whatever place the modal terms stand.

1. Cap. deest.    2. Initial N in red ink.

13. Perhaps a better because more striking example of the *compound* and *divided* sense would be the following sophism: Qui videbat ante mille annis est mortuus hodie; sed Alexander Magnus vivebat ante mille annos; ergo Alexander Magnus est mortuus hodie. According as *hodie* is taken to modify *est* and *mortuus* together or made only to modify *est*, there are two very different senses.



Sed notandum quod multis modis dicitur *necessarium*. Different senses of the word *necessary*:  
 Aliquando omne utile dicitur necessarium, ut sic vestes 1. merely useful or  
 et cibi sunt necessarii. Sed alio modo capitur pro tali *repugnant with*  
*quod repugnat non esse*, et sic aliquod est necessarium *inexistence*:  
 5 *simpliciter* et aliquod necessarium *per accidens*. Neces- 2. necessity, absolute or  
 sarium simpliciter est, quod *non potest nec potuit nec* *relative*;  
*poterit esse falsum*, ut: 'deum esse'. Et ista propositio: 3. natural, ordained, or  
*necesse est deum esse* debet sic exponi: *Deus est*; et *foreknown*;  
*non potest esse quin deus est*; ergo *necesse est*  
 10 *deum esse*. Vel debet sic officari: *Hec propositio est*  
*necessaria*: deus est, *que primarie significat* 'deum  
*esse*', *vel* 'necessario deus est'. Necessarium *per accidens*  
 dicitur tribus modis: scilicet necessarium *quoad naturam*,  
 necessarium *quoad ordinacionem* et necessarium *quoad*  
 15 *prescenciam Dei*. Necessarium *quoad naturam* est, quod  
*a nulla natura creata potest impediri quin sit*; ut, quod  
 ego fui, quod mundus fuit. Sed Deus potest facere quod  
 ego non fui et quod mundus non fuit; et ista propo-  
 sitio: *necessario mundus fuit*, debet sic probari: *mundus*  
 20 *fuit* et (de via nature) *non potest non fuisse*; ergo *ne-*  
*cessario mundus fuit*. Necessarium *quoad ordinacionem*  
 6' est tale | *quod est vel erit ordinatum a deo*; ut si ego  
 ero cras, tunc necessario ego ero cras, et ista propo-  
 sitio debet sic probari: *ego ero cras*, et *repugnat* (isti  
 25 *ordinacioni divine*) *quod non ero cras*; ideo *necessario*  
*ero cras*. Necessarium *quoad prescenciam* est tale *quod*  
*non est ordinatum, sed prescitum a Deo*; ut, 'necessario  
 ego peccabo'. Ista debet sic exponi: *Ego peccabo, et*  
*repugnat* (prescencie divine) *quod non peccabo*; ergo etc.  
 30 Item, 'Necesse est ut veniant scandala'. debet sic pro-  
 bari: *talis propositio est necessaria*: 'scandala evenient',  
*que primarie significat* 'scandala evenire': ergo etc. Vel:  
*scandala evenient, et repugnat* (prescencie divine) scan-

1. natural,  
 antecedent, or  
 consequent;

9. potest non. 9—11. vel debet -- necessario deus est *in marg.*

18. This is a doctrine peculiar to Wyclif. Aquinas, in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, asserts that God cannot make the past not to have been; and he is followed by the whole School. Wyclif states the same opinion again, further on. But he seems to contradict it decidedly in the third part of *Logica* and elsewhere. Mr. Matthew suggests the substitution of *potuit* for *potest* on l. 17, and p. 28, l. 30. 19. *Probari* is here and elsewhere employed for *exponi*. It is clear that it is not a syllogistic demonstration, since the second premise contains the whole of the conclusion. Some A is B; no A is not B; . . . every A is B.

*dala non evenire: ergo necesse est ut scandala eveniant.* Item, aliqua est necessitas *naturalis*; ut si ignis sit applicatus ad aliquod combustibile subdominans, tunc necessario incipit agere vel agit in idem. Aliqua est necessitas *antecedentis* et aliqua necessitas *consequentis*; 5 necessitas antecedentis exemplo proposito est accio ignis; et aliqua est necessitas *volicionis* et aliqua necessitas *coaccionis*. Necessitas volicionis est, ut: si Deus vult Petrum esse, tunc necessarie Petrus est. Necessitas coaccionis est, sicut quando aliquis homo cogit suum 10 captivum, vel servum, ad faciendum aliquid, vel ad relinquendum etc. Necessitas coaccionis accidit quando homines coguntur transire ad suspensionem vel aliquid odibile, contra voluntatem.

5. *Voluntary or constrained;*

Meanings of 'contingent':  
1. A modal or a *substantive* sense; modal if it stands for the verb 'happen'; and then 2. it either *includes* or *does not* include the possibility of its contrary;

in which latter case it is subalternate to necessity, and means the same as *possible*.

A *substantive* sense, when taken as a noun:  
3. it then is contingent either as a *merehappening*, or by *nature*:

Sed nota quod multis modis dicitur *contingens*. Ali- 15 quando iste terminus, 'contingens', capitur *modaliter* et aliquando *nominaliter*. Modaliter capitur, quando per viam circumlocucionis implet vicem istius verbi impersonalis *contingit*, ut hic: *Contingens est hominem esse*, tantum valet sicut ista: *Contingit hominem esse*. Sed 20 aliquod est contingens *valens ad opposita*, et aliquid contingens *non valens ad opposita*. Contingens valens ad opposita est tale *cuius oppositum potest evenire*; ut, quod 'ego sum bonus'. est contingens valens ad opposita; quia, quamvis nunc sim bonus, postea possum esse 25 cum hoc quod non sim bonus, precipue moraliter. Et omne tale dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet. Contingens non valens ad opposita est contingens *cuius oppositum non potest evenire*; ut, 'Deum esse est contingens non valens ad opposita'; quia oppositum eius nullo 30 modo potest evenire. Et isto modo contingens subalternatur necessario, et non contradicit sibi; ut, si 'necesse est Deum esse' tunc 'contingens est Deum esse' vel 'contingit Deum esse'. Et eodem modo dicitur possibile. Et hoc est quod vult Philosophus: *Cuiuscumque debetur* 35 *possibile, eidem debetur contingens*. Nominaliter capitur iste terminus, quando sumitur nominaliter *pro veritate que est et potest non esse*. Et duplex est tale contingens: scilicet, contingens *natum*, et contingens *ad utrumlibet*. Et ulterius, triplex est contingens natum, scilicet: contingens *semper* 40

15. <sup>m</sup>mo. 25. <sup>m</sup>mo. <sup>r</sup>l.

3. *Subdominans*. I suppose this word here means 'from underneath', and applies to *ignis*, not to *combustibile*.

et contingens in maiori et contingens in minori. Contingens semper est contingens natum cuius est causa effectiva quoad hoc, non impedibilis, naturaliter ordinata; ut sunt eclipses, et coniunctiones, et ortus. Est modus loquendi quod sit semper contingens, non absolute quoad tempus, sed condicionaliter, quoad causam; quia *semper*, absque substantia; [ut] si fuerit diametralis interpositio terre inter solem et lunam, causatur eclipsis lune. Et *semper*, quando luna subponitur vel superponitur soli, sic quod sol non mittat suos radios versus illam partem lune que respicit versus terram, tunc causatur coniunctio: etc. Contingens in maiori parte est contingens natum cuius est causa effectiva quoad hoc impedibilis naturaliter ordinata; ut natura ordinavit quod homo nasceretur precise cum quinque digitis in una manu: et sic in maiore parte contingit, sed non contingit *semper*, quia aliquando procreatur monstrum cum sex digitis in una manu, et agnus cum duobus capitibus. Et hoc est preter principalem intentum nature; et ideo vocatur contingens in minori, quia in minori parte sic contingit; et sic omne quod producit, cuius non est aliqua causa effectiva et naturaliter ordinata ad hoc, est contingens in minori: ut sunt peccata, et monstra in natura.

Ulterius notandum quod quadrupliciter dicitur impossibile; scilicet impossibile simpliciter, impossibile quoad naturam creatam, impossibile quoad nos et impossibile quoad prescenciam Dei. Impossibile simpliciter est tale, quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse verum; ut hec propositio: 'nullus Deus est'. Impossibile quoad naturam est tale, quod de natura creata non potest esse verum, primarie significando, ut est talis propositio 'sol non movetur'; 'nemo est animal'. Impossibile quoad nos est tale, quod non potest esse de potencia nostra; ut est talis: *avarus non introibit in regnum celorum*; quia impossibile est quoad nos avarum introire in regnum celorum, sed non est impossibile quoad Deum. Et isto modo debet intelligi: *Que impossibilia sunt apud homines possibilia sunt apud Deum*; et sic idem est possibile et impossibile. Et ad istum sensum dicit apostolus: *Impossibile est enim eos, qui semel illuminati sunt et gustaverunt donum celeste, participes facti sunt spiritus sancti, gustaverunt nihilominus*

the latter divided into what happens always, mostly, or seldom; according as an event takes place in all cases when its cause is posited.

or in most cases,

or only exceptionally.

Four meanings of impossible:  
1. absolutely; that which at no time can be true;  
2. naturally; that which is not true of created nature;  
3. quoad nos; that which is impossible for man;

and 1. *God fore-  
knowing:*  
that which is  
impossible,  
given the  
prescience of  
God.

*bonum Dei verbum virtutesque seculi venturi et postea* Hebr. VI, 4  
*prolapsi. iterum ad penitentiam scilicet renorare: hoc est*  
impossibile quoad homines. Impossibile quoad prescien-  
ciam Dei est tale, *quod est falsum et repugnat pre-*  
*sciencie divine illud non esse falsum;* sicut est ista pro- 5  
positio: 'Scandala non evenient'. Et ideo dicit evan-  
gelium: *Impossibile est quod non eveniant scandala,* quia  
est una regula philosophorum. quod ad 'impossibile' se-  
quitur 'necesse'. Non sic intendo istas propositiones quasi  
una esset simpliciter necessaria et alia simpliciter impos- 10  
sibilis, sic quia una est necessaria ad prescenciam Dei  
(ista: 'scandala evenient'), et alia impossibilis quoad  
prescenciam Dei (scilicet ista: 'scandala non evenient').  
Omne enim tale quod potest esse, potest dici possibile.

When a  
proposition has  
to be  
contradicted,  
the whole  
ought to be  
denied.

Sciendum quod in dando contradictorium proposi- 15  
tionis modalis oportet ponere negacionem toti, ut con-  
tradictorium istius: '*Necesse est ut veniant scandala*',  
est hoc: *Non necesse est ut veniant scandala.* Et contra-  
dictorium istius: *Impossibile est ut non veniant scandala,*  
est hoc: *non impossibile est ut non veniant scandala.* Et 20  
contradictorium istius: *Necesse est hominem esse.* est  
hoc: *Non necesse est hominem esse* etc.

Remark that  
any attribute  
that is not of  
God's essence,  
might,  
absolutely  
speaking, be  
wanting.

Notandum hic: quicquid non essencialiter inest Deo,  
sed accidentaliter, potest deesse Deo de potencia ab-  
soluta Dei; et quia talis non est nisi accidentalis, 25  
faciens aliquid dominare temporaliter (et pretericio et  
futuricio sunt accidentia) ideo insunt Deo accidenta-  
liter, pro adiacencia temporis. quod ipse *fuit* vel *est* in  
tempore, vel *erit*: et omne tale potest deesse Deo.  
Igitur Deus potest facere quod nullum tempus fuit, vel 30  
est, vel erit; et si sic fieret, tunc Deus solum esset in  
mensura eternitatis; et sibi inesset purum *esse* eterno  
et non preterito vel futuro. Sed de prima ordinacione  
Deus non potest sic facere, sed de potencia absoluta.  
Et sic dicunt theologi quod Deus fuit ante mundum 35  
eternaliter et non temporaliter.

20. ut veniant.

30. See note *supra*, p. 25.

## CAPITULUM NONUM.

Post cognitionem propositionis categorice, restat cognoscere propositionem yppotheticam. Et sciendum, quod propositio hypothetica est que componitur ex duabus propositionibus categoricis, mediante aliqua nota. Septem enim sunt species hypothetice, scilicet: *copulativa, distinctiva, condicionalis, causalis, comparativa, localis et temporalis*.

*Copulativa* est, que principaliter subordinatur actui hypothetico copulativo; ut hoc: *Vidit Deus cuncta que fecerat et erant valde bona*. Et est copulativa vera, quando ambe partes eius sunt vere. Et vocatur actus hypotheticus comprehensio anime, adequate correspondens toti propositioni.

*Disiunctiva* est illa que principaliter subordinatur actui hypothetico disiungendi, ut est ista: *Deus est, vel nullus homo est*. Et est disiunctiva vera, quando altera eius pars est vera. Note copulandi sunt iste: *et, atque, ac, nec, neque etc.* Note disiungendi, sunt iste: *vel, aut, seu, re, etc.*

*Condicionalis* est illa que principaliter subordinatur actui yppothetico condicionata; ut hoc: *Si creatura est, creata est; si homo est, animal est*. Et est condicionalis vera, quando consequens | formaliter intelligitur in antecedente; ut: *si Deus est, ipse est omnipotens*. Illa propositio que immediate sequitur hoc nomen *si*, est *antecedens* in condicionali, et alia propositio est *consequens*; ut ista propositio: *Deus est*, est antecedens, et ista propositio: *ipse est omnipotens*, est consequens. Et hoc consequens, ipse est omnipotens, formaliter intelligitur per hoc antecedens: *Deus est*. Similiter de talibus: *Si Petrus est caritativus, ipse est virtuosus*, ista condicionalis est

A hypothetical proposition is composed of two categorical ones, united by a particle: seven classes. It is

1. *Copulative*, when its parts are joined by *and*: its truth depends on the truth of both parts;

2. *Disjunctive*, when its parts are joined by *or, &c.*: its truth depends on that of one of its parts;

3. *Conditional*, when it expresses a condition, signified by *if*: that part which comes immediately after *if* is the antecedent, the other the consequent; when the latter is implied in former, the proposition is true, and corresponds to a good consequence in a syllogism;

1. Cap. deest.      2. Initial P in blue ink.      30. ipse est omnipotens est consequens et hoc antecedens before ipse.

bona, quia 'esse virtuosum' formaliter intelligitur 'in esse caritativum'; et quia impossibile est aliquid esse caritativum, nisi fuerit virtuosum. Nota quod quelibet condicionalis bona convertitur cum consequentia bona; ut iste duo convertuntur: *si tu es caritativus, tu es virtuosus*, et: *Tu es caritativus; ergo, tu es virtuosus*.

4. *Causal*, when the two parts are joined by the assertion of a causal nexus between the two; if this nexus really exists, the whole is true, and can be expounded categorically;

*Causalis* est illa que principaliter subordinatur actui ypothetico causandi; ut: *quia tu es homo, tu es rationalis; quia tu es virtuosus, tu es bonus*. Et est causalis bona, quando significatum primarium antecedentis est causa primarie significati consequentis; ut prima causalis tantum significat quod 'te esse hominem *causat* te esse rationalem' vel sic, et brevius: 'Humanitas tua *causat* racionalitatem tuam'. Et secunda sic significat, quod 'te esse virtuosum *causat* te esse bonum', vel sic et brevius, 'Virtus tua *causat* bonitatem tuam.' Et ad istum sensum dixit Deus ad serpentem: *Quia hoc fecisti, id est, decepisti mulierem, maledictus eris*. Hoc est, 'decepcio tua *causat* malediccione[m] tuam.' Et sic: *Quia aliquis est finaliter impenitens, ipse damnabitur*; hoc est: 'finalis' impenitencia alicuius *causat* eius damnacionem. Et hic oportet notare quomodo deus est prima causa, et omnia *causat* preter se ipsum, et ipse deus nullo modo est *causatus*: et ideo non possumus cognoscere Deum per aliquam causam precedentem ipsum, sed per effectus creatos ab ipso, etc.

5. *Comparative*, when the two parts are joined by a sign of comparison (as, than, &c.): it can often be turned into a categorical proposition containing a comparison.

*Comparativa* est propositio ypothetica principaliter denominata a nota comparandi, ut: *Deus est melior quam est aliquis purus homo; Caritas est ita bona sicut est aliqua virtus*. Note comparandi sunt tales: *sicut, quam*, etc. Et talis propositio dicitur ypothetica comparativa, que habet duas proposiciones coniunctas cum aliqua nota comparandi. Et hic nota quod ista non est propositio ypothetica: *Deus est melior aliquo puro homine*, vel: *quam alius purus homo*, quia in talibus non est nisi una copula; et tamen convertitur cum una ypothetica.

6. *Local*, when the idea of place joins the two parts; it is true when, the two parts signifying the same place, it is

*Localis* est propositio ypothetica principaliter subordinata actui ypothetico locandi, ut hic: *Ubi ego sum, illic et minister meus est; Petrus est ubi Paulus est*, et sic de ceteris. Et est localis vera, quando ambe partes, que cum termino demonstrativo addito significant

- eundem locum, sunt vere, ut hic: *Ubi ego sum, et hic minister meus erit, Petrus est hic et hic Paulus est*, demonstrando uniformiter per utrumque adverbium. Sed ista nota localis, *ubi*, teneri potest multipliciter; vel
- 5 *large* vel *stricte*. Si tenetur *large*, tunc potest concedi quod *terra est ubi celum est et sol est ubi luna est*; quia terra, celum, sol et luna sunt in eodem mundo; et sic quilibet homo est ubi papa est, quia in mundo. Et sciendum quod aliud est esse *in loco adequato*, et
- 10 aliud est esse *ad locum adequatum*, quia omne tangens aliud est *ad locum adequatum* in quo aliud est, sed non *in loco adequato*. Ut, si Petrus tangit Paulum, tunc Petrus est *ad locum adequatum* Pauli, sed non *in loco adequato* Pauli. Stricte loquendo, est res ubi
- 15 alia res est, et sic mundus et eius quantitas et situs eiusdem sunt in eodem loco adequato; et corpus de genere substantie et corpus de genere quantitatis et situs eiusdem substantie sunt in eodem situ adequato. Sed sic non potest esse Petrus in eodem situ adequato
- 7<sup>b</sup> 20 in quo Paulus est simul et semel. Sed primo modo loquendo, omnia que sunt in eodem regno eodem loco sunt, quia in mundo; omnes Anglici sunt in eodem loco, quia in universitate; et omnes famuli sunt specialius in eodem loco, quia in eadem domo etc.
- 25 Temporalis est illa que subordinatur principaliter actui ypothetico, temporali per notam adverbii temporis; et sic omnis propositio in qua sunt due propositiones conjuncte cum tali nota, *dum, quando* etc. est temporalis. Et est temporalis vera, quando ambe eius partes
- 30 sunt vere; et hoc in eodem tempore; et aliter est falsa: Ut hic: *Deus fuit, quando creavit celum; quando Petrus erit, Paulus erit; dum corpus est, anima est*; etc. Sed

so in reality; but in a wide sense, *ubi* can mean anywhere in the world; and in a stricter sense two persons may be *at* the same place, but not *in* the same space; but different realities may; as v. g. a body, its quantity, and its position.

7. Temporal, when both of its parts relate to the same time; it is true, when both parts are true, as thus related. 'The same time' can be understood loosely, and thus any two events may

23. quia in universitate.

1. *Eundem locum*. Wyclif here forgets the *negative* local propositions, as '*Whither I go, thither ye cannot come*'; or he considers a denial of identity of place as including in a wide sense this idea of identity. 15. I am not quite sure whether this should not mean 'the reality of anything is where the reality of anything else is', especially when we note the words *stricte loquendo*, and remember that the Universals, as constituting the ideal world, are not only eternal but everywhere. But the examples given can be understood without referring to this. 23. *Quia in universitate*. This is so evidently a mistake that the copyist has struck it out. The reader will easily supply some word in place either of *universitate* or of *anglici*.

happen in the  
same time; or  
strictly, meaning  
absolute  
simultaneity.

talis temporalis potest capi stricte vel large. Large  
capiendo, sunt tales propositiones vere, ut: *Petrus fuit,*  
*quando deus creavit mundum,* quia in aliquo parte  
magni temporis preteriti fuit Petrus, et in isto tempore  
creavit Deus mundum; et sic est verum quod *ego fui,*<sup>5</sup>  
*quando mater mea fuit virgo. et quando Adam fuit in*  
*paradiso.* Sed non in eodem tempore adequato. Et  
quando sunt due res, et una durat per omne tempus  
per quod durat reliqua, et e contra, tunc quelibet illa-  
rum est adequate in eodem tempore in quo est alia.<sup>10</sup>

6. This is quite true in the sense Wyclif gives it; but it is  
an undeniable opening to paradox. This, by the way, was the  
general tendency of the Realists. "... *Les réalistes, ennemis des*  
*distinctions, et tirant toujours en ligne droite, pour ainsi dire,*  
*les conséquences de leurs principes,*" says Berault-Becastel  
(Hist. de l'Eglise, l. LV, p. 496) and he goes on to tell us of  
Pierre de Rieu, who, in 1470, declared that there was no truth  
in any future proposition; meaning *truth* in the same way as  
in propositions concerning the present.



## CAPITULUM DECIMUM.

Conversio est transmutacio predicati in subiectum, et e contra. Et notandum est quod triplex est conversio: *simplex* conversio, *per accidens*, et conversio *per contra-*  
 5 *posicionem*. What and of  
how many  
sorts  
Conversion is:

Conversio *simplex* est quando de subiecto fit predi-  
 catum et e contra, *manente eadem qualitate et quan-*  
*titate*. Et sic convertitur universalis negativa, et simi-  
 liter particularis affirmativa, verbi gracia: *nulla virtus*  
 10 *est viciu*; ergo, *nullum viciu est virtus*; *nichil est in-*  
*possibile apud Deum*: ergo, *nullum impossibile apud Deum*  
*est aliquid*. Particularis sic convertitur simpliciter: *Ali-*  
*quis Deus est omnipotens*: ergo, *aliquod omnipotens est*  
*Deus*. *Aliquis homo vivit bene*: ergo, *aliquod vivens bene*  
 15 *est aliquis homo*. Et nota, quando principale verbum  
 illius proposicionis que debet converti est verbum ad-  
 iectivum, tunc principale verbum in sua conversa erit  
 verbum substantivum, verbi gracia: *Aliquis sanctus videt*  
*Deum*: ergo, *aliquod videns Deum est aliquis sanctus*;  
 20 *aliquis homo transit ad celum*: ergo, *aliquod transiens ad*  
*celum est aliquis homo*. 1. *Simple*, for  
universal  
negative and  
particular  
affirmative  
propositions;  
the predicate  
and the subject  
merely change  
places.

Conversio *per accidens* est quando de subiecto fit  
 predicatum et e contra, *manente eadem qualitate, sed*  
*mutata quantitate*: ut, si convertens sit universalis affir-  
 25 *mativa*, sua conversa erit particularis affirmativa; et si  
 convertens sit universalis negativa, sua conversa erit  
 particularis negativa; et sic convertitur universalis affir-  
 mativa et universalis negativa. Verbi gracia: *omnis*  
2. *Accidental*,  
for universal  
affirmatives and  
negatives,  
which become  
particular.

1. Cap. deest.      2. Initial C in red ink; ib. initia.      4. et per  
accidens conversio.

16, 17. We may note that *verbum adjectivum* means not only every verb except *est*, but even *est*, when that verb includes the predicate 'existence'. Thus: *aliquis homo est* is converted into: *aliquod existens est homo*.

*angelus est substantia; ergo, aliqua substantia est angelus; Nulla virtus est viciū: ergo, quoddam viciū non est virtus.* Illic manet eadem qualitas, quia utraque est negativa; sed mutata est quantitas, quia una est universalis et alia particularis etc. 5

3. By counterposition, for universal affirmatives and particular negatives; it consists in changing the places of subject and predicate, but prefixing *not* to each, without any other change.

Conversio *per contrapositionem* est quando de subiecto fit predicatum et e contra, *manente eadem qualitate et quantitate, sed mutatis terminis finitis in terminos infinitos.* Et sic convertitur universalis affirmativa et particularis negativa. Verbi gracia: *Omnis sapiencia est virtus: ergo, omnis non virtus est non sapiencia; Aliqua sapiencia non est viciū: ergo, quoddam non viciū non est non sapiencia.* Et iste conversiones ponuntur in istis versibus:

Simpliciter feci convertitur, *ari* per accid. 15

Cato per *contra*. Sic fit conversio tota.

Notandum quod in iste termino *Feci* sunt due vocales; *e* significat universalem negativam, et *i* significat particularem affirmativam, et *a* universalem affirmativam, et *o* particularem negativam. 20

Difficulties as to propositions that include the idea of past or future: a particular method of solving them.

Sed in proposicionibus de preterito et futuro est maius dubium; sicut est in talibus: *Nullus puer fuit senex: Aliqua mulier corrupta erit virgo; Omnis sapiencia erit virtus.* Prima debet sic converti, simpliciter: *Nullus puer fuit senex: ergo, nullus [ preteritus senex est vel fuit 25 puer: et hoc est falsum.* Secunda sic convertitur: *Aliqua mulier corrupta erit virgo: ergo, aliqua futura virgo est vel erit mulier corrupta.* 3<sup>cia</sup> propositio sic debet converti per accidens: *Omnis sapiencia erit virtus: ergo, aliqua virtus futura est vel erit sapiencia.* 30

23. erit non.

10. According to logicians, even in our own time, the *particularis negativa* can be converted in no other but this very crabbed way. In reality however, I believe it is *always* possible to change it into a *particularis affirmativa*, and then convert it simply, thus: *Some Englishmen are not Londoners . . . Some Englishmen are Not-Londoners . . . Some Not-Londoners are Englishmen.* This would be a fourth species of 'conversion'; but I must give it on my own responsibility, having met with it nowhere. 22. *Est vel fuit.* Because the sense modifies or may modify the sense both of subject and of predicate. But I think that since Wyclif by his conversion comes to a false conclusion from a true departure (*et hoc est falsum*), we may try the ordinary method. Thus: *No boy is having-been an old man . . . No having-been an old man is a boy.*

## CAPITULUM UNDECIMUM.

Argumentum est *ratio rei dubie, faciens fidem et certitudinem de re dubia*. Et notandum quod quatuor sunt species argumenti, scilicet: *Enthymema, induccio, exemplum* et *sylllogismus*. What an argument is; Its species:

*Enthymema* est curtatus syllogismus, habens unicam premissam et unicam conclusionem, ut sic argumentando: *Deus est; ergo, substantia omnipotens est. Caritas est bona; ergo, virtus est bona*. Enthymema,

*Induccio* est quando universalis probatur per suas singulares, ut sic argumentando: *ista virtus est, et ista virtus est; ergo, omnis virtus est*. Induction,

*Exemplum* est, quando unum simile probatur per aliud simile, ut sic: *Sicut se habet voluntas Dei in celis, sic se habet voluntas Dei in terris; et: Sicut vixerunt apostoli in ecclesia primitiva, sic etiam tenentur vivere episcopi circa finem mundi. Et: Sicut se habet magister in scolis, sic se habet rector in navi*. Analogy,

*Sylllogismus* est argumentum in quo, ex premissis debite dispositis in modo et in figura, sequitur conclusio. Et sciendum quod in omni syllogismo requiruntur tres termini, scilicet, *maior extremitas, minor extremitas* et *medius terminus*. *Medius terminus* est ille qui bis sumitur ante conclusionem et non in genere eodem dicitur. *Maior extremitas* est illa que sumitur in maiori cum medio. *Minor extremitas* est illa que sumitur in minori cum medio termino. Ut sic argumentando, and  
Syllogism;  
which is made  
up of two  
premises and  
a conclusion,  
and contains  
three terms;  
one of  
comparison,  
and two that  
are compared in  
the premisses,  
making up the  
major and the  
minor.

1. Cap. deest.    2. Initial A in blue ink.

5. The *Sorites* (A is B, B is C, C is D, . . . . Y is Z, . . . A is Z) might have been added here.    16. If we consider that *Logica* is in all probability one of the first philosophical works of Wyclif, this example (as also allusions to Antichrist being in Rome, further on in the book) shows us that his theological system was already fermenting in his mind at a very early date.

*omnis Deus est eternus, omne increatum est Deus: ergo, omne increatum est eternum; in isto syllogismo sunt tres proposiciones: scilicet, due premissae et una conclusio; due premissae sunt ille due proposiciones que precedunt hanc notam, ergo; et conclusio est propositio<sup>5</sup> sequens hanc notam, ergo. In isto secundo syllogismo sunt tres termini, scilicet isti: Deus, eternum, et increatum; et iste terminus, Deus, est medius terminus, et iste terminus, eternus, est maior extremitas, et iste terminus increatus, est minor extremitas.* 10

There are 19 modes of syllogism, classified in three figures. A mode is the classification of syllogism by order of terms; a figure, by order of modes. Mnemonic lines.

Et sciendum quod decem et novem sunt modi syllogismorum; et tres sunt figure, in quibus sunt syllogismi. Modus est debita ordinatio trium terminorum, que requiruntur ad syllogismum; figura est debita dispositio modorum. In primo figura continentur novem modi,<sup>15</sup> et in tertia figura continentur sex modi. Quilibet terminus versuum sequencium, qui sic incipiunt:

Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, baralip-ton,  
Celantes, dabitis, fapesmo, frisesomorum.

2<sup>a</sup> Cesare, camestres, festino, baroco, 3<sup>a</sup> darapti, 20

Felapton, disamis, datisi, bocardo, ferison;

In the first figure the middle term is subject in the minor; in the major, predicate; in the 2<sup>nd</sup>, it is twice predicate; in the 3<sup>rd</sup>, twice subject.

quolibet istorum vocatur modus. Et sciendum quod medius terminus debet diversimode ordinari in prima figura, et in secunda, et in tertia. Nam in prima figura erit medius terminus subiectum in maiori et predi-<sup>25</sup> catum in minori, et in secunda figura erit medius terminus predicatum tam in maiori quam in minori; sed in tertia erit medius terminus subiectum in utraque propositione. Et propter hoc ponitur talis versus:

*Sub, pre, prima; pre bis, secunda; tertia, bis sub.* 30

Omnes modi in quibus fiunt syllogismi possunt clare cognosci per versus sequentes: *Barbara, Celarent, Darii*, ut supra. Et notandum est quod quilibet syllogismus in aliquo istorum modorum concludit directe, preter quinque, qui sunt in istis versibus:

Omnes directe concludunt; excipe quinque;

Nomina sunt quorum, *bara. ce, da, frisesomorum.*

Examples of syllogisms in *Darii*, in *Baralip-ton*, in *Cesare*.

In predicatione directa sic fit syllogismus in *Darii*: | *Omnis caritas est virtus; aliqua dilectio est caritas: ergo,* 8<sup>b</sup>

12. synonymi. 10. Ecce pro et.

18. *Baralip-ton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum* are considered by modern logicians to make a fourth figure.

*aliqua dilectio est virtus; sed in predicacione indirecta fit taliter in Baralipon: Omnis virtus est bonitas, omnis iusticia est virtus: ergo aliqua bonitas est iusticia.* In secunda figura, sic fit syllogismus isto modo in *Cesare*:  
 5 *Nulla virtus est viciū; omne peccatum est viciū; ergo, nulla virtus est peccatum.* In tertia figura sic fiet syllogismus in *Darapti*: *omnis homo est animal; omnis homo est risibilis: ergo, quoddam risibile est animal.*

Et notandum quod in qualibet figura potest fieri  
 10 *syllogismus expositorius.* In prima figura sic: *hoc est homo, et Sor est hoc: ergo, Sor est homo.* In secunda figura, sic fiet syllogismus expositorius: *virtus est hoc, et bonitas est hoc: ergo, virtus est bonitas.* In tertia figura sic fiet syllogismus: *hoc diligit Deum, et hoc est homo: ergo, homo*  
 15 *diligit Deum.* Et iste syllogismus expositorius in tertia figura est maxime usitatus. Et sciendum quod oportet

The expository syllogism, in which the middle term is a demonstrative pronoun, is much used, especially in the third figure.

bene notare rem pro qua supponit hoc pronomen *hoc* in syllogismo expositorio; quia si fuerit diversa suppositio in antecedente et consequente, tunc syllogismus non valet:

But it does not conclude, unless the pronoun has the same signification in both premisses.

20 ut hic: *hoc est Petrus* (demonstrando naturam humanam) et *hoc est Paulus* (demonstrando eandem naturam): ergo, Petrus est Paulus. Hoc argumentum non valet, quia iste terminus, *hoc*, nunc supponit pro Petro in antecedente, nec demonstrat Petrum, sed naturam humanam; et ad hoc  
 25 quod argumentum valeret, oporteret in antecedente demonstrare Petrum personaliter per *h* 'hoc', tam in minori quam in maiori; et tunc consequentia esset bona et antecedens falsum pro minori: scilicet, quod hoc (demonstrando Petrum) est Paulus. Et illud argumentum non plus concludit, quam sic argumentando: *homo est Petrus, et homo est Paulus: ergo, Petrus est Paulus.* Et eodem modo contingit fallacia in materia de trinitate, sic argumentando: *Hoc est pater* (demonstrando divinitatem) et *Hoc est filius: ergo, pater est filius.* Et argumentum non valet; et eodem modo  
 30 de Christo, sic argumentando: *hoc est Deitas* (demonstrando Christum) et *hoc est humanitas: ergo, Deitas est humanitas;* quia, sicut una deitas est communicabilis tribus personis, sic est una persona Christi communi-

Examples.

11. Wyclif's apponents very often used this 'expository syllogism' against him, to refute his doctrine of Universals. His remark (l. 11—37) contains his general reply to their refutations. Throughout his philosophical works, we shall find him again and again returning to the subject.

cabilis duabus naturis, scilicet nature divine et nature humane.

No syllogism is  
conclusive, if  
both its  
premisses are  
negative or  
particular.

Et nota quod syllogismus non fit totaliter ex negativis nec totaliter ex particularibus: vel si fiat, nunquam valet talis syllogismus; unde ponitur talis versus: 5

Syllogizari non est ex particulari.

Neque negativis, ratione concludere si vis.

7. concluditur; *ib.* a blank space of 4 lines.

## CAPITULUM DUODECIMUM.

Quia dictum est de summulis in quibus tractatur quodammodo de proposicionibus, et quoniam ignorantibus suppositiones terminorum veritas proposicionum latet, ideo, propter magis distinctam noticiam proposicionum, oportet materiam de supposicionibus aliququaliter declarare. Et sciendum quod nullus terminus extra oracionem supponit, sed solum in oracione; nec aliqua pars extremi supponit; sed toti extremo debetur suppositio. Hoc est, nulla pars subiecti aut predicati supponit sed toti extremo i. e. toti predicato aut subiecto debetur suppositio.

Importance of some acquaintance with *Supposition*.

No term can have *supposition*, except when in a proposition, and this property belongs to the whole subject or predicate.

Sed notandum est primo, pro quidditate suppositionis, quod suppositio est *significacio termini categorici qui est extremum proposicionis, in comparacione ad aliud extremum*. Et est extremum in proposicione subiectum vel predicatum. Suppositio dicitur dupliciter; scilicet, *propria* et *impropria*. Suppositio impropria est quando terminus significat aliter ex usu loquendi quam ex primaria significatione: ut *Anglia* | *pugnat*; *bibi ciphum*. In ista proposicione, iste terminus *Anglia* supponit pro hominibus in *Anglia*, vel pro aggregato ex hominibus in *Anglia*. Et in secunda proposicione *ciphum* supponit improprie pro contento in *cipho*.

It is the signification of one categorical extremity of a proposition, compared with the other extremity:  
1. *Supposition proper or improper.*

Suppositio *propria* dupliciter dicitur: scilicet, *materialis* et *formalis*. Suppositio pure *materialis* est quando terminus supponit pro se ipso, aut secum analogo, ut *li* "ego" est pronomen, *li* "dominus" est nomen: Hec dictio "amo" est verbum, *li* "Iohannes" est trysyllabum etc.

2. If proper, *material* or *formal*; according as it stands for the word it is, or for what the word represents.

Suppositio *formalis* est duplex: scilicet suppositio *simplex* et *personalis*. Suppositio simplex est illa qua

Formal supposition is *simple* or

1. Cap. deest.

2. Initial Q in red ink, and De supposicionibus in marg.

*personal*, it is  
simple when  
the term is  
only used for  
an abstract  
essence,

and is of two  
sorts: *adequate*  
and *inadequate*.

*Personal*  
supposition,  
when *singular*,  
employs a term  
for one  
individual;  
when *general*,  
for many  
together; and  
then it is either  
*collective* or  
*universal*: in  
the latter case  
either  
*distributive* or  
*indefinite*.

Note 1. that  
simple and  
personal  
supposition  
may be united;  
as when we  
say *Every*  
*animal*, for

terminus solum assertive supponit pro re universali ad  
extra, ut hic: *Homo* predicatur de omni homine; iste  
terminus *homo* supponit simpliciter pro natura humana,  
et tantum sonat ac si diceretur *esse hominem inest omni*  
*homini*. Et in ista proposicione, *homo est species*, sup- 5  
ponit subiectum simpliciter pro natura humana, que est  
species specialissima omnium hominum. Et in hac  
proposicione, *animal est genus*, supponit iste terminus,  
*animal*, simpliciter pro genere animalis, quod est genus  
commune omnium animalium; quia, sicut omnes homi- 10  
nes conveniunt in una humanitate, que est natura illo-  
rum specifica, sic omnia animalia conveniunt in  
eadem animalitate, que est generalis omnium animalium.  
Supposicionum simplicium alia est *equa*, et alia *inequa*.  
Suppositio simplex et equa est, qua terminus simpliciter 15  
supponit solum distincte vel assertive pro universali  
primo specifico, ut in talibus: *Homo est species*. Si  
autem sit suppositio inequa, hoc contingit dupliciter,  
vel sic, quod supponatur pro specie inferiori; ut,  
*substantia est species*; vel pro accidente aut proprio 20  
primo; ut *hic homo communis est risibilis, quantus, ali-*  
*qualis*, etc.

Suppositio *personalis* dicitur dupliciter, scilicet *sin-*  
*gularis* et *communis*. *Singularis* est quando terminus  
supponit solum pro uno singulari, ut: *hic homo est*. 25  
Suppositio *personalis* et *communis* est, quando terminus  
supponit personaliter confuse pro multis. Si autem sit  
*communis*, hoc contingit dupliciter, vel sic quod sit  
distincta, quando supponitur pro singularibus, ut hic:  
*isti sunt*; vel quod sit *communis universalis* suppositio 30  
*personalis*. Hoc contingit dupliciter: vel sic quod sit  
confusa distributiva, ut hic: *Omnis homo est*; vel suppo-  
sicio *confusa* tantum; ut hic: *uterque istorum est alter*  
*istorum*, iste terminus *alter istorum* supponit confuse  
tantum, quia non est dare aliquem istorum qui *est* uter- 35  
que istorum.

Notandum quod terminus *communis* concrete suppo-  
situs potest mixtim supponere personaliter et simpliciter,  
et hoc tam in universali, quam in definita, ut hic:  
*omne animal fuit in archa Noë*; in ista proposicione 40  
potest iste terminus, *animal*, supponere confuse distri-



butive pro omnibus individuís animalium, que fuerunt; et sic intelligendo, est propositio illa falsa; vel potest supponere pro omnibus speciebus perfectis animalium, et sic regula est vera; quia illa tantum significat quod *omnis species perfecta animalis fuit in archa Noë*; et hoc est verum. Eodem modo dicendum est de ista propositione: *omnis homo est mendax*; iste terminus, *homo*, potest supponere confuse distributive pro omni individuo speciei humane, nullo excipiente, et sic illa est falsa pro Cristo; vel potest solum supponere pro hominibus peccatoribus, et sic illa est vera; quia *qui se dicit sine peccato mendax est*. Similiter in tali indefinita, *homo moritur*, potest iste terminus supponere personaliter pro individuo, vel simpliciter pro natura humana; et utroque modo illa regula est vera; et in omnibus talibus est suppositio personalis, mixta cum suppositione simplici.

Sed notandum quod talia nomina: *Johannes*, *Thomas*, et talia pronomina *hic*, *id*, *istud* etc. non debent distribui, sicut nec talis terminus *persona*, *individuum*; quia omnes tales termini fuerunt inventi ad significandum discrete vel simpliciter, et non plus valet distribuere talia (sicut dicendo: *Omnis Johannes est*, "*Johannes*" tenendo suam proprietatem primam), quam sic dicendo, *omne hoc est hoc*, quia tales termini et propria nomina sunt inventa ad significandum discrete, sicut pronomen. Et quando homines distribuunt tales terminos per signa universalía, in hoc faciunt illa nomina appellativa et non nomina propria. Et sic abutuntur terminis; et sic de aliis superius recitatis.

Notandum etiam quod in universali affirmativa subiectum supponit mobiliter. id est, confuse distributive; et predicatum, si sit terminus communis, supponit confuse tantum vel simpliciter confuse tantum, quando non contingit descendere ad singulare nec universale, ut hoc: utrumque istorum est aliquod animal istorum. Simpliciter supponit quando non contingit descendere ad aliquod singulare, sed ad universale, sicut in ista propositione: *omnis homo est homo*. Iste terminus *homo*, qui

every species of animal; or predicate a general rule to which there are exceptions; or say what is true both of the abstract essence and of the individual.

2. That proper nouns and what may stand for them cannot be distributive nor receive the sign of universality, unless by changing their sense into that of common nouns.

3. That in every universal affirmative proposition, the subject has distributive, the predicate indefinite supposition;

9. ext<sup>o</sup>.

31. All this is very briefly set forth here, and cannot be properly explained in notes. See the Introduction.

in every  
universal  
negative, both  
subject and  
predicate are  
distributed,  
in particular  
affirmatives,  
both subject and  
predicate have  
determinate  
suppositions; in  
negatives, the  
subject is  
determinately  
and the  
predicate  
distributively  
supposed;  
in singular  
affirmatives the  
subject is  
assimilated to a  
collection, and  
the predicate  
determinately  
supposed, and  
in singular  
negatives, the  
subject being as  
before, the  
predicate is  
distributed.

est predicatum, supponit pro homine communi vel  
natura humana, quod idem est; et sic significat quod  
*homo communis vel natura humana est omnis homo*. In  
omni universali negativa tam subiectum quam predi-  
catum supponit confuse distributive; et hoc, si subiectum 5  
et predicatum sint termini communes; ut hec; *nullus  
homo est lapis*. Isti duo termini, *homo* et *lapis* suppo-  
nunt confuse distributive negative; et sic de ceteris. In  
omni particulari affirmativo et indefinita affirmativa,  
ubi subiectum et predicatum sunt termini communes, 10  
supponit tam subiectum quam predicatum determinate:  
ut hic, *aliquis homo est animal*. In omni particulari  
negativa et indefinite negativa subiectum supponit deter-  
minate et predicatum confuse et distributive, si subiec-  
tum et predicatum fuerint termini communes. In omni 15  
singulari affirmativa, ubi predicatum est terminus com-  
munis, subiectum supponit discrete et predicatum deter-  
minate, ut hic: *hoc est homo*. In omni singulari negativa,  
ubi predicatum est terminus communis, subiectum  
supponit discrete et predicatum confuse et distributive 20  
negative, ut hic: *iste non est lapis*.

21. Blank space for 2 lines after lapis.

3. Wyclif may be supposed to mean: *That which is common to all men is human nature*. But I am not quite sure, from the way he expresses himself, that he does not mean: *Every man is identical with the Universal: human nature*.

## CAPITULUM TREDECIMUM.

Consequencia est *quedam habitudo inter antecedens et consequens, cum nota consequente*. Vel: consequencia est quoddam aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente cum  
 5 nota consequencie; ut hic: *homo currit*: ergo, *animal currit*. Definition of Consequence.

Ad cognoscendum que sunt consequencie bone et formales dantur 22 regule, quarum prima est hec: Quelibet consequencia est bona et formalis, in qua consequens formaliter intelligitur in antecedente; ut sic arguendo: *Petrus est caritativus*; ergo, *ipse est virtuosus*, quia hoc consequens, *ipse est virtuosus*, intelligitur in hoc antecedente: *Petrus est caritativus*. Et sunt note consequencie ergo, etc., ideo et quia. A consequence is good:  
1. When the consequent is formally understood to be in the antecedent;

Secunda regula est ista: Quelibet consequencia est  
 15 bona et formalis, quando ex contradictorio consequentis sequitur contradictorium antecedentis ut: *homo currit*: ergo, *animal currit*; quia sequitur formaliter: *nullum animal currit*, ergo: *nemo currit*. 2. when, it you contradict the consequent, you contradict the antecedent;

Tercia regula est ista: Quelibet consequencia est bona  
 20 et formalis, ubi contradictorium consequentis formaliter repugnat antecedenti, ut: *Omnia intelligit*, igitur *aliquid intelligit*, quia ista repugnant: *nihil intelligit* et *omnia intelligit*. 3. when the contradictory to the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent;

Quarta regula est ista: Quicquid antecedit ad ante-  
 25 cedens, antecedit ad consequens. Hoc est sic intelligendum, quod quelibet propositio que antecedit ad antecedens potest antecedere ad consequens illius antecedentis; ut hic: *aliquod animal sentit*; ergo, *aliquod corpus sentit*; et sic sequitur: *aliquis homo sentit*, ergo *aliquod corpus sentit*: quia ista propositio, *aliquis homo sentit*, potest antecedere ad hoc consequens prioris consequencie, scilicet *aliquod animal sentit*, et per consequens potest antecedere ad hoc consequens: *aliquod corpus sentit*. 4. when the antecedent of the antecedent is antecedent to the consequent;

5. when, in a chain of antecedents and consequents, the particular consequence of each is good;

but the consequent of the previous argument must be strictly the antecedent of the succeeding one;

6. when the antecedent is a universal proposition, and the consequent, its subalternate;

7. when an indefinite proposition is inferred from a particular one;

8. When we argue, in certain matters, from the general to the particular.

Alia regula est ista: quando argumentatur a primo ad ultimum, ubi omnes consequencie intermedie sunt bone et formales et non variate, est consequencia bona. Et argumentatur a primo ad ultimum, quando consequens prioris consequencie est antecedens posterioris consequencie. Ut, sic argumentando: *ordinata dileccio est: ergo, caritas est: caritas est: ergo, virtus est: virtus est: ergo, bonitas est.* Sed argumentatur contra istam regulam, *nullum tempus est: ergo, dies non est: dies non est, et aliquod tempus est.* A primo ad ultimum: *nullum tempus est: ergo, aliquod tempus est.* Ista consequencia non valet; et tamen argumentatur per regulam supradictam: ergo regula illa est falsa. Dicendum est quod consequencie intermedie sunt variate, quia plus ponitur in antecedente secunde consequencie quam fuit consequens prime consequencie: ideo non argumentatur per regulam etc.

Alia regula est ista: ab universali ad suam particularem subalternam, tam affirmative quam negative, tenet consequencia affirmative: ut hic: *quelibet virtus est bona: ergo, aliqua virtus est bona;* negative, ut hic: *nulla caritas est vicium: ergo, aliqua caritas non est vicium.*

Alia regula est: a particulari ad suam infinitam, tam affirmative quam negative, est consequencia bona: ut, *quedam caritas est virtus: ergo, caritas est virtus;* 25 negative, ut sic: *quedam caritas non est vicium: ergo, caritas non est peccatum.*

Alia regula est ista: ab universali ad suam singularem affirmativam cum debito modo, ubi singulares significant res corruptibiles, valet consequencia: ut sic argumentando: *omnis homo est animal; ergo, iste homo est animal.* Sed quando universalis supponit pro re convertibili incorruptibili, tunc tenet talis consequencia, gracia terminorum: ut argumentando: *omnis angelus est: ergo, iste angelus est: omnis sol lucet: ergo, iste sol lucet.* Sed ab 35 universali affirmativa ad suam singularem affirmativam

2. int<sup>o</sup>. 5. prioris. 20. 13 = tenet. 30. corporales non. 32, 33. corporali.

35. We must remember that the sphere of things corruptible was considered to extend only as far as the orbit of the moon; and as the individuating principle was supposed to be *materia signata* or matter affected with quantity and mutation, angels and supralunary bodies were properly neither singular nor universal, but only by assimilation of terms, *gracia terminorum*.

cum debito modo est consequentia bona; ut sic argumentando: *Omnis homo est substantia; iste est homo; ergo, iste est substantia.*

Alia regula est ista: Ex falso sequitur verum, sed  
5 nunquam ex vero sequitur falsum formaliter, versu:

*Ex falsis verum, ex vero nil nisi verum:*

ut bene sequitur: *homo est asinus; ergo, Deus est.* Sed non e contra; et pro ista regula potest illud sacre scripture allegari: *Omne mendacium ex veritate non est,*  
10 quod equipollet huic: *nullum mendacium ex veritate est.* Sed ex falso sequitur verum. Nam ista regula [est] quod ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet (vel sequi potest); ut sequitur: *nullus Deus est, ergo, nullus mundus est;* et similiter quod *mundus est,* vel quicquid volueris concludere.

Alia regula est ista: propositio simpliciter necessaria  
15 sequitur vel sequi potest ad quamlibet aliam propositionem, ut sequitur: *tu es, ergo Deus est.* Sed ex necessario nunquam sequitur contingens ad utrumlibet. Nam non sequitur: *Deus est; ergo, ego curro.*

Alia regula est ista: ab universali negativa ad suam  
20 singularem negativam est consequentia bona; ut: *nullus homo currit; ergo, iste homo non currit.*

Alia regula est ista: ab inferiori ad suum superius  
sine negacione et sine dictione, et sine aliqua dictione  
25 habente vim negacionis, est consequentia bona: ut hic, *caritas mundat hominem; ergo, bonitas mundat hominem.* *Homo currit; ergo animal currit.* Et hoc potest fieri dupliciter: vel a parte subiecti, ut patet superius, vel a parte predicatorum, quando predicatum antecedentis est inferiorius ad predicatum consequentis: ut sic argumentando;  
30 *Sor est caritativus; ergo ipse est virtuosus.* Ad cognoscendum quid sit inferiorius et quid superius, docet Aristoteles in libro predicamentorum 8. "Illud est superius, a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia". Unde  
35 sequitur: *homo currit; ergo, animal currit.* Sed non e contrario. Item illud est superius, quod plura significat et de pluribus predicatur quam suum inferiorius; ut iste terminus: *animal,* est superius ad istum terminum: *homo,* et quam iste terminus: *homo,* quia plura significat;  
40 quia omnia animalia: sed iste terminus: *homo,* non significat nisi omnes homines, et iste terminus, *animal,*

9. truth or falsehood can follow from falsehood, but falsehood never follows from truth;

10. the necessary can follow from the contingent; not vice versa;

11. a universal negative implies its particular;

12. a less universal affirmative proposition implies the more universal one that includes it. This may take place either for subject or for predicate; a more universal term being that which cannot be put in the place of the other,

or which is predicated of more things;

11. est deest. 24. do<sup>o</sup>.

33. Arist. Cat. VIII.

and the less  
universal, that  
which possesses  
some  
characteristic  
wanting in the  
other.

Thus, what is  
superior in  
meaning  
contents, is  
inferior in  
extent of  
predication.

and a term may  
be essentially  
inferior to  
another in the  
second sense, or  
accidentally so,  
on account of  
another term  
added to it.

13. When one  
proposition is  
accidentally  
inferior to  
another, the  
first implies the  
second only by  
means of a  
proposition that  
acts as a  
medium.  
Five fallacies  
occur, arguing  
from an inferior  
proposition to  
its superior:  
in negative  
propositions; in  
exclusive  
propositions,  
when the

predicatur de omnibus animalibus; sed iste terminus, *homo*, predicatur solum de homine, vel de hominibus. Alia regula est ista: Omne habens se per modum ap-  
posicionis respectu alterius, inferius est eo, ut capiantur  
isti termini { *homo* et *homo*, tunc neuter istorum est 5 10<sup>b</sup>  
inferior ad reliquum, si additur uni istorum *albus*: tunc  
iste terminus cui fit addicio, cum ista addicione, est  
inferior ad alium; quia iste terminus: *homo albus*, est  
inferior ad istum terminum, *homo* per se, quia ista con-  
sequencia est bona: *homo albus currit*: ergo *homo* 10  
*currit*.

Sed notandum quod aliquis terminus est inferior alio  
dupliciter: vel secundum significacionem, vel secundum  
predicacionem; quoad significacionem, est iste terminus,  
*homo albus*, superior ad istum terminum *homo*, quia 15  
iste terminus, *homo albus*, significat secundum suam  
primam partem omnem hominem: et secunda pars, sci-  
licet, iste terminus, *albus*, significat omnem albedinem.  
Sed quoad predicacionem, est iste terminus, *homo*, supe-  
rior ad istum terminum, *homo albus*. Similiter notandum 20  
quod aliquis est per se inferior ad alterum et aliquis  
per accidens. Terminus [est] per se inferior ad alium,  
quando significat essenciam predicati superioris termini,  
sine adieccione accidentali; et sic iste terminus, *homo*,  
est inferior ad istum terminum, *animal*. Terminus est 25  
per accidens inferior, quando significat essenciam alteri-  
us predicati cum adieccione accidentali; et sic iste  
terminus, *homo albus*, est inferior ad istum terminum,  
*homo*.

Alia regula est ista: ab inferiori ad suum superius 30  
per accidens non valet consequencia sine debito medio:  
ut, *homo albus non currit*: ergo, *homo non currit*. Sed  
ad hoc ut consequencia valeat oportet addere debitum  
medium, ut: *homo albus est*. Et sciendum quod quinque  
modis fallit consequencia ab inferiori ad suum superius. 35  
Primo, quando arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius,  
cum negacione proposita termino inferiori et superiori,  
non valet consequencia, ut sic argumentando: *nullum*  
*animal irrationale salvabitur*: ergo, *nullum animal sal-*  
*vabitur*. Secundo, quando argumentatur ab inferiori ad 40  
superius a parte predicati, diccione exclusiva addita  
subiectis, non valet consequencia, ut: *tantum homo*

*currit: ergo, tantum homo moventur.* Sed ab inferiori ad suum superius a parte subiecti, diccione exclusiva addita subiectis, est consequentia bona: ut: *tantum homo est risibilis: ergo, tantum animal est risibile.* Tercio

predicates are less and more universal;

5 modo, quando argumentatur cum nota alienitatis vel cum nota differentie; ut: *tu es aliud ab asino: ergo, tu es aliud ab animali.* Quarto modo quando argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius cum diccione affirmativa vel negativa, non valet consequentia; ut sic argumentando:

when the propositions contain a differential term; in affirmative and negative propositions, and when the latter contain a second negation; and when a comparative term is employed.

10 *omne animal est sensitivum: ergo, omne corpus est sensitivum.* Negative, sic: *nullum animal est sine sensu: ergo, nullum corpus est sine sensu.* Quinto modo fallit consequentia, quando argumentatur ab inferiori ad suum superius, cum ista diccione, *sicut*, vel *quam*, vel cum

15 comparativo vel superlativo, ut sic argumentando: *Sor est ita sapiens sicut iste homo: ergo, Sor est ita sapiens sicut homo; Sor est melior isto homine: ergo, ipse est melior aliquo homine. Sor est perfectissimus istorum hominum: ergo, Sor est perfectissimus aliquorum hominum.*

20 Et sciendum, quando argumentatur a superiori ad suum inferius, cum aliqua istarum dictionum precedentium terminum inferiorem et superiorem, est consequentia bona; ut hic: *tu es sapiencior aliquo homine.*

Alia regula est ista: a superiori ad suum inferius 25 sine negacione et sine distribucione et sine aliqua diccione habente vim negacionis non valet consequentia, ut: *animal currit, ergo homo currit.*

14. A more general affirmative proposition does not imply the less general, unless it has the sign *all*.  
15. But it does in this case; also when negative, or implying negation.

Alia regula: a superiori ad suum inferius cum negacione vel distribucione vel alia diccione habente vim 30 negacionis, est bona consequentia; ut: *Omne animal est perfectum in natura: ergo, omnis homo est perfectus in natura; nulla virtus est viciū: ergo, nulla caritas est viciū.*

Alia regula est ista; in omni consequentia bona et formali, ubi argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius,

35 distributo consequente, sequitur antecedens distributum; ut, *homo currit: ergo, animal currit; nam sequitur: omne animal currit: ergo, omnis homo currit.* Sed contra istam regulam argumentatur sic. Ista consequentia est bona: *animal est homo: ergo, homo est animal;* et argu-

16. In any right argument from an inferior to a superior proposition, the consequent, if universal, renders the antecedent so, at least with a negation, if not always affirmatively.

40 mentatur ab inferiori ad superius; et tamen, distributo consequente, non sequitur antecedens distribui; quia non 11<sup>a</sup> sequitur: | *omnis homo est animal: ergo, omne animal*

*est homo. Ergo regula minus vera. Ad hoc est dicendum quod, quamvis non affirmative sequitur, tamen negative; quia sequitur: nemo est animal: ergo, nullum animal est homo.*

17. In a good syllogism the denial of the conclusion with the admission of one premiss, must bring about the denial of the other.

Alia regula est ista: quando aliqua est consequencia 5 in qua sunt plures premissae, et ex opposito conclusionis cum altera premissarum, sequitur oppositum alterius premissae, illa consequencia est bona; et aliter non. Ut sic argumentando: *omnis homo est sapiens; tu es homo: ergo, tu es sapiens*, due premissae sunt iste due propo- 10 siciones precedentes hanc notam, *ergo*: tunc ex opposito conclusionis cum minori, que est altera premissa, sequitur oppositum maioris, que est prima premissa, ut sequitur: *tu non es sapiens et tu es homo: ergo, aliquid quod est homo non est sapiens*. Similiter ex opposito 15 conclusionis cum maiori sequitur minoris; ut: *Omnis homo bene vivit; tu non bene vivis: ergo, tu non es homo*.

18. Of one of two contradictory terms (A, and not A) anything may be truly predicated, and nothing of both at once.

Alia regula est ista: de quolibet dicitur alterum contradictorium incomplexorum et de nullo eorum simul 20 ambo. Et sunt contradictoria complexa propositiones contradicentes, ut iste: *tu es et tu non es*. Sed contradictoria incomplexa sunt contradictorii termini, ut: *homo et non homo, lapis et non lapis*. Tunc de qualibet re in mundo verum est dicere quod *illa est homo vel* 25 *non homo*; et: *si non sit homo, est non homo*, et *si non sit non homo, est homo*: et sic de ceteris.

19. If a proposition be true, its abstract meaning must also be true.

Alia regula est ista: quod a quacunque propositione vera sequitur suum dictum fore verum. Unde dictum propositionis debet dari, vertendo nominativum casum 30 in accusativum et verbum indicativi modi in infinitum; aut proponendo istam coniunctionem, *quod*. Unde sequitur: *Deus est: ergo, verum est Deum esse*; vel: *Deum esse est verum*. Iam ista omnino infinita: *Deum esse*, est dictum istius propositionis: *Deus est*. Similiter 35 sequitur: *Deus est: ergo, quod Deus est, est verum*. Iam hoc totum, *quod Deus est*, est dictum eiusdem propositionis similiter.

3. non pro nemo.

18. Some words are probably wanting here. The primary syllogism is to be supplied thus: *Omnis homo bene vivit; tu es homo: ergo, tu bene vivis*. Take the denied conclusion (*tu non bene vivis*) along with the major (*omnis homo bene vivit*) and you get the conclusion (*tu non es homo*).



Alia regula est ista: ab affirmativa de predicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito cum verbo substantivo de presenti, est consequentia bona; ut sic argumentando: *Tu es non lapis*; ergo, *tu non es lapis*.  
 5 *Tu es non homo*; ergo, *tu non es homo*. Sed quando argumentatur cum verbis adiectivis et cum verbo de presenti vel futuro, non est consequentia. Sic non sequitur: *tu vides non hominem*; ergo, *tu non vides hominem*. *Tu fuisti non sapiens*; ergo, *tu non fuisti sapiens*. *Tu eris non*  
 10 *sedens*; ergo, *tu non eris sedens*.

Alia regula est hec: a negativa de predicato finito ad affirmativam de predicato infinito cum constancia subiecti, est consequentia bona universaliter, si argumentatur cum eisdem terminis; ut: *tu non es Deus*; et *tu es*:  
 15 ergo, *tu es non-Deus*. *Tu non vides hominem*; et *tu vides*: ergo *tu vides non-hominem*. *Tu non fuisti sapiens*; et *tu fuisti*; ergo, *tu fuisti non-sapiens*.

Alia regula est ista: ab affirmativa de predicato privato sequitur negativa de predicato finito; ut: *iste homo*  
 20 *est iniustus*; ergo, *iste homo non est iustus*.

20. From *A is a not-B*, the proposition *A is not B* can be inferred, but only with the verb *to be*, and only in the present tense.

21. The converse of rule 20 is true, the subjects remaining the same.

22. From an affirmative proposition with a privative term for predicate, a negative proposition with a corresponding positive predicate may be inferred.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMQUARTUM.

What  
propositions are  
exclusive.  
Attention to be  
paid to the  
place of the  
exclusive  
particle, on  
which the sense  
depends.

Sequitur de terminis exclusivis, et propositionibus  
ratione eorundem expositis: et sunt dicciones exclusive,  
ut *tantum, solum, solummodo, precise*, et in consimiles.  
Sed notandum quod aliqua est exclusiva affirmativa,<sup>5</sup>  
et aliqua exclusiva negativa. Exclusiva affirmativa est  
talis: *tantum homo est risibilis*, vel *solum Deus est om-*  
*nipotens*. Exclusive negative sunt tales: *solum Deus est*  
*non pure creatura, solum homo non est aliud ab homine*.  
Est tamen cum diligencia observandum quod quecumque<sup>10</sup>  
exclusiva ratione termini exclusivi exponenda debet ex-  
poni secundum exigenciam ordinis termini exclusivi.  
Unde ista debet aliter exponi: *homo tantum est animal*,  
et aliter ista: *tantum homo est animal*.

How to  
expound an  
exclusive  
affirmative  
proposition:  
thus: *only A is B*  
is expounded:  
*A is B*, and *no*  
*not -A is B*:  
∴ *only A is B*.

Unde, generaliter loquendo, quedam exclusiva in qua<sup>15</sup>  
terminus exclusivus tenet primum ordinem exponi debet  
per eius | preiacentem et universalem de subiecto et<sup>11<sup>b</sup></sup>  
qualitate oppositis subiecto et qualitate propositionis  
preiacentis: ut ista, *tantum homo currit*, debet sic ex-  
poni: *homo currit* et *non quod non est homo currit*:<sup>20</sup>  
ergo, *tantum homo currit*. Similiter ista: *solum Deus*  
*est omnipotens*, debet sic exponi: *Deus est omnipotens*  
et *non quod non est Deus est omnipotens*; ergo etc. Pre-  
iacens exclusive est illud quod remanet, demta diccione  
exclusiva; ut, si ab ista exclusiva, *tantum Deus est om-*<sup>25</sup>  
*nipotens*, dematur diccio exclusiva, tunc remanet talis  
propositio: *Deus est omnipotens*, que est preiacens tocius  
exclusive: et secunda exponens habet istum terminum  
infinutum, *quod non est homo*, pro suo subiecto; et ille  
opponitur huic termino *homo*, qui subicitur in preia-<sup>30</sup>  
cente: et virtute negacionis precedentis est propositio  
negativa, cum preiacens sit affirmativa.

- Exclusiva negativa debet exponi per suam preiacentis negativam, et per universalem affirmativam de subiecto aggregato ex termino transcendente et termino opposito subiecto preiacentis ut ista: *Tantum Deus non est pure 5 creatura*, debet sic exponi: *Deus non est pure creatura* et *omne quod est non Deus est pure creatura*, ergo etc. Et ista: *solum homo non est aliud ab homine* [debet sic exponi: *homo non est aliud ab homine*], et *omne quod est non homo est aliud ab homine*: ergo etc. Et iste 10 exclusive sunt vere. Et notandum quod in exclusiva affirmativa, predicatum affirmatur de subiecto et removetur ab opposito subiecti; sicut etiam [in] ista exclusiva: *Solum Deus est omnipotens*, hoc predicatum, *omnipotens*, affirmatur de Deo et removetur ab omni quod non est 15 Deus. Sed in exclusiva negativa, predicatum removetur a subiecto et attribuitur cuicumque opposito subiecto, quia sic dicendo: *tantum Deus non est pure creatura*, removetur a Deo secundum deitatem et affirmatur de omni re que non est Deus.
- Item, aliquando exponitur propositio, in qua ponitur terminus exclusivus ratione pluralitatis vel excessus; et tunc debet talis propositio sic predicari: sicut ista: *Christus est solum homo*, debet sic exponi: *Christus est homo* et *Christus non est plus quam homo*, ergo etc. Et 25 tunc patet quod minor est falsa, scilicet quod *Christus non est plus quam homo*: quia Christus est tam Deus quam homo et *esse Deum et esse hominem* est plus esse quam *hominem per se*, vel plus quam *Deum per se et non hominem*. Et isto modo est ista propositio falsa: 30 *Petrus est solum homo*, quia ipse est *homo et animal, corpus et substantia*. Et sic *esse hominem animal* est plus esse quam *hominem esse*. Et sic homo non solum vivit, sed etiam sentit, videt, operatur, intelligit et vult multa facere. Et breviter, quodcumque aliqua predicacio est 35 alicui attribuenda, et alia que non est synonyma cum illa, tunc non solum sibi illa predicacio inest.
- Et propter hoc multi, non acceptantes istum modum loquendi, statuunt sibi novos terminos exclusivos, scilicet istos: *pure* et *mere*: ut ens est *pure* taliter, quando est 40 taliter sine participatione alicuius habentis contradiccione oppositam; ut est *pure* album quando est album

A negative exclusive proposition is expounded thus: *Only A is not B*, i. e. *A is not B and every not-A is B*. ∴ *only A is not B*.

So these propositions, if affirmative, affirm of the subject and deny of everything else; and if negative, they deny of the subject and affirm of all things beside.

But if *only* is the mere denial of more than, then the proposition may be expounded thus.

*A is only B*; i. e. *A is B*, and *A is not more than B*. But this is false whenever the predicate is not synonymous with the subject;

so the word *purely*, meaning *without any share in the contrary quality*, is preferable.

7, 8. *ab homine* — *ab homine deest*.  
animal esse est.

11. *alba*.

12. *in deest*.

31. *est homo*

sine participacione nigredinis: et sic de ceteris denominationibus.

Only *A* is *B*  
∴ every *B* is *A*.  
is a legitimate  
conclusion.

Alia regula est ista: ab exclusiva affirmativa ad suam universalem affirmativam de terminis transpositis et in terminis rectis et in singulari numero et cum verbo de presenti, est consequentia bona, ut *tantum virtus est caritas*: ergo, *omnis caritas est virtus* et e contra; *tantum homo est risibilis*: ergo, *omne risibile est homo* et e contra. Sed in terminis obliquis et in ypotheticis non valet consequentia: ut non sequitur: *cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit*: ergo, *omne currens est asinus hominis*; quia, supposito quod quilibet homo habeat duos asinos, scilicet, unum currentem et alium quiescentem, tunc totum antecedens verum et consequens falsum.

But a similar  
formula would  
not hold in this  
case:  
Every *A*'s *B*  
is *C*; ∴ every  
*C* is *A*'s *B*.

Alia regula est ista: ab exclusiva ad suum preiacens est consequentia bona, ut, *tantum homo est risibilis*, ergo, *homo est risibilis*. Alia regula: ab exclusiva ad utramque eius partem est consequentia bona; ut: *tantum homo est animal rationale*; ergo, *homo est animal rationale*, et *non quod non est homo est animal rationale*, et e contra. Item, ab exclusiva ad alteram eius exponentem est consequentia bona; ut: *tantum Deus est omnipotens*; ergo, *non quod non est Deus est omnipotens*; et patet e contra, quia antecedens est summe necessarium; sed non generaliter.

Another good  
conclusion  
is thus:  
Only *A* is *B*;  
∴ *A* is *B*, and  
no *not-A* is *B*  
and no *B* is  
not-*A*.

In this formula:  
(1.) Only *A* is *B*;  
i. e. (2.) *A* is *B*  
and (3.) no *not-A*  
is *B*, the truth  
of (1.) implies  
that of both  
(2.) and (3.); the  
falsity of that  
of (2.) or (3.)  
that of (1).

Alia regula est hec: si exclusiva sit vera, utraque eius pars exponens erit vera; si altera exponens eius sit falsa, tota exclusiva erit falsa. Et nota, quod contradictorium exclusive debet dari per negacionem propositam toti; ut contradictorium istius: *tantum homo est risibilis*, est hoc: *non tantum homo est risibilis*. Et contradictorium exclusive habet duas causas veritatis; ut ista, *non tantum homo currit*, habet duas causas veritatis: *nihil quod est homo currit*; vel, *aliquid aliud ab homine currit*.

Not only *A* is *B*  
∴ no *A* is *B*.  
is a false  
inference,

Alia regula est: quando argumentatur a proposicione habente plures causas veritatis ad unam illarum, non valet consequentia; ut: *non tantum homo currit*; ergo,

37. u'it<sup>e</sup>.

11. It is not quite clear why Wyclif assimilates this case to the preceding one. The genitive of course produces a certain exclusion in the sense, but by no means equal to the particle *only*. 17. This formula is the very exposition of the exclusive affirmative. See above, p. 49.

*nihil quod est homo currit; quia posito, quod homo et* but *no A is B*  
*asinus currant tunc est antecedens verum et consequens* ; *not only A*  
*falsum.* Sed argumentando ab una causa veritatis ad *is B, is a good*  
*one.*  
 5 *proposicionem habentem aliam causam, est consequentia*  
*bona; ut, nihil quod est homo currit: ergo, non tantum* Propositions  
*homo currit.* Nota quod quando diccio exclusiva additur including  
 diccioni significanti numerum ultra binarium illa pro- numbers:  
 posicio potest exponi duobus modis; scilicet ratione *A is only 12,*  
 alietatis et ratione pluralitatis; ut ista: *tantum 12 sunt* *may be*  
 10 *apostoli Dei; potest sic exponi: 12 sunt apostoli Dei, et* expounded:  
*non alii quam 12 sunt apostoli Dei.* Et sic minor est *A is 12 and A is*  
*nothing but 12;*  
*or A is 12 and*  
*A is no more*  
*than 12.*  
*falsa.*

11. *Non alii etc.* is a false minor, because 11, 10, 9, etc. are numerical attributes of the Apostolic College; no such attribute, however, that is *more than 12* is admissible. See p. 55, l. 10.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMQUINTUM.

Which are the  
particles  
denoting  
exception.

Dicto iam de exclusivis, dicendum est de exceptivis. Et sunt termini exceptivi: *preter quam* et *nisi* et aliqua que illis equivalent. Et differunt in hoc, quia duo primi excipiunt indifferenter a distribucione affirmativa vel negativa. Et sunt exceptivarum quedam affirmative et quedam negative; omnes tamen proprie. Exceptive sunt universales, ut patet de talibus: *Omnia preter Deum sunt creata*; *Omnis res preter substantiam est accidens*; *nemo est bonus nisi solus Deus*; vel *nihil preter Deum est omnipotens*.

How to  
expound  
affirmative  
propositions of  
this sort  
*Every A, except  
B, is C*: i. e.  
*Every A that is  
not B is C*,  
and *B is not C*.

Unde debet pro regula observari, quod quelibet exceptiva affirmativa exponi debet per universalem affirmativam, communicantem cum exceptiva in extremis, addendo subiecto oppositum terminum extra capti, et per negacionem cuius subiectum erat terminus extra captus; et predicatum est synonymum cum priori. Verbi gracia, sic dicendo: *Omnis res preter substantiam est accidens*; ista debet sic exponi: *Omnis res non substantia est accidens*, et *substantia non est accidens*: ergo, *omnis res preter substantiam est accidens*. Maior communicat cum exclusiva in subiecto et predicato; et subiecto additur iste terminus *non substantia*, que est oppositum istius termini, *substantia*; et iste terminus, *substantia*, est pars extra capta in exceptiva; et predicatum minoris est synonymum cum predicato exceptive et prime exponentis.

There are thus  
four elements in  
every such  
proposition:  
1. A, the  
quantitative  
whole in which  
the exception  
is found.

Et notandum quod in omni exceptiva propria, quatuor requiruntur: scilicet, a quo fit exceptio, quia est subiectum quod vocari solet *totum in quantitate*, affirmatum vel negatum; secundo illud respectu cuius fit exceptio, quod est predicatum; tercio, dicitio exci-

1. Capitulum deest.  
5. Jdipr.

2. Initial W in blue ink.

3. aliquando.

piens, et quarto pars extra capta; ut hic in ista propositione exceptiva affirmativa: *Omnis res preter substantiam est accidens*; hoc subiectum *res* est illud a quo fit exceptio. et hoc predicatum *accidens* est illud respectu cuius fit exceptio, et dictio excipiens est hec dictio exceptiva *preter*, et pars extra capta est terminus iste *substantiam*. Preiacens exceptive est illud quod remanet, demta dictione exceptiva cum termino extra capto; ut preiacens istius: *Omnis res, preter substantiam est accidens* est propositio falsa, *omnis res est accidens*.

Si autem fuerit exceptiva negativa, potest pro secunda [regula] observari quod prima exponens erit universalis negativa, communicans cum exceptiva in utroque extremo, addendo subiecto oppositum termini extra capti; et secunda exponens erit affirmativa habens subiectum synonymum cum termino extra capto, et predicatum synonymum cum priori predicato; ut ista: *Nemo est bonus, nisi solus Deus*; sic significat quod | *nemo est de se bonus, nisi solus Deus*. Et ista debet sic exponi: *Nemo non solum Deus est bonus, et solus Deus est de se bonus*. Et ista, *nemo preter Christum est omnipotens*, debet sic exponi: *nemo non Christus est omnipotens*; et *Christus est omnipotens*.

Alia regula est ista: Omnis exceptiva propria repugnat sue preiacenti: ut iste propositiones repugnant: *Omnis res preter substantiam est accidens*, et *omnis res est accidens*; et iste due repugnant: *Nemo preter Christum est omnipotens* et *nemo est omnipotens*.

Alia regula est ista: Ab exceptiva affirmativa ad exceptivam negativam est consequentia bona, et e contra; ut sic argumentando: *omnis res preter Deum est creatura*; ergo, *omnis res non Deus est creatura* et *Deus non est creatura* et e contra. Item, sic: *nemo preter Christum est omnipotens*; *nemo non Christus est omnipotens*, et *Christus est omnipotens*.

Alia regula est ista quod Omnis universalis, habens alias singulares veras et aliquas falsas, potest verificari per exceptionem partis false: ut ista universalis: *Omnis res est substantia* habet multas veras et multas falsas. Sed excipiendo partem falsam per dictionem excipientem, tunc verificatur illa propositio sic dicendo: *Omnis res preter accidens est substantia*.

2. C, the predicate from which B is excepted;  
3. the term except, &c. and  
4. B, the excepted term.  
The proposition without the exception (Every A is C) is called the prejacents.

Exposition of negatives:  
No A, except B, is C; i. e.  
No A that is not B is C, and Every B is C.

Every A but B is C, and Every A is C; or No A but B is C; and No A is C; cannot both be true.

Every A but B is C. ∴ Every A not B is C; and No B is C; likewise No A but B is C  
∴ No A that is not B is C, and every B is C, are true inferences.

Note that every proposition can be rendered true by including the exceptions:  
Every A except B is C; B meaning all A's that are not C's.

*Every A but B is C may mean either Every B is not C and Every A that is less than B is C; or Every B differs from C and No A that is not B differs from C.*

Sed ulterius notandum quod exceptiva sic potest exponi, gracia pluralitatis vel gracia alietatis seu negacionis; ut sic, dicendo: *Deus non fecit nisi quatuor elementa*, potest habere talem sensum: *Deus non fecit plura elementa, quam quatuor et Deus fecit quatuor elementa*; et sic sensus 5 est verus: vel potest facere talem sensum, gracia negacionis, vel alietatis: *Deus non fecit nisi quatuor elementa vel alia quam quatuor, et Deus fecit quatuor elementa*. Et iste sensus est falsus, quia Deus fecit duo elementa vel et tria elementa, et duo vel tria sunt tam nota 10 quatuor quam eciam alia quam quatuor. Et talis sophistication potest fieri in talibus proposicionibus. *Sor non est non homo*. Ista potest sic predicari: *Sor est homo*, et *Sor non est non homo vel aliud quam homo*; et talis sensus est verus. Vel ista potest sic predicari: *Sor est 15 homo*, et *Sor non est plus quam homo*; sed hoc est falsum; quia ipse est *albus, sapiens, sacerdos, animal, substancia*, et sic esse plus esse quam esse solum hominem. Et ideo debemus predicare tales proposiciones: *Christus non est nisi Deus*; ista est falsa, quia Christus est tam 20 Deus quam homo; et hec est falsa, quod *homo non est nisi corpus*, quia ipse est tam corpus quam anima, et compositum ex his. Sed notandum quod tales proposiciones exceptive non sunt proprie exceptive, nisi fuerint universales affirmative, vel negative. 25

*When we say A is not more than B we deny that anything else can be predicated of it; when we say A is not other than B, we deny any difference; in both cases there may be error.*

10. no. 18.  $\widehat{ee}$  plus  $\widehat{ee}$ .

7. Here the exposition is negative. Logically it ought to stand thus: *Nulla elementa nisi quatuor, sunt facta a Deo* (No A but B is C) which can mean either *Every A is C and no A that is more than B is C*; or *Every A is C, and no A that is other than B is C*. 18. I should certainly have thought that the text was corrupt here, had I not found an expression exactly similar when Wyclif returns to the same subject in *Logice Continuacio*.



## CAPITULUM DECIMUMSEXTUM.

Sequitur de copulativis. Ubi notandum primo pro regula quod si altera pars copulative sit falsa, tota copulativa erit falsa; ideo, si sit vera, oportet quod utraque  
 5 eius pars sit vera, si teneatur copulative. Verumtamen aliquando talis copulativa potest teneri kategorice; et tunc potest esse vera, quamvis quolibet eius pars sit falsa; ut: *non est ita quod Deus est, et homo est asinus*. Potest enim ista intelligi kategorice. Si hec negacio,  
 10 *non*, cadit super actum principalem copulandi (et consequenter super utrumque) est kategorica negativa et vera; quia illa tantum significat quod *falsum est Deum esse, et hominem esse asinum, simul*. Vel illa potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio solum cadat super primum  
 15 actum: et talis sensus est impossibilis, quia illa significat quod *ita est quod Deus non est, et ita est quod homo est asinus*.

Alia regula: a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem est consequentia bona; ut: *tu es homo et tu sedes*; ergo *tu sedes*. Et nota, quod hec coniunctio, *et*, aliquando  
 20 tenetur copulative et aliquando copulativim. Tenetur copulative quando copulat inter propositiones. Tenetur copulativim quando copulat inter terminos. Copulative tenetur; ut, sic dicendo: *Terra autem erat inanis et vacua*,  
 13<sup>a</sup> et *tenebre erant super faciem abyssi*. Tenetur copulativim in talibus; *In principio creavit Deus celum et terram; Deus*  
 25 *fecit hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem suam*.

Alia regula est ista: a parte copulative ad totam copulativam non valet consequentia, sed est fallacia conse-

Of copulative propositions (form: *A is B and C is D*). To be true, both parts must be true: unless it is taken categorically thus: *Not A is B and C is D*, supposing that *not* denies only the union, not the propositions separately.

*A is B and C is D* ∴ *A is B*; or ∴ *C is D*, is a true inference. And unites propositions or terms, in one case, 'copulative', in the other, 'copulativim'.

*A is B* ∴ *A is B and C is D* is a false inference;

1. Cap. *deest*.      2. Initial S in red ink.      13. similiter pro simul; *ib.* animal pro vel.      27, 28. coplatam.

28. *Fallacia consequentis*. This fallacy is perhaps the most general of all, since all may be resolved into it; it is in the form of a conditional syllogism, in which the condition is inferred from the conditioned proposition. *If Pompey killed Caesar, Caesar is dead; but Caesar is dead; ∴ Pompey killed Caesar*. In this case it would be: *If (A is B and C is D), then A is B; but A is B ∴ (A is B and C is D)*.

but, *A B is C*; quentis: sed quando secunda pars copulative est antecedens ad aliam partem copulative, tunc argumentando ab illa parte que est antecedens ad totam copulativam, valet consequencia: ut *homo currit*: igitur, *homo currit et animal currit*. 5

The contradictory of Every *A is B and some C is not D*, would be: *Either some A is not B, or every C is D*. Alia regula est quod contradictorium copulative est una disiunctiva facta ex oppositis partibus illius copulative: ut, contradictorium illius copulative *mundus per ipsum factus est et mundus eum non cognovit*, est ista disiunctiva: *nullus mundus per ipsum factus [est] vel omnis mundus eum cognovit*. 10

10. est *deest*.

---

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMSEPTIMUM.

Sequitur de disiunctivis.

Prima regula est ista: argumentando a tota copulativa disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem cum opposito unius partis, est consequentia bona; ut: *tu sedes vel tu loqueris*: sed *tu non sedes*: ergo, *tu loqueris*. Vel sic: *peccatum est bonum, vel caritas est bona*: sed *nullum peccatum est bonum*: ergo *caritas est bona*.

Of disjunctive propositions;  
Either *A is B*  
or *C is D*:  
*A is not B*,  
∴ *C is D* is a true inference;  
and *vice versa*.

Alia regula est ista: a tota disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem sine opposito alterius partis non valet consequentia generaliter; ut ista consequentia non valet: *Sor bene agit, vel Plato bene agit*: igitur, *Plato bene agit*. Sed tamen quatuor modis tenet consequentia a tota disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem sive opposito alterius partis. Primo modo, quando una pars est sequens ad aliam; ut: *tu es caritativus, vel tu es virtuosus*: ergo, *tu es virtuosus*. Secundo modo, quando una pars est inferior ad aliam, tunc ad partem superiorem argumentando consequentia est bona; ut: *homo currit vel animal currit*; igitur *animal currit*. Tercio modo, quando una pars est possibilis et alia impossibilis. Tunc argumentando ad partem possibilem est consequentia bona; ut: *tu es asinus vel tu curris*: ergo, *tu curris*. Quarto modo, quando una pars est necessaria et alia impossibilis vel contingens; tunc argumentando ad partem necessariam est consequentia bona; ut: *nihil est vel Deus est*: ergo, *Deus est*: *Tu es Rome vel Deus est eternus*: igitur, *Deus est eternus*. Et nota quod hec dictio, *vel*, aliquando tenetur *disiunctive*, aliquando *disiunctim*. Tenetur *disiunctive* quando disiungit inter propositiones. Et tenetur

But, unless we posit  
*A is not B*,  
*C is D* is a false inference,  
except in these cases, which infer rightly:

1. *A is BC* or  
*A is C* ∴ *A is C*.
2. *AB is C* or  
*B is C*;  
∴ *B is C*.
3. *A is not-A* or  
*A is B*;  
∴ *A is B*.
4. *A is B* (a proposition known to be false) or *C is D*: ∴ *C is D*.  
Or unites propositions 'disjunctive', and terms 'disjunctim'.

1. Cap. deest.    2. Initial S in blue ink.

15. *Caritas* meaning *virtus dilectiva Dei*, and *homo* standing for *animal rationale*. I have represented them in the marginal notes by BC and AB respectively.

*disiunctim* quando ponitur inter terminos. Exemplum primi, ut hoc: *Deus est*, vel *homo est asinus*; exemplum secundi; ut hic: *tu es homo* vel *non-homo*.

The  
contradictory  
of *Either A is B*  
or *C is D*, is  
*A is not B and*  
*C is not D.*

Alia regula est ista: Contradictorium disiunctive est una copulativa facta ex oppositis parcium illius disiunctive: ut contradictorium istius: *tu curris vel tu moveris*, est hoc: *Tu non curris et tu non moveris*.

6. non curris *pro* moveris.      7. mon'is.

---

## CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM.

Dicto de modo argumentandi, dicendum est de modo exponendi propositiones et addendum contradictoria earundem.

How to expound propositions and take their contradictories.  
*Every A is B: i. e. A is B, and no A is not-B.*

5 Et primo de universali affirmativa. Sed nota quod universalis affirmativa potest probari dupliciter: scilicet, inductive per suas singulares, ut superius patet; vel exponitur isto modo: *Omnis homo est iustus; homo est iustus et non est homo non iustus; igitur, omnis homo*

10 *est iustus.* Et universalium quedam tenentur in recto, quedam in obliquo et quedam sunt de simplici subiecto et de simplici predicato: et quedam de copulato subiecto et de copulato predicato: et quedam de disiuncto predicato et subiecto.

Different sorts of universal propositions, according to the form of words that express them.

15 Et primo sciendum est de expositione universalium aliquorum de simplici subiecto et de simplici predicato. Unde tenendum est pro regula quod quolibet universalis affirmativa exponenda debet exponi per suam subalternam et universalem negativam convenientem in subiecto, sed de contradictorio predicato; ut ista: *omnis iusticia est virtus, debet sic exponi: iusticia est virtus, et non est aliqua iusticia non virtus: igitur etc.*

When the subject is in the nominative singular or plural, the formula is as above;

13<sup>b</sup> Exemplum secundi de universali affirmativa in obliquo et in singulari numero: *Cuiuslibet sancti existentis in celo anima est beata* [debet sic exponi: *Alicuius sancti in celo anima est beata*] et *non est sanctus in celo cuius anima est non beata: igitur etc.* Exemplum universalis affirmativæ de recto et in plurali numero: *Omnia creata per Deum facta sunt* [debet sic exponi: *Aliqua creata per deum facta sunt, et non sunt*] *aliqua creata que per ipsum facta non sunt: igitur etc.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa in obliquo et plurali numero; ut: *omnium fide-*

when it contains another case, thus: *Every A's B is C: i. e. Some A's B is C and no A's B is not C.*

1. Cap. *deest*. 2. *Initial D in rea ink.* 16. aliorum. 25, 26. debet — et non *deest*. 29, 30. facta sunt — et non sunt *deest*.

*lium aliqua est constancia, exponitur sic: Aliquorum fidelium aliqua est constancia; et nulli sunt fideles quorum non aliqua est constancia: igitur etc.*

If the subject be copulative: *Every B that is C and D is E: homo albus et iustus bene agit.* Illa debet sic exponi: *aliquis homo albus et iustus bene agit, et non est homo albus et iustus qui non bene agit: igitur etc.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa et de copulato subiecto et in plurali numero; ut hic: *omnis 'homo et duo homines' sunt tres.* Ista sic exponitur: *'homo et duo homines' sunt tres et non est 'homo et duo homines' qui non sint tres, igitur etc.*

Exemplum de universali affirmativa de disiuncto subiecto et in singulari numero, ut *omne peccatum vel virtus est virtus* sic exponitur; *aliquod peccatum vel virtus est virtus, et nullum est peccatum vel virtus que non est virtus: igitur etc.* Et patet quod ista universalis est vera. Exemplum de universali affirmativa de disiuncto subiecto in plurali numero; ut: *omnes homines vel angeli tenentur diligere Deum.* Ista sic exponitur: *Aliqui homines vel angeli tenentur diligere deum et non sunt homines vel angeli qui non tenentur diligere Deum: igitur etc.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa de disiuncto subiecto, et in obliquo, et in singulari numero: 25 ut: *ab omni homine vel asino angelus differt.* Illa sic exponitur: *ab aliquo homine vel asino angelus differt; et non est homo vel asinus a quo angelus non differt, igitur etc.*

When the principal verb is in the past tense: *All A was B; i. e. some A was B, and no past or present A was not B.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa, cuius principale 30 verbum est preteriti temporis et singularis numeri; ut: *omnis sapiencia fuit semper cum Deo.* Ista sic exponitur: *Aliqua sapiencia fuit semper cum Deo, et non est vel fuit sapiencia que fuit non semper cum Deo, igitur etc.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa in obliquo et in 35 singulari numero, cuius principale verbum est verbum de futuro: ut *cuiuslibet electi anima erit beata.* Ista ex-

6—8. *Agit.* The MS. has *agunt* consistently three times; but as I do not think that *in singulari numero* can refer only to the subject, I have ventured on this correction. 31. In these and the following examples the author points out how the notion of time, possibility, &c., affecting the copula, also affect the subject.

ponitur sic: *alicuius electi anima erit beata et non est electus, vel erit electus, cuius non anima erit beata, igitur etc.*

*some A's B will be C, and no present or future A's B will not be C.*

Exemplum de universali affirmativa in recto, cuius principale verbum est hoc verbum *potest*; ut: *omnis homo potest bene facere*. Ista sic exponitur: *Aliquis homo potest bene facere, et non est homo vel potest esse homo non potens bene facere: igitur etc.* Exemplum de universali affirmativa in obliquo, cuius principale verbum est hoc verbum *potest*. Ut: *cuiuslibet iusti anima potest esse beata* [sic exponitur: *alicuius iusti anima potest esse beata*] et *non est iustus vel potest esse iustus, cuius anima non potest esse beata: igitur, cuiuslibet iusti anima potest esse beata*. Exemplum universalis affirmative de disiuncto subiecto, cuius principale verbum est preteriti temporis; ut: *omnis prudentia vel iusticia fuit virtus*. Illa sic exponitur: *Aliqua prudentia vel iusticia fuit virtus et nulla est vel fuit prudentia vel iusticia que fuit non virtus: igitur etc.*

With the verb 'can': Every A can be B, i. e. Some A can be B and nothing that is or can be A cannot be B. A last example: Every A or B was C; i. e. Some A or B was C, and no A or B (whether present or past) was not C.

11, 12. sic — beata *deest*.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMNONUM.

How to  
expound the  
verb "differs  
from."  
*A differs from*  
*B*, i. e. *A is C*  
and *B is C*,  
and *A is not B*.

Iam consequenter dicendum est de aliis exposicionibus aliarum proposicionum.

Et primo respectu istius termini *differt*, vel *aliud*, vel *non idem* que eodem modo confundunt terminum; 5  
ut: *Petrus differt a Paulo*. Ista sic exponitur; *Petrus est*, et *Paulus est*, et *Petrus non est Paulus*: Igitur etc. Similiter ista: *homo est aliud ab asino* debet sic probari: Prima debet sic resolvi: *homo est aliud ab asino*, et *hoc est homo*: igitur etc.; quia est regula gene- 10  
ralis quod in omni proposicione predicanda primus terminus in oracione probabilis debet predicari; et tunc ulterius debet ista singularis exponi ratione huius termini, *aliud*; ut: *hoc est aliud ab asino*, sic exponitur: *Hoc est*, et *asinus est*, et *hoc non est asinus*: igitur etc. Et eodem 15  
modo exponitur | propositio ratione illius termini *non* 14<sup>a</sup>  
*idem* etc.

1. Cap. deest.      3. Initial I in blue ink.

7. As *est* here "predicat 2<sup>m</sup> adiacens", i. e. means *is something* or *is existing*, I have represented the predicate by a separate letter in the marginal notes.      10. I am not quite sure of Wyclif's meaning here; but I think it amounts to this. A differs from B. A<sup>1</sup> (any of the individuals A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, A<sup>3</sup> &c. comprised in its extension) is A: so A<sup>1</sup> differs from B. Then: A<sup>1</sup> is C (something) and B is C, and A<sup>1</sup> is not B. But I do not see the necessity of descending to singular propositions; or, if this must be done, I do not see why the general term B ought not to be analyzed in like manner.

---



## CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM.

Sed propositio exponenda ratione istius termini *Incipit* vel *Desinit* sic exponitur; ut ista propositio: *Sor incipit esse*, sic exponitur: *Sor nunc est, et ipse immediate ante hoc non fuit: igitur* etc. Vel sic: *Sor iam primo est et ipse immediate ante hoc non fuit: ergo, Sor incipit esse*. Sed hoc verbum, *desinit*, alio modo exponitur per posicionem de presenti et per remocionem de futuro; ut ista: *Petrus desinit esse*, sic exponitur: *Petrus nunc est, et ipse immediate post hoc non erit: igitur* etc. Vel sic: *Petrus iam ultimo est: ergo Petrus desinit esse*. Et notandum quod omne quod incipit esse vel desinit esse incipit vel desinit esse per posicionem vel affirmacionem de presenti, quia inceptio dicit primum instans esse rei, et desinacio dicit ultimum instans esse rei. Et hec diversitas est inceptiois et desinicionis.

Exemplum exponendi propositioem ratione istius termini, *sicut*; ut: *Petrus est ita sapiens sicut Paulus*. Illa sic exponitur: *Petrus est sapiens et Paulus est sapiens et neutra pars comparatorum est sapientior altera illa: igitur* etc. Et ista est comparacio ratione positivi gradus. Exemplum de propositioe exponenda ratione comparativi gradus; ut: *Deus est sapientior Petro vel quam Petrus debet sic exponi: Deus est sapiens, et Petrus est sapiens, et Petrus non est ita sapiens sicut Deus; igitur* etc. Exemplum de propositioe exponenda ratione superlativi gradus; ut: *Christus est sapientissimus hominum*. Illa sic exponitur: *Christus est homo sapiens, et homines sunt gradatim sapientes, et nemo non Christus est ita sapiens sicut ille: ergo Christus est sapientissimus hominum*. Sed quia aliquando possunt multi habere simul gradum denominationis superlative, ideo oportet accipere pro ultimo exponente universalem nega-

How to  
expond  
beginning and  
ceasing.  
A begins to  
be B; i. e.  
A is B now and  
A was not B  
just before.  
And A ceases to  
be B; i. e.  
A is B now,  
and A will not  
be B the next  
instant.

How to  
expond  
comparisons:  
1. of equality  
A is as much  
B as C is, i. e.  
A is B and  
C is B, and  
neither is A  
more B than C  
nor C  
more B than A.  
2. Of  
superiority: A  
is more B than  
C; i. e. A is B,  
and C is B, and  
C is not so  
much B as A is.  
3. Of  
supremacy:  
A is the most  
B of C's, i. e.  
A is B and  
C's are more or  
less B, and  
no C that is  
not A is as  
much B as A.

But there is a  
supremacy  
which admits  
equals; in that  
case we should  
say:

*A is the most B  
of C's; i. e.  
A is B and C's  
are more or less  
B, and no C's  
are more B  
than A.*

tivam de comparativo; ut, quia multi possunt esse primi  
et multi novissimi, ideo oportet sic exponere talem pro-  
posicionem: *Sor est primus istorum*: Sor est pro ordine  
istorum quo nullus istorum est prior: igitur, Sor est  
primus istorum.

5

3. pridem *pro* pro ordine.

2. As an analysis of comparative propositions, this will no  
doubt be found unsatisfactory. To expound equality, superiority  
comes in (neither A is *more B than C*, &c.); to expound  
superiority, equality; to expound supremacy, both. But the fact  
is that such propositions cannot in reality be analyzed, because  
comparison is a primitive mental act, implied in all judgments.  
See Introduction.

## CAPITULUM VIGESIMUMPRIMUM.

Termini officiales dicuntur tales termini qui important aliquod ministerium vel officium positivum vel privativum, ratione quorum propositiones in quibus ponuntur debent officari; et specialiter tales qui concernunt actum mentis; ut *scire, intelligere, velle, nolle*, et sic de ceteris.

'Official' terms are those which express something performed on the abstract meaning of the proposition: mostly an act of the mind.

*I know that A is B; i. e. this proposition, A is B, is known by me, and it means primarily "that A is B."*

To argue from the act performed, to the performance of the act, is a legitimate conclusion.

Other such propositions: *It is true that ... It is false that ... It is necessary that, &c.,* are expounded in like manner.

Et propositio probanda ratione termini officialis habebit duas officiantes, ut ista: *scio Deum esse*, debet sic officari: *Ista propositio est scita a me, "Deus est"* que *primarie significat deum esse; igitur etc.* Et sic similiter ista: *Ego intelligo Deum esse summum bonum*, sic probatur: *Ista propositio est intellecta a me "Deus est summum bonum"*, que *primarie significat Deum esse summum bonum: ergo etc.* Hic argumentatur ab omnibus officiantibus ad eorum officiatum: igitur consequentia bona. Et similiter tales propositiones debent officari: *Verum est primam causam causare effectum; nullum Deum esse est falsum*; quia, quando terminus officialis similiter precedit dictum propositionis, vel finaliter subsequitur, tunc tenetur in sensu concreto, et debet officari prima propositio effective; sic: *Ista propositio est vera, "prima causa causat effectum"*, que *primarie significat primam causam causare effectum: igitur verum est primam causam causare effectum.* 2<sup>a</sup> sic probatur: *ista propositio est falsa "nullus Deus est"* que *primarie significat nullum Deum esse: ergo nullum Deum esse est falsum.* Sed tales propositiones: *Necesse est Deum esse, contingens est anti-* christum esse, possunt resolvi et exponi et officari. Sic resolvitur talis propositio: *Hoc est "Deum esse"*, demonstrando veritatem eternam, que est Deus; et *hoc est necesse: ergo, necesse est Deum esse.* Et ista exponitur sic: *Non potest esse quin Deus est: ergo, etc.* Et ista offi-

1. Cap. deest.

2. Initial T in blue ink.

27. est falsum ergo.

ciatur: *Talis propositio est necessaria, "Deus est", que primarie significat Deum esse; ergo, necesse est Deum esse. Et eodem modo de impossibili, de possibili, et de contingenti.*

Terms are either mediate or immediate; *mediate* terms have other less general ones comprised in their extension; immediate terms are singular, and may be proper nouns, pronouns or adverbs.

Notandum quod aliqui termini sunt mediati et aliqui 5 immediati. Termini mediati sunt tales qui habent terminos inferiores ac per que possunt probari: ut: *homo, animal, necessario, scio, verum, falsum*. Termini immediati sunt tales qui non habent terminos inferiores per quos possunt probari, ut pronomina demonstrativa 10 et adverbia demonstrativa; ut: *hic, iste, ibi, tunc, sic* etc. Et semper terminus mediatus, si sit resolubilis, debet probari per terminum immediatum, ut iste: *homo currit*, sic resolvitur: *Hoc currit: et hoc est homo, igitur homo currit*. Alia propositio: *Cras ero episcopus*, sic 15 resolvitur: *tunc ero episcopus*: demonstrando crastinam diem per *ly* "tunc"; et *tunc erit cras: igitur, etc.* Ista propositio: *alicubi Deus est*, sic probatur: *ibi Deus est, et "ibi" est alicubi; ergo* etc. Et ista propositio: *aliqua- 20 liter ego moreor*; sic probatur: *Taliter, vel sic, ego moreor: et "taliter" est aliqua- 25 liter; ergo, etc.*

14. After resolvitur hoc pro homo

## CAPITULUM VIGESIMUMSECUNDUM.

Suppositis paucis introductoriiis precedentibus, ad aliqualem cognicionem de proposicionibus, restat iam ulterius videre de obligacionibus. Ubi primo notandum, 5 quod obligacio est quedam ars obligans respondentem ad respondendum affirmative vel negative secundum libitum proponentis

Et notandum quod due sunt species obligacionis: scilicet, posicio et deposicio. Posicio est obligacio mediante qua respondens tenetur respondere affirmative, vel 10 aliquis ponit tibi aliquam talem, pono tibi istam: *Antichristus est*; si ista sit possibilis, debes admittere; et quando ipse proponit, debes concedere: et hoc est affirmative respondere. Deposicio est obligacio mediante qua 15 respondens tenetur respondere negative.

Prima regula est hoc. Omne tibi positum et a te admissum sub forma positi propositum, scitum a te fore tale durante tempore obligacionis, est a te concedendum. Intellectus istius regule est talis: Quod, si fuerit aliqua 20 propositio tibi posita a te admissa, si bene velis respondere ad illam ubicunque proponatur, [illa,] vel aliqua sequens ex ea est a te concedenda durante tempore obligacionis. Verbi gracia; pono tibi istam: *Antichristus est Rome*. Ista est possibilis; ideo admittatur. Deinde 25 proponatur, et concedatur, quia omne tibi positum etc. Deinde proponatur: *Antichristus est homo*; concedatur tanquam ex ea sequens, quia omne formaliter sequens ex posito est a te concedendum; et formaliter sequitur *Antichristus est Rome*: ergo, *Antichristus est homo*. Deinde, 30 si proponatur ista: *Nullus Antichristus est*, negatur, tam-

Of the exercise called obligation, by which the respondent is compelled to admit or deny a proposition, as the questioner may choose.

Two sorts, called *position* and *deposition*. Position, when the answer must be affirmative: deposition, when it must be negative.

### Rules.

1. During the whole exercise, the proposition, once admitted as true, is to be considered as such.

Therefore, any other proposition, if following from the first, is also to be admitted;

and it contradictory, denied.

1. Cap. deest; a blank space of three lines. 2. Initial S in blue ink with red tracery. 4. Obligatoria in marg. in red ink. 11. a'q' tam. 21. illa deest.

28. Formaliter sequitur. Not from the circumstance of being in Rome, but from the very idea of Antichrist.

quam repugnans, quia ista est regula: Omne repugnans posito a te est negandum. Deinde proponatur *Antichristus est contrarius Christo*. Concedatur, quia hoc significat nomen eius. Deinde, si ponatur ista: *Antichristus viciose vivit*; est sequens ex posito, vel bene concesso, vel 5 concesso durante tempore obligacionis: est a te concedendum. Et formaliter sequitur: *Antichristus est homo, et ipse est contrarius Christo; ergo Antichristus vitiose vivit.* |

2. Whatever follows from the junction of two propositions, one denied in reality, and the other during the exercise, is to be admitted, whatever the consequence may be.

Alia regula est ista: omne formaliter sequens ex 15<sup>a</sup> posito cum opposito bene negati, vel cum oppositis 10 bene negatorum durante tempore obligacionis, est a te concedendum. Ut, pono tibi istam: *Omnis homo est Rome*, admitto. Deinde propono istam: *Tu es Rome*, negatur, quia falsa et inpertinens. Deinde propono tibi istam: *tu es homo*; negatur, quia repugnat posito cum 15 opposito bene negati. Deinde propono: *tu non es homo*; conceditur, quia sequitur ex opposito cum opposito bene negati, quia sequitur. *omnis homo est Rome; tu non es Rome: igitur tu non es homo.*

3. If a proposition is irrelevant to the obligatory one, it must be answered as it is known: admitted as true, denied as false, or doubted as uncertain.

Alia regula est ista: Ad inpertinens respondendum 20 est secundum suam qualitatem. Hoc est: si sit aliqua proposicio et inpertinens scita a te esse vera, est a te concedenda. Si sit falsa et scita a te esse falsa, est a te neganda. Et si sit dubia, scita a te esse dubia, est a te dubitanda. Pertinens casui est illud quod sequitur 25 vel repugnat. Impertinens casui est illud quod nec sequitur nec repugnat; ut pono tibi istam: *Sor vivit caritative per totam vitam suam*: admitto, propono, concedo. Deinde propono: *tu es homo*; concedatur, quia verum et impertinens: verum est de facto. Et est impertinens, 30 quia non sequitur nec repugnat posito; quia non sequitur, *Sor vivit caritative per totam istam horam*; ergo, *tu es homo*; nec repugnat. Sed stant bene simul quod *Sor bene vivit per totam vitam suam*, et quod *tu sis homo*. Et si proponatur talis proposicio, *Sor placebit* 35 *Deo per totam vitam suam*; conceditur, quasi sequens et pertinens; quia sequitur, *Sor rivet caritative per totam vitam suam*; ergo *Sor placebit Deo*, et cetera. Et si sumatur in eodem casu: *Nullus Sor bene vivit*, negatur, quasi repugnans et pertinens; quia ista duo non possunt stare 40 simul in veritate, quod *Sors caritative vivit per totam vitam suam*, et nullus *Sor placet Deo*.

Alia regula est ista: propter possibile positum non est impossibile per se concedendum, nec necessarium per se negandum; ut propter talem casum positum, quod *omnis homo est Rome*, non debeo concedere quod  
 5 *homo est asinus*, nec aliquid aliud impossibile. Nec debeo in eodem casu negare quod *Deus est* nec aliquid tale necessarium.

Alia regula: Duo contradictoria ab eodem non sunt concedenda nec neganda infra idem tempus obligacionis;  
 10 ut, si hoc sit concessum a te in casu quod *omnis homo est virtuosus*, non debet in eodem casu concedere quod *nullus homo est virtuosus*, nec negare illa simul.

Sciendum quod duplex est posicio, scilicet posicio simplex et posicio composita. Simplex posicio est quando  
 15 ponitur aliqua categorica. Posicio composita est quando ponitur aliqua yppothetica. Nunc determinandum de posicione simplici, et videndum qualiter faciendum sit ex parte opponentis et ex parte respondentis. Opus opponentis est ponere, et proponere, quousque videat  
 20 respondentem male respondere. Opus respondentis: ita sustinere positum, ne videatur deduci ad aliquid inconueniens. Et si positum sit admittibile, admittatur; et si sit impossibile, negetur.

*Primum sophisma.* Pono tibi istam, *tu es mortuus*;  
 25 admittatur, quia possibile est esse sicut ista significat. Deinde, ipsa proposita, consideratur, si proponitur: *tu es vivus*, negatur, quia repugnat posito si proponatur. Tu respondes: *negatur*, quasi repugnans posicioni. Et si dicitur: *ex hoc sequitur quod negas proprium actum*,  
 15<sup>b</sup> 30 dicitur quod non; | quia, si hoc sit verum quod *tu es mortuus*, *tu non habes proprium actum respondendi nec negandi aut concedendi*; nec alicuius alterius accionis; quia sic *tu non es in isto casu* nisi tenendo illam opinionem quod *tu es anima tua*, quia tunc tu debes concedere,  
 35 quod *simul es mortuus secundum corpus et vivus secundum animam*. Sed tunc proposiciones possunt formari isto modo: *tu es corporaliter vivus*; et tunc debet illa negari, nisi fuerit ita quod tenueris istam opinionem quod *omne quod fuit, vel est, erit*. Et per istam opinionem debet ista concedi quod  
 40 *tu es corporaliter vivus in tali casu, quo fueris mortuus*;

22 admittibile. 29. negans. 33. si pro sic.

7. As what is possible may be false but cannot be absurd, it would be bad logic to admit that an absurdity can follow from it.

1. Nothing absolutely impossible should be admitted; nothing absolutely necessary denied; the obligation is to be admitted only if possible.

5. Two contradictory propositions must not be admitted during the same exercise.

Simple 'position' having to do only with categorical propositions, the duties of the opponent and the respondent in this case are now to be explained.

The former has to do all he can to make the latter reply badly; the latter must not let himself be led into any absurdity; if he grants v. g. *that he is dead*, he must deny that he is answering now, or take a distinction, following one opinion or another, as he may choose.

quia ante mortem tuam continue dum vixisti tu eras corporaliter vivus. Sed adhuc oppositiones possunt formare propositiones isto modo, proponendo istam: *Tu es vivus corporaliter in hoc instanti, vel nunc*, et tunc habes necessarie illam tamquam repugnans positioni. 5 Et sic homo potest diversimode secundum diversas opiniones respondere.

How to answer the sophism which, on the hypothesis that one hand does not and the other does exist, proves that *Every hand exists*, there being no more than one.

The consequence must be denied: or even that the other hand exists, if it is to mean *Every hand*.

Another sophism: if it is granted that no proposition is now put forward, the opponent proves the contrary by the fact that he puts forward one. This fact must be denied for consistency's sake.

*Aliud sophisma.* Pono tibi istam: *aliqua manus tua non est.* Admittatur quia possibile. Deinde proponatur: *aliqua manus tua est*: si concedatur, tunc argumentatur: 10 *Aliqua manus tua est; sed nulla est manus tua, nisi dextra vel sinistra*: ergo, *vel dextra manus tua est, vel sinistra manus tua est.* Si conceditur quod *dextra manus tua est et sinistra manus tua non est*; tunc fit: *dextra manus tua est et dextra manus tua est omnis* 15 *manus tua; ergo, omnis manus tua est*; et per casum, *Aliqua manus tua non est*; ergo, contradiccio. Ad istud dicendum est admittendo positum. Et quando proponitur: *Aliqua manus tua est*, negatur quod bene sequitur: *aliqua manus tua non est*: ergo, *nulla manus tua est*; 20 et sequitur: *aliqua manus tua est*: ergo, *omnis manus tua est.* Immo, in casu quo aliqua manus tua non est, sic istam debes negare: *alia manus tua est*, sicut et istam: *omnis manus tua est*; quia equipollent. Nam regula est, quando hoc verbum, *est*, sine determinabili 25 precedente subiecto, predicat secundum adiacens in particulari, tunc equipollet sue subalterne.

*Aliud sophisma.* Pono tibi istam. *Nulla propositio est tibi posita.* Admittatur et concedatur. Deinde proponatur: *aliqua propositio est tibi posita*; negatur, quia repugnat 30 posito. Sed contra, *ista propositio est tibi posita, et ista propositio est aliqua propositio*: ergo, *aliqua propositio est tibi posita.* Ad argumentum secundum conceditur consequentia et negatur antecedens pro maiori, quod *ista propositio est tibi posita.* Contra, dicit opponens: *ego* 35 *pono tibi istam propositionem; ergo ista propositio est tibi posita.* Conceditur consequentia, et negatur antecedens: *quod opponens ponit tibi aliquam propositionem*: quia in isto casu quo *nulla propositio est tibi posita*, nemo tibi ponit propositionem. Ut sic, sicut respondens 40 debet aliquando negare proprium actum si repugnat

22. est almost effaced.

25. verum pro verbum.

26. subiectum pro subiecto.



casui, sic aliquando debet negare actum opponentis, quando repugnat casui.

*Aliud sophisma:* pono tibi istam: *homo est asinus est tibi positum:* admittatur, deinde propositio concedatur.

5 Tunc proponatur: *homo est asinus est a te concedendum:* negatur. Contra: "*homo est asinus*" est tibi positum et a te admissum sub forma positi propositum scitum a te fore tale; ergo "*homo est asinus*" est a te concedendum.

Ad istud dicendum: *admitto casum.* Et quando pro-

10 ponitur: "*homo est asinus*" est a te concedendum; negatur illud. Et ad argumentum, concedatur consequentia et negatur antecedens; scilicet, quod "*homo est asinus*" est tibi positum, quia ista propositio "*homo est asinus*" non est tibi posita, sed hoc totum: "*homo est asinus*"  
15 est tibi positum, naturaliter sumendo est tibi positum; et quando homo ponit talem positionem simplicem, ponit totum per casum et nullam eius partem.

16" *Aliud.* Casum pono tibi quod *Deus sit homo;* admittatur, quia verum. Deinde proponitur: conceditur. Deinde  
20 proponatur iste: *Deus est immortalis;* conceditur. Tunc argumentatur sic: *Iste Deus* (demonstrando Christum) *est immortalis, et ipse est mortalis; ergo, idem est mortale et immortale, et sic idem potest moveri et non moveri;* quod est contradiccio. Hic dicitur: admittendo casum  
25 tamquam necessarium et verum, conceditur quod *idem Deus est mortalis et immortalis;* scilicet, *immortalis secundum divinitatem et mortalis secundum humanitatem.* Et quando argumentatur ad hoc: *ergo, idem est mortale et non mortale,* negatur consequentia: quia isti duo

30 termini non eodem modo significant per omnia. Et sic negatur ulterius quod *iste Deus non potest moveri* (demonstrando Christum); sed bene conceditur quod ipse non potest moveri et similiter quod ipse non potest moveri secundum deitatem. Et si argumentatur: Ex hoc  
35 sequitur quod pro triduo corpus eius iacuit in sepulcro, ipse non transivit ad inferos; quia tunc Christus non fuit homo: negatur istud, quia pro illo triduo Christus fuit homo tam mortuus quam vivus: mortuus scilicet, secundum corpus, quod iacuit in sepulcro; vivus secun-

If it be granted that 'man is an ass' is proposed, it does not follow that 'man is an ass' ought to be granted; the fact of the proposition is alone admitted.

Another example: Christ is God and man, mortal and immortal, movable and immovable. The respondent must deny that these are contradictory terms, since they do not refer to the same thing.

It is said that Christ, when dead, was no longer a man, and that therefore He did not descend into Hell: the answer is that Christ was a man, dead according to the body, living according to the soul.

18. alius casus. 33. non alia manu.

4. *Concedatur* stands for the admission of the fact; *admittatur*, for the possibility. See p. 69, l. 24.

dum animam que movebatur ad inferos pro eodem tempore; et tamen secundum deitatem permansit simpliciter immortalis. Et sic concedi debet quod eadem persona est divisibilis et indivisibilis, possibilis et impossibilis.

Another case put: two men during one hour acquire at the same rate, a certain amount of charity; at the end of the hour one dies and the other is alive. Each is as perfect as the other; but one has not acquired the last degree at the last instant; and the other has acquired an infinitely small amount, which can make no difference.

*Alius casus.* Pono quod Petrus incendatur in caritate 5 uniformiter per totam istam horam et Paulus similiter, scilicet a non gradu usque ad gradum B; ita quod Petrus incendatur in caritate usque ad finem istius hore exclusive: sic quod pro ultimo instanti istius hore Petrus sit mortuus, et quod Paulus vivat pro illo instanti. Admit- 10 tatur, tunc proponatur: Petrus erit ita perfectus sicut Paulus. Si conceditur: contra Petrus acquirit omnes gradus latitudinis caritatis, a non gradu usque ad gradum ut octo, et non acquirit gradum ut decem; sed Paulus acquirit gradum ut octo, et omnem gradum caritatis citra 15 gradum ut 8<sup>o</sup>; ergo, Paulus erit perfectior quam Petrus. Si negatur (quod Petrus erit ita perfectus sicut Paulus) probatur hec sic: Paulus non acquirit ultra totam latitudinem acquisitam a Petro, nisi unicum gradum indivisibilem: sed nullum indivisibile additum divisibili facit 20 totum maius vel minus: ergo Paulus non erit perfectior quam Petrus.

13. latius. 14. dicendo pro decem.

12, 13. *Gradus latitudinis.* The same expression occurs in *De Blasphemia* once, and many times in *Logicae Continuatio* without any abbreviation. It is impossible to suppose that the MSS. are wrong every where, and to substitute *altitudinis*; this would, however, be a more comprehensible term. 14. *Octo.* I have purposely left the numbers as they stand though I think that all ought to be either *octo* or *decem*.

# LOGICE CONTINUACIO.

## PROEMIUM.

Iuvenum rogatibus quibus afflictor superatus, tres  
tractatus (Summulas, supposiciones et consequencias  
5 quas eis collegeram) consequentes pro faciliori doctrina  
superioris partis logice propono contexere; quorum  
primus probationes pure categorice de *inesse* tam in  
generali quam in speciali seriatim dilucidat; secundus,  
de proposicionibus exclusivis et exceptivis cum aliis  
10 famosis exponentibus de *inesse* et proposicionibus mo-  
dalibus, processum priorem prosequitur, probationes  
ipsarum varias pertractando. Sed tercius de cunctis  
speciebus hypothetice quo ad earum probationes in  
genere declarat, diffusius priorum logicorum sententiis,  
16<sup>b</sup> 15 ut plurimum intendo. |

1. Titulus et Proemium desunt; blank space one line A      3. Initial  
I in red ink AB.

1. The Prague MS. begins here; the Vienna readings will  
be henceforth denoted by A; those of the Prague MS. by B.

The author, at  
the request of  
his youthful  
disciples,  
follows up the  
preceding  
summary with  
three treatises;  
the first dealing  
with simple  
categorical  
propositions;  
the next with  
exclusive,  
exceptive and  
other well-  
known  
propositions;  
and  
hypothetical  
propositions  
dealt with at  
more length  
than by former  
writers form  
the scope  
of the third

# TRACTATUS PRIMUS.

## CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

Given the definitions and divisions of the foregoing Summary, we shall deal with simple categorical propositions: but first show in general how any proposition may be proved.

Truth is the correspondence between a proposition and its primary signification;

whether categorical or hypothetical, every true proposition answers to a truth, which has logical being. The primary meaning of a sign is that which a sign is chiefly taken to mean, in its most general sense.

Suppositis autem descripcionibus et distinccionibus terminorum summulis prelibatis, superest primo de probacionibus proposicionum de *inesse* per ordinem pertractandum: et cum probare sit veritatem ostendere, sicut inprobare est ostendere falsitatem, videndum est primo quomodo universaliter probandum est quamlibet proposicionem esse veram.

Pro quo sciendum est quod universaliter et convertibiliter, si aliqua propositio significat primarie sicut est, vel si suum primarium significatum sit veritas, tunc est vera: ut ista est vera: *omnis homo est*: quia primarie significat quod omnis homo est, et ita est quod omnis homo est. Iste eciam sunt vere, *Cesar fuit, ego non sum asinus, anticristus potest esse*, et cetera huiusmodi: quia veritas est quod Cesar fuit, quod ego non sum asinus, quod anticristus potest esse, etc. Et illas veritates dicte proposiciones primarie significant, et sic universaliter potes arguere de omnibus categoricis yppoteticis, et econtra. Iste tamen veritates nec sunt substantie nec accidentia, sed encia logica vel encia rationis. Et voco primarium significatum signi cuiuscunque, quod primo et principaliter apprehenditur toto signo: ut iste terminus, *homo*, primarie significat hominem, et hominem primarie significat in communi, sed nec istum nec illum, quocunque individuo demonstrato, sed speciem vel naturam humanam, quam principaliter intellectui representat. Nec ista: *omnis homo est*, primarie significat quod iste homo est, vel quod omne ens est ratione verbi transcendentis

1. Capitulum Primum *deest* AB. 2. *Initial S in red ink* AB. 3. in summulis B. 4. pro ordinem B. 5. est *deest* B. 24. homo pro hominem A.

quod est pars dicte proposicionis: sed primarie significat quod omnis homo est, quod primo et principaliter apprehenditur toto signo: et sic de omnibus similibus iudicandum.

- 5 Et ex isto patet quod tripliciter contingit signum significare secundarie quodlibet designandum: vel quia eius pars primarie vel secundarie illud significat, ut ista, *omnis homo est omne ens*, significat ratione significati primarii sui verbi. Vel quia illud continetur sub primario significato aut saltem est primarie significabile | a signo inferiori adsignans principale: ut ista: *Omnis homo est*, significat quodcunque individuum speciei humane esse, sive fuerit, sive etiam non esset possibile ipsum esse. Tercio significat signum per accedens secundarie id ens cuius apprehensionem memorie est reducens: ut cogitando de Hectore, communiter cogito de Achile.
- Et ex istis bene notatis patent tria: primo, quod quolibet propositio, quantumcunque vera, cum falsificatur propter suum et secundarium significatum, significat sicut non est nec etiam potest esse: sicut et quolibet propositio, quantumcunque falsa, significat secundarie veritatem, ymmo necessitatem absolute, ut ista: *deus est*, significat omne significabile propter significacionem amplissimam predicati. Et ista, *deus non est*, significat infinitas necessitates propter consimiles causas. Secundo patet quod, duobus hominibus intelligentibus eandem oracionem equivoce, tunc non est propositio una falsa vel vera: vel aliter contingit eandem proposicionem esse respectu diversorum veram et falsam, affirmativam et negativam, necessariam et impossibilem. Et sic de aliis denominationibus que respectu eiusdem contrarie solent dici. Et secunda pars disiunctive est michi probabilior, quamvis prima sit magis pueris placens. Tercio, potest convinci ex predictis quomodo convertibiliter est arguendum signum esse necessarium, impossibile vel contingens. Si enim propositio primarie significat sicut necesse est esse, aut veritatem necessariam (que necessitas dicitur): tunc est necessaria, et econtra. Ut ista, *chimera non potest esse*, significat istam veritatem necessariam primarie, que est, chimeram primarie non posse esse; | et ista

There are three secondary ways in which a sign may mean anything:

1. Either by extending the general meaning of a part to the whole.

2. By descending from the universal to the singular.

3. By association of ideas.

Three conclusions.

1. However true a proposition may be in itself, it may be taken to mean what is impossible:

thus *God is*, it is means *is anything*, cannot be true:

vice versa: *God is not*, however false it is, may likewise mean what is true.

2. The same proposition, understood differently, is neither false nor true; or rather both at once from a different standpoint.

3. A proposition is necessary, impossible or contingent, according as its primary signification includes

one or the other of these modes.

3. sic est B. 18. cum non both MSS. 19. alium pro primum A. 23, 24. communissimam B. 26. hominibus above the line A; deest B. 27. una falsa vel vera above the line A; deest B. 29. falsam above the line A. 33. convici A.

est necessitas, sicut ista, *Hoc est, vel hoc non est*, significat primarie veritatem disiunctam, que est necessitas: ideo utraque necessaria debet dici. Et correspondenter de impossibili et possibili est dicendum.

Aristotle, taking the word *thing* to mean *truth*, says that a proposition is true or false as the thing it means is or is not. But if we deny Universals, then we must say that a proposition is true, only when it adequately means those ideas which it expresses, as agreeing with its signification.

Unde Aristoteles, ampliando hoc nomen, *res*, ad significandum quaecunque huiusmodi veritatem, dicit quod in quantumcunque *res* est vel non est quam propositio primarie significat, est ipsa vera vel falsa. Signum enim capit denominationem a posteriori de suo principaliter significato. Si autem aliquis voluerit negare universalia et veritates tales negativas, ac etiam veritates de preterito, de possibili, de futuro, tunc oportet aliter dicere signum quod consonat sue vie: ut, quando negabam universalia, dixi quod propositio solum convertibiliter tunc est vera quando adequate significat sub conceptibus sub quibus est vere exprimibile ita esse, sicut illa significat. Et alii dicunt non omnes propositiones veras univoce esse veras. Sed non claret mihi quot sunt universalia, et quod veritas est quod *nemo est asinus*, et ita est quod *Cesar fuit*, quod *tempus erit*, et quod *multa instantia possunt esse*.

3-5. debet -- amplians, at top of page A. 7. vel *res* B. 12. et de B. 13. negarem AB. 16. exprimibili B; *ib.* sicut illa significat above the line A; deest B. 18. modo pro non B.

16. This definition is very obscure and not at all satisfactory. Yet it exactly embodies the Nominalist or Conceptualist position. If there is no universal *thing* corresponding to a universal proposition that is true, *what corresponds?* At most, universal ideas. And what do these ideas mean? They mean . . . the proposition itself! It is hard to get truth out of this circular reasoning.

## CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

- Consequens est post dicta particularius discutere de modo probandi propositiones disparium specierum. Tripliciter enim contingit in genere convincere aliquam propositionem esse veram. Vel solo sensu cum ipsi  
 5 convenientibus, et noticia terminorum, ut patet de talibus: *Iste currit, iste loquitur, sive sedet*, et breviter de omnibus significantibus primarie contingentes et sensibiles veritates. Vel solo intellectu cum ipsi convenientibus et  
 10 noticia terminorum, ut patet de universalibus per se notis; cuiusmodi sunt talia: *nihil simul est et non est, omnis numerus est par vel impar; aliquid est vel non est*, etc. Quamvis enim alique talium, tam sensibilibum quam intelligibilium veritatum, probari poterint a priori.  
 15 sophisticis tamen satis est sine probacione, ex sensu vel motu, de talibus elicere veritates. Tercio, ex sensu et intellectu cum ratione et noticia terminorum etc., cuiusmodi sunt tales: *ista planeta est incorruptibilis*; ymmo breviter omnis conclusio demonstrata.
- 20 Omnem ergo propositionem veram non immediatam contingit probare quadrupliciter, videlicet a priori, a posteriori et ex opposito et ab equo. A priori; quia quilibet huiusmodi habet causam (si quis eam cognosceret) ex qua sequitur eius primarium significatum. Ut ex hoc:  
 25 *homo currit, quod habet voluntatem currendi et non impeditur*. Et sic de ceteris quibuscunque. A posteriori, ut per suum inferius vel aliam aliquam propositionem significantem pro signo sue veritatis; ut, probando quod *homo currit* quia *iste homo currit*, vel quod *substantia*

There are three ways of proving any proposition.

1. By sensible demonstration of the fact which it expresses, in the case of contingent truths.

2. In the case of axioms that are self-known, by an act of intellectual intuition.

And 3. by sense, intellect and reasoning together; as in the case of inductive generalizations.

So it a truth be not immediately known by itself, it can be proved either.

(1.) *A priori*, by means of other known truths on which it depends as on a cause.

(2.) *A posteriori*, by means of particular propositions from which

1. Cap. deest AB. 2. Initial C in blue ink A; deest B. 3. modis B. 7. ille B. 9. ipsum both MSS. 11. omnis B. 13, 14. quam intelligibilium in marg. A. 15. sophisticis A. 16. intellectu pro motu B. 17. etc. deest B. 21. probari B. 22. vel for et both times B. 26. ceteris omnibus B.

16. *Motu*. Allusion to Diogenes' demonstration of movement.

another more  
general may be  
deduced.

(3.) *Ab aequo*,  
i. e. by  
expounding its  
meaning, by its  
definition, or by  
any proposition  
convertible  
with it.

Or (4) *ex  
opposito*, by  
proving the  
contradictory  
proposition to  
be false.

Some proofs  
are preferred to  
others at  
different times  
and by different  
persons.

We may note  
that a  
proposition is  
immediately  
proved (or  
self-evident) in  
two ways: by  
the senses or by  
the intellect.

Every  
proposition can  
be proved in  
some way:  
even such as:  
*A man runs, a  
being exists,  
and God  
exists.*

If a proposition  
has several  
primary  
meanings,  
of which one is  
true, it should  
always be  
granted.  
V. g.: *A man is  
not the Pope*  
is true for many  
individuals

*est, quia accidens est.* Ab equo, probando proposicionem  
per suas exponentes, per diffinicionem, vel aliquod con-  
vertibile magis notum: ut probando quod *omnis homo*  
*est risibilis* per hoc quod *homo est risibilis* et *non est*  
*homo quin sit risibilis*; vel per hoc quod *omne animal* 5  
*rationale est risibile*; vel per hoc quod *nemo non est*  
*risibilis*. Indirecte, ex opposito, capiendo contradictorium  
proposicionis probande, probando illud esse falsum. Hoc  
autem facto, sequitur (iuxta primum principium et alia  
regula danda) proposicionem quam probare voluero esse 10  
veram.

Aliquando autem est unus modus probandi facilior,  
et aliquando alius: ymmo uni est unus modus probandi  
efficacior, qui est alteri ineptior, et econtra; quia uni  
est una propositio magis nota que est alteri minus 15  
nota, et econtra. Et ex isto patere potest quod differenter  
contingit proposicionem esse immediatam: vel quo ad  
sensum que non habet ipsa inferius et nocius quo ad  
sensum, ex quo poterit probari a posteriori: ut est  
talis: *iste currit*; vel quo ad intellectum, que non habet 20  
ipsa prius quo ad communitatem, ex quo probari poterit;  
ut ista: *aliquid est*. Et sic credo quod quelibet pro-  
positio | vera probari poterit modo suo. Nam illa *homo* A 17<sup>b</sup>  
*currit*, potest probari a priori et a suo convertibili,  
capiendo descripcionem cursus. Et ista, *ens est*, probari 25  
potest a posteriori, sic: *hoc est et hoc est ens*; ergo,  
*ens est*; et ita: *nihil simul est et non est* probari potest  
a priori (non quo ad consequenciam sed quo ad causam)  
per illam universalem que est immediata quo ad in-  
tellectum: | sicut tales negative: *Nulla substancia est* B 2<sup>b</sup>  
*quantitas*, sunt immediate in genere, iuxta philosophum.  
Ymo illa, *deus est*, que est immediatissima, probari potest  
a posteriori: ergo quelibet propositio vera probari potest  
modo suo.

Ex istis elicitur alia regula: quod queque propositio 35  
habens multos sensus primarios quorum unus sensus  
est verus, semper concedenda est. Et voco sensum pri-  
marium istum qui immediate correspondet toti signi-  
ficacioni primarie proposicionis, ut hec: *homo non est*  
*papa* habet istum sensum secundarium: *iste non est papa*, 40

8. et probando B. 10. vera *pro* regula A. 21. ista causam B.

23. ista B. 26. sicut B. 28. quam A; *ib.* conclusionem (9<sup>em</sup>) B.

32. ista B. 33. poterit B. 40. habet — *papa deest* A.



(demonstrando papam), et istum sensum communem  
 primarium, *homo non est papa*; et iste est verus pro  
 multis singularibus: ideo propositio est concedenda. The reason is  
 that every true  
 proposition can  
 be proved, and  
 is therefore  
 admissible.  
 Probatur ista regula per hoc quod quolibet talis pro-  
 5 posicio, iuxta primam regulam, est vera; et omne  
 verum potest probari iuxta regulam proximam: ergo,  
 cum omne probatum sit concedendum, sequitur quam-  
 libet talem esse concedendum. Unde, prolata ista pro-  
 positione: *Omnes apostoli Dei sunt XII*, posito quod  
 10 habeat XII apostolos et non plures, patet quod est  
 concedenda ad sensum talem collectivum: *illi (qui sunt  
 omnes apostoli Dei), sunt XII*, quamvis posset habere  
 sensum divisivum talem: *nulli sunt apostoli Dei, quin  
 sint XII*. Et sic iudicandum est de similibus quibus-  
 15 cunque.

2. iste verus A.      4. sic *pro* ista B.      10. habeat collectivum B; *ib.* quod  
 above line A.      11. isti; illi *in marg.* B.      13. divisum *both MSS.*  
 14. consimilibus B.

## CAPITULUM TERCIVM.

Various  
divisions of  
terms.

Cum autem variacio probacionis proposicionis ex terminis habet ortum, notanda est, iuxta doctrinas utiles logicorum precedencium, pertinens distincio terminorum.

5

Some can be analyzed into singulars: these are general terms. Each may have more concrete terms in their extension: example.

Sunt enim, quantum ad propositum pertinet, aliqui termini resolubiles: ut termini communes, puta nomina, verba, adverbia, et participia habencia signa ipsis inferiora; ut sunt talia: *homo movetur aliquantulum fatigatus*, quibus inferiora sunt ista: *hoc currit bene exerci-* 10 *tatum*.

Others can only be expounded as propositions: these are the words of universal affirmation, exclusive, exceptive, modal terms and those denoting beginning, end, or comparison.

Aliqui autem sunt termini exponibiles: ut signa universalis affirmativa, denominationes exclusive et exceptive, *incipit* et *desinit*, omnes comparativi et superlativi, termini modales, et breviter omnes termini ratione quorum 15 sunt proposicionibus in quibus ponuntur exponentes convertibiles assignande: ut sunt tales: *differt, aliud, in quantum, per se, necessario, contingenter*, etc.

And some terms are 'official', limiting the supposition of the other terms; such as *to know*, etc.

Alii autem sunt termini officiales, ut termini limitantes ad sensum compositum vel divisum, aut ad diversas 20 supposiciones secundum diversas ordinationes in proposicionibus; ut sunt termini significantes actus anime, utputa: *scire, cognoscere*, et termini quorum actus signati possunt esse circa commune, cum hoc quod non distincta circa illius singularia; et tales ponuntur termini 25 modales, et termini secunde inposicionis et secunde intentionis, et omnes termini distrahentes. Omnes enim tales termini limitant ad supposiciones; ut *scio omnes homines esse* et tamen *non omnem hominem scio esse*, saltem distincte; quia primus est sensus compositus, ubi predi- 30

1. Cap. *deest* AB. 2. Initial C in red ink A, *deest* B; *ib.* proposicionum B. 3. *regulas* B. 4. p<sup>th</sup> A. 5. p13 *struck out pro* pertinet A. 6. et verba adverbia *both* MSS. 7. necessarium A. 8. coordinaciones B. 9. et termini *deest* A. 10. significati *corr. in* signati B. 11. et - saltem *in marg.* A.

catum supponit simpliciter, et secundus est sensus divisus, ubi predicatum supponit personaliter. Et talis limitatio  
 B 3<sup>a</sup> est per tales ordines terminorum: | *necesse est esse aliquid contingens, hominem possibile est non esse, homo*  
 5 *est species, deus est nomen* etc.

Nec est ista trimembris divisio terminorum ex opposito assignata, cum contingit eundem terminum esse resolvablem, exponibilem, et officialem; ut patet de isto termino; *necessarium*. Ut in tali propositione; *necessarium est*  
 10 *aliquid esse*, que potest tripliciter probari, primo resolutione, sic: *hoc est aliquid esse, et hoc est necessarium* (continue demonstrando deum esse): *ergo necessarium est aliquid esse*. Secundo, expositive, sic; *aliquid est*, et  
 A 18<sup>a</sup> *non potest* | *esse quin aliquid est; ergo necessarium est*  
 15 *aliquid esse*. Tercio officialiter per captionem talis propositionis: *propositio est necessaria: "aliquid est", que primarie significat aliquid esse; ergo, necessarium est aliquid esse*. Sed sufficit quod rationes talium denominationum sint diverse.

20 Ex istis elicitur talis regula, quod universalis propositio exposita convertitur cum suo antecedente debite exponente, licet non universaliter. Sed quandoque propositio resolutione vel officialiter proposita, cum suo antecedente, gracia materie, convertitur; verbi gracia, convertibiliter  
 25 sequitur, *instans est*, et *non potest esse quin instans est; ergo, necessario instans est*. Et sequitur, *hec propositio est necessaria, "instans est," que primarie significat instans esse: ergo, necessario instans est*; sed non sequitur econtra. Unde notabiliter errant quidam, intelligentes  
 30 tales propositiones; *necessario tu non es asinus*, convertibiliter vel primarie significanter, quod *talis propositio est necessaria, "tu non es asinus"*; est enim necessarium quod tu non es asinus, etsi nulla talis propositio sit in mundo. Sequitur etiam: *hoc est*, et *hoc est homo*;  
 35 *ergo, homo est*, et non econtra; cum antecedens sit necessarium, et consequens contingens. Exempla secunde partis regule sunt talia; ista consequentia est bona: *deus est, ergo, hoc est, et hoc est deus*, et econtra. Et sic

This division of terms is not exclusive, but taken from different points of view; the same proposition may be proved either by analysis or by exposition, or by the forming of a second proposition to explain it; as. v. g. *It is necessary for something to be.*

An expounded universal proposition must always be able to take the place of its exponents. This convertibility exists sometimes, not always, in the other two cases.

V. g. *Thou art necessarily not an ass* cannot be converted with: *This proposition is necessary, which means that thou art not an ass*; because the fact would be true even if the proposition did not exist.

1. secundus sensus B. 5. homo pro deus B. 8. patet in marg. A.  
 9. ut above the line A, deest B. 12. continue demonstrando deum in  
 marg. A; ib. esse deest B. 16. propositio est necessaria deest; necesse A;  
 aliquid est A. 20. universaliter both MSS. 21. et directe B.  
 22. uniformiter corr. A. 23. probata B. 24. intelligendo B. 30. non  
 deest A. 31. significatorie B; figurat A. 33. esset B. 37. ista B.  
 G\*\*

Examples of cases in which this convertibility exists.

Care must be taken, in demonstrating a proposition, to repeat certain official terms; as, v. g. *A begins to be B*; i. e. *A<sup>1</sup> begins to be B*, and *A<sup>1</sup> is (or begins to be) A*.

Neglect in the observation of this rule may lead to confusion.

When a term is repeated in the same proposition, we should understand it in the same sense.

As for the juxtaposition of the same terms in a sentence, that is partly a question of grammar.

As, before we decide of the truth of a proposition, its terms must be understood, we should provisionally take every subject in an abstract sense.

universaliter. de universali cuius singularia sunt necessaria. Et sequitur: *homo est species; ergo, natura humana communis omni homini est species*; et econtra. Et sequitur: *homo scit aliquid esse; ergo scit signum aliquid, significativum primarie tale "aliquid esse"*; et sic de ceteris. 5

Ex istis elicitur talis regula, quod in probando propositiones est ordo terminorum specialiter attendendus, cum utrobique, termini mediati (secundum intellectum debitum prioris) significatio debeat explicari, antequam posterioris termini mediati officium explicetur. Verbi 10 gratia; capta illa propositione, *album incipit esse Sor*, cuius primus terminus est ille terminus resolubilis *album*, probanda est propositio resolutorie, ratione illius termini *album*, sic argumentando: *hoc incipit esse Sor, et hoc est (vel incipit esse) album*. Unde aliqui, per defectum 15 illius consideracionis intricarunt seipsos, et expresserunt suam sententiam nimis diffuse. Et hoc est quod monet quidam subtilis loycus, quod non fiat saltus ultra terminos mediatos in qualibet propositione exponenda; nam, exponendo primo hoc verbum *incipit*, foret nimis longum 20 opus et intricabilis expositio, quamvis contingat frequenter multas propositiones | sic inferri. Et additur B 3<sup>b</sup> in regula dicta "secundum intellectum debitum prioris"; quoniam quandoque terminus precedit vocaliter ubi, ad congruum intellectum habendum, oportet equipollentem 25 terminum posterius intelligi. Ex quibus patet quod falsum est quod *homo homo non est*; quia nugacio esset, nisi intelligeretur quod *homo non est homo* specialiter, si uterque terminus sit universale non contractum ad aliquod singulare. Et patet quod verum est quod *ab* 30 *homine differt homo*, cum sit idem cum ista: *ab homine homo differt*; et sic de multis aliis quorum iudicium est grammaticis relinquendum. Ut sic dicto: *homo est species; hominem esse est necessarium* etc. Tamen oportet pre-intelligere singulos terminos propositionis et habitudinem 35 eorum ad invicem, antequam iudicetur de eius veritate, patet quod ante indicium de veritate talis propositionis, saltem temporaliter vel naturaliter, limitanda sunt subiecta ad supponendum simpliciter.

4, 5. significatum both MSS. 5. aliquid *deest* B. 9. significat<sup>9</sup>; *corr.* in marg. B. 11. sortes B. 15. album ergo B; *ib.* propter B. 18. quidam *deest* A; *ib.* nt; quod *above* B. 21, 22. frequenter *deest* B. 22. frequenter sic B. 23. priorum *corr.* A. 25. equivalentem B. 31, 35. premittere A.

## CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Sequitur de universali affirmativa tractandum, quomodo in speciali probari debeat; et patet, iuxta secundam regulam, quod potest probari a priori; ut sic argumentando: *Omnis triangulus rectilineus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis; omnis isosceles rectilineus est triangulus rectilineus: ergo, omnis isosceles rectilineus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis.* Potest etiam quilibet talis probanda probari a posteriori, inductive per | sua singularia.

A universal affirmative proposition may be proved either *a priori*, by means of a higher truth,

or *a posteriori*, by proving the singulars which it includes.

Sed notandum pro regula quod, ad hoc quod aliqua sint singularia dande universalis, oportet quod habeant predicata sinonima cum predicato dati universalis, et subiecta cum eius subiecto sinonima demptis signis. Et  
15 voco signa, nomina distributiva et pronomina demonstrativa. Verbi gracia. singularia illius universalis, *omnis homo est animal*, sunt talia, *iste homo est animal*, et *ista homo est animal*, et non talia: *illud risibile est animal*, vel *iste homo est substantia animata, sensibilis*;  
20 quamvis equivalenceant. Et patent ex isto tria; primo quod universalis non convertuntur cum suis singularibus; nam stat universalis esse possibilis et sua singularia impossibilia; ut patet de ista: *omne animal quod est in ista domo est asinus*. Stat etiam universalis esse necessaria et sua singularia contingencia; ut patet de  
25 istis: *omne ens est, omnis homo est animal, omne corruptibile est*, etc. Stat etiam universalis esse impossibilia et sua singularia possibilis; ymmo, quecumque duo danda compossibilia; ut patet de istis: *Omne corruptibile*  
30 *cognoscitur non esse in omni instanti; hoc erit generandum*, etc. sic de similibus.

Note that a singular proposition must be identical with its universal, except as regards the signs of universality or singularity. It would not do to put even convertible terms in the places of the subject and predicate. A universal proposition cannot be converted with its singulars; the latter may be impossible or contingent while it is possible or necessary; it may be impossible while they are possible; or both may be possible.

1. Cap. deest AB.      2. Initial S in blue ink A; deest B.      19. istius B.  
20. quomodo A.      23. istis A; ib. quod est crossed off B.      20. omnis —  
animal deest A.      28. sua in marg. A.

We must therefore, inferring the universal from the particular, add: *and so of every one.*

'So' is a distributive, not a singular demonstrative term: nor does it correspond with 'every' which sometimes refers only to species.

To say: *every A is every A*, is false, if each singular is predicated distributively: *A is every A*, etc.

But it is true to say: *A is only one A*, and to conclude: *Every A is only one A*. The fact that all the singulars may in some cases be converted with their universal does not render this conversion legitimate.

So also when the subject is compound; as *Every A or B is C*.

For the propositions: *A<sup>1</sup> (which is A or B) is C*; and *A<sup>2</sup> (which is A or B) is C*; and so on — would be converted with the universal;

Ideo patet quod, inferendo universales ex contingentibus singularibus, debet addi in fine talis particula, *et sic de singulis*; quia aliter non videtur talis consequentia, nisi consequens fuerit necessarium. Nec est talis terminus, *sic*, singulariter demonstrativus, sed confuse significativus, quod de singulis suppositis subiecti; et sic intelligendo per *li* 'sic', confuse, sicut priora singulariter significant. Nec est omnino identitas illius particule ad universalem; quia iste terminus *omnis* distribuit quandoque pro speciebus, quandoque pro individuis: quandoque stat collective, quandoque divisive; sed iste terminus singularis distribuit semper divisive pro individuis. Unde solet addi in cartis: *omnibus et singulis*, etc. Et tercio, ex istis patet quomodo tales sunt false: *omnis homo est omnis homo*, limitata suppositione personali 15 utrobique; quia singularia eius sunt talia; *iste homo est omnis homo*, etc. Patet etiam quod bene sequitur, *iste homo est unus solus homo*, et *sic de singularibus hominibus*; ergo *omnis homo est unus solus homo*; sed minor est falsa, quia non sic est de mulieribus, que 20 sunt homines. Patet etiam quod ista universalia non convertuntur: *omnis homo qui est albus currit*, et *omnis homo qui currit, est albus*, quamvis omnia sua singularia convertuntur; non enim convertuntur omnia universalia cum suis singularibus; ymmo referret dicere, *sic est de 25 singularibus hominibus qui sunt albi quod currunt*; et *sic de singularibus masculis qui sunt currentes quod sunt albi*. Ideo, completa antecedencia ex quibus inducuntur, dicte universales multum differunt.

Et idem est iudicium de talibus universalibus de 30 subiectis compositis: ut *Omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria* est vera, *omnis homo vel asinus est asinus*, etc. Nam omnes singulares primi sophismatis convertuntur cum singularibus illius universalis, *omnis propositio est vera*, cum sint tales: *Hoc quod est propositio 35 vel eius contradictoria, est verum*. Unde multum refert addere: *sic est de singulis propositionibus vel sibi contradictoriis, quod sunt vere*; et dicere quod *sic est de sin-*

1. sed pro ideo B. 3. talis in marg. A. 7. ly B; it. p<sup>a</sup> B; it. singularis B. 8. istius B. 9. ly omnis B. 14. propositiones B. 20. 21. que tamen B. 23. enim above the line A; currit qui both MSS. 25. refert B; it. et sic B. 26. q; A. 27. qui pro quod A. 31. ut deest A. 33. fōp<sup>t</sup> A. 34. istius B. 35. after vera, vel eius contradictoria AB. 36. contradictorium A. 38. directe pro dicere quod A.

*gulis proposicionibus quod sunt vera vel veris contradictoria.* Ideo illa universalia multum differunt: omnis *proposicio vel eius contradictoria est vera, et omnis pro-* and yet they would not mean the same as *A or B is C*; and so on, which makes a great difference.

*positio est verum, vel eius contradictorium.* Sic et sua singularia, cum quolibet singularis prime partis parciens

subiectum, si demonstratur *proposicio falsa, sit falsa.*

Unde talis *proposicio, Hec proposicio vel eius contradictoria est vera,* non verificatur ad istum sensum, *hec (existens) proposicio vel eius contradictoria est vera,* quia

non est cathegorica, cum habeat sensum ypotheticum distinctum. Ideo huiusmodi *proposiciones non inductive* sed a posteriori inferunt secundam universalem. Unde

A 19<sup>a</sup> *probabile est quod quolibet huiusmodi universalis | convertatur cum infinita, capiente collective omnia*

15 *supposita subiecti cum circumlocutione debita.*

3<sup>o</sup> possunt universales affirmative probari ex opposito indirecte, tum quia frequenter est grave invenire medium probandi huiusmodi universalia a priori, tum etiam quia particularia impossibilia sunt magis nota frequentius

20 *esse falsa quam sua universalia sunt cognita esse vera; ut probando quod omnis homo est quantus, probari potest*

per ducens ad impossibile, capiendo oppositum, scilicet,

B 4<sup>b</sup> *quod datus homo non est | quantus, et deducendo ex hoc quod iste homo non sufficit ridere vel exercere*

25 *operationem hominis; et sic de multis aliis inconuenientibus. Et illo modo sunt multe conclusiones geometrice probate seu demonstrate.*

Quarto modo maxime usitato, contingit expositorie probare universalia. Unde pro regula est tenendum quod

30 *quolibet universalis affirmativa exponenda debet exponi per suam subalternatam, et universalem negativam convenientem in subiecto, sed de contradictorio predicato;*

*ut hec: omnis homo currit, sic exponi debet; homo currit, et non est homo non currens; ergo omnis homo currit.*

35 *Unde videtur mihi quod illa est affirmativa, non est homo quin currit, que convertitur cum universali exponenda. Ideo vel non exponit illam, vel superflue*

A universal affirmative may be proved indirectly by the falsity of its contradictory, because of the difficulty of a direct proof, or because the falsity of a particular proposition is often better seen.

Rule for the exposition is of a universal affirmative: Take its corresponding subalternate, and a universal negative with the same subject and the same predicate, but negative: as *Every A is B* is expounded: *some A is B, and no A is not B*; but the negative minor being equivalent to the universal term, the major seems useless.

1, 2. 9<sup>da</sup> A.

*marg. A: p<sup>ma</sup> B.*

4. vera B; *ib.* sicud B.

6. si *deest both MSS.*

5. *sin<sup>to</sup> A; ib. p<sup>ius</sup> in*

8. intellectum B.

9, 10. *h<sup>ic</sup> ex<sup>ns</sup> AB.*

14. indefinita B.

*ib.* scilicet *deest B.*

*scu in marg. A: deest B.*

non B.

10. ypotheticum *deest A.*

18. talia *pro* huiusmodi B.

24. ille B; nec B.

29. notandum B.

11. Ideo *in marg. A.*

22. per ducens B;

26. isto B.

27. probate

35. iste B; *ib.* et

additur subalternata de illa; tamen non fiat vis, potissime cum ex sermone vocali sit dependens.

This general formula varies. 1. According to the quantifying sign; which may be of different genders; or common (omnis); in which latter case its gender may be determined by the words that follow.

Quadrupliciter ergo contingit expositionem huiusmodi variari; vel ratione signi, vel ratione subiecti compositi vel simplicis, vel ratione verbi, vel ratione predicati. 5 Exemplum primi. Aliquod signum est restrictum ad masculos, ut *unusquisque, uterque*, etc. Et ratione talium debent capi subalternate et negative illis correspondentes; ut *quilibet, quisque, vel unusquisque, uterque* etc. *homo currit, si homo masculus currit, et non sit homo masculus non 10 currens*. Et cum illo signo, *uterque*, oportet proporcionare ambas exponentes sue significacioni, ut sic: *alter illorum currit, et neuter illorum est non currens*; ergo *uterque illorum currit*. Et tamen oportet logicum curare ex alio latere in assignando exponentes universali affirmative, cuius signum 15 est communis generis iunctum cum substantivo duorum generum. Ut, si *omnis homo civis et burgensis currit*, tunc *homo burgensis civilis* etc. *currit*, et *non est homo civis burgensis* etc. *quin currit*. Verumtamen quandoque, ratione adiectivorum per se predicatorum, que non pos- 20 sunt per se supponere, contrahuntur talia subiecta ad supponendum solum pro masculis, ut hec, *omnis homo est albus*. Illa enim debet sic exponi: *homo masculus est albus, et non est homo masculus qui non est albus*.

2. According to the subject, which may be either simple or compound; if simple, it may be epicene or of a fixed gender. If compound, either copulated (A and B) or disjunct (A or B).

In the first case: All A's and B's are C; i. e. Some A's and B's are C, and no A's and B's are not C.

Ergo ratione subiecti contingit exponentes multipli- 25 citer variari; quandoque enim est subiectum simplex, et quandoque compositum. Et si simplex, tunc vel communis generis vel unius, ut prius. Quod si sit compositum, vel de copulato extremo, aut sibi equivalente, vel de disiuncto extremo vel sibi equivalente, vel ex 30 coniunctione recti cum obliquo; et in omnibus istis est diversitas exponendi. Exemplum primum, sic: dicto, *omnis homo et asinus currunt*, ista debet sic exponi: *homo et asinus currunt, et non sunt homo et asinus qui 35 non currunt; ergo, omnis homo et asinus currunt*. Hec autem, *omnis homo et asinus currunt*, existens congrua, est copulata et non universalis. Ex istis patet quod

1. de 1<sup>o</sup> AB. 2. potissima B; *ib.* 3<sup>o</sup> vocabli B. 5. simpliciter A. 16. subalternato; subiectivo *in marg.* A; substio B; secundorum *pro* duorum A. 17. et *deest* B, *a word effaced* A; currit B. 18. *word erased* A; etc. B. 19. *word erased* A; etc. B. 20. adiectorum A. 22. solummodo B; hic B. 24. *qui and est desunt* B. 27. vel est B. 28. *g<sup>o</sup> A.* 28. vi<sup>9</sup>; uni<sup>9</sup> *in marg.* A. 30. vel de disiuncto — vel *before* ex *in marg.* A. 32. primi B. 36. ex<sup>us</sup> A, ex<sup>us</sup> B. 37. copulativa B; *ib.* universales sunt B.



tales sunt false: *omnia duo et tria sunt quinque*,  
 B 5<sup>a</sup> *omnes duo | homines et duo animalia sunt plura quam*  
*duo; et taliter similia. Nam omnia 4<sup>or</sup> sunt duo, et 3<sup>a</sup>,*  
*et nulla 4<sup>or</sup> sunt quinque: ergo, non omnia duo et tria*  
 5 *sunt 5. Ideo secunda exponens est falsa, videlicet quod*  
*non sunt duo et 3<sup>a</sup> que non sunt 5<sup>e</sup>, eo quod omnia 4<sup>or</sup>*  
*sunt duo et 3<sup>a</sup> comunicancia. Sed hoc est verum,*  
*quod omnia duo sunt aliquot que et tria sunt quinque,*  
*vel duo et tria constituencia quinque. Et hoc inferunt*  
 10 *tales singulares, ista duo et tria sunt quinque etc. et*  
 A 19<sup>b</sup> *tales exponentes | duo et tria sunt quinque, et non sunt*  
*duo que non et tria sunt quinque. Secunda est falsa;*  
*quia omnes duo homines sunt duo homines et duo*  
 15 *animalia; sed non duo et duo, et nulli duo homines*  
*sunt plura quam duo. Ideo non omnes duo homines*  
*et duo animalia sunt plura quam duo, quamvis forte*  
*omnes duo homines sunt aliquot que et duo animalia*  
*sunt 4<sup>or</sup>. Sicut omnes duo homines sunt aliquot, que*  
*et duo animalia sunt pauciora quam 4<sup>or</sup>. quia solum*  
 20 *tria.*

Racione subiecti disiuncti accedit varietas exponendi:  
 ut hec: *omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vera.*  
 Debet enim sic exponi: *propositio vel eius contradictoria*  
*est vera, et non est propositio vel eius contradictoria que non*  
 25 *est vera, igitur etc. Unde, quandoque distribuitur copula-*  
*tive et distributive utrumque disiunctorum; ubi non sic*  
*distribuitur utrumque copulatorum (ut sic dicto: omnis*  
*homo albus vel coloratus est) hic stat utrumque disiunctorum*  
 30 *distributive copulative, quia staret non distributive disiunc-*  
*tive in sua subalternata. Sed sic, dicto: Omnis homo albus*  
*vel coloratus est hic, stat totum coniunctum copulative*  
*pro omni homine albo et colorato, sed non secunda pars*  
*pro omni homine colorato, sicut stat in priori, ut patet*  
 35 *per exponentes, quia in subalternata staret totam co-*  
*pulative pro albo et colorato. Ideo in universali distri-*

Thus to say:  
 All 2's and 3's  
 are 5, or all  
 2 men and  
 2 animals are  
 more than 2, is  
 false.

We should say.  
 All 2's are a  
 number which  
 with 3 makes 5:  
 and this is  
 borne out by  
 the singulars  
 of this  
 proposition  
 In like manner,  
 two men are  
 two animals --  
 2 and 2; yet  
 they make  
 together, not  
 four, but only  
 three.

When the  
 subject is  
 disjunct, we  
 must consider  
 if both parts  
 are to be taken  
 as disjunct or  
 as copulated.

Every man  
 white or  
 coloured exists:  
 here we take  
 the parts as  
 disjunct:  
 This man  
 white or  
 coloured  
 exists . . . and  
 so on.  
 Every man,  
 (whether) white  
 or coloured, is  
 here: this means  
 the same as the  
 copulated term  
 white and  
 coloured.

3. 1<sup>a</sup> A, c B. 7. ad hoc A. 12. etiam est B. 15, 16. Ideo — quam  
 duo deest B. 17. sint B. 18, 19. 1<sup>or</sup> — pauciora quam deest B.  
 21. 1<sup>or</sup> 1<sup>a</sup> A. 23, 24. debet — et non in marg. A; deest B. 26. et  
 deest B. 25, 26. con<sup>e</sup> A. 26. distrib<sup>u</sup> A. 27. dd<sup>a</sup> = dicendo B.  
 26. distrib<sup>u</sup> A. 31. et pro vel both MSS.; ib. coniunctim deest B;  
 ib. con<sup>e</sup> A. 32. non stat B.

8, 10, 11, 12. Et tria. Equivalent to cum tribus. 26. Wyclif  
 counts the universal 'Man' as making up the number 3 with the  
 two individuals.

It both parts of the subject are necessary, and independent of each other, it makes no difference which way they are taken.

When the sense of either part determines the way the whole must be taken, we should follow the sense. In cases in which an adiective of profession comes in, it can be taken as a substantive, and then the verb must be in the plural, for the subject becomes collective; were the verb in the singular, the contrary would take place, and the sense would be quite different.

Many other forms are equivalent to the former: partitive and implicative propositions, ablatives absolute, etc. Difference in meaning between *homo* — *futurus est*, and *homo* *futurus* — *est*.

buto stabit disiunctive pro albo vel colorato; distributum tamen pro omni primario significato per totum extremum. Quod si utrumque coniunctorum sit necessarium, et neutrum determinativum alterius, nec ambo alicuius tercii, tunc non refert. Ut sic: idem est, *omnis* 5 *homo vel asinus currit*, et *omnis homo vel asinus currunt*; sed quando primarie significatum alterius potest non esse, tunc refert, cum copulativa ponit utrumque, et non talis disiunctio.

Si autem coniuncta possunt indifferenter determinare 10 subiectum, et eciam seorsum sine determinacione supponere, tunc videndum est quis sensus debet verisimilius haberi; et iuxta illum est respondendum. Quod si fuerit omnino indifferencia, eligendus est quicumque sensus placuerit. Verbi gracia, sic dicto, *Omnis homo* 15 *iustus et gramaticus currit*; et potest utrumque adiectivum, quia adiectivum professionis est, per se supponere. Verumtamen per verbum singulare limitatur ad determinandum substantivum, sicut limitaretur per verbum plurale ad indeterminate supponendum, sicut dicto, *omnis homo* 20 *iustus et gramaticus currunt*. Unde multum differunt illa a priori, eo quod existentibus mille gramaticis et iustis non currentibus, sed omni iusto et grammatico corrente, foret prima vera et secunda falsa. Sed sic dicto, *Omnis asinus et homo iustus et gramaticus* | *currunt*, non est talis 25 B5<sup>b</sup> limitacio. Ideo eligo ego respondere ad tales, ut subiecta indeterminate supponunt. Et sic, breviter dicendo, patet noscentibus gramaticam et exponentes predictas quomodo universaliter in talibus sit dicendum.

Racione coniuncti equivalentis copulacioni vel disiuncti 30 tioni accedit diversitas; ut patet de partitivis oracionibus, implicativis, ablativis absolutis, et huiusmodi. Exemplum primi, *omnis homo futurus est animal in hoc instanti*, que debet sic exponi, *homo futurus est animal in hoc instanti*; et non est *homo futurus qui non sit animal in* 35 *hoc instanti: ergo*, etc. Et patet quod universalis est falsa. Illa tamen universalis, *omnis homo futurus est animal*, est amphibologica, eo quod hoc totum *futurus*

3. ut pro quod B. 5. ut A; ut B. 8. copula B. 11. substatm B.  
15. homo deest B. 16. et before potest deest B; ib. per se stare B.  
17. potest B. 20. dicendo B. 23. et deest B. 27. in deest B. 28. nofeca B.  
30. equipollentis B; ib. copula<sup>o</sup> A; ib. et B. 30. 31. disiunctio A.  
31. est B; ib. pp<sup>as</sup> B. 32. et ceteris B.

est, potest supplere vicem huius verbi de futuro, erit, et tunc est verum. Exempla secundi sunt talia: *Omne quod fuit est; uterque illorum qui est Sortes est Sor; omne quod deus potuit facere potest facere; et sic* 5 *similia, quorum primum debet sic exponi: aliquid quod fuit est, et non est aliquid preteritum quod non est, ergo etc.* Et patet quod universalis est impossibilis, eo quod minor negativa habet contradictorium necessarium, ut patet: *aliquid est preteritum quod non est.* Sed ista, A 20<sup>a</sup> *omne quod est, quod fuit, est.* | debet exponi per talem negativam: *non est aliquid quod est (quod fuit) quod non est.* Et patet diversitas. Secunda universalis debet sic exponi: *alter illorum qui est Sor est Sor, et non est alter illorum quin ille qui est Sor est Sor; ergo, etc.* Et 15 *ratio illius est quia universalis est affirmativa implicans utrumque illorum esse Sor. Unde famose exponentes implicant illam universalem: quicumque illorum duorum fuerit Sor, ipse est Sor. Tercia sic debet exponi: aliquid quod deus potuit facere potest facere; et non potuit quicquam* 20 *facere quod non potest facere; ergo, etc.* Et patet quod universalis est impossibilis, cum multa tempora, motus, et ceteras veritates potuit deus facere, que nunc non potest.

De ablativis absolutis patet ex dictis. Nam cum talis absolutus habet iuxta gramaticos exponi tripliciter, 25 vel per *si*, vel per *quia*, vel per *dum*, patet iuxta quartam regulam et octavam, que debent concedi et que negari: sed de hoc postmodum.

Quarto modo, contingit subiectum universalis esse compositum ex recto et obliquo, et hoc contingit dupli- 30 citer: vel quod rectus cum signo precedat obliquum quem regit, vel econtra. Quod si primo modo, tunc datur talis regula: Subiecto universalis affirmative existente termino composito ex recto precedente, et obliquo quod ab eo regitur subsequente, utraque pars distribuitur 35 et subicietur in exponente negativa, vel sibi sinonima. Verbi gracia: *Quilibet singularis alicuius universalis est vera*; ista debet sic exponi: *aliqua singularis alicuius universalis est vera et non est singularis alicuius universalis que non est vera*: igitur etc. Et patet ex regulis

Every A that has been is C, is false; but it put thus: Every A that is, that has been, is C, it amounts to: No A that is (that has been, is not C.

Either of the two that is A is A, amounts to: one of the two that is A is A, and neither of the two that is not A is A. Whatever could be A can be A; Something that could be A can be A and nothing that could be A cannot be A.

Ablatives absolute amount to propositions with the particles *si*, *quia* or *dum*.

The subject may contain a genitive or another case: in the nominative goes first, the rule is that both parts must be taken universally as the subject of the negative exponent; the formula being: Every A of B is C; i. e. Some A of some B is C, and no A of any B is not C.

3. for\* A. 9. videlicet B. 10. totalem A. 11. quod est deest B.  
22. deus facere deest A. 24. ablativus B. 30. suo signo B.  
32, 33. exnte AB. 34. qui B.

21. See p. 25, l. 17, where I think *potuit* ought to be read for *potest*.

This can be  
proved by  
analysis: Every  
A of B is C;  
but A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>,  
A<sup>3</sup> etc. are A's  
of B; so A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>,  
etc. are C.

in consequenciis traditis quomodo sequitur: *quelibet singularis alicuius universalis est vera. Quelibet singularis alicuius universalis habens singulares est vera; hec est aliqua universalis habens singulares; ergo, quilibet singularis huius est vera.* Argumentatur enim a propositione 5 cum termino stante modaliter ad propositionem cum singulari eiusdem termini, cum particulari constancia subiecti. Et per idem va | lebit ista consequencia in B 6<sup>a</sup> primo prime, *quelibet singularis alicuius universalis est vera; quilibet singularis illius "omnis homo est asinus"* 10 *est singularis alicuius universalis; ergo, quilibet singularis illius est vera.* Et peccabit illud argumentum; *quelibet singularis illius universalis est vera, et quilibet singularis illius est similiter alicuius universalis; ergo, quilibet singularis alicuius universalis est vera;* quia argumentatur 15 cum impedimento ab inferiori ad suum superius.

But a formula  
like Every A  
of this B is C;  
every A of this  
B is A of any  
B; therefore,  
every A of any  
B is C, would  
be wrong; the  
inference from  
the particular  
to the general  
cannot hold  
here.

Examples how  
to choose the  
right middle  
term for proving  
a proposition  
with such a  
compound  
subject.

Cavendum tamen est de pertinenti medio respectu obliqui; ut patet in istis exemplis, *omne caput animalis videtur a te; ista ostrea est animal capitatum; ergo omne eius caput videtur a te. Omnis famulus obediens* 20 *magistro suo diligatur a te; ille est magister obediens famulatus; ergo, omnis talis eius famulatus diligitur a te. Omnis servus odians hominem oditur a te; iste est homo quem servus odit; ergo, omnis talis eius servus oditur a te. Omnis homo utens aliquo instrumento est* 25 *prudens; hoc est aliquod instrumentum usitatum ab homine; ergo, omnis homo utens hoc est prudens; et sic de similibus.* Unde, propter talia media extranea, diceret aliquis, quod obliquus non distribuitur per signum in recto, nec econtra. Aliter tamen supponit talis pars 30 subiecti quam facit pars que non regitur, ut patet in istis. *Omnis bestia alicui homini obedit; omnis homo lignum videt; omnis homo ab homine differt; etc.*

But when the  
other case of  
the subject is  
not governed by  
the nominative,  
the supposition  
differs.

If the  
nominative is  
preceded by the  
other case, the  
latter is to be  
taken  
universally and  
not the former.

Si secundo modo sit subiectum compositum, tunc datur talis regula: subiecto universalis affirmative exi- 35 stente termino composito et obliquo (composito vel simplici) precedente, et recto subsequente, totum obliquum distribuitur, et non rectum. Unde in exponente

1. quicq[ue] B. 2, 3. Quelibet — hec deest AB. 6. mor AB.  
7. pertinenti B. 9. p<sup>mo</sup> p<sup>te</sup> AB. 15. universalis deest A. 17. p<sup>th</sup>;  
pertinenti above the line A. 28. singulis A; ib. neva A. 31. q[ui] fat B.

9. In primo prime. In Barbara, the first mode of the first figure.

negativa rectum a parte predicati locabitur, ab obliquo  
 A 20<sup>b</sup> quod subicitur separatum. | Verbi gracia: *cuiuslibet paris* As: *Of any*  
*contradictoriorum alterum est verum* sic exponitur: *ali-* *couple of*  
*cuius paris contradictoriorum alterum est verum*, et non *contradictory*  
 5 *est par contradictoriorum, cuius non alterum est verum;* *propositions,*  
*one or the other*  
 ergo, etc. Et patet quomodo debet siloisari et inferri, *is true; a*  
 vel descendere respectu talis universalis, scito quod pars *couple means*  
 obliqua mobilitatur, et pars recta stat confuse tantum. Et *'any couple';*  
 ex istis elicitur regula de subiecto composito, copulato *one or the other*  
 10 vel disiuncto, in recto, vel in obliquo, aut mixtim. Si *means a*  
 autem utraque pars subiecti copulati aut disiuncti uni- *number of*  
 versalis affirmative fuerit in recto, et neutra ad idem *uncertain*  
 relata, tunc pro utraque fit distribucio. Sed si utrumque *individuals in*  
 copulatorum ad idem relatum fuerit, tunc pro illis fit *those couples.*  
 15 distribucio copulativi; verbi gracia, si *omnis homo et* *If the two parts*  
*asinus currunt*, tunc *et omnis homo et omnis asinus* *of a copulative*  
*currit*; sed si *omnis grammaticus et albus currit*, tunc *subject are not*  
*quicunque est tam grammaticus quam albus currit*; non *connected by*  
 tamen oportet quod *quicunque grammaticus currat*, nec *the sense, they*  
 20 quod *quicunque fuerit albus currat*. *are both to be*  
*taken*  
*separately but*  
*collectively, if*  
*they are*  
*connected.*

Subiecto existente composito ex terminis diversorum  
 numerorum vel diversorum generum, accedit variacio  
 quam cautus sophista sufficienter instructus in grama-  
 25 tica satis percipiet. Unde videtur mihi verum quod  
 B 6<sup>b</sup> *omnis homo et duo homines sunt tres*, nec est verum  
 quod *omnes duo homines sunt homo et duo* | *homines*;  
 ut, *Sor et Plato non sunt homo et duo homines*, quia  
 nugacio videtur mihi ista: *Sor et Plato sunt Sor et Sor et*  
*Plato*; et ita de talibus: *Sor et Plato sunt Sor, et iste*  
 30 *binarius*. Et conformiter dicitur de talibus: *Quilibet vir*  
*et mulier currunt*; nam illa implicat omnem mulierem  
 currere cum viro; quia masculinum genus in talibus  
 rationabiliter concipit feminineum. Et econtra conver-  
 35 sibiliter se habent: *quilibet mulier et vir currunt*; quam-  
 vis gramaticis non placeat ista sententia. Et ex ista  
 sententia patet quomodo in casu communi hoc sophisma

2. <sup>partis</sup> *paris* above A. 3, 4. sic — verum et deest. 5. *paris* pro  
 par B. 8. *aliqua* A; *ib. mobil* A, *mobilitatur* B; *ib. 9<sup>e</sup> tm* AB. 10. *after*  
 vel, in *deest* A. 11. enim B. 16. *omnis* deest before *asinus* B.  
 27. et pro quia B. 35, 36. Et — patet *deest* A.

6. *Siloisari*. For *syllogisari*, as *loicus* and *loica* often stand  
 for *logicus* and *logica*.

est falsum; *Omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vera, omnis homo vel asinus est asinus, et sic de aliis.*

The verb may vary the exposition of a proposition according as it is amplified or not; also, according to the sense, past or future. It amplified, the principal verb of the second exponent must be the substantive verb, together with the same amplified verb as in the expounded proposition.

Ideo principaliter contingit expositionem universalis affirmative variari ratione verbi: ut aliter debet negativa exponens capi cum verbo ampliativo et aliter 5 cum verbo non ampliativo, et aliter cum verbo de presenti et aliter cum verbo de preterito vel futuro. Unde potest pro regula sustineri, quod sicut omnis universalis affirmative cuius principale verbum est non ampliativum de presenti, principale verbum secunde exponentis erit verbum substantivum de presenti; sic omnis talis universalis cuius principale verbum est ampliativum de presenti, principale verbum secunde exponentis erit verbum de presenti disiunctum, ex verbo substantivo et ampliativo synonymo cum verbo propo- 15 sicionis principaliter exponende. Ut exponendo illam, *omne animal currit*, patet ex dictis quod secunda exponens erit talis, *non est animal quod non currit*; et sic de omni universali affirmativa de presenti, sive verbum substantivum sive adiectivum non ampliativum predicetur. 20

Thus Every A can be B; the negative exponent is: No A is or can be, that cannot be B.

In like manner for the verb, when modified by the idea of beginning.

It is often unnecessary to expound a proposition thus; but this is done for the rule to hold universally; for in some cases the negative exponent would be false.

Exempla secunde partis cum verbo ampliativo sunt multa; nam ista, *omnis homo potest esse* habebit secundam exponentem negativam talem, *non est vel potest esse homo non potens esse*. Verumtamen sufficit in talibus gracia materie addere verbum tale ampliativum de 25 presenti. Secundum exemplum est de illa: *omne A incipit esse*, que habebit secundam exponentem talem: *non est vel incipit esse A quod non incipit esse*. Unde, quamvis gracia materie non oportet addere verbum tale ampliativum de presenti, dum subiectum distribuitur solum 30 pro talibus que non possunt incipere esse nisi per posicionem de presenti; ad hoc tamen quod universaliter teneat, oportet sic disiungere verbum ratione talium que possunt incipere esse per remocionem de presenti. Verbi gracia, hoc est impossibile: *omne ens quod non 35 est hoc instans incipit differre ab hoc instanti*; et tamen

2. similia pro de aliis B. 4. affirmative deest B; ib. variare A.  
9. affirmativa A. 14. et A; ib. substantivum B. 16. et ut above A.  
18. non quod B. 20. po'mtr. 21. cum — ampliativo above the line A; deest B. 28. quamvis quandoque B. 30. de presenti deest B.  
31, 32. per propositionem in marg. A.

1. I suppose Wyclif means some such fallacy as this: Let A stand for *Every proposition or its contradictory*: then we have at the same time: *A is true*, and *A is false*.

ille exponentes sunt vere, *aliquid ens quod non est hoc instans incipit differre ab hoc instanti*, et nullum est *ens quod non est hoc instans quin incipit differre ab hoc in-*

A 21<sup>a</sup> *stanti*: Hoc tamen est falsum quod nullum | *incipit esse* 5 *ens, quod non est hoc instans quin incipit differre ab hoc instanti*, cum necessario tempus et motus incipiunt esse, que non possunt esse hoc instans, nec differre ab hoc instanti. Et sic de *desinit* est iudicandum.

Example in the case of the beginning of time and of movement.

Tercium exemplum est tale: *Omnis res intelligitur,* 10 *apprehenditur, significatur, est volita, ymaginata*, et sic de ceteris verbis quibuscunque passive ampliatis. Nam secunda exponens prime erit talis, *non est vel intelligitur res quin intelligitur*; et sic de aliis. Ex istis patet quod tam subiectum quam predicatum potest distrahere et 15 restringere verbum principale, quantum ad modum exponendi et medium inducendi, | ut in talibus, *omne quod erit, est; omne quod intelligitur vel potest esse, est*. Debet enim 2<sup>a</sup> exponens prime sic capi: *non erit aliquid quod non est*; et secunda exponens 2<sup>e</sup> erit talis: *non aliquid* 20 *ens intelligitur vel potest esse, quod non est*: et sic de similibus. Et patet ex dictis sensus ultime particule inductionis talium: nam sensus particule prime erit talis; *sic est de singulis que erunt, quod illa sunt*; et sensus 2<sup>e</sup> erit talis; *sic est de singulis que intelliguntur vel* 25 *possunt esse, quod sunt*; et sic de ceteris. Et sic potest verbum ampliativum ampliari, ut hoc: *omne quod intelligitur potest esse, omne quod intelligitur est ymaginatum; omne quod non potest esse potest esse*; et sic de similibus que sunt falsa; et quandoque restringuntur 30 talia, ut patet in talibus: *omnis homo qui incipit esse potest generari; omnis res que necessario fuit, preterita est; omne animal que est in ista domo potest esse homo*; ista enim in casu sunt vera, et singularia eorum sunt falsa.

Passively ampliative terms, indicating an intellectual process, ought to be expounded in like manner. These terms may come in either in the subject or in the predicate;

and all ampliative terms may be combined with each other to form more complex terms.

Gravis tamen est sophisticacio cum determinacione 35 termini negativi; ut *omne quod non est, erit vel fuit; omne quod non fuit est vel erit*. Veruntamen per exponentes et dicenda in posterum patet quomodo ad omnia talia sit dicendum. Nam illa: *omne ens quod non fuit erit*, debet sic exponi, *aliquid ens quod non fuit*

But there are many fallacies in the determination of negative terms as: *Every not-A in the past will be A*;

3, 6. instanti — cum bottom of page B. 8. ceteris pro desinit A; ib. dicendum B. 10. Bar B. 16. ad modum pro medium B. 18. primi both MSS.; ib. aliquid erit B. 19. 2<sup>a</sup> both MSS.; ib. aliquid B. 21. predictis B; ib. p<sup>th</sup> A. 22. p<sup>mi</sup> A. 26. hic B. 30. talia deest B. 33. simplicia sua pro singularia eorum A. 37. p<sup>um</sup>um. 38. ens deest B.

which amounts to: *Some not-A in the past will be A; and no A (past or future) was not or will not be A.*

But in these cases it is better to take their contradictories than to expound them.

Many would deny the first exponent as implying the non-being of something; but it may be admitted.

When the principal verb is in the past or future, the negative exponent takes the substantive verb in the present, with another such, either in the past or the future.

For instance: *Every A will be B; i. e. Some A will be B, and no A is or will be that will not be B.*

In the case of 'beginning' the strict observance of the rule is superfluous;

also in the case of 'can'.

*erit, et nullum fuit vel erit ens quod non fuit vel quod non erit*, et negativa est examinanda per suum contradictorium. Unde talia facilius discerni possunt per sua contradictoria quam per suas exponentes, ut patet de istis: *omne quod non est potest esse; omne quod non fuit vel erit, potest esse; omne quod non est intelligitur*; et sic de aliis. Semper tamen addendum est in secunda exponente verbum substantivum (conformis temporis cum verbo secundario negativo) disiunctum, cum verbo similis temporis cum principali verbo. Ut prima illarum debet sic exponi: *aliquid quod non est potest esse, et non est nec potest esse aliquid quod non est, quod non potest esse, ergo* etc. Sed primam exponentem negant aliqui; et sic quamlibet talem universalem, cum implicat aliquid non esse. Sed probabile videtur eam concedere, <sup>15</sup> per hoc quod homo generandus potest esse; et ille non est, sed potest esse aliquid.

Si autem principale verbum talis universalis fuerit de preterito vel de futuro, tunc datur talis regula: Quod omnis universalis affirmativa de preterito vel de futuro, <sup>20</sup> cuius principale verbum est non ampliativum, principale verbum secunde exponentis erit verbum substantivum disiunctum ex verbo substantivo de presenti et substantivo proportionaliter de preterito vel futuro. Sciendum etiam quod omnis talis ampliative propositionis de <sup>25</sup> preterito vel futuro secunda, exponens negativa habebit principale verbum disiunctum ex ampliativo et substantivo proportionaliter de preterito vel futuro. Verbi gracia, quo ad primam regulam: hec universalis, *omnis homo curret*, sic exponetur; *homo curret, et non est vel erit* <sup>30</sup> *homo qui vel que non curret*. Et sic, si *omnis homo fuit*, tunc *non est vel fuit homo qui vel que non fuit*. Exempla secunde partis regule sunt talia: *omnis res incepit esse*, que debet sic exponi: | *res incepit esse et non est vel* <sup>B 7<sup>b</sup></sup> *fuit vel incepit* | *esse res que non incepit esse; ergo*, etc. <sup>A 21<sup>b</sup></sup> Veruntamen, gracia materie, non oportet addere verbum tale ampliativum de preterito. Secundum exemplum est tale, *omnis res potuit fuisse*, que debet sic exponi: *aliqua*

1. vel *before* quod *deest* B. 1. 2. et — non erit *in marg.* A.  
2. eius B. 7. ceteris B. 9. B<sup>o</sup> 10 A. 15. mihicam B. 16. propter B.  
21. cuius *deest* A. 23. disiunctum A; disiunctu B; *ib.* subiecto *pro*  
verbo substantivo B; *ib.* et sic B. 24. proportionaliter *deest* B.  
24. secundam pl<sup>o</sup> *pro* primam B. 33. regule *deest* B.



*res potuit fuisse et non est vel potuit fuisse aliqua res quin potuit fuisse, ergo* etc. Et gracia materie non valet addere verbum tale substantivum in minori, nec verbum tale disiunctum de presenti; cum eo ipso quod quicquid fuit, ipsum potuit fuisse, et non econtra, ut patet de motu brunelli corrupti et respectibus individuatis a tempore cum veritatibus affirmativis et negativis. Et, si *omnis res poterit esse* tunc sufficit, sive dicatur quod *nunc non potest esse* sive quod *non poterit fore res, quin poterit esse*. Et sic, si *omnis res significabatur, tunc nulla res fuit significabilis quin significabatur*. Et sic de similibus.

Nec obest istis quod extremum ampliatur ampliat verbum, ut patet in istis: *Omne quod potest esse est*, quia sicut illa propositio, *hoc quod fuit, est*, implicat *hoc fuisse*, sic illa, *omne quod fuit est* implicat *aliquid fuisse*; quia aliter superflue adderetur verbum de preterito; non tamen oportet universalem implicare assertive, qualitercunque implicat aliqua eius singularis. Nam quelibet singularis huius, *omne quod fuit est*, convertitur cum singulari illius: *omne quod est fuit*. Et tamen universalis non convertuntur, ut prius dictum est in simili.

Ex istis potest patere cum quibus mediis fiet descensus ad singularia universalis affirmative. Nam potest pro regula sustineri quod conformiter sicut verbum secunde exponentis universalis affirmative fuerit disponendum, sic disponendum est verbum medii descendendi. Verbi gracia, *omnis homo currit; hoc est homo*, quocunque demonstrato, sive existente sive non existente; *ergo hoc currit*. *Omnis res incipit esse, hoc A est res vel incipit esse res, ergo hoc A incipit esse*. *Omnis res potest esse, anticristus potest esse res; ergo, anticristus potest esse*.

In propositions of this sort existence is implied: *what may is*, implies that something was; yet universals should not do so, as in that they differ from their singulars, which imply existence.

How to analyze a universal affirmative proposition into its singulars.

Every A is B:  
A<sup>1</sup> is B,  
A<sup>2</sup> is B,  
A<sup>3</sup> is B.  
∴ every A is B.  
Every A begins to be B:  
A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, A<sup>3</sup> ... is B or begins to be B ∴ every A begins to be B.

1. vel fuit vel potuit *pro* vel potuit B; vel non potuit A.
2. oportet B.
4. sed B.
6. buelli B; *ib.* individuantibus A.
- 6, 7. a 1<sup>o</sup> A.
8. *te* *no* *pro* tunc B.
9. *ne* *above the line* A *before* quod; *deest* B; *ib.* *esse* *deest* B.
9. significabilis A.
28. h. currit *pro* hoc est homo A; *ib.* quocunque individuo homine B.
30. vel *deest* A.

6. *Brunellus* is a word that occurs later in this work, as the name of an ass; but what the present allusion may be, it is hard to guess. 28. It is clear that some mistake has been made here, but it would not do to take too much liberty with the text. I therefore confine myself to showing in a side-note what I think was Wyclif's idea. It shows the ordinary method of the *descensus ad singularia* (l. 24, 25) from which Wyclif's examples widely depart.

*Omnis res intelligitur; ista res est intelligibilis: ergo, ista res intelligitur.* Et sic de preterito et futuro.

When the predicate is separated from the verb, the proposition may have different meanings, according to the genders which may vary.

Quarto, accedit variacio principaliter in exponendo universalem affirmativam ratione predicati predicantis tercium adiacens; et hoc contingit tot modis quot modis dictum est subiectum variari. Quandoque enim predicatum restringit subiectum, ut hec: *omnis homo est albus*, quod tantum valet, quantum valet id: *quilibet homo est albus*, quia negativa exponens, que est illa: *non est homo non existens albus* non falsificaretur nisi pro muliere; sed hec est incongrua: *mulier est non existens albus*. Ideo pro congruitate dicte universales convertuntur. Quandoque autem predicatum est terminus implicativus, cuius relativum potest habere diversam antecedentis construccionem. Et in talibus multi appreciantur

Or the sense may change when a relative pronoun can be supposed to have several antecedents.

multa sophismata que iudicio meo tenent infinitum gradum valoris, cuiusmodi sunt talia: *omnis pater generat individuum de sua substantia cui est similis in specie*. Potest enim ille terminus, *cui*, referri ad illum terminum, *substantia*, vel ad illum terminum, *pater*, vel ad illum terminum, *individuum*. Si ad illum terminum *substantia*, cum terminus, *species*, sumitur pro specie specialissima famosiori, et substantia talis sit semen, falsa esset propositio. Ideo potest pro regula sustineri quod relativum referibile ad utrumque duorum antecedentium predencium, ad quorum neutrum est accidentibus limitatum, debet referri ad proximum antecedens: ut in exemplo posito debet iste terminus, *cui*, referri ad illum, *substantia*. Sed sic, dicto, *omnis homo est animal quem contingit non esse*, oportet illum terminum, *quem*, referri ad istum terminum *homo*, propter convenientiam accidentium pro congruitate salvanda. Et sic, dicto, *in omni instanti fuit vir, in quo fuit homo vel mulier*, debet iste terminus, *quo*, referri ad illum terminum *instanti* propter convenientiam casuum; et sic de similibus iudicandum.

The rule is that it must stand for the nearest antecedent, unless its form shows clearly to which it belongs.

This leads us to those fallacies called amphibologies, which change the relations between words.

Et talia sunt sophismata ex amphybologia vel equivocatione procedencia, ut patet de istis, *quicquid vivit semper erit; Omne quod eveniet de necessitate eveniet;*

7. hic B. 10. after homo, non deest A. 14. ampliatus A.  
14, 15. ante above A; deest B. 15. appreciant A. 23. ffina pro famosiori AB. 27. propriam B; ib. consequens A. 30. quem non B. 34. vel mulier deest B. 37. amphy A. 39. est B.

- omne quod vivit bene placet deo; et sic de ceteris. Et taliter contingit equivocare in universalibus adverbiorum, ut in talibus: *Ubique est mundus; semper erit motus successive durans; semper deus cognoscet quod A non dividet B superficiem quam incipit dividere*; et sic de similibus. Prima enim potest habere istum sensum: *in omni loco est mundus*, vel istum; *ad omnem locum est mundus*; et secunda potest habere istum sensum: *per omne tempus erit motus successive durans*, vel istum; *in omni tempore est motus successive durans*. Et tertium distributive pro omni quando, si univoce sunt instans et tempus quandalitates. Tercia propositio potest habere sensum talem: *per omne "quando" deus sic cognoscet*; vel talem, *in omne "quando" deus sic cognoscet*. Et tales sunt equivocaciones in istis: *quociens fuisti Oxonie, tociens fuisti homo*. Nam aliqui intelligunt sic: *in quotquot instantibus fuisti Oxonie, tot vicibus fuisti homo*. Alii autem, cum quibus ego, sic intelligunt: *quotquot vicibus interpollatis fuisti Oxonie, tot vicibus fuisti homo*. In talibus enim magna est difficultas, ut patet alibi. De aliis autem particulis copulatis disiunctis vel quomodo libet aliter compositis cognosci poterit danda sententia ex predictis; et sic quo ad omnem universalem affirmativam, quantum ad modum probandi parcius, servare vire sufficiunt regule supra dicte, etc.

Examples.  
Some  
equivocations  
bear upon  
adverbs.

'Everywhere'  
may signify  
either *in every*  
*place* or *at any*  
*place*: 'always',  
either *during*  
*all time*, or *in*  
*all time*.

So many times,  
taken with the  
idea of  
repetition, can  
turnish matter  
for several very  
difficult  
sophisms.

6. p̃ A. 12. quādalitates A; q̃dalitēs B. 17. tociens B. 19. int-  
pollat<sup>us</sup> A 20. n. A; *ib.* ut — alibi *deest* B. 21. p̃tis A. 24. p̃cius A;  
*deest* B. 25. potuerunt *pro* sufficiunt B.

## CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

The universal negative can be proved.

I. *A priori*. As: *no man is a quantity*, because *no substance is a quantity*; the latter being self-evident, as being one category denied of the other.

II. *A posteriori*, by the singulars that come under its extension.

A proposition, to be really the singular of a given universal must coincide with it not only in form, but in meaning;

i. e. that the supposition, simple or personal (abstract or concrete) should

Universalis negativa iuxta secundam regulam quadrupliciter probari poterit. Primo a priori, ut per hoc probari potest quod *nullus homo est quantitas*, quia *nulla substantia est quantitas*. Et illa universalis (*nulla substantia est quantitas*) secundum Aristotelem est immediata, in qua unum predicamentum removetur ab alia, quia est propositio necessaria, que non potest probari a priori, saltem quoad ordinem predicandi.

Secundo, potest universalis negativa probari a posteriori, utputa, per sua singularia; ut ista, *nullus homo est asinus*, est inducibilis ex talibus singularibus: *iste homo non est asinus*, et sic de singulis. Et cognoscemus que sunt singularia dati universalis per septimam regulam supradictam, cui regule addendum arbitror quod, ad hoc quod aliqua sint singularia date universalis, oportet quod non solum verbaliter sed sententialiter convenient in extremis. De convenientia verbali dictum est quomodo requiruntur totaliter predicata esse singularia, sive signa universalia aut sinkategorica fuerint partes predicatorum, ut hec, *omnis homo est omne animal*, et *omne animal est homo vel asinus*, et sic de similibus; sive non fuerint talia signa a parte predicati. Et de subiectis dictum est quomodo oportet totalia subiecta preter signa universalia et signa demonstrativa, esse sinonima, quamvis quandoque equivalent, etsi non sint sinonima. Sed pro convenientia quoque sententiam est notandum quod oportet subiecta singularium et sui universalis in suppositione proportiona-

1. Cap. deest AB. 2. Initial U in blue ink A, deest B. 3, 6. nulla — secundum above the line A, deest B. 8, 9. quia non potest probari a priori after immediata and above the line A. 13. alius B; ib. cognoscens AB. 16. dati A. 17, 18. final A. 18. convenient B. 20. fing<sup>a</sup> A; synonyma B. 21. ps B.

liter convenire; ut si simpliciter, utrobique simpliciter, be the same in  
si personaliter, utrobique personaliter. both cases.

Nam secundum vere ponentes quamlibet animam Examples.  
A 22<sup>b</sup> hominis esse trinam, scilicet memoriam, rationem | et  
5 voluntatem, tunc hec universalis est vera: *nulla anima  
hominis intellectiva est non trina*; et sic de ceteris;  
quamvis quolibet talis singularis est falsa: *non ista* 1. Every human  
*ratio intellectiva est non trina*; *non ista memoria vel* cannot conclude  
*voluntas est non trina*; et sic de ceteris; quamvis que- that every  
10 libet talis memoria, ratio, vel voluntas sit anima intel- individual  
lectiva. Et ideo diversitas est, quia in universali negativa memory of  
supponit ille terminus, *anima*, simpliciter pro essentia man is three-  
anime, et dicte singulares supponunt personaliter pro told, because  
15 liarius potest poni, supposito quod quolibet species the supposition  
perfecta animalis fuit in archa Noe, tunc secundum changes.  
volentes concedere quod *omne animal perfectum fuit in* 2. Grant that  
*archa Noe* ad istum sensum quod *omnis species animalis* every perfect  
*perfecti fuit in archa Noe*, non erunt ille singulares animal was in  
20 negative huius, *nullum animal perfectum defuit tunc ab* Noah's ark  
*archa Noe*, *non hoc animal singulare defuit tunc ab* (meaning every  
*archa Noe*; et sic de singulis. Sed erunt tales propor- species); we  
tionaliter supponentes pro speciebus, sicut pro speciebus cannot say:  
25 *archa Noe*; et sic de singulis. In talibus enim univer- A1, A2, A3 . . .  
salibus non debet quis descendere ad ultimum singu- are animals;  
lare, ymmo forte non est possibile signare ultimum therefore they  
singulare, cum singularius sit istum hominem esse were in Noah's  
30 zophistam quam istum hominem esse; et sic de singulis ark.

Indeed, it is perhaps impossible to descend to the ultimate singulars in any case.

Sed in assignando singularia universalis negative de  
subiecto composito, est pro regula observandum quod  
totum subiectum in quo communicat singularis cum sua  
universali negativa per negacionem explicatam est ne-  
35 gandum. Verbi gracia, hec universalis, *nullum animal*  
B 9<sup>a</sup> *alicuius | quantitatis est*, habebit talia singularia, *non*  
*hoc animal alicuius quantitatis est*; et sic de aliis. Unde,  
quamvis in quibusdam singularibus, ubi subiectum est  
simplex significacione, non refert sive negacio sit pre-  
The singular of  
a universal  
negative, when  
the subject is  
compound, is  
found by  
prehening the  
negative to the  
singular  
affirmative  
proposition.

1, 2. utrobique — utrobique *in marg.* A. 4. esse hominis B.  
5. et *pro* tunc B. 11. ratio diversitatis B. 13. negative B. 21. nam  
*pro* non B. 22. aliis B. 24. tunc perf. def. B. 24, 25. ita non ista  
species defuit tunc ab archa noe B; aliis B. 29. quam — esse *deest* A;  
*ib.* aliis A. 36. qñtũ B; *ib.* hec *pro* talia B.

posita vel postposita, ut communiter solet servari pro regula, verumtamen (ut universaliter dicatur) semper in talibus singularibus negacio est proponenda. Iste enim singulares sunt vere: *hoc animal alicuius quantitatis non est*, et sic de singularibus. 5

A difficulty: the sum of the singulars: *This animal has not a certain size* . . . etc. — would amount to: *No animal has any size at all!*

To clear this up, note that all the parts of the subject, and also the predicate, are distributed, or universal.

It follows that a negative universal can be converted simply, that it requires no middle term to descend to its inferiors; and that however simple its form may be, it comprises a very complex negative.

Another rule: in contradictory propositions, subject and predicate must have contradictory suppositions.

In the universal affirmative the subject has universal, the predicate particular supposition.

Et tamen hec universalis negativa est impossibilis, *nullum animal alicuius quantitatis est*. Unde predictae singulares inferunt talem universalem negativam, *omne animal alicuius quantitatis non est*, que equipollet isti: *nullum animal cuiuslibet quantitatis est*. Pro quo declarando, oportet duas regulas premittere, primo, quod cuiuslibet universalis negative cuius distribucio negativa precedit, tam totum subiectum quam etiam predicatum (si non alia obstat distribucio) utrumque distribuitur negative; ut sic, dicto *nullius hominis asinus currit*, vel 15 *nullus asinus hominis currit*, quod idem est, tam rectum quam obliquum quomodocunque dispositum, quam etiam predicatum distribuitur negative. Et hinc est quod non refert preponere rectum obliquo vel econtra in talibus. et quod universalis negativa propter vehemen- 20 tiam distribucionis transientis ad predicatum est convertenda simpliciter, et quod ab universali ad sua singularia contingit descendere sine medio; ymmo, quod omnis universalis negativa de quantumcunque simplici subiecto, infert universalem negativam de subiecto 25 composito, pro quocunque tempore distributo; ut bene sequitur: *nullum animal est; ergo, nullum animal quod fuit, est, vel poterit esse, vel quod erit, est*. Et secus est in toto de universali affirmativa.

Secunda regula premittenda est, quod in propositionibus contradictoriis oportet extrema proportionalia contradictoriis modis supponere. Et voco contradictorios modos supponendi, suppositionem universalem | affirmativam et suppositionem particularem negativam, et 30 suppositionem universalem negativam et suppositionem particularem affirmativam. Et etiam suppositionem affirmativam et suppositionem singularem negativam, ut, sic dicto, *omne animal est corpus*, subiectum supponit

A 23<sup>a</sup>

1. sive post B. 2. universalis B. 4. quātūf A. 5. aliis B.  
6. falsa est B. 9. illam pro isti A. 13. totum B. 15. dicendo B.  
16. nullius B. 17. quocunque A. 19. ppon'e A. 21. trāfent AB;  
ib. est deest A. 31-38. supponendo A: suppositionem particularem negativam et suppositionem universalem affirmativam et singularem affirmativam et singularem negativam: ut sic dicendo B.

- universaliter affirmative et predicatum confuse tantum affirmative. Sed in ista, *animal non est corpus*, subiectum supponit confuse disiunctive negative, et predicatum confuse et disiunctive negative. Et sic invenies in contradictoriis quibuscunque. Istis suppositis, cum aliis prius dictis, patet quod in ista, *omne animal alicuius quantitatis non est*, stat pars recta subiecti confuse disiunctive negative et pars obliqua confuse tantum negative. Ideo in suo contradictorio stabunt partes subiecti modis oppositis, ut patet hic, *aliquod animal alicuius quantitatis est*; ibi pars recta stat disiunctive affirmative, et pars obliqua per addicionem signi distributivi distributive affirmative. Et patet universaliter quomodo de omnibus talibus contradictoria, contraria, et subalterna debeant assignari. Nota tamen quod hec est amphibologica, *omne animal alicuius quantitatis non est*, ex hoc quod obliquum potest construi et regi a recto ex vi accidentis; et tunc est impossibile | convertibile cum isto *nullum animal alicuius quantitatis est*; vel cum verbo, et ab eo regi; et tunc est necessarium convertibile cum isto, *nullum animal alicuius quantitatis est*, ita quod iste terminus, *quantitatis*, stat conformi modo confuse tantum negativa in una, sicut stetit in alia. Et conformiter sciendum est de similibus; ut ista: *cuiuslibet contradiccionis altera pars non est vera*; que est tam universalis quam negativa contradicens huic: *alicuius contradiccionis utraque pars est vera*. Et isti, *cuiuslibet contradiccionis altera pars est vera*, contradicit hec: *alicuius contradiccionis neutra pars est vera*. Sed idem est dicere: *alicuius contradiccionis altera pars est vera*, et *altera pars alicuius contradiccionis est vera*. Ideo universalia illius contradictoria convertuntur; ut ista: *nullius contradiccionis altera pars est vera*, et: *nulla pars contradiccionis est vera*. Sed notandum quod quandoque, gracia materie vel terminorum, stant subiecta et predicata in ambabus contradictoriis mobiliter; ut hic: *omne animal est*; et: *animal non est*; ibi iste terminus, *animal*, stat mobiliter
- In a particular negative there is no universal supposition.
- It is obvious that Every animal is of some size does not generalize its predicate.
- And note that its contradictory: Every animal is not of some size, has two meanings.
- In one case, 'of some size' means 'of any size' and is universal; in the other it is particular.
- So also for the proposition: in every couple of opposites one of them is not true.
- Sometimes on account of the matter, the predicates are universal in both the universal affirmative and the universal
4. tantum pro disiunctive B. 7. recta deest A. 7, 8. d<sup>no</sup> A.  
10. cuiuslibet B. 12, 13. pars — Et patet twice B. 13. quomodo  
universaliter A. 21. cuiuslibet B. 22, 23. negative confuse tantum B.  
25, 27. que est — vera. Et deest A. 27. ista A. 28. hoc A. 31. et  
aliqua A. 35, 36. ambobus A. 37. ubi B.

37. It is very difficult to find what Wyclif exactly means by *mobilitur*. In *Logica* (p. 40, l. 32) he takes it as an equivalent for *confuse distributive*. Here he takes it otherwise. See next p., l. 1—5.

negative that  
corresponds;  
but it is  
properly  
distributive  
only in the  
case of the  
negative.

III. *Ab absurdo.*  
A third manner  
is by pointing  
out the falsity  
of the opposite  
proposition.

Many  
propositions  
seem false and  
yet their  
opposites are  
certainly false.  
This proof is  
founded on the  
principle:  
Nothing is and  
at the same  
time is not; and  
is much used  
by  
geometricians.

Examples.  
1. Sophistical  
juggles about  
the *Nothing* and  
the *Absurd*; all  
the ridiculous  
consequences  
they draw are  
based on the  
principle: That  
of which  
the opposite is  
false must be  
true.

Only they take  
false opposites,  
as may be seen  
by going in  
detail into their  
arguments.  
To differ from  
non-entity does  
not imply the  
opposite of  
non-entity.

in utraque, sed distributive in una et indistributive in alia. Et sic in ista: *omne ens est ens*, stat predicatum mobiliter, sicut in ista: *ens non est ens*; non tamen distribuitur predicatum prime per signum universale, sed potius mobilitatur gracia materie. 5

Tertio modo probanda est universalis negativa efficaciter indirecte per dacionem sui oppositi. Multa enim sunt talia universalia que apparent falsa; et tamen sua opposita, cum fuerint considerata, apparebunt etiam esse falsa. Ideo, hoc cognito, probatur per hoc principium: *nichil simul est et non est*, quod universalia sunt vera. Et illo modo frequenter demonstrant geometri tam conclusiones affirmativas quam negativas, sic, ut posita una negativa conclusione, cui falsigraphus contradicit, dans oppositum ducitur satis notorie ad 15 oppositum primi principii, vel alterius prius dati. Et istum modum probandi Aristoteles vocat demonstrationem ducentem ad impossibile. Sophista tamen directe concludit propositum sic argumentando: *oppositum illius universalis est falsum; ergo, hoc est verum.* 20

Exemplum primum est de talibus universalibus: *nichil et chimera sunt fratres carnales geniti ex eadem matre, quia de matre tua prius quam ipsa fuit; et sic vere sunt germani tui tam infinitum seniores quam infinitum iuniores te.* Et sic de similibus ridiculis infinitis | que sophiste A 23<sup>b</sup> proponunt verificantes omnia negative, probantes omnia talia per hoc quod *omnium talium opposita sunt impossibilia*; puta quod *aliquid et chimera sunt fratres carnales*; ideo *nichil et chimera sunt omnia que sunt*, et tamen *ab omnibus differunt*, quia differunt a seipsis. Sed cave de nega- 30 cione, quoniam non sequitur: *nichil et chimera differunt ab illo quod non est*; ergo, *non sunt illud quod non est*; sed potius sequitur quod *sunt illud quod non est*. Nec sequitur quod *si sunt | sapienciora te*, quod *non sunt minus B 10<sup>a</sup> sapiencia quam tu es*. Sed sequitur oppositum: scilicet, 35 quod *fuerint insipenciora te*. Nec sequitur: *nichil et*

3. sed tamen non B. 6, 7. efficaciter negativa A. 9. etiam *deest*; blank space B. 13. tam *deest* B. 14. una questione; *abore* conclusione B. 15. satis dicitur B. 19. ppo<sup>m</sup> B. 21. primum *deest* B; *ib.*  $\bar{u}^1$  = nichil A. 22. chime'a A. 26. negativa B. 27. th'a A, talia B; *ib.* th'um A; *ib.*  $\wedge$  3ap<sup>m</sup> added after talium A, *deest* B. 31. qui AB. 35. o<sup>m</sup> B. 36. scilicet *deest* B.

22. I think *chimera* ought to be understood here as any being that cannot possibly exist; any *absurdity*.



*chimera sunt infinitum plura quam duo et infinitum pau-*  
*ciora quam unum: ergo, non sunt tot quot sunt; sed*  
*sequitur oppositum. Ideo, quando queritur a sophista*  
*quid fecit hoc?* vel aliqua alia interrogacio; vere  
 5 *respondet quod nichil. et chimera et quodcumque*  
*volueris illis adiungere, hoc fecerunt; sunt enim tam*  
*confederati socii cum quocumque; quod illa sciunt*  
*omnia intelligibilia et tamen cuilibet alterum impossi-*  
 10 *cere quot potest deus non sunt minus potenciora quam*  
*deus, vel aliud assignandum, quia antecedens est necessa-*  
*rium et consequens impossibile; tum nichil et chimera*  
*necessario sunt infinitum minus potencia quam unum*  
*finium modice potenciae. Ymmo breviter, non est aliqua*  
 15 *proposicio in tali materia proponenda quin optima sic*  
*probacio an sit vera vel falsa, est per adversionem ad*  
*suum oppositum. Secundum exemplum est de talibus:*  
*ex nihilo nihil fit, nihil ordinavit deus esse materiam ex*  
*qua fiebat mundus; nichil fit ex nichilo, et sic de simi-*  
 20 *libus. Et, si bene respicies, prima istarum est impossi-*  
*bilis, cum necessario ex aliquo nichil fit. Secunda est*  
*vera, quia eius oppositum est falsum, videlicet quod*  
*aliquid ordinavit deus esse materiam ex qua fiebat*  
*mundus. Tercia est eciam vera, que fuit principium*  
 25 *philosophis negantibus quicquam posse creari. Et tali*  
*modo derisorie locuntur quidam de nemine, dicentes*  
*quod est maximo maior, infinitum maior deo et infi-*  
*nitum peior pessimo. Tercium exemplum est de veritate*  
*negativa significata per universalem negativam: ut nullum*  
 30 *hominem esse asinum est deum esse, ymmo, quidlibet*  
*mundi; et sic contingens necessarium et impossibile et*  
*significatum a quolibet signo. Et est in omni loco, omnia*  
*regens, et sic de infinitis aliis negative verificatis. Alias*  
 35 *tamen alibi declaravi quomodo ille proposiciones pos-*  
*sunt aliter significare et consonancius conceptibus logi-*  
*corum.*

Quarto modo, potest universalis negativa probari ex  
 equo, ut per suam simpliciter conversam vel quomodo-  
 libet aliter equipollens, ratione diffinitionis vel descrip-

To be infinitely  
 many and few  
 is not to be  
 more and less  
 numerous than  
 oneself.

Nothing can  
 make as many  
 miracles as  
 God; it does  
 not follow that  
 "nothing" is not  
 less powerful  
 than God.

2. Some  
 philosophical  
 difficulties  
 concerning  
 nothing.  
*Nothing is*  
*made out of*  
*nothing; false,*  
 for it must be  
 made out of  
 something.  
*Nothing was*  
*that out of*  
*which God*  
*made the world.*  
 This is true;  
 for God made  
 the world out  
 of something  
 is false.

3. The negative  
 truth of a  
 proposition  
 may be said to  
 extend very  
 far, proving  
 the existence of  
 God and  
 consequently  
 of all things in  
 the world; but  
 this is dealt  
 with elsewhere.  
 IV. *Ex aequo.*  
 Thus we prove  
 that "no animal  
 is a chimera",  
 because "no  
 chimera is an  
 animal".

2. 1<sup>a</sup> f3 B. 3. Et ideo si B. 5. rñd3 A; respondet B. 8. tantumlibet  
 alterius possibilis; in cuilibet alterius *added in very much faded ink* A;  
 cuilibet alteri possibilis B. 11. aliquid B. 11. aliqua talis B.  
 15. ponenda B; *ib.* sit *deest* B. 20. inspicias B; *ib.* istorum A. 33. ne<sup>re</sup> A.  
 38, 39. quolibet B. 39. equivalens.

cionis terminorum; ut per hoc probatur quod *nullum animal est chimera, quia nulla chimera est animal*. Et probatur per hoc a priori quod *nulla chimera est animal, quia nulla chimera est*. Et per hoc probatur quod *nullum animal est insensibile, quia nullum sensibile est insensibile*. Et sic de ceteris. Exponentes autem talium universalium non inveni, quamvis cum diligencia sum scrutatus: ut iste non expositive inferunt | negativam; B 10<sup>b</sup> *aliqua chimera non est, et nulla est chimera quin non est; ergo nulla chimera est, vel omnis chimera non est* 10 (quod idem est); quia minor non existens | exceptiva A 24<sup>a</sup> convertitur cum universali negativa; cum tunc ille terminus *quin*, convertitur cum illo termino composito *qui non*. Et sic idem est dicere, *nulla chimera est, que non est, et nulla chimera est quin est*. Si autem teneatur 15 affirmative exceptive, tunc non universaliter tales exponentes et expositum convertuntur; ut, posito quod *nichil currat*, tunc verum est quod *nullum currens est animal*. Et tamen falsum est quod *nullum est currens quin illud non est animal*, posito quod exceptive implicet *currens* 20 *esse*. Et ratio huius communiter ponitur, quod oportet exponencium unam esse affirmativam, et aliam negativam; ideo, minore negativa non est exponibilis, sed per affirmativam probabilis, sicut negacio et privacio per affirmacionem naturaliter cognoscuntur etc. 25

But it is not possible properly to expound these negative universals; the usual forms are not successful, for the negative minor amounts to exactly the same as the proposition to be expounded. Examples.

2. nullum *pro* nulla chimera A.      11. ex<sup>ns</sup> A.      12.  $\widehat{n}$  = enim B.  
 15. tea<sup>r</sup> A.      18. quod *deest* A.      20. exceptiva B.      21. quia B.

## CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

Particularis affirmativa iuxta secundam regulam quadrupliciter probari poterit. Nam non est possibile quod quitquam probetur nisi vel directe vel indirecte, nec  
 5 est via possibilis predicandi aliquid indirecte nisi ex eius opposito. Si directe, non est possibilis probacio nisi ex vero. Quamvis enim ex falso sequitur verum, nunquam tamen falsum directe probat verum. Et si verum probetur per verum, non est possibile nisi verum  
 10 probans sit prius aut posterius, vel equum in natura cum veritate probata. Et patet necessitas secunde regule supradicte.

Exemplum ergo probandi particularem affirmativam a priori est tale. Terra dyametrallyter intercipitur inter  
 15 solem et lunam: ergo luna eclipsatur. Antecedens enim, si est, est causa consequentis, quamvis mutuo se inferant. Multe enim sunt cause priores naturaliter suis causatis, quamvis convertibiliter se inferant. Ideo dicunt logici quod duplex est prioritas naturalis, quo ad causam et  
 20 quoad consequenciam; quo ad causam, ut prius naturaliter est homo, quam est risibile; et universaliter subiectum quam eius passio, et tamen quo ad subsistendi consequenciam convertuntur: quoad consequenciam; ut prius naturaliter est movens esse, quam causans esse.  
 25 Et certum est quod idem est: *prius est causa posterioris*, et cum hoc *quoad consequenciam prius, est causa*. Et sic universaliter probacio a priori est utilior quam aliqua aliarum, quamvis iuvenibus sit minus rapida.

Secundo modo probatur particularis a posteriori, et  
 30 hoc dupliciter: vel a posteriori totaliter separato, vel a posteriori inferiori. Exemplum primi: *in corpore quod*

A particular affirmative proposition, like all others, is proved either directly or indirectly; and if directly, by its equal, its inferior or its superior:

I. *A priori* (by its superior). The earth is between the sun and moon, all three being in a line: therefore the moon is eclipsed. Here the first proposition is the cause of the second. But there are two sorts of priority; priority of cause and of consequence; to be human is prior to being risibile in the first sense; to move is prior to causing in the second.

II. *A posteriori*. Either by its inferior that is a distinct thing, or by some singular proposition that infers it.

1. Cap. deest. 2. Initial P in red ink AB. 5. ad predicandi A.

14. dyametri A. 16. si ē ē A. 23. quam. 25. est after idem deest B; ib. est above line A. 25. 26. posterius A. 27. utilior valdior B. 29. priori A.

Thus, I see a body in which vital operations go on, and I conclude that it lives.

Or, from the fact that something runs and this something is a man, I say that some man runs.

The rule here is that the major must be the singular of the proposition to be inferred, and the minor a singular with the same subject as the major, and the predicate identical with the subject of the conclusion.

But the verb in the minor should be the substantive verb, in the same tense as the conclusion, with another verb if necessary besides; similar to that in the conclusion.

The great difficulty is in assigning this other verb: therefore several examples are given.

*videtur a me sunt subiective operationes vitales; ergo: corpus quod videtur a me est vivum.* Et illa probatio est famosa apud philosophos naturales, et vocatur demonstratio a signo, vel demonstratio quia. Exemplum secundi est tale: hoc currit, et hoc est homo, ergo <sup>5</sup> homo currit. Et isti modi probandi innituntur sophiste, de quo datur talis regula: Quod ad particularem affirmativam aut sibi | equivalentem inferendam resolutorie <sup>B 11<sup>a</sup></sup> oportet maiorem esse singularem propositionis inferende et minorem esse singularem de subiecto sinonimo cum <sup>10</sup> priori. et verbo ac predicato proportionalibus verbo et subiecto propositionis principaliter inferende. Verbi gracia, inferendo istam, *homo currit*, sic arguitur: *hoc currit*, et *hoc est homo*; ergo, *homo currit*. Modo maior est singularis indefinite probande, et minor est singu- <sup>15</sup> laris de subiecto sinonimo cum subiecto maioris, et predicatum minoris est sinonimum cum subiecto propositionis probande. Ideo tale proporcionabile subiecto propositionis et verbo minoris est proporcionabile verbo propositionis probande: quia est verbum substantivum <sup>20</sup> eiusdem temporis cum verbo propositionis inferende. Et ut breviter dicam de proporcionione verborum indefinite probande et sue minoris, est pro regula observandum: Quod verbum minoris et indefinite probande est verbo illius indefinite consimiliter coaptandum. Illud <sup>A 24<sup>b</sup></sup> verbum secunde exponentis universalis affirmative est verbo directe vel exponibiliter similandum. Et quomodo hoc erit, potes cognoscere ex <sup>12<sup>a</sup></sup>, <sup>14<sup>a</sup></sup>, et <sup>15<sup>a</sup></sup> regulis supradictis.

Et in assignacione talium verborum est magna pars <sup>30</sup> difficultatis huius materie, pro qua concipienda ponam per ordinem tot exempla. Si *hoc est et hoc est homo, tunc homo est*. Si *hoc incipit esse et hoc est album vel incipit esse album, tunc album incipit esse*. Unde, si de possibili una res alba incipit esse per remocionem de <sup>35</sup> presenti, tunc foret talis minor falsa: *hoc est album*. Ideo oportet sub disiunctione verbum probari, ut si *hoc potest esse et hoc est album vel potest esse album, ergo album potest esse*. Si *hoc potest esse, et hoc est vel*

6. fop<sup>er</sup> A. 7. partem A. 8. subiecti A. 9. minorem A.  
11. minor A. 18, 19. tale — est deest A. 23. probando A. 25. con-  
similiter deest B; ib. sicut B. 27. universalis B. 27. exponibilis  
both MSS. 28. potest B; ib. et deest B. 35. inciperet B. 37. pre-  
dicari B; ib. ut in marg. A. 37, 39. si — si deest A.

*potest esse episcopus, tunc episcopus potest esse. Si hoc significatur, et hoc est vel significatur chimera, tunc chimera significatur. Et sic proportionaliter de aliis disparibus, de preterito et futuro.*

- 5 Sed de acceptione significacionis illius verbi *est*, est controversia inter homines. Aliqui enim volunt *esse* solum *esse esse* commune ad actuale; et illa significacio est famosior, non solum apud vulgares, sed apud logicos hiis diebus. Sed alii volunt tripliciter res  
 10 *esse*, puta secundum *esse* actuale; ut homo dum vivit *est*; secundum *esse* potenciales, ut res que non actualiter *est*, sed potest *esse* actualiter; ut anticristum *esse*.  
 3<sup>m</sup> *esse* est intelligibile, ut res que non est actualiter, nec potest actualiter *esse*, sed intelligitur; et sic claudit  
 15 contradiccione aliquod nominabile non *esse*, cum omne quod potest *esse* est secundum *esse* potenciales; et omne quod non potest saltem actualiter *esse* est secundum *esse* intelligibile; et iuxta illam viam sufficeret ponere in minori verbum substantivum, tam in exponendo  
 20 quam in inferendo, sine tali arte vel ranga verborum. Et difficile est valde, invenire artificialiter verbum proportionale ad inferendum talia: *chimera significatur qualiter non potest esse, intelligitur*, et cetera similia. Non enim valet tale medium: *hoc est significabile vel intelligibile*  
 B 11<sup>b</sup> *esse chimera*, quia hoc est | verum de quolibet. Ideo, iuxta talem illacionem, omne signum significaret chimeram, et per consequens quidlibet esset chimera.

- Ideo quondam dixi quod non oportet addere minorem in talibus; nec adhuc occurrit mihi apcius medium  
 30 quam ampliando hoc unum, *est*, ad tale triplex *esse*. Et si queratur quomodo habebitur quod *hoc est chimera*, dicitur quod ex hoc quia *illa chimera est in intellectu vel intelligitur*. Nec est idem dicere, *ista chimera intelligitur* et *hoc intelligitur esse chimera*, quia quocunque demonstrato, *illud intelligitur esse chimera* necessario, sed de  
 35 nulla alia re est verum quod *illa chimera intelligitur*; ideo illo termino '*hoc*' demonstrante chimeram simili-

5. huius B. 7. *esse deest* B; *ib.* ad *esse* B. 12—14. sed — nec in marg. A. 12. anticristus; *esse deest* B. 13. vel 2<sup>m</sup> pro 3<sup>m</sup> B; *ib.* intellectuale pro est intelligibile B. 14, 15. clauditur contradictorium A. 15. nominale A. 18. intellectuale B. 20. ranga AB. 21. aliter B. 28. quod *deest* B. 33. non B. 34. chimeram B.

14, 15. *Claudit* — *nominabile*. Because it is nameable.

liter bene sequitur sine medio, *hoc significatur*, vel *intelligitur*: igitur *chimera significatur* vel *intelligitur*.

We must, as before, take care to change the middle term according to the tense of the verb in the proposition to be proved.

Sed inferendo talia particularia de preterito vel de futuro, oportet proporcionari verbum minoris conformiter, sicut prius de universali affirmativa; ut si *hoc curret*, et *hoc est* vel *erit homo*, tunc *homo curret*; et si *hoc cucurrit* et *hoc est* vel *fuit homo*, tunc *homo cucurrit*. Prima tamen talium inferencium, quamvis sit singularis, est probando, resolvendo verbum iuxta sextam regulam ad singulare tempus de preterito vel de futuro; 10 ut si inferri debet quod *hic curret*, quia in tali tempore vel in tali instanti *hoc curret*.

This leads us to admit that a given man will differ from a given ass at a certain time; but we cannot infer any more.

Et hic nota; nam iuxta illud conceditur quod *homo differat ab asino* | *quamvis non omnis asinus differat ab* A 25<sup>a</sup> *illo*; quia *hoc differet ab asino*, et *hoc est* vel *erit homo*; 15 *ergo, homo differet ab asino*. Et maior sic probatur. *Hoc in tali instanti differet ab asino, ergo* etc. Et assumptum sic probatur: *hoc in tali instanti erit, et in tali instanti erit asinus*; et *hoc in tali instanti non erit asinus*; *ergo tunc differet ab asino*. Et ex hoc bene 20 sequitur quod *omnis asinus qui erit tunc differet ab illo*. Et conformiter conceditur in casu communi de muliere impregnata, de qua erit verum dicere quod *hoc est omnis homo*, quod *hoc erit omnis homo*; quia *hoc in B instanti erit omnis homo*, sicut patet per exponentes 25 illius termini, *omnis homo*. Ideo *hoc erit omnis homo*. Nec sequitur ex illo quod *omnis homo erit hoc*, sed bene sequitur quod *illud quod erit omnis homo erit hoc*, et quod *omnis homo existens in illo instanti in quo hoc, erit omnis homo, et hoc*. Idem enim est: *in illo instanti* 30 *hoc erit omnis homo, et: in illo instanti erit ita quod hoc est omnis homo*. Sed non est idem dicere, *omnis homo erit hoc, et hoc erit omnis homo*, quia in prima distribuit signum tam subiectum quam verbum pro quocunque tempore futuro; sed a parte predicati non 35 sic. Ideo, ipso subsequente, stat verbum indiffinite quo

So of a pregnant woman we may say: *The universal man will be this*;

but not, *this will be the universal man*, for the proposition is not convertible.

2. vel *pro* igitur A. 4. minoris *deest* B. 5. de — affirmative above A; *deest* B. 9. est tamen B. 9. 10. iuxta — regulam *deest* B. 11. vel *pro* ut si A. 14. differe A. 15. above the line: quia corruptus; inter non encia non cadit differencia A. 16. non A. 17. differt B. 20. directe (drce) *pro* bene B; *ib.* ex *deest* B. 21. drt B. 23. unum A; *ib.* dicere *deest* B. 28. after illud: concedendum *pro* quod B. 29. est ens *pro* existens B. 30. erit *pro* et B. 31. et sic ista *pro* erit ita B. 34. distribuitur per signum B.

ad tempus: sicut patet in istis: *hoc erit non sedens, et hoc non erit sedens.*

- Unde subtiliter fuit ista regula famosa inventa quod in terminis distributivis, implicativis, et comparativis, non convertuntur universaliter propositiones de preterito vel futuro, cum modalibus de preterito vel futuro, in quibus est dictorum translacio de presenti. Unde non sequitur: *tunc erit ita quod omnis homo est Sor, ergo omnis homo erit | Sor.* Et ratio est quia hoc signum, *omne*, distribuit unum verbum pro omni tempore futuro, et sic non aliud verbum. Idem tamen est quod *tunc Sor erit omnis homo seu tunc erit ita quod Sor est omnis homo*; deficit enim talis causa. Nec sequitur, *tunc erit ita quod ille asinus est animal quod est in ista domo*; ergo ille asinus erit animal quod est in ista domo; et ratio diversitatis est diversitas connotacionis temporis per verbum; nam secunda propositio debet sic inferri: *ille asinus tunc erit hoc, et hoc est animal quod est in ista domo*; ergo, etc. Nec sequitur, *tunc erit ita quod Sor est tantus quantus est Plato*; ergo, *tunc erit tantus quantus est Plato*; et sic de similibus infinitis. Ex istis patet quod illa *Sor differt ab asino* non debet primo exponi per exponentes illius verbi, *differt*, quia ponatur quod *Sor sit albus et erit albus per totam istam horam et post niger*; tunc ipse *differt ab albo*, quia post finem huius hore, et tamen *ipse erit albus*. Et ex istis patet quod magna diversitas est in istis propositionibus et earum probacionibus, ratione modi connotandi tempus per verbum; ut aliud est dicere secundum aliquos, *Sor erit tantus, ita senex, ita debilis* etc., *sicud erit*, et dicere: *erit quod est tantus, ita senex, ita debilis*, etc., *sicud erit*, posito quod continue intendatur in tali denominatione usque ad primum instans non esse sui; in quo casu communiter conceduntur propositiones prime forme, eo quod in illo tempore *Sor erit ita magnus, ita senex* etc., quamvis in nullo instanti eius. Due tamen sunt opiniones probabiles de talibus; prima dicit quod, si *Sor erit tantus quantus erit Plato*, tunc in aliquo instanti erit tantus quantus erit Plato. Et sic de singulis quibuscunque.

The rule is this:  
For distributive, implicative and comparative terms, past or future propositions (A will be B, A was B) are not always convertible with their modal forms (It will be so: A is B; It was so: A is B).

This will be true: v. g. Socrates is as tall as Plato is, does not amount to the same as: Socrates will be as tall as Plato is.

And if we suppose a man continually receiving a quality more and more intense until the moment of his death, we say that at that moment he will be v. g. as old as he ever will be; yet at that very moment he ceases to exist, and will not be.

9. omnis B. 11. a'd A; ib. quod deest B. 13. tunc deest B.  
14. rcc pro ille B. 18. erit pro est A. 22. differt B; ib. asino pro albo A.  
29. et pro ut B. 30, 31. ita erit quod B. 34. gccm = concederum;  
propositiones deest B. 37. probabiles deest B. 39. plato deest B;  
ib. similibus B.

Two opinions:  
one that such  
a predication  
requires to be  
verified at a  
certain instant.

Et evidencia magna est ad hoc, quod nunquam pro-  
positio verificatur pro aliquo communi in suppositione  
personali, nisi sit dare aliquid singulare pro quo veri-  
ficatur illud commune; ut nunquam erit verum quod  
*hoc cucurrit*, nisi sit dare cursum quo cucurrit. Nec 5  
hoc erit *in illo tempore* | nisi sit dare instans singulare A 25<sup>b</sup>  
pro quo erit in hoc tempore; et sic de similibus.  
Quare ergo non conformiter hoc: *Si hoc erit in illo  
tempore ita senex sicut erit, est dare instans pro quo  
hoc erit ita senex*, etc. 10

The other, that  
it is not  
necessary; but  
this has been  
examined  
elsewhere.

Ideo unus magnus logicus negavit omnes huiusmodi  
de preterito et futuro. Et pro alia via que concedit  
taliam de futuro, sicut et ego quondam concessi, sunt alie  
evidencie. Sed illam materiam alias disputavi; ideo sufficit  
pro presenti dicere aliquam viam probabilem sine argu- 15

Many other  
sophisms  
proceed from  
the same root,  
especially those  
based on the  
accident of time.  
If any term can  
be truly,  
predicated in  
the nominative  
of a singular  
subject, and its  
opposite too,  
this term is  
accidental to  
the subject.

Uterius ex eadem radice patet tota causa sophistic-  
cationis per antepositionem et postpositionem termino-  
rum accidentalium cum verbis de preterito et futuro.  
Pro quo cognoscendo notandum est prima | regula, quod B 12<sup>b</sup>  
si fuerit aliquis terminus qui posset vere et affirmative 20  
in recto predicari de subiecto singulari, cum hoc quod  
suum oppositum vere predicabitur de eodem, talis  
terminus est accidentalis quantum pertinet ad sophis-  
mata, cuiusmodi sunt termini speciales denominativi  
denominantes accidencia, ut *illud quod iam est sedens* 25  
*potest alias esse non sedens*; et sic de albo, calvo et  
ceteris specialibus concretis accidencium, quamvis tamen  
genera accidencium non sic possunt.

Example of  
fallacies; of a  
man that  
will be a bishop  
and is not yet  
so, it may be  
said: This  
bishop will see  
S. and yet S.  
will never be  
seen by the  
bishop.  
Other examples.

Isto cognito, patet intellectus talium sophismatum;  
*episcopus immediate post hoc videbit Sortem qui nunquam* 30  
*videbitur ab episcopo; iste rex fuit genitus a muliere,*  
*que nunquam genuit istem regem; nec unquam morietur*  
*iste rex, qui tamen morietur aliquo tempore. Iste sacer-*  
*dos fuit vulneratus ab aliquo qui nunquam nocuit isti*  
*sacerdoti, ymmo nunquam fuit propinquus isti sacerdoti* 35  
*per mille miliaria; et sic de infinitis similibus; quorum*  
omnium predicacio dependet super illo quod quicunque

1. ad hoc *deest* B. 3. aliquid *deest* B. 6. homo *pro* hoc B. 8. qu *qu* B;  
*ib.* h<sup>o</sup> A; *deest* B. 11. alibi B. 15. dicere *deest* A; alteram *pro* aliquam B.  
16. patet *deest* A. 19. primo B; *pro* regula B. 21. singulariter B. 22. con-  
formiter de B. 25. pronominales; de *abore the line* A; *ib.* connotantes B.  
26. ca<sup>l</sup> *abore the line* calvo A; ca<sup>l</sup> B. 27. terminis B; *ib.* quamvis *deest* B.  
28. p<sup>u</sup>t A. 30. f<sup>u</sup>r A. 35. nunquam *in marg.* A.

11. *Magnus logicus.* Probably Ockam.



terminus accidentalis, predicatus respectu verbi affirmativi de preterito vel de futuro limitat ratione difference temporis connotati suum significatum inesse subiecto pro conformi tempore connotato; ut si *videbis istum episcopum*, tunc *videbis eum pro instanti pro quo erit episcopus*. Si *ista mulier genuit istum regem*, tunc *genuit ipsa pro instanti pro quo fuit rex*. Si *Sor percussit istum sacerdotem*, tunc *percussit eum pro instanti pro quo fuit sacerdos*. Et sic non est, ipsis positis a parte subiecti. Nam si *hoc videbis*, et *hoc est vel erit ille episcopus*, tunc *istum episcopum videbis*; sed *ista: tu videbis istum episcopum*, debet sic inferri: *tunc tu videbis istum episcopum, ergo etc.* Et antecedens probatur per hoc quod *tunc erit ita quod tu vides istum episcopum*.

- 15 Unde potest pro regula observari quod omnis simplex categorica de preterito vel futuro cuius verbum non distribuitur, convertitur cum modali de conformi tempore in qua modali est dicti translacio de presenti: verbi gracia, bene sequitur cum *videbis papam, ergo, aliquando erit ita quod vides papam*; et econtra; *tu percussisti sacerdotem; ergo, aliquando ita fuit quod tu percutis sacerdotem*; et econtra. Non tamen sequitur: *aliquando erit ita quod omnis homo est in ista domo; ergo, aliquando omnis homo erit in ista domo*; quia 25 verbum distribuitur pro omni tempore futuro. Nec sequitur: *tu videbis istos duos, videlicet hominem et asinum; ergo, aliquando erit ita quod tu vides istos duos*, demonstrando hominem et asinum. Nec sequitur: *tu genuisti istos duos filios; ergo, aliquando fuit ita quod 30 tu gignis istos duos*, quia predicatum est de copulato extremo vel synonymo, et sic non est simplex categorica, cum predicatum sit compositum; sed verificatur copulatum pro diversis instantibus futuris. Nec sequitur, *tu fuisti vel eris per multa tempora non communicancia; ergo, aliquando erit ita | vel fuit ita quod tu es per multa 26<sup>a</sup> tempora non communicancia, | quia verbum tale indeterminate distribuitur per predicatum, ut patet in tali: tu eris semper: que tantum valet, quantum hec uni-*

Rule: A simple categorical proposition in the past or the future, is, unless its verb is universally distributed, convertible with a modal proposition of the same tense as itself, with the verb in the present. Thus: you will see the Pope may stand for: some day this will be true: you see the Pope. Not so if the verb is distributed: thus: at some time or other this will be true: Every man is in this house, cannot stand for: At some time or other every man will be in this house. The proposition must be simply categorical too; if the predicate is copulated, it is no longer simply categorical.

3. quotatē A. 7. istum B. 14. tunc — tu deest A. 20. quod tu B; ib. videbis AB; ib. et econtra cum pro et quando tu B. 22. percussisti AB. 24. erit pro est A. 26. scilicet B. 27. videbis AB. 28. demonstrando — nec deest B. 30. duos deest; ib. p̄tū est t's B. 37. p̄ptum AB; ib. ut est B. 38. <sup>et</sup> <sub>es</sub> above the line A

versalis in omni tempore tu eris. Sic in proposito idem est dicere: *tu eris per tempus, et per alicuius temporis quamlibet partem tu eris*. Et sic patet quod peccant sophiste, negantes aliquid corruptibile fore per tempus, quia tunc, ut negantes putant, *per omne tempus ipsum* 5 *erit*, ratione distributionis illius preposicionis, *per*. Non enim distribuitur terminus cui adiungitur pro suis significatis, sed distribuitur intellectualiter pro partibus sui significati.

These modal propositions, to be true, all require a given instant; the others do not; and consequently only *beginning* or *ending* follows upon the latter.

Et tales proposiciones de inesse de preterito vel 10 futuro, inferentes modales cum suis dictis de presenti, vocavit quidam subtilis logicus proposiciones requirentes instans ad hoc quod verificentur. Et alias non sic inferentes dixit non requirere instans pro sua verificacione. Et ideo ad illas non sequitur in- 15 cepcio vel desinicio; ut *si fui albus postquam non fui albus*, cum hoc quod si fui albus fuit ita quod sum albus, tunc *incepi esse albus*. Et si non *potero videre te nisi fuerit ita, video te tunc si video te*; et: *iam non video te, incipio vel incipiam videre* 20 *te*; et ita de similibus. Non sic autem intelligitur regula sua quod aliqua proposicio de preterito vel futuro poterit verificari sine instanti: cum talis: *ego ero ita senex sicut ego ero per totam vitam meam*, erit necessaria; sed intellexit quod pro nullo instanti erit ita de 25 presenti, sicut talis affirmativa significat de futuro: et talis significata de presenti intellexit inceptiorem vel desinicionem.

Not that the latter propositions are not true at a certain instant, but that they are only so in the sense of *beginning* or *ending*.

III. *Ab absurdo*; granting, v. g. that the species *lion* exists, it is absurd to say that no individual lion exists.

3<sup>o</sup> probatur particularis affirmativa indirecte, per eius oppositum; ut probo quod *leo est*, quamvis 30 nullum senciam, ex hoc quod *falsum est nullum leonem esse*; quia, cum species leonis sit perfecta cuius individuum non potest generari nisi per propagacionem, *si non est leo, non potest esse leo*; quod

3. *quāq̄* pro quamlibet A; *ib.* sic *deest* B. 6. *above* erit, fore AB.  
9. sui *above the line* A. 10. de preterito vel *deest* A. 15. sui B.  
17. si *deest* A. 19. *potes* AB; *ib.* *before nisi deest* A. 20. *videbo* B;  
*ib.* *incipiebam* B. 23. oracio ego B. 24, 25. vera B. 26. significat  
*deest* A. 29. modo B. 31. eo B. 32. quia *deest* B. 33. propter B.  
33, 34. per proposicionem *struck out*; per propagacionem *in marg.* A.

23. The moment of death is here in question. At that moment one cannot say: X *is* as old as he ever will be, because X exists no longer; but it is true that he 'begins to be' older, or that he 'ends by being' as old.

scitur esse impossibile Ideo cognoscitur esse *necessarium quod sit leo*.

4<sup>o</sup> modo probatur ex equo; ut ex sua simpliciter IV. *Ex aequo*.  
conversa, vel aliter convertibili; ut per hoc probatur  
5 quod *sunt nonnulli homines*, quia *sunt aliqui homines*;  
et quod *animal est homo* quia *homo est animal*.

1. cognoscitur *deest*; ut *pro* esse B.  
6. et cetera B.

2. sic leo esse cognoscitur B.

## CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Negative particular propositions are proved, like the former.

1. *A priori*, by means of universal negatives.

This is priority of consequence, not of cause; the truth of the universal includes that of the particular, but the particular truths make up the universal truth.

Such particular propositions may thus be true, even though implying an absurd supposition;

provided that the principal verb does not admit that which is absurd.

Particularis negativa, ut cetera, simpliciter probari poterit. Primo a priori; ut quilibet particularis negativa probanda efficaciter probari potest per suam universalem negativam subalternantem, ut, si *nemo currit*, tunc *homo non currit*, et si *nullum animal est insensibile*, quod *aliquod animal non est insensibile*. Et si obiciatur quod prius naturaliter est *animal non currere* quam *nullum animal currere*, posito quod sic; tum, quia primum est necessarium et 2<sup>m</sup> contingens, tum quia eo ipso | quod *nullum animal currit*, *animal non currit*, et non e contra; ideo prius quoad consequentiam, et per consequens prius naturaliter est *animal non currere* quam *nullum animal currere*: dicitur quod est naturalis prioritas causacione et non prioritas consequentia inter significatum subalternantis et significatum subalternati; et contra est prioritas naturalis quo ad consequentiam: et patet solutio.

Per istum ergo modum probandi patere potest quod talia particularia negativa particularia sunt vera, quod *aliquis homo qui est asinus non est asinus; differens ab ente, non est; aliqua res volita a chimera non est res volita a chimera*, etc. Omnium enim istarum subalternantes ex quibus sequuntur sunt necessarie; et per consequens ille sunt necessarie. Et si obiciatur quod prima implicat falsum, cum negacio subsequens non impedit implicacionem, dicitur quod non, cum sit mere negativa, racione negacionis principalis verbi; et sic negacio subsequens impedit implicacionem, eo quod

1. Cap. *deest* AB.      2. Initial P in blue ink A; *deest* B.      3. poterit B.

11, 12. animal — et non *deest* A.      15. et — inter *deest* A.      17. con<sup>m</sup> A.  
20. particularia — quod *deest* A.      23. et est *pro* etc.; *ib.* Oppositum AB.  
23, 24. subalt<sup>n</sup>ant<sup>s</sup> B.      24. sequuntur A.      25. omnes ille B.      27. dū q'q̄ =  
dum quidem *pro* dicitur quod A.

oracio illa truncata non implicaret, nisi virtute affirmacionis cuius foret pars; et talis affirmacio deficit ratione negacionis subsequens. Et si contra secundum obiciatur quod si *differentens ab ente non est* et *omnis asinus est ens*, tunc *differentens ab asino non est*, cum argumentatur a termino stante mobiliter ad suum singulare cum proporcionato medio; et si *differentens ab asino non est*, tunc nullum *differentens ab asino*; et per consequens cum *asinus sit*, sequitur *quemlibet esse asinum*: Dicitur quod prima consequencia non stat; videlicet, nec iste terminus *ente* mobiliter, cum negacio subsequens illud impediat, eo quod particularis convertitur cum sua universalis. Nec est verum quod nulla negativa negat, nisi illam subsequens; quia, admissio modo loquendi quod negacio negat, ipsa existente signum actus negandi, certum quod quandocunque hoc verbum *est* predicat 2<sup>m</sup> adiacens in particulari negativa, negacio negat subiectum universaliter; sed non per negacionem vel per signum sibi proporcionatum. Unde bene sequitur; *album non est*; ergo *nec hoc album est*, *nec hoc*; et sic de aliis. Et conformiter dicitur verbum substantivum, predicatum 2<sup>m</sup> adiacens in particulari affirmativa, mobilitate eius subiectum. Unde sic dicto: *currens est*, eque mobiliter stat hoc subiectum *currens*, sicut in ista universalis; *omne currens est*. Et iuxta illam consideracionem conceditur quod *plures quam infiniti homines non sunt*, et tamen infinitum pauciores quam infiniti homines non sunt; cum tamen falsum sit quod *plures quam quatuor aut mille non sunt*; et sic ad maximum numerum hominum exclusive. Et sic iudicabis de multis similibus, quorum omnium optima probacio est per universalem negativam. | Nota tamen quod multi alii sunt modi probandi talem negativam a priori: ut per hoc probari potest a priori *chimeram non esse* quod *non potest esse*, et per hoc *parietem non respirare* quia *non habet pulmonem*; et ita de ceteris.

What is different from Being is not a being, may be attacked thus:

What is different from A is not a being; it follows that everything is A.

But Being cannot here be taken distributively, though the whole subject is distributed in this case and the particular is equivalent to a universal. When *is* stands alone for existence, it is so; thus *A is not*, means: neither A<sup>1</sup> is, nor A<sup>2</sup> is . . . etc.

We may thus admit that more than an infinite number of men do not exist, without admitting that more than four do not exist.

There are many other *a priori* proofs.

3. con<sup>m</sup> A. 4. obicias B; *ib.* ens pro est A. 6. mo<sup>r</sup> A; mobit<sup>r</sup> B.  
9. quodlibet B. 11. 12. v<sup>3</sup>ne stat pro stat videlicet nec B; *ib.* ille B; *ib.* mo<sup>r</sup> A.  
12, 13 convertatur B. 13. virtus pro verum A. 14. negacio B;  
*ib.* ipsam B. 16. certum est B. 19. propositum above the line B.  
21. singulis pro aliis B; *ib.* after conformiter, dicitur bene sequitur album non est, ergo nec hoc album est, nec hoc struck out A. 22. predicat A.  
23. mare A. 29. dicunt pro aut A; *ib.* ullū = mille A. 34. after potest, a priori deest B. 35. pietem AB.

II. *A posteriori*,  
v. g. by a  
singular which  
is included in  
it.

Examples.

Note that such  
a proposition:  
*This chimera is  
not understood  
by thee* implies  
that God  
understands all  
that is  
intelligible.

We cannot  
possibly  
suppose and at  
the same time  
deny our  
understanding  
it.

Here this may  
be contradicted  
by bringing  
forward a fifth  
sort of proof,  
called *captio*.

It we  
understand the  
fact that  
a given  
proposition is  
self-  
contradictory,  
we do  
understand it.

So we may  
know that a  
proposition is  
true that we do  
not know to be  
true.

Secundus modus probandi est a posteriori, ut inferendo talem particularem negativam ex singulis; de quibus utendum est arte consimili, sicut dictum est de inductione particularis affirmative. Ut, *homo non est papa*, quia *hoc non est papa*, et *hoc est homo*, igitur etc. 5 *Homo non fuit ad bellum troyanum*, quia *hoc non fuit ad bellum troyanum*, et *hoc est vel fuit homo*; igitur, etc. *Homo non videbit anticristum*: *hoc non videbit anticristum*; et *hoc est vel erit homo*. *Aliquod ens non potest fore vel esse per tempus*, quia *hoc instans non potest fore vel esse per tempus*, et *hoc instans est aliquod ens vel potest esse aliquod ens*, quamvis non posset fore aliquod ens. *Chimera non intelligitur a te*, quia *chimera non intelligitur a te*, et *ista chimera est in intellectu*. Unde necesse est omne intelligibile intelligi 15 a deo, ex quo patet quod impossibile est quod aliquid intelligatur quod non intelligitur. Illa enim non possunt probari, nisi per hoc quod *nichil quod intelligitur intelligitur*, quod non potest quicquam probare, cum non possit esse; hoc eciam est impossibile, *aliquid 20 quod non intelligitur a te intelligitur a te*. Et sic de omnibus similibus.

Sed forte contra illud arguitur inducendo quintum modum probandi proposicionem, qui capcio dicitur. Nam tu intelligis istam proposicionem: *aliquid quod 25 non intelligitur a te est*, cum intelligere potes quod claudit contradiccionem. Intelligis ergo subiectum huius proposicionis; et per consequens eius primarium significatum; et cum solum primarie significat *aliquid quod non intelligitur a te*, sequitur quod tu intelligis *aliquid 30 quod non intelligitur a te*. Sic enim probatur quod tu scis *aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam non scis esse veram*, capiendo talem proposicionem scitam a te: *aliqua propositio est vera quam non scis esse veram*. | Sed dicitur quod conclusio intenta est impossibilis. Et A 27<sup>a</sup> conceditur bene quod intelligis *datam proposicionem*, sicut et omne quod potest intelligi, intelligendo hoc,

5. igitur etc. *deest* B.      8. etc. *deest* B.      8, 9. hoc — et hoc *deest* A.      9. instans *pro* ens B.      10. *pc*<sup>o</sup> A; *p*<sup>ts</sup> B.      12, 13. quod si non potest formaliter aliquod *pro* quamvis — aliquod A.      13. instans *pro* ens B.      15. est intellecta B.      16, 17. *q*<sup>o</sup> *ad* *q*<sup>o</sup> *inter* *nō* *ner* B.      17. *pos*<sup>o</sup> B.      18. *nl* *q*<sup>o</sup> B; *ib.* nihil intelligitur quam A.      23. hoc B.      24. quia *pro* qui A.

*transcendens ens*; et sic intelligis eius subiectum. Sed non intelligis *quid* vel *quod* illud subiectum primarie significat; sicut nec deus. Non enim primarie significat aliquid quod non intelligis; nec est dare quid primarie significat, sicut nec dare est quid significat ille terminus, non significat primarie. Ymmo, posito quod multa sunt que ego non intelligo, sicut est possibile me non existente vel non intelligente, adhuc non magis primarie significat ille terminus *aliquid quod non intelligo*, aliquid quod non intelligo, quia pari evidencia qua alteri sic significaret hoc, significaret hoc et mihi; et sequeretur conclusio. Ymmo breviter, ille terminus, *aliquid quod non video*, non principaliter significat aliquid quod non video; nec iste terminus, *nichil*, significat primarie nichil, aut iste terminus *non homo* non hominem; et sic de similibus quibuscunque. Sed multa secundarie significant tales termini, ratione suarum parcium. Et sic ille terminus, *asinus*, et multi similes significant in casu aliquid quod non intelligo, posito quod non intelligam asinum aut tale primarie significatum per terminum illum assignatum. Unde sequitur: *iste terminus primarie significat naturam asinam, et illam non intelligo; ergo primarie significat aliquid quod non intelligo*. Et ille terminus: *aliquid quod non intelligo*, non solum significat aliquid quod non intelligo, ymmo omne quod ego intelligo, sicut ille terminus *nichil* significat omne ens; et quilibet talis terminus, infinitus. Nec sequitur: *ista propositio primarie significat quod aliquid quod non intelligis est; ergo, pars eius significat primarie aliquid quod non intelligis*; significatum enim propositionis intelligis, sed non aliquid quod non intelligis.

Aliter enim dicit sophista quod ipse satis intelligit quid iste terminus primarie significat *aliquid quod non potest intelligi*, quia intelligit quod primarie significat *chimeram, quidlibet*, vel aliud dandum. Et non sequitur ultimo quod tota illa propositio significat primarie, scilicet: *aliquid quod non potest intelligi potest intelligi*, quod chimera non potest intelligi. Non enim sequitur, *intelligo quod A significat hoc: ergo, A significat hoc*, cum intelligo omnia que non possunt esse; non tamen

But this sort of proof is impossible: we do not know the sense of the proposition, for it has none.

All such terms do not signify primarily as they stand: what I do not see, nothing, not-man have no objects that correspond to them thus, only secondarily.

So many others may primarily signify what I do not understand.

and what I do not understand may mean what I do understand, and nothing, everything.

Or it might be answered that our knowledge of the term what we do not understand, is sufficient, knowing what terms are included in its extension.

4, 5. primarie B<sup>1</sup> ite t's B. 5. significat before ille deest B. 8. nichil pro non B. 15. non homo A. 22. nam A; ib. i<sup>a</sup> A. 26. iste B. 29. intelligitur B. 32. diceret B; ib. satis bene B. 34. q'a A. 35. vel quidlibet B.

cognosco vel scio quid ille terminus principaliter significat. Ulterius dicitur quod modus probandi per capcionem est modus probandi a posteriori; nam posterius est me scire illam proposicionem: *aliqua propositio est vera quam nescio esse veram sic significantem*, quam 5 me scire aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam nescio esse veram. Ideo ille modus probandi, sicut quilibet alius significabilis, continetur sub aliquo predictorum. Et tanta dixerim ut promisi de probacione simplici kategorice *de inesse*. 10

It may be added that *captio* is a proof a posteriori: for the new meaning given to the word 'understand' is posterior to the first one.

1. quod B.      3. a posteriori est modus probandi per capcionem B.  
8. signabilis B.      9. simplicis B.



## TRACTATUS SECUNDUS.

### CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

Secundarie, superius principaliter est promissum de  
exclusivis, exceptivis et aliis que non sorciuntur univer-  
salitatem, quantitatem, et cetera accidentia simplicis et  
pure kategorice, pertractandum. Ipsa enim, quasi media  
inter kategoricas et ypoteticas, excludunt et includunt  
proprietas et accidentia utriusque. Dici tamen possunt  
kategorice modo suo.

We may now  
examine those  
propositions  
which are  
neither purely  
categorical nor  
hypothetical,  
yet belong  
rather to the  
former class.

Et primo, vel gracia dicendorum, exponendi sunt  
10 isti duo termini *differt* et *aliud*. Iste enim terminus  
*differt* conceditur a famosis logicis mobilitare terminum  
per negacionem inclusam; sed certe nescio hoc fundare.  
Non enim video quin concedi debeat quod *homo differt*  
*ab homine*, sed non *ab omni homine*; sicut homo diversi-  
15 ficatur, distat et discrepat ab homine, sed non ab omni  
homine. Supposita tamen famosa sententia sophistarum  
A 27<sup>b</sup> quod *differre* | importans alietatem, dicat differenciam  
inter significatum subiecti et quodcunque significatum  
predicati in propositione affirmativa; tunc dicitur  
20 habere tres exponentes: duas affirmativas, in quibus  
subiectum et predicatum propositionis exponende, vel

First those that  
imply *difference*  
or *otherness*.

Some say that  
*to differ from*  
renders the  
following term  
universal; but  
it does not  
follow, if a man  
differs from a  
man, that he  
differs from  
every man.

Such a  
proposition has  
three  
exponents: two  
affirmative,  
asserting the  
existence of the  
subject and the  
predicate, and

1. Cap. *deest*. 2. Initial S in red with tracery of lilac ink A;  
*deest* B. 3, 4. vi<sup>to</sup> pro universalitatem A. 4. quantitates B. 9. n. AB.  
11. a famosis logicis above the line A; *deest* B. 13. q'n A. 14. sicut  
homo in marg. A. 17. *differt* above A; *ib.* importans AB. 18. subiecti —  
significatum above the line A.

16. There is here a marginal note at the bottom of the page  
(in A): *sophistarum inexpertorum logicorum*, which may guide us  
in determining the sense in which it is used in this work. But it is  
not used so throughout. Sometimes it merely signifies *dialectician*;  
sometimes it is even employed with approbation; often it is  
taken to mean any one who opposes Wyclif's views with  
embarrassing arguments: most philosophers use it in this sense  
even at the present day.

one negative, denying the subject to be the predicate; the tenses of each to agree with that of the principal proposition.  
Formula.

*A differs from B*; i. e. *A is*, and *B is*, and *A is not B*; with proportionate changes for the past and the future.

saltem termini illis synonymi, subiciuntur verbo substantivo predicante secundum ad | iacens, et terciam B 15<sup>a</sup> negativam, in qua unus talium terminorum removebitur a reliquo. Et est pro regula observandum quod omnium trium exponencium terminorum illorum, *differt et aliud*.<sup>5</sup> verba erunt conformis temporis cum verbo principali proposicionis principaliter exponende. Verbi gracia, *tu differs ab asino, tu differebas ab asino, tu differes ab asino*, debent per ordinem sic exponi: *tu es et asinus est et tu non es asinus: ergo, tu differs ab asino: tu* 10 *eris et asinus erit tecum, et tu non eris asinus: ergo, tu differes ab asino*. Et addo illum terminum, *tecum*, ad denotandum simultaneitatem essendi in tempore; quia hoc ad differenciam oportet et alietatem; *tu eras et asinus erat tecum et tu non eras asinus: ergo tu* 15 *differebas ab asino*. Et conformiter exponitur iste terminus, *aliud*.

Several conclusions to be drawn hence.  
1. No man can differ from man in general, only from some particular man.

Ex istis patent tales conclusiones: *Sor qui differt ab omni homine non differt ab homine*, quamvis differat ab *homine centum annorum*. Ponatur quod *Sor* sit decennis,<sup>20</sup> et patet iuxta exponentes quod *Sor differt ab omni homine*, sicut quilibet differt a quolibet; et per exponentes patet etiam *quod Sor non differt ab homine* sicut nichil differt ab aliquo. Et tertia particula patet per exponentes, posito quod homo centum annorum sit.<sup>25</sup>

2. The difference between *A* and *B* or *C* is not that between the same *A* and *B* and *C* taken together.

Secunda conclusio est talis: *Sor differens a muliere et viro non differt a muliere vel viro*, sicut *Sor* differens ab asino vel chimera non differt ab asino et chimera: quolibet particula patet per exponentes, posito quod *Sor* sit.<sup>30</sup>

3. To differ from everything that is does not imply difference from anything or everything that can be.

Tercia conclusio est, *Sor differens ab omni quod est, non differt ab aliquo quod potest esse*, nec ab omni quod potest esse. Illud per hoc patet, quia si differt ab aliquo quod potest esse, tunc non est aliquid quod potest esse, et si differt ab omni quod potest esse,<sup>35</sup> tunc omne quod potest esse est: quorum utrumque est falsum.

4. No man can differ from every man past, present or future.

Quarta conclusio, *ab omni homine differt homo*, sicut omnis homo differt ab omni homine, sed nemo differt

3. removetur B. 6. principali deest A. 7. ista tria dum B.  
10. 2<sup>a</sup> sic B. 13. similitate A. 14. Tercia sic B. 19. omni above the  
line A. 20. 1. 20 an in marg. A. 24. p<sup>1a</sup> B. 25. posito deest B.  
33. quod B.

ab omni quod est, fuit vel erit homo. Prima particula patet ex hoc, quia convertibilis est cum illa: *ab omni homine homo differt*, sicut patet ratione congruitatis; et secunda particula patet per exponentes: et tertia 5 particula patet per hoc quod, si homo differt ab omni quod est, fuit vel erit homo, tunc est omne quod est, fuit, vel erit homo: quod est falsum.

Quinta conclusio: *Omnis homo ab homine differt*, sed *nemo ab omni homine differt*. Prima pars patet ex VII 10 regula et sexta tractatus primi; nam *hoc ab homine differt*, quocunque demonstrato: sequitur enim *hoc ab isto homine differt*; ergo *hoc ab homine differt*. Et 2<sup>a</sup> particula patet per hoc quod, si homo differt ab omni homine, tunc differt a se ipso.

B 15<sup>b</sup> Sexta conclusio est: *Sor differet | ab asino, sed non omnis asinus differet ab illo*. Prima pars patet ex hoc quod *Sor aliquando differet ab asino*, quia in medio instanti crastine diei; et 2<sup>a</sup> pars patet per hoc quod 20 tunc non est vel erit asinus quin differet a Sor. Et per consequens simul erit cum illo.

Septima conclusio: *Sor differet ab omni homine*, et tamen *non differet ab omni homine* qui vel que erit, nec ab omni homine iam existente, nec ab omni homine preterito, posito quod Sor non sit, sed quod erit tunc. 25 Patet 2<sup>a</sup> pars per hoc quod in nullo instanti differet ab omni homine qui, vel que, erit, eo quod tunc in illo instanti foret omnis homo qui erit.

Octava conclusio: *Sor differet ab albo et tamen nec differens ab albo unquam erit Sor, nec differens ab albo 30 potest esse Sor*. Posito quod aliquando erit ita quod A 28<sup>a</sup> *Sortes | differt ab albo*, tunc patet prima pars; et secunda pars patet, posito quod *Sor postmodum erit albus*; nam si *differens ab albo erit Sor*, tunc *differens ab illo quod est album vel erit album erit Sor*; quod 35 est contra casum. Et per idem, si *differens ab albo potest esse Sor*, tunc *differens ab illo quod potest esse*

5. Every man differs from other men, but no man from all men.

6. A man may differ from an ass, but not every ass will differ from him; for if he differs at a given instant, every ass, differing from him, there would be a certain identity in this difference.

7. A man, differing from every man would not differ from every man past, present and future.

8. A man may differ from what is white, and yet never come to differ, nor be able to differ from what is white.

1. est vel fuit A. 2. illa quia convertibilis est cum illa B. 6. homo deest A. 9. pars above the line A. 10. proximi B; homo; corr. above hoc A. 12. homo ab A. 15. est deest B. 22. qui fuit A; ib. hec B. 25, 27. differet — foret in marg. A. 26. vel que deest B. 31. for\* A. 34. vel — album in marg. A.

15—36. These three last conclusions remind one curiously of Hegel's doctrine of difference and identity.

*album potest esse Sors.* Ex quo patet quod non sequitur: *illud quod est differens ab albo erit Sor, et illud quod erit differens ab albo erit Sor; ergo differens ab albo erit Sor.* Nec sequitur illud: *quod potest esse differens ab albo potest esse Sor; ergo, differens ab albo potest esse Sor.* Sed tales erunt propositiones inferentes: *hoc potest esse Sor, et hoc est vel potest esse differens ab illo quod est album, vel potest esse album, ergo, differens ab albo potest esse Sor.* Et sic de similibus.

The reason is that in the future or past tense, the term *white* becomes distributive, and means *all that is white*; which may render the proposition false.

Cuius ratio est talis: Quodcumque terminus communis subiectus distribuitur respectu verbi de preterito vel futuro, tunc distribuitur pro quocunque tempore connotato per verbum, eo quod, ipso supponente sic distributive, supponeret pro quocunque tali tempore disiuncte; ut sic, dicendo *omnis homo erit*, pro omni homine futuro in aliquo tempore fit distributio; sicut patet per eius exponentes. Ideo, sic dicendo: *differens ab albo erit Sor*, stat ille terminus *albo* distributive pro omni quod est album, vel erit album. Ideo est propositio in casu falsa, nam nec *illud quod est differens ab illo quod est album vel erit album erit Sor*, nec *illud quod erit differens ab illo quod est album vel erit album erit Sor.* Et si sic inferatur, *hoc erit Sor, et hoc est differens ab albo; ergo differens ab albo erit Sor*, certum est quod uniatur suppositio illius termini, *albo*, in antecedente et consequente. Ideo non sequitur; sed bene sequitur quod *illud quod est differens ab albo erit Sor.* Et conformiter dicendum est ad talia sophismata, *aliud a vero erit verum.* Et si dicatur quod ille terminus, *albo*, restringitur ibi ad supponendum pro presentibus, ratione huius participii *differens*, de presenti, cum idem sit dicere *differens ab albo erit Sor*, et *quod differt ab albo erit Sor*, dicitur quod hoc bene contingit; et contingit illum terminum, *differens*, stare nominaliter per temporis amissionem. Verumtamen quocunque modo dicatur, conclusio est possibilis; quia posito quod *Sor* iam non *sit* | sed *erit* tam albus quam differens ab albo, patet conclusio, tenendo istum terminum *differens*

The idea of difference bears only on the supposition, the *that which*;

as when it is said: *That which is other than true will be true*;

yet it may happen that the word *different* is employed as a noun, and the proposition has then a more restricted sense.

13. sic supponente et B. 13, 14. *de* ne B. 14. supponum A; *ib.* *de* ne B. 18. *de* ne B. 20. ut *pro* nec B. 20, 21. nec — erit sor *deest* B. 23. quod hoc B; *ib.* est vel erit B. 25. *uniatur?* *ingatur?* AB 27. sic *pro* bene B; *ib.* est vel erit B. 33. illud B 34. nomine B. B 16<sup>a</sup>

13. sic supponente et B. 13, 14. *de* ne B. 14. supponum A; *ib.* *de* ne B. 18. *de* ne B. 20. ut *pro* nec B. 20, 21. nec — erit sor *deest* B. 23. quod hoc B; *ib.* est vel erit B. 25. *uniatur?* *ingatur?* AB 27. sic *pro* bene B; *ib.* est vel erit B. 33. illud B 34. nomine B.

particulariter. Prima enim propositio ponitur in casu, et alie particule patent per hoc quod *Sor non est*: si enim *Sor non est*, nichil quod differt ab albo est vel potest esse *Sor*.

- 5 Alie sunt multe conclusiones consimiles in ista materia; sed istis octo cognitis, satis facile est elicere alias, tam cum illo termino *differt*, quam cum illo termino *aliud*: quia similes sunt in confundendo terminos. Ut: *Sor erit aliud ab albo*, et tamen *non aliud*  
 10 *ab albo erit Sor*; sed talis erit sua conversa quod erit: *aliud ab albo erit Sor*. Ut posito quod *Sor* iam sit albus et, in instanti erit niger et postmodum albus, tunc patet prima pars: quia *in B instanti erit ita quod Sor est aliud ab albo*; ideo *Sor erit aliud ab albo*. Et  
 15 secunda pars patet ex dictis. Nam, si *aliud ab albo erit Sor*, tunc *aliud quam est album vel erit album erit Sor*; quod est contra casum.

- Et hic mihi videtur quod idem est dicere, *Sor erit aliud quam album et Sor erit aliud quam album erit*,  
 20 cum oratio sit truncata, et isto modo est supplenda. Ideo aliud est dicere: *Sor erit aliud ab albo*, quam dicere: *Sor erit aliud quam album*; sed cum verbis de presenti non refert: ut idem est dicere: *Sor est aliud ab albo et aliud quam album vel quam est album*; quod  
 25 est idem. Possibile est tamen quod *Sor erit aliud quam album*, posito quod nunc sit niger; et sic continue erit per totam vitam suam; quo posito, concedo quod *omne album erit aliud quam Sor*, quamvis infinitorum  
 A 28<sup>b</sup> alborum *nullum erit aliud a Sorte*. | Et sic *Sor* in quolibet  
 30 instanti esse sui *erit aliud quam album*, sicut in quolibet tali instanti erit ita quod *Sor est aliud quam album*. Unde, *nunc Sor est aliud quam album erit*, quantumcunque remotum ab hoc instanti; sicut patet per exponentes. *Ego enim sum aliud quam erit asinus*  
 35 *qui mille annis generabitur, postquam ego desivero esse*; et tamen non sum *solum aliud ab illo vel aliud quam ille*. Et si queratur inter que est illa alietas quam propositio implicat esse, dicitur quod inter me et futuricionem asini illius, quorum utrumque est. Sed ex

Like conclusions may be drawn from the term *other*. A, v. g. will be other than white, yet that which is other than white will not be A.

Disquisition on the difference between *aliud ab* and *aliud quam*; there is none when the verb is in the present: otherwise there may be, on account of the verb understood after *quam*. Supposing a man, once white, to be black and continue so, we could say: *album erit aliud quam Sor (est vel erit)*, but not *aliud a Sorte*; because this form comprises the past. Other examples.

1. ppt' B; *ib.* p<sup>3</sup> B. 2. p<sup>te</sup> A. 1-3. propositio — differt *in marg.* A. 11. est vel erit B. 12. erit albus B. 14. igitur B. 16. et sor — album erit *deest* A. 20. et sic cum A; *ib.* ideo *pro* isto modo A. 26. continue *deest* B. 32. nunc *above line* A. 35. desine'o AB. 39. fuicionem, *crossed out*, futuricionem *in marg.* A.

hoc non sequitur *quod ego ero aliud quam ego sum*, quamvis *me esse* et *me fore* differunt; sed bene sequitur *quod ego ero alter quam nunc sum, et alterius modi*.

*Aliud* therefore expresses substantial difference of kind, *alterum*, difference of quality, and *alterius modi* of manner. Many fallacies arise from not keeping these ideas distinct.

Unde differentia est inter istos tres terminos, *aliud*, *alterum* et *alterius modi*; ex hoc quod primus dicitur 5 diversitatem substantialem specificam, et secundus dicitur diversitatem in qualitatibus, et tercius dicitur universaliter diversitatem in quocunque accidente: et ideo concedunt sophiste quod aliquis potest esse *alterum* quam prius fuit, sed non *aliud*. Si enim Sor erit aliqualis, et nunc 10 non sit talis: tunc erit alter quam est modo; et sic si Sor sit nunc alicuiusmodi, et huiusmodi non erit, tunc est alicuiusmodi, cuiusmodi aliquando non erit.

Without going into the other forms of proof, the author notes the mistake of those who make propositions signifying that which is not, to signify otherwise than it is.

De aliis autem modis probandi propositiones de talibus terminis, *aliud*, *alter*, et *aliter* et *sic*, satis 15 dictum est in priori tractatu. Sed hic notandum quod concedentes propositionem significare aliter quam est, et istam *chimeram significare aliam chimeram quam istam* (et sic de ceteris), abutuntur terminis, habentes B 16<sup>b</sup> istos terminos, *aliter quam est*, *aliud quam est*, et 20 ceteros, convertibiles cum istis terminis negativis, *qualiter non est*, *quod non est* etc. Et per idem haberent istos terminos, *aliter quam sedens*, *aliud quam lapis*, et ceteros terminos similes convertibiles cum istis terminis negativis, *qualiter non est sedens*, *quod non est lapis*; 25 et ita quodlibet foret *aliud quam chimera*, vel quodcunque quod non est. Proposicio ergo significat *sicut non est*, vel *ens quod non est*; et iste propositiones non inferunt tale significatum esse quod non est, ratione terminorum negativorum. Sed sufficit quod proposicio 30 significet *illa*, et *quod illa non sunt*. Si autem placeret equivocare istum terminum *esse* ad 3<sup>a</sup> esse superius memorata, tunc concedendum esset quod iste terminus, *chimera*, significat aliud quam actualiter est et est; ista proposicio, *chimera est*, significat aliter quam actualiter 35 est, quia chimera est aliud quam actualiter; et *chimeram esse*, est aliter quam *actualiter esse*, quia utrumque habet *esse* intellectuale, solummodo sic, quod nec *esse* potencie nec *esse* actuale; et tanta dixerim de expositione istorum terminorum, *aliud*, *aliter*, et *alter*. 40

If we admit the threefold sense of *being*, we may even grant that they signify their object otherwise than it actually is; not otherwise than it is intelligibly.

6. specificam *deest* B.  
16. in *deest* B.

13. tunc iam est B.

18. *chimeram before* quam *deest* B.  
31. sint B.

15. et sic *deest* B.

26. quilibet,

*corr. above the line* A.

Sed alii sunt termini qui dicantur negacionem includere ut *sine*, *ne*, *prohibere*, *cavere*, etc.; ut, si homo *cavet casum*, tunc *omnem casum cavet*; si *Sor prohibet vel inlibet furtum*, tunc *omne furtum prohibet*. Si *curro*,  
 5 *ne tangar ab homine*, tunc *curro ut a nullo homine tangar*. Et de isto ultimo, scilicet, *ne*, est verisimile, quamvis de aliis possit oppositum probabiliter sustineri. Scilicet, si deus *prohibet* ne fiat furtum, tunc omne  
 10 furtum prohibet fieri; sed homo posset prohibere furtum et precipere furtum, et sic *cavere* tactum et appetere tactum; sed non *cavere ne* tangatur. Et sic de *sine*: ut si *sine oculo possum videre*, tunc *sine isto* (quocunque demonstrato) *possum videre*.

As for the terms, *without*, *lest*, *forbid*, *beware*, etc. *lest* alone probably renders the following term universally negative; for the others it is doubtful.

5. *ne pro* ut *corr.*; a n<sup>o</sup> in marg. A.  
 deest B. 8. *ne* A. 13. etc. B.

6. .f. *ne* above the line A:

## CAPITULUM NONUM.

There can be as many kinds of exclusive as of categorical propositions; logicians agree to call only those exclusive that are modified by an exclusive particle.

Sequitur de expositione exclusivarum. Ubi primo notandum quod quamvis verbaliter quelibet propositio que quicquam excludit vel excipit vocari poterit exclusiva, verumtamen apud logicos solum | propositio A 29<sup>a</sup> kategorica participans exclusive termino dicitur exclusiva. Et voco terminos exclusivos *solum, tantum, solummodo, precise, precipue, duntaxat*, et eis consimiles. Ex quo patet quod tot possunt esse species propositionem exclusivarum quot et kategoricarum: et alia est exclusiva 10 affirmativa, et alia negativa, alia universalis, alia particularis, alia indefinita et aliqua singularis etc.

In expounding them, the place of the exclusive particle is very much to be considered. When *tantum*, etc., precedes the subject, the first exponent must be a preiacent, and the second a universal proposition with the same predicate, a contradictory subject, and a verb of different quality: by *preiacent* is meant, the proposition without the exclusive particle. Only *A is B*, i. e., *A is B*, and *what is not A is not B*.

Sed pro expositionibus exclusivarum est cum diligencia observandum quod quecumque exclusiva, ratione termini exclusivi exponenda, exponi debet secundum 15 exigenciam ordinis termini exclusivi; ut aliter ista debet exponi, *homo tantum est animal*, et aliter ista, *tantum homo est animal*. Unde, generaliter loquendo, quelibet exclusiva in qua terminus exclusivus tenet primum ordinem, exponi debet per eius | preiacentem et uni- B 17<sup>a</sup> versalem de subiecto et qualitate oppositis subiecto et qualitati ipsius preiacentis; ut ista: *tantum homo currit*, debet sic exponi: *homo currit et nichil quod non est homo currit, ergo* etc. Prima enim exponens est preiacens exclusive; quia cuiuslibet exclusive vel exceptive 25 preiacens vocatur totum quod remanet, dempto termino exclusivo vel exceptivo: ut, dempto isto termino *tantum* de ista propositione exclusiva, *tantum homo currit*, remanet hec immediata, *homo currit*, que est eius preiacens et prima eius exponens. Secunda eius 30

1. Cap. *deest* AB. 2. Initial S in blue ink A; *deest* B. 7. *tantummodo* B. 10. et *after* quot *deest* B; *ib.* ut *pro* et *before* alia B; *ib.* sic *pro* est A. 12. et aliqua singularis *deest* A; *ib.* etc. *deest* B. 13. exponentibus B. 17. hoc B. 18. hoc B. 27. cum parte extra capta ut B. 29. in<sup>ta</sup> A. 30. suum A.



exponens habet istum terminum infinitum, *quod non est homo*, pro suo subiecto. Et ille opponitur huic termino, *homo*, qui subicitur in preiacente et virtute negacionis precedentis est propositio negativa, cum  
5 preiacens sit affirmativa.

Nec debet propositio exclusiva universaliter exponi per talem terminum, *aliud*, quia impossibile est quod *tantum hoc instans erit instans*, et tamen *hoc instans erit instans*, et *nichil aliud ab hoc instanti erit instans*. Ideo  
10 regularius dicitur *non quod non erit hoc instans erit instans*; potest enim dari talis minor exponens: *nichil aliud quam est vel erit hoc instans erit hoc instans*; quod est falsum. Similiter, posito quod propositio incipiat esse per remocionem de presenti, et B propo-  
15 sicio incipiat esse de preterito per remocionem de presenti, et quod nulla propositio incipiat esse nisi A vel B, patet quod falsum est quod *tantum A incipit esse propositio et tamen nichil aliud quam A incipit esse propositio*. Ponatur enim quod *A desinat esse propositio*;  
20 *hoc tamen est falsum: non quod non est A incipit esse propositio*. Similiter ista propositio est falsa: *tantum illa chimera significatur per istum terminum, "chimera", et tamen illa et nulla alia significatur per istum terminum "chimera"*; et sic de infinitis aliis  
25 exemplis. Regulariter ergo et universaliter loquendo videtur mihi expedior expositio supradicta.

Diversitas tamen accidit in sic exponendo, ratione signi, ratione subiecti, et ratione predicati. Ratione signi et subiecti secundum diversitatem suorum acci-  
30 dencium; ut quandoque ratione generis, sicut patet hic, *solus homo est animal rationale masculinum*; ista enim debet sic exponi, *homo masculus est animal rationale masculinum, et non quod non est homo masculus est animal rationale masculinum*. Et ex hoc sequitur, iuxta  
35 regulas traditas in consequenciis, quod solum *homo est animal rationale masculinum*, sed non sequitur universaliter

subject, and a verb of different quality; by *preiacent* is meant the proposition without the exclusive particle.  
Only *A is B*, i. e. *A is B*, and *what is not A is not B*.  
It is not desirable to replace this double negative by *other than*, as in certain cases it leads to wrong conclusions, especially when the matter concerns things instantaneous or impossible.

This general rule is liable to variations.  
1. As the sign and subject may vary in gender.

Examples.

8. hoc in *after* tamen B. 9. hoc in B; *ib.* erit in B. 10. erit in *pro* hoc B; *ib.* erit in *after* instans B. 11. tamen *pro* enim B. 12. erit in *after* vel erit B; *ib.* erit in instans *pro* erit hoc instans B. 15. de preterito *deest* B. 16. li *pro* nisi B. 17. incipiat B. 18. incipiat B. 19. defimat A. 21. proposicione *after* ista B; *ib.* est *deest* B. 22. *after* supradicta, m̄ om̄ A. 31. rationale *above the line* A; *ib.* ita *pro* ista B.

6. The MS. is written in another hand, from the word *nec*.

in similibus e converso: ut non sequitur; *solum homo est animal rationale; ergo, solus homo est animal rationale*, cum antecedens sit necessarium et consequens impossibile. Si tamen subiectum fuerit unius generis tantum, tunc non refert; ut idem est dicere: *solum Sor est homo*, et *solus Sor est homo*, et easdem exponentes habebit | utraque, puta tales, *Sor est homo, et non quod* B 17<sup>b</sup>  
*non est Sor est homo*, etc. Unde tales exponentes, *Sor est homo, et non aliquis homo qui non est Sor est homo* exponunt talem exclusivam: *tantum Sor est homo* | 10  
*masculus.* A 29<sup>b</sup>

2. As the subject may happen to express number or quantity; it then may be expounded, according to the sense, by *more* or by *other than*.  
*Only 4 .A's are B;* i. e. *4 .A's are B, and no more than 4 .A's are B.*  
*Or: no other than 4 .A's are B.*  
 This latter way is for the most part inappropriate, but may sometimes be right.

2<sup>o</sup> racione subiecti numeralis quantitatis vel mesure, accedit diversitas exponendi: ut illa: *tantum quatuor homines currunt*, debet sic exponi, gracia pluralitatis, *4<sup>or</sup> homines currunt, et non que sunt plura quam quatuor* 15  
*homines currunt.* Iste enim terminus, *plura quam 4<sup>or</sup>*, opponitur quodammodo huic termino, *4<sup>or</sup>*. Et hoc est quod antiquitus solet dici, quod quelibet exclusiva affirmativa, cuius subiectum est terminus numeralis, potest exponi gracia alietatis; et sic erit quelibet talis 20  
 impossibilis; vel gracia pluralitatis; et sic contingit aliquam huiusmodi esse veram. Et simile iudicium est de talibus, *tantum pedale est hoc, tantum per horam durasti, tantum unum denarium dedisti, tantum A gradu est hoc frigidum, calidum vel potens*; et sic de similibus, 25  
 que omnia possunt exponi gracia pluralitatis vel gracia alietatis, quamvis in aliquibus unus sensus communicatur cum alio; ut in proposicionibus in quibus predicantur verba substantiva. Ut hic; *si tantum pedale est hoc, tunc non plus quam pedale est hoc*; bipedale enim non 30  
 est pedale. Ista tamen significacio plus favore admittitur quam virtute sermonis.

3. As the verb and predicate may vary, v. g. in tense or by other modal terms; the rule to be followed is as above, for universal affirmative propositions.

3<sup>o</sup> racione verbi vel predicati contingit diversitas exponendi; ut aliter capienda est minor cum verbo de preterito vel futuro, et aliter cum verbo de presenti, et 35  
 aliter cum verbo ampliativo. et aliter cum verbo non ampliativo: cuius diversitatem potes cognoscere ex doctrina quam dedi de exponentibus universalis affirmative; ut: si *tantum Sor fuit sacerdos, tunc sacerdos*

1. i. insilibus AB; *ib.* 29<sup>o</sup> A; *ib.* eius contra *pro* e converso B.  
 7. <sup>utraq</sup> <sup>ue</sup> <sup>utrum</sup> B. 8. ergo etc. B. 9. et non est A. 23. <sup>pol</sup> B.  
 24. <sup>ag</sup> <sup>er</sup> <sup>pro</sup> A gradu A. 25. <sup>pot</sup> A. 29. *tantum deest* B.  
 30. *h* <sup>pro</sup> hoc B. 31. enim B; *ib.* favori B.

*fuit Sor, et non quod non est vel fuit sacerdos; et  
econtra. Si tantum logicus fuit iste homo, tunc logicus  
erit iste homo et non quod non est vel erit logicus erit  
iste homo; et econtra. Si tantum malus homo potest esse  
5 filius tuus; tunc malus homo potest esse filius tuus, et  
non quod non potest esse malus homo potest esse filius  
tuus, et econtra. Et sic de aliis quibuscunque similibus.*

Alii autem dicunt quod iste propositiones, *tantum  
Sor movetur, tantum Sor fecit istum actum*, etc., possunt  
10 exponi ratione tocius compositionis limitantis, gracia  
materie; vel communiter, ut alie, gracia forme. Unde  
debet prima sic exponi, gracia materie: *Sor movetur  
et nichil aliud a Sorte, vel per tempus Sortis, movetur;*  
quod non formaliter includit repugnanciam. Secunda  
15 sic exponitur, gracia materie: *Sor fecit istum actum et  
nullum aliud individuum speciei humane fecit istum  
B 18<sup>a</sup> actum*; quod est possibile cum hoc | quod deus fecit  
istum actum. Sed videtur michi quod isti sensus sunt  
preter vim sermonis, et per idem, ratione materie, possent  
20 imponi quantumlibet impossibilibus propositionibus  
sensus veri. Ideo expedit exprimere materiam intentam,  
ut sic: *solum Sor vel eius pars movetur, solum Sor fuit  
homo faciens istum actum*; et sic de aliis. Et aliter  
negande sunt tanquam propositiones truncate.

25 Unde potest pro regula sustineri quod quelibet huius-  
modi affirmativa exclusiva de presenti. cuius predicati  
primarium significatum non poterit inesse primario  
significato subiecti, nisi cum hoc quod insit alicui quod  
non sit significatum primarium huiusmodi, est impossi-  
30 bilis; ut patet de talibus: *solum Sor est album, solum  
deus intelligitur, solum omnis homo est animal*, et uni-  
versaliter quelibet talis de subiecto distributo pro multis  
vel pro unico respectu predicati communioris, ut hic;  
*solum omnis deus est aliquid, solum omnis homo est  
35 animal*. Et patet ratio ex hoc, quia secunda exponens  
negativa repugnat prime exponenti affirmative; et, ut

Some assert  
that certain  
propositions  
can be  
expounded by  
reason of the  
subject matter,  
excluding in  
the minor all  
that is excepted  
by the particle.  
Examples.

But Wyclif  
considers that  
this would be  
changing the  
sense of the  
propositions  
too much.

As a rule, it  
what is  
primarily  
implied by the  
predicate  
cannot  
primarily  
belong to the  
subject without  
belonging to  
something  
else, the  
proposition is  
impossible.

1. 1. s. 1. sor B; *ib.* fuit sor B. 2. laicus B; *ib.* erit B; *ib.* laicus B.  
3. laicus B; *ib.* et sic B. 4. erit et B. 5-7. et — tuus *deest* A. 7. quod-  
libet (!) B. 13. parte sor B; *ib.* *pte*<sup>a</sup> A. 17. est *deest* B. 25, 26. *mōi*  
huius B. 28. hoc insit; quod *deest* B. 29. primarium *deest* B.

17. This restriction (speciei humane) and the subsequent remark,  
must refer to the doctrine of Divine concurrence in every act of  
every creature.

breviter dicam, correspondens diversitas contingit in exclusiva affirmativa, ratione extremi compositi ex recto et obliquo, vel extremis copulatis disiunctis, vel alio modo compositis; qualis declarata est contingere in universali affirmativa. Et istam diversitatem poterit solers logicus eligere ex predictis.

Examples of other variations arising from differences of gender, of tense, or of both together.

Quarto, contingit diversitatem accidere, ymmo quandoque mixtim contingit diversitatem accidere, ut patet in talibus: *solus homo qui non est est corruptus*; | *solus vir qui non est est generandus de specie humana*; *A 30<sup>a</sup>*  
*tantum fenix qui non est potest esse in specie fenicis* etc. Prima istarum est impossibilis, et secunde sunt vere in casu quo *vir sit generandus et non mulier* et in casu quo *nulla fenix sit sed erit*. Et sic sunt talia vera: *tantum fur erit socius tuus*; *tantum verum incipit esse* 15  
*hec propositio: "hoc instans est"*; et tamen illud quod est aliud quam fur et quod erit aliud quam fur erit socius tuus, et quod incipit esse aliud quam verum incipit esse hec propositio.

In the case of negative propositions, the minor by which they are expounded is to be a double negative, equivalent to a universal affirmative: *Only A is not B*; i. e. *A is not B*, and *no not A is not B*, or *every not-A is B*; for this reason such negatives have been called *pregnant*, because they imply affirmation. In affirmatives of this sort the predicate is affirmed of this subject and denied of every other; whereas in negatives, the contrary takes place.

Uterius pro exponentibus exclusive negative est no- 20  
tandum, primum, quod prima exponens erit preiacens negativa, et secunda erit universalis affirmativa, de subiecto aggregato ex transcendente et termino opposito subiecto preiacentis. Ut ista: *tantum homo non currit* habet sic exponi, *homo non currit, et non quod non est* 25  
*homo non currit*, ut patet ex secunda regula huius capituli. Et quia tales equipollent universali affirmative, ideo pro planiori expositione ponitur loco illius talis affirmativa; *omne quod est non homo currit*. Et hinc est quod logici antiquitus vocaverunt exclusivas nega- 30  
tivas et exceptivas negativas, non mere negativas sed negativas pregnantes, includentes affirmationes; | et B 18<sup>t</sup>  
quod, sicut in exclusiva affirmativa predicatum attribuitur subiecto, et removetur a quocunque alio opposito a subiecto, sic in exclusiva negativa predicatum 35  
removetur a subiecto et attribuitur cuicunque opposito subiecti; et est utraque sententia valde bona. Nam sic dicto: *tantum homo currit*, denotatur cursus inesse homini, et removeri a quocunque quod non est homo.

10. est only once B. 15. vey pro verum A. 21. primum above the line A;  
deest B. 22. negative A. 28. locus B. 32. pgnates B; ib. pgnan\* A;  
includentes above the line A; deest B. 38. dico A; f non dicto B.  
39. est non B.

Sed sic dicto: *tantum homo non currit*, implicatur cursum removeri ab homine, et attribui cuilibet quod est non homo. Et ex hoc patet quod quolibet huiusmodi exclusiva negativa de subiecto positivo, cuius  
 5 totale predicatum non est transcendens, est impossibilis, sicut quolibet talis, cuius predicatum est transcendens et primarie significatum subiecti non potest esse, est necessaria. Exemplum prime partis: hec sunt impossi-  
 10 *ridet*. Et hec sunt necessaria, *tantum chimera non est*, *tantum corruptum non est*, etc., sicut patet ex suis exponantibus.

It follows that all such negatives are impossible when the predicate is not transcendent and the subject is positive, but necessary when the predicate is transcendent and the subject impossible.

Et cavendum est de assignacionibus exponencium talium exclusivarum, sicut dictum est de exposicionibus  
 15 exclusivarum affirmatarum, ratione signi, ratione subiecti, ratione verbi, et ratione predicati.

The same variations that take place in expounding the affirmative take place for the negative proposition too.

Ratione signi; ut hic: *solus homo non differt ab homine masculo*: cuius preiacens erit talis, *homo non differt ab homine masculo*, propter restrictionem adiectivi.  
 20 Ratione subiecti, ut hic: *tantum quatuor chimere non sunt*, que debet sic exponi: *quatuor chimere non sunt*, *et omnia plura quatuor chimeris sunt*: vel, si dicatur quod exposicio gracia pluralitatis est preter vim vocis, cum excludit numerum maiorem et non minorem, dici  
 25 potest universaliter loquendo quod capiendus est terminus infinitus appositus subiecto preiacentis, ut exemplatum est in aliis. Ut sic: *omnia non 4<sup>or</sup> chimere sunt*; et sic quolibet talis exclusiva de huiusmodi subiecto numerali esset necessaria ratione verbi. Nec hic: *tantum chimera*  
 30 *non potest esse*, que sic debet exponi, *chimera non potest esse*, *et quodlibet non chimera potest esse*. Unde, exponentes talem negativam per istum terminum, *aliud*, dicunt omnem talem esse impossibilem, quam nos dicimus esse necessariam. Ymmo, dicunt quod impossi-  
 35 bile est quod *tantum non ens non est*, cum tamen *omne quod non est non est*, sicut patet ex suo convertibili, quamvis nichil non sit. Ex omni enim universali affirmativa de duplici predicato, quorum primum sit superius

The sign may vary in gender; the subject may contain the idea of number, and may be expounded by means of the word *more*; or as usual, it is considered to strain the sense.

If the word *other* be used, then propositions, which would otherwise be impossible, become necessary.

2, 3. quod est I non B. 4. pofivo A. 5. impossibile A. 7. est in marg. A. 11. eciam B; et A. 23. g<sup>ra</sup> m<sup>e</sup> A. 24. d<sup>t</sup> p<sup>t</sup> A; dici B. 32. predicatum *pro* per istum B. 33. conclusionem *pro* omnem B. 35. est *before* quod *deest* B. 37. sit non B. 38. communius *above* superius A.

But in this case the exclusive proposition is not necessarily convertible with its exponents.

So an affirmative proposition should be made out of the same subject (with a *not* prefixed), the contrary copula, and the same predicate.

The predicate may also cause variation; and it is fitting, when there is a relative term, to expound by means of other.

Example.

vel sinonimum cum sequente, sequitur universalis negativa de predicato porporcionali duplici negato; ut, *si omne quod movetur | currit, tunc omne quod non movetur* A 30<sup>b</sup>  
*non currit*; et sic de ceteris. Non tamen convertitur quilibet talis exclusiva cum tali universali negativa. 5  
 Nam ex dictis patet quod talis exclusiva, *tantum quod non creat non creat*, debet sic exponi: *quod non creat non creat, et omne quod creat creat*, et sic esset exclusiva falsa, nullo creante. Et tamen hec universalis necessaria, *omne quod non creat non creat*. Capiendum | 10  
 ergo affirmativum oppositum subiecti negativi talis exclusive; sed addenda est negacio infinitans totum subiectum propter brevitatem, propter consonanciam exposicionis, et propter significacionem extraneam sine tempore. Ideo secunda exponens istius: *tantum chimera* 15  
*non potest esse*, erit talis: *omne non chimera potest esse*; et hoc est verum. Predicatum enim talis exclusive negative excluditur a subiecto, et attribuitur cuicunque opposito subiecti in comparacione ad verbum. Unde in ista exclusiva, *tantum chimera non est* excluditur *esse* 20  
 ab ista chimera, et attribuitur cuicunque quod non est ista chimera. Et sic, quamvis appareat istam exclusivam esse falsam, *tantum ista chimera non est*, cum infinite alie et infinite plures chimere quam ista non sunt, tamen iuxta exponentes predictas quilibet talis 25  
 est necessaria.

Racione predicati ut hic: *tantum illo modo non es asinus quo non esses asinus si non aliquid esset*, ubi racione termini relativi consonum est exponere cum illo termino *aliud*; ut dictum est alibi. Et sic exponendo: 30  
*illo modo non es asinus quo non esses asinus si non aliquid esset, et non alio modo nunc non es asinus quam illo modo quo non esses asinus si non aliquid esset*. Quorum primum est verum, quia *omni modo non es asinus, quo non esses asinus si non aliquid esset* 35  
*esset*; sicut patet per suum equipollens: ergo, *illo modo non es asinus quo non esses asinus, si non aliquid esset*. Sed secunda exponens est impossibilis, convertibilis cum universali affirmativa impossibili, cum

2. notato B. 7. non creat *before* debet *deest* B. 9. est neces. B.  
 13. sut. affirmativum B. 22. esse istam *after* appareat A. 28. es B;  
 ces A; *ib.* cet A. 30. ut *pro* et B. 32. nullo *before* alio B.  
 33. quam *before* non esses A. 35. quomodo A.

necessario aliquo alio modo nunc non es asinus quo non esses asinus si non aliquid esset; sicut patet per suam subalternantem. Unde sicut, *tantum ista chimera non est* et tamen *infinite chimere alie ab ista non sunt*; sic, *non solum illo modo nunc non es asinus quo tunc non esses asinus*, sed infinitis aliis modis.

Et ita, illi qui ampliant *esse* ad *esse* potenciales et *esse* intellectuales possunt utrobique uti isto termino *aliud* in exponentibus exclusive. Et illi habent dicere quod non solum *ista chimera non actualiter est* sed infinite alie, et ita ad consimiles habent taliter respondere. Ideo sufficit sensus exponere, ut iuvenes possint loquentes concipere et eligere sibi viam placitam, quam voluerunt sustinere.

Uterius, quoad exclusivas in quibus terminus exclusivus ponitur post subiectum, potest pro regula observari quod quilibet exclusiva affirmativa, cuius terminus exclusivus ponitur post subiectum, est convertibilis cum exclusiva affirmativa in qua terminus exclusivus determinat ipsum verbum: ut idem est dicere, *Hoc tantum est homo*, et: *hoc est tantum homo*: *hec propositio precise significat sicut est*, et: *hec propositio significat precise sicut est*. Tu tantum vides hominem, et tu vides tantum hominem: et sic de ceteris.

Ex quo patet quod ista regula antiqua: "quolibet propositio affirmativa convertitur cum seipsa, dictione exclusiva addito predicato," intelligitur de affirmativa in qua verbum substantivum predicat tertium adiacens vel equivalenter, ut | hic: *hoc est videns hominem*, et: *hoc est tantum videns hominem*. Opinio tamen est quod dicio exclusiva, precedens verbum, excludit actum oppositum a subiecto; ut, si tu | *tantum vides*, tunc tu vides, et non aliud agis quam vides; et econtra. Sed post verbum, excludit solum oppositum predicati, ut si tu diligis hominem et non diligis non hominem, tunc diligis tantum hominem: et sic refert dicere: tu tantum diligis hominem, et tu diligis tantum hominem. Prima tamen posicio michi probabilior: quia idem est dicere tu tantum sedes, vel es sedens et tu es tantum sedens;

One advantage in the position of those who grant the triple meaning of *being*, is to be able to use other in such cases.

When the exclusive particle immediately follows the subject, it determines the verb, and may indifferently be placed after it.

That is, after the substantive verb and before the predicate.

But some think that before the verb, the particle excludes the contrary act from the subject, as: *you only see*; i. e. *you do nothing else*; but that after the verb it excludes only the contrary to the predicate: *you love only man*;

2. es before asinus B. 3. sequitur: sic above A. 11. actualiter A.  
13. concipe B. 23, 24. et — hominem in marg. A. 27. addita B.  
36. tantum tu B. 37. et — hominem deest B. 39. vel es sedens  
deest B; ib. sedens vel tu tantum es sedens nec B.

i. e. *you love*,  
but *nothing else*  
*but man*.

Wyclif prefers  
the former  
opinion.

nec omne verbum adiectivum significat accionem, cum respectu cuiuscunque accidentis est dare verbum adiectivum, ut: tu tantum *quantificaris*, *qualificaris*, tantum *referris* etc. Ideo omnia talia debent resolvi in verbum substantivum; ut *si tu sedes, et non es non 5 sedens vel aliter quam sedens, tunc tu tantum sedes vel es tantum sedens*, quod idem est.

The rule in this case is similar to the former one; *only* must be expounded in an analogous manner to that which obtains when it stands first.

*A is only B*; i. e.  
*A is B, and A is not any not-B.*

Unde pro exponentibus talium propositionum est regulariter observandum quod quelibet talis exclusiva cuius terminus exclusivus est posterioris ordinis, est 10 secundum proporcionabiles exponentes quo ad ordinem et qualitatem parcium exponenda; sicut exclusiva exponi debet in qua terminus exclusivus tenet primum ordinem.

Et hoc est quod dicebatur in prima regula huius capituli quod ordo termini exclusivi est plurimum attendendus. 15 Verbi gracia, ista propositio: *A precise significat sicut est*, debet sic exponi: *A significat sicut est, et idem A non significat sicut non est, vel significat non sicut non est*; quod tantum valet. Et patet magna diversitas inter istas et talem exclusivam: *tantum A significat sicut est*. 20 Et conformiter iudicabis de similibus quibuscunque. Si autem subiectum talis exclusive fuerit terminus mediatus, tunc iuxta dicta propositio probari debet iuxta exigenciam talis termini; ut ista propositio: *omnis homo tantum currit*, debet exponi ut universalis affirmativa. 25 Et ista: *homo tantum currit*, debet resolvi ut infinita affirmativa; et sic de ceteris.

Examples, showing how to expound propositions that come under the latter category.

Et ex hoc patet quomodo tales sunt vere: *de specie humana, solus homo differt a muliere istius hominis, tantum una anima actualat corpus unum de natura humana; 30 tantum octo fuerunt individua tempore diluvii*; et sic de similibus. Prima enim debet sic exponi: *de specie humana homo masculus differt a muliere, et de specie humana non quod non est homo masculus differt a muliere; ergo, etc.*: Et proportionaliter est de reliquis 35 iudicandum. Et patet quante iste differant ab exclusivis, ubi termini exclusivi tenent primum ordinem. Tales enim, de similibus terminis, sunt impossibiles.

It is here seen in what sense a man is alone.

Secundo patet quomodo quelibet talis est vera: *iste homo est solus, vel iste homo tantum est vel est solum 40*

3. In tantum qualificaris B. 4. In tantum B; *ib.* referre A, referens B.  
8. expositionibus B. 15. attendentes B. 17. ideo B. 18, 19. vel — quod  
deest B. 21. singulis B. 23. prius dicta tractatu B. 40. vel deest  
before iste B.



aut *tantum*: que omnia equivalent: *iste homo tantum*  
*vivit cum arbore, anima est tantum passiva; deus solum*  
*est homo*; et sic de ceteris. Solet enim dubitari quando  
 5 quod tales propositiones vulgares sunt truncate ad  
 mentes loquencium. *Omnis enim res est sola vel solum*  
 B 20<sup>a</sup> *est*, quod tantum valet; *aliquis* | tamen *homo in dato*  
*situ solum est homo*; et tunc dicit vulgus hominem  
 esse solum, quando est notabilis locus in quo non est  
 10 homo preter istum. Et sic *quilibet homo* quo ad aliquem  
 situm, *est solus homo*. Ex quo ad 2<sup>m</sup>, 3<sup>m</sup> et 4<sup>m</sup> patet quod  
 non repugnat istum hominem vivere solum, et tamen  
 cum hoc intelligere; aliter enim lapis non solum esset,  
 cum gravatur, appetit et agit, et ita multa tam essen-  
 15 cialiter quam accidentaliter sibi insunt. Nec obest  
 animam esse tam solum activam quam solum passivam.  
 A 31<sup>b</sup> et deum solum esse hominem | et deum; et sic de  
 ceteris.

Et tercio, notandum pro regula quod tales exclusive  
 20 de quibus fit conclusio, gracia pluralitatis de subiectis  
 singularibus precedentibus terminos exclusivos, conver-  
 tuntur cum exclusivis primi ordinis; et econtra. Et  
 istam exposicionem habent auctores et vulgus pro  
 famosa; ut idem est ad istum sensum, *tu durasti tantum*  
 25 *per horam et tantum per horam durasti, tu dedisti michi*  
*tantum unum denarium et tantum unum denarium michi*  
*dedisti, de specie humana tantum iste fuit tunc, et tantum*  
*iste fuit tunc de specie humana*; et sic de omnibus  
 assignandis in quibus terminus singularis subicitur et  
 30 accidentalis vel superior predicatur.

Unde pro intellectu exposicionis gracia excessus vel  
 pluralitatis, est notandum quod potest esse excessus in  
 quocunque accidente: excessus in superioritate et ex-  
 cessus in inferioritate. Et iuxta hoc concesserunt antiqui  
 35 quod *non solum album est Sor*, sed *musicum, stans*, etc.,  
 et *Sor non solum est animal*, sed *est animal rationale*;  
 et propterea nec *homo solum vivit* aut sentit, sed intelligit  
 et vult insensibilia, ut angelus; et breviter, quando-  
 cunque aliqua predicacio est alicui tribuenda et alia  
 40 que non est synonyma est cum ista, tunc non solum

This and similar propositions, are incomplete, leaving a part understood in the popular sense. Strictly speaking, every man is alone in the place his body occupies; but it is understood to mean a considerable space in which there is no other man. A man, living alone, may yet produce other acts besides those of life.

When the subject requires to be expounded by means of the term *more*, it matters not whether the exclusive particle be before or after the subject.

We must note that there may be, in every accidental predication, the idea of *more or less*. The ancients admitted that no man was *only white*, he was *more*; *musical*, *standing*, etc. In this sense no man may be said to live

11. Et *pro* ex B. 13. *int* A. 14. *guar* A. 15. *Hec corr.* B.  
 20. in *pro* de B; *ib.* exclusio B. 25. *tu durasti* B. 29. et terminus B.  
 30. superioris A. 35. non *deest* A. 25. *est after* sed *deest*. 37. *est*  
 vivit B. 38. *visibilia* B. 39. *attribuenda* B. 40. non *pro* non est B.

alone, since  
there are other  
vital acts  
besides.  
And all such  
propositions  
must be false,  
because no  
quality is alone  
in its subject;  
but, two  
qualities being  
more than one,  
they may be  
expounded by  
the term *more*.

The young  
generation is  
opposed to this  
manner of  
expounding,  
which they  
restrict to  
sentences  
referring to  
quantity.

In every case  
we must attend  
to the term  
upon which the  
exclusive  
particle bears;  
and in  
expounding,  
*more* has to be  
used in very  
different ways.

Examples.

ista predicacio sibi inest. Illud tamen non sapiunt nec cognoscunt, nisi ponentes universalia ex parte rei. Unde secundum hoc loquentes, talis propositio, *tantum album est Sor* debet sic exponi, gracia pluralitatis: *album est Sor*, et *non plus quam album est Sor*; ergo etc. quod 5 secundum eos est falsum, quia tam *album* quam *musicum* est Sortes. Et *album et musicum* est plus quam *album*, quia stat alicui prius advenire *esse album*, et postmodum, advenire sibi *esse musicum*. Et conformiter, *hoc* non solum *vivit*, sed *vivit, sentit, et intelligit*; nec solum *est* 10 *substantia*, sed *est corpus et animal*; et hoc est plus quam *substantia*; cum *animal* presupponit *substantiam* et superaddit differentiam constitutivam *animalis*.

Iste autem modus loquendi, quamvis sit solitus apud auctores, non tamen placuit iuvenibus: sed cum terminis 15 significantibus excessum quantitativum bene concedunt sensum talem; ut bene conceditur quod *Sor non solum duravit per instans, nec solum unum denarium dedit michi*, et sic de ceteris; quia *Sor duravit per amplius, et plus dedit michi*. Non sic tamen quod tempus fuit 20 maius quam instans, nec quod duo | sunt plura quam B 20<sup>b</sup> unum; sed ponitur in talibus comparativus pro positivo: ut, *Sortes duravit plus vel amplius*; hoc est, *duravit duracione continua*; et *Sor dedit denarium et plures*, hoc est, *multos*. Duo tamen non sunt plura quam unum, 25 nisi detur talis sensus quod *duo sunt multa, et unum est non multa*; sed de hoc postmodum. Et iuxta utramque partem huiusmodi sentencie attendendum est ad terminum super quem cadit exclusio, et ad terminum respectu cuius fit exclusio. Unde aliud est dicere: *tantum* 30 *per horam duravit Sor*, et *tantum Sor duravit per horam*; subiectum enim exclusive est primus terminus, sive sit pure rectus, sive mixtus de recto precedente et obliquo sequente, sive sit obliquus. Rectus enim subsequens obliquum non est pars subiecti exclusive, ut prius 35 dictum est de universali affirmativa. Semper autem in exponendo talem exclusivam debet capi in secunda exponente negacio excessus significati termini super quem

5—7. quod — Et album *deest* B. 7. ut *pro* et *after* album B.  
8. plus A. 22. *gpat* <sup>h</sup>propositivo A. 26, 27. et — sed *deest* B.  
28. sive *pro* sentencie A; *ib.* attendendus B. 29, 30. ut *pro* et ad —  
Unde A. 31. per *before* horam duravit *deest* B. 32. est *pro* enim A.  
34. sequente *deest* A.

cadit exclusio; ut, si *tantum Sor moveatur*, tunc *non plus quam Sor moveatur*. Si *Sor tantum moveatur*, tunc *non plus est denominatus quam motus*. Si *tantum per horam durasti*, tunc *per horam et non plus durasti*. Si  
 A 32<sup>a</sup> *tantum homo est animal* | tunc *non plus quam homo est animal*, cum tamen tam homo quam asinus sit animal. Et sic potest transferri tota expositio exclusive ad expositionem gracia excessus; et iuxta illud non solum activa esset anima, nec anima esset solum  
 10 activa (quod idem esset iuxta proximam regulam) sed esset tam activa quam passiva, et hoc est plus quam esse activum. Nec deus tantum esset homo, sed tam homo quam deus: nec voluntas esset solum libere elicitiva sui actus, sed tam libere quam naturaliter.

Thus it is possible to expound every exclusive proposition by the idea of excess, or more.

15 Nota tamen quod aliqui volentes acceptare tales sensus exclusive communius appropriant tali exclusioni istum terminum exclusivum *pure* vel *mere*; ut *ens est "pure" taliter*, quando est taliter sine participacione alicuius habentis condicionem oppositam; ut, *res est*  
 20 *pure alba*, que est alba sine participacione nigredinis; et sic de aliis denominationibus qualitatum contrariis. *Res enim est pure naturalis*, quando est naturalis sine participacione artis, violencie, supernaturalitatis, et voluntatis que faciunt vel fecerunt ipsam esse. Ista tamen  
 25 plus dixerim gracia explanandi sententiam auctorum iuvenibus quam gracia sic loquendi in sophismatibus, ut et possint concipere sic loquentes et loqui pro loco et in tempore quando libet.

It is well to note that some authors, instead of *only*, employ *purely* or *merely*: by which they intend to express the possession of a quality, without any mixture of the contrary. This is only given by the way, however, as a help towards understanding writers on these subjects.

Ex predictis patet quodammodo quomodo dicendum  
 30 est de exclusivis negativis posterioris ordinis, ut ista: *Sor tantum non est animal*, debet sic exponi, *Sor non est animal et Sor est quodcunque non animal*. *Sor tantum non currit*: *Sor non currit et Sortes est quodcunque non currens*; *A est tantum non significans sicut est*; *A est*  
 35 *non significans sicut est*, et *A non est non ens non significans sicut est*; quelibet enim talis convertitur cum proposicione non exclusiva iuxta prius dicta. *Chimera tantum non potest esse*: *chimera non potest esse et chimera est quidvis non potens esse*. Et sic de aliis.

As for negative propositions of the second sort (*only* placed after the subject) it is clear that they follow the same rules as above;

1. tunc *deest* B. 6. est *pro* sit B. 7. sic *deest* A. 16. *gnus* AB;  
 ib. exclusive B. 20. quando B. 21. nominacionibus A. 24, 25. que —  
 plus *deest* B. 28. in *deest* B. 29. quodammo *quo* AB. 31, 35. A *after*  
 est — et A *deest* B. 38. non tantum B. 39. quodlibet B; ib. ceteris B.

some preferring  
other, and some  
more, in their  
exposition.

The particle  
not also makes  
a great  
difference: as  
*A is only not B,*  
and *A is not*  
*only B.*

In all such  
propositions,  
negative or  
affirmative, the  
subject affected  
by the particle  
is indefinite in  
quantity (unless  
rendered  
universal from  
other causes)  
and the  
predicate is  
universal.

When the  
particle  
precedes the  
verb and not  
the subject; the  
predicate is  
indefinite in  
affirmative and  
universal in  
negative  
propositions.

The exclusive  
particle does  
not change the  
supposition of  
the subject that  
it follows; nor  
of the predicate  
either.

In the latter  
case some say  
that every other  
predicate is  
implicitly  
denied unless  
it has the same  
meaning as the  
one affirmed.

Verum | tamen, sicut dictum est, duplex est opinio de B 21<sup>a</sup>  
exposicione talium proposicionum gracia pluralitatis vel  
gracia alietatis. Et patet quante refert dicere, *iste*  
*homo tantum non currit*, et *iste homo non tantum currit*.  
Patet eciam quomodo differt exclusiva negativa ab ex- 5  
clusiva cuius exclusio ponitur a parte predicati infiniti;  
ut multum refert dicere: *Sor tantum non est album*, et  
dicere *Sor est tantum non album*. Patet eciam ratio  
regularum de supposicionibus terminorum proposicionis  
exclusive, quomodo tam exclusive affirmative quam 10  
negative subiectum super quo cadit exclusio stat confuse  
tantum, si non aliunde fuerit distributum; et cuiuslibet  
talis exclusive primi ordinis predicatum stat confuse et  
distributive, subducto quolibet prohibente. Unde bene  
sequitur, *tantum Sor est animal*, *Plato est animal*; ergo, 15  
*Plato est Sor*. Sequitur eciam: *tantum Sor non currit*,  
*Plato est non currens*; ergo, *Plato est Sortes*; et sic de  
ceteris.

Similiter, sicut in exclusiva affirmativa secundi ordinis  
cuius exclusio precedit verbum, stat predicatum ceteris 20  
paribus immobiliter, sicut in tali negativa stabit mobi-  
liter predicatum de termino infinito; ut si *Sor tantum*  
*non est album* et *Plato est non album*, tunc *Plato est*  
*Sortes*. Vel, si capiatur predicatum finitum tunc stat  
mobiliter respectu subiecti infiniti: ut, si *Sor tantum non* 25  
*est animal*, et *Plato est animal*, tunc *Plato est non Sor*,  
et hoc existente subiecto termino singulari.

Similiter, sicut exclusiva sequens subiectum affirmative  
non mutat suppositum cuiuscunque termini, sic nec  
quando a parte predicati ponitur, nec quando exclusio 30  
contradictorie est negativa: ut patet in istis, *Sor tantum*  
*est animal*, *Sortes est solum non album*, *non solum*  
*Sor est albus*. Verumtamen, iuxta opinionem prius  
recitatam | que ponit quod exclusiva utrobique posita A 32<sup>b</sup>  
non negativa excludit omne inequum, illi super 35  
quod cadit exclusio a subiecto, dicendum esset quod  
distribuit pro quocunque opposito vel inequo illi ad  
quod exclusio terminatur. Ut, si *Sor solum videt*  
*Platonem*, *videre Ciceronem* est aliud quam *videre*

1. et (2?) *pro* duplex B.

7. vel *pro* ut A.

11. super quod cadit

subiectum B.

13. prima tamen *pro* predicatum A.

20. tantum *pro*

verbum B.

21, 22. mobiliter *deest* B.

30. *before* exclusio quando *occlu*<sup>o</sup> A.

31. contradiccio A.

33. album B.

35. negata B; *ib.* igitur *pro* illi A.

36. exclusivo; a *deest* A.

38, 39. *sor* v. *platonem* solum B.

*Platonem*, vel est non eque illi; ergo, *Sor non videt Ciceronem*.

In omnibus ergo istis oportet diligenter notare Much care must  
subiectum et predicatum et medium descendendi. cum <sup>be paid to</sup>  
5 determinacione opinionis tenende; et aliter deceptio est <sup>every point, in</sup>  
<sup>order to avoid</sup>  
propinqua, etc. <sup>error.</sup>

3. enim *pro* ergo B.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUM.

Exceptive propositions are called, in Logic, only those categoricals in which there is an exceptive term, such as *but* or *except*.

Sequitur de exceptivis propositionibus pertractandum. Ubi primo notandum quod, quamvis quolibet propositio in qua exclusio implicatur vel exceptio dici poterit exceptiva; logici tamen restringunt ad kathegoricam in qua ponitur terminus exceptivus cuiusmodi sunt isti termini (et si qui illis equivalent); *preter*, *preterquam* et *nisi*. Et differunt in hoc quod duo primi excipiunt indifferenter a distribuzione affirmativa et negativa; sed tertius non proprie excipit nisi a distribuzione negativa. Ista tamen differentia plus usum loquendi ponderat quam rationem.

Et sunt exceptivarum quedam affirmative et quedam negative. Omnes tamen proprie exceptivae sunt universales, ut patet de talibus; *omnis homo preter Sor currit, nullus homo preter Sor currit; nullus homo nisi Sor currit, vel preterquam Sor currit*. Tenetur autem iste terminus, *preter*, quandoque proprie exceptivae, ut in exemplis propositis, et quando excessive, excessum significans, ut hic: *preter tres solidos dedi tibi robam seu tunicam*; et secundum alios tenetur quandoque diminutive, ut hic: *decem preter 5 sunt 5*. Nec refert sive ille terminus, *preter*, sequatur subiectum sive precedat; ut idem est dicere, *preter Sor nemo currit*, et *nemo preter Sor currit*; et sic de aliis. Ymmo, etsi dicio exceptiva cum suo casuali sequatur totaliter, eadem est sententia, ut hic: *omnis homo currit preter Sor*, et: *omnis homo preter Sor currit; nemo scit omnia nisi deus*. Iste autem terminus, *nisi*, quandoque tenetur exceptivae, et quandoque condicionaliter; exceptivae ut in 30

Some are affirmative, some negative; all are universal. Different meanings of the different Latin exceptive terms. *Praeter* sometimes signifies excess (*besides*); sometimes diminution (*lessened by*). Examples. The place of the exceptive term in the sentence makes no difference whatever. *Nisi* may either mean *except*, or *if not* (*unless*).

1. Cap. *deest* AB. 2. Initial S in red ink A, *deest* B. 3. qly *appom* quo A. 4. *excipitur* B; *ib.* nisi *deest* B. 5. ille B. 6. excessum — hic above the line A, *deest* B. 7. tunicam robam fentm B; *ib.* 2<sup>m</sup> a alios B. 8. ut to h' B; *ib.* 2 (*sic*) B. 9. *preter* *deest*. 10. affirmativis *pro* aliis B. 11. et — nemo *deest* A.

exemplis propositis; condicionaliter, quando coniungit proposiciones, ut sic; *tu es homo, nisi non sit homo*. Et tunc equivalet huic termino, *si non*.

- Vocemus ergo solum universalem affirmativam vel  
 5 negativam cum dictione exceptiva et casuali debite dispositis, exceptivam. In qua, ut antiquitus solet dici, 4<sup>or</sup> sunt attendenda, scilicet illud a quo fit exceptio; quod est subiectum, quod vocari solet *totum in quantitate affirmativum vel negativum*; illud respectu cuius fit  
 10 exceptio, ut predicatum; dicio excipiens; et pars extra capta, ut eius casuale. Unde regulariter observetur quod quilibet exceptiva affirmativa exponi debet per universalem affirmativam, communicantem cum exceptiva in extremis, addendo subiecto oppositum termini  
 15 extra capti; et per negacionem cuius subiectum erit terminus extra captus, et predicatum erit synonymum cum priori. Verbi gracia, sic dicto, *omnis homo preter Sor currit*, sic fiat expositio; *omnis homo non Sor currit et Sor non currit*, maior communicat cum exceptiva in  
 20 subiecto et predicato, et subiecto additur iste terminus, *non Sor*, qui opponitur termino extra capto; et subiectum minoris est synonymum cum recto termini extra capti, et predicatum est synonymum cum predicato exceptive et prime exponentis. Et capitur terminus infinitus et  
 25 non terminus alietatis, propter causas superius expressas. Quandoque enim non refert exceptivam exponere per illum terminum *aliud*, et quandoque vel erit magna difficultas proporcionare istum terminum, vel non sufficiens expositio per illum.
- A 33<sup>a</sup> Et est intelligendum quod negacio | infinitans terminum extra captum infinitabit in comparacione ad verbum. Ut sic, dicto: *omnis homo non albus curret*, infinitatur iste terminus, *non albus*, pro omni homine qui est vel qui erit non albus; ita quod sequitur:  
 35 *omnis homo non albus curret; ergo, omnis homo qui est vel qui erit non albus curret*. Et si *omnis propositio non vera potest esse propositio falsa*, tunc *omnis propositio que potest esse non vera potest esse propositio falsa*; et sic intelligendo terminum infinitum non erit

Four points to be considered:  
 1. the subject or quantitative whole, from which the exception is made;  
 2. the predicate concerning which it is made;  
 3. the exceptive particle; and 4. that which is excepted.  
*Rule:* Every affirmative exceptive proposition must be expounded by a universal affirmative, leaving out the exception and adding to the subject the opposite of the thing excepted; and by a negative having the same predicate and the thing excepted for subject.  
*As:* Every A, but B, is C: Every A not B is C, and B is not C.  
 The reason why not is used rather than other, is that in certain cases there is very great difficulty with the latter. It must be understood that not B means whatever was, is or will be not B, etc. according as the proposition to be expounded is affected by

2. hic B. 4. Docemus A. 15. pñ<sup>va</sup> B. 18. si fiet A. 20. ille B.  
 22. predicato pro recto B; ib. exceptive B. 23, 24. et — et prime  
 deest B. 26. exceptivam deest B. 27. refert after quandoque B.  
 31, 32. adverbium AB. 32. currit B. 38, 39. potest after vera — et  
 sic deest B. 39. multitudo B.

tense or any other modality; according to the rules given above.

*Rule for negatives:* the first exponent must be a negative universal, identical with the proposition to be expounded; only, instead of the exception, its opposite is added to the subject; the second must be affirmative, having the same predicate and the thing excepted for subject.

Many causes occur to vary the form of exposition; but we may note those variations that arise from the excepted part of the proposition.  
V. g. *Every A but B or C is D* and: *Every A but B and C is D*.  
have very different significations,

especially in the case of non-entities, which Wyclif states to be excepted just like entities.

difficultas in assignando differenciam temporis per circumlocucionem verborum, ut dictum est in capitulo de expositione universalis affirmative.

Si autem fuerit exceptiva negativa exponenda, regulariter potest observari quod prima exponens erit univ-  
5 versalis negativa, communicans cum exceptiva in utroque extremo, addendo | subiecto oppositum termini extra B 22<sup>a</sup>  
capti, et 2<sup>a</sup> exponens erit affirmativa habens subiectum  
sinonymum cum termino extra capto et predicatum  
sinonimium cum priori; ut ista propositio, *nullus homo* 10  
*preter Sor currit*, debet sic exponi, *nullus homo non Sor*  
*currit, et Sor currit*. Et vocatur terminus immediatus  
termino exceptivo, terminus extra captus; quia est signum  
entis quod implicatur excipi a denominatione predicati.  
Unde ille antiquus modus loquendi non placet modernis 15  
logicis, cum habet sensum preter vim vocis. Expedit  
tamen sic loqui causa brevitatis; brevitatis enim, sicut in  
uno latere gignit confusionem et intricacionem, sic ex  
alio latere gignit facilitatem et compendium.

Et accidunt variaciones in exponendo exceptivam ex 20  
quadruplici causa vel quintuplici: puta ratione signi,  
ratione subiecti, ratione partis extra capte, ratione  
verbi et ratione predicati. Et quia de aliis patet  
exemplum in prioribus, ideo solum pono exemplum de  
diversitate partis extra capte. Multum enim refert dicere, 25  
*omnis homo preter Sor vel Platonem currit*, et dicere.  
*omnis homo preter Sor et Platonem currit*; quia, posito  
quod *uterque illorum sit non currens*, et *omnis homo*  
*differens ab altero illorum currat*, tunc est prima vera  
et secunda falsa. 2<sup>a</sup> enim non potest esse vera nisi 30  
*omnis homo curret*, sic quod nec Sor nec Plato vel  
saltem alter istorum non esset. Et secundum ponentes  
non encia non excipi in talibus foret propositio im-  
possibilis. Ego tamen reputo probabile quod *omnis res*  
*preter chimeram est*, et *nulla res nisi chimera non est*; 35  
quamvis infinite alie non sunt: sicut patet per ex-  
ponentes superius positas. Si enim *omnis res preter Sor*  
*et Platonem currit* et tam Sortes quam Plato sit *res que*  
*est non Sor et Plato*, sequitur quod illi currunt.

2. est *deest* B. 17. gracia B. 20, 21. ex<sup>ci</sup> *pro* ex quadruplici B.  
23. ubi *pro* verbi B. 35. partis *deest* A. 28. *mo* = modo B.  
32. saltem B; *ib.* istorum *deest* A. 35, 36. et — quamvis *in marg.* A.  
37. omnes B. 38. currunt B.



Ideo potest servari pro regula quod ex omni tali exceptiva cuius terminus extra captus est de copulato extremo vel ad hoc equivalens, inferibilis est universalis affirmativa, cum extremis sinonimis cum huiusmodi exceptiva; ut si *omnis homo preter duos homines sit in Oxonia*, tunc *omnis homo est in Oxonia*. Si *omnis homo preter omnem asinum sit iustus*, tunc *omnis homo est iustus*; et sic de aliis. Et si obiciatur quod antiqua regula que non fallit ponit quod omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte falsa potest verificari per exceptivam partis false; ex quo videtur, cum ad hoc deservit exceptio, quod omnis exceptiva implicat alienationem et quod tales propositiones necessitate sunt vere: sed huic dicitur quod sophista negaret illud esse regulam, cum non sit possibile aliquam propositionem esse mixtim veram et falsam; sed talis est eius intellectus quod quodcumque est universalis aliqua habens aliquas singulares veras et aliquas falsas ex similibus terminis, potest fieri | exceptiva vera, excipiendo illa singularia falsa; non quidem quod illa universalis fiat vera, nec quod eius significatum fiat verum. Et ex illo | intellectu non sequitur consequens argucii; nam exceptio est ordinata ad excipiendum, tam illa que sunt quam illa que non sunt.

Et si dicatur quod superfluit illa exceptio, *que non sunt*: ut cum idem sit *omnis res creata, preter illam que non est, conservatur a deo* et *omnis res creata a deo conservatur*, ad quid additur exceptio? concedo; sicut illa superflua infinita alia, que ad aliquem finem modernis temporibus sunt locuta. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod sunt falsa, nec quod omnino superfluunt; ut idem est dicere, *omnis homo est*, et *omnis homo existens est*; vel, *omnis homo est dum est*, et tamen talia satis licite sunt locuta et ad finem aliquem utilem, quamvis non ad exprimendum veritatem talem. Et debet fieri exceptio talium falsorum singularium per disiunctionem, vel aliter per terminum partitivum; quia nimis longum est numerare singularia falsa, ut patet in istis; *omnis homo*

As a rule, when the excepted part is composed of copulated terms, the proposition amounts to a universal one. Every A but (A' and A'') is D; therefore Every A is D. It may be said that every proposition can be made absolutely true by rendering it exceptive, and that therefore the exception implies difference between the two propositions:

any proposition will become true if turned into an exceptive one, denying the singulars which are not true: but this proves nothing.

It may be objected that this exception of what is not is superfluous. It is at least not more so than other modes of expression now in use; and it is neither false, nor absolutely superfluous.

Such singular terms should be disjunctively excepted in expounding a proposition of this sort,

2. exceptivus B. 5. sit deest B. 6. homo before est deest B. 7. hominem album pro omnem asinum B. 10. habet pro potest B. 13. nece A. 20. 2<sup>a</sup> pro illa B. 22. argumentum B. 26. causata B. 28. addatur A. 29. quod illa sicut multa alia superflua B. 30. locata B. 34. locata B.

5—7. These are two very different examples. I have been able to find a proper formula for the former only, in the marginal notes.

which cannot  
always be  
expounded by  
the term *other*:  
v. g. it does not  
follow that to  
be other than a  
given  
impossibility is  
to be  
possible.  
Nothing can  
differ from  
what cannot be.

Three  
corollaries.

1. The  
exceptive:  
*Every A but  
B is C* and its  
prejacent,  
*Every A is C*,  
are  
subcontraries;  
as both may be  
false, and in  
cases where  
exposition by  
difference is not  
allowed, both  
may be true.  
Some may  
therefore deny  
that they are  
opposed, but  
such only as  
hold to the  
differential  
exposition;  
the exceptive  
and its  
prejacent come  
to the same,  
when the verb  
cannot be  
predicated of  
the exception;  
but not in the  
case of  
negatives.

*Objections:*

1. "When the  
predicate is not  
universal, there  
is no opposition,  
even for  
negatives."  
But such  
propositions  
are either not  
properly  
exceptive, or  
the predicate  
must be  
understood  
universally.

*preter Sortem vel Platonem est pluralis; omnis homo preter aliquid istorum (demonstrando mulieres) est masculus; omnis res intellecta, preter illam que non potest esse possibilis.* Et ex illo exemplo patet quod non universaliter exceptiva debet exponi per signum alietatis; patet 5 quia hec universalis: *omnis res intellecta est possibilis*, est in parte vera et in parte falsa ad sensum positum; et tamen quelibet talis est impossibilis; *omnis res alia quam talis que non potest esse est possibilis*, quia implicat rem posse esse aliam quam talem que non potest esse: 10 quod est contradicció. Alie sunt multe diversitates exponendi secundum diversitatem termini extra capti: quas omnes exemplariter potes cognoscere ex predictis.

Ex istis specialiter patent tria. Primum, quod quelibet exceptiva et sua preiacens sunt quodammodo 15 contrarie repugnantes; ut iste repugnant: *omne animal, preter hominem, est substantia*, et *omne animal est substantia*; et dico quod *quodammodo* contrarie repugnant; quia, in terminis accidentalibus et ubi est predicacio indirecta, possunt simul esse false et more subcontrariorum 20 simul vere in illis que non implicant alietatem. Subcontraria enim possunt in terminis accidentalibus et predicacionibus indirectis simul esse vera. Ideo, cum nullum verum, ut videtur, contrariatur vero, negaret aliquis talia subcontraria vel eis similia, esse opposita. 25 Sed exponentibus exceptiva cum terminis alietatis foret illa regula, et non isti vie: cum ex qualibet tali exceptiva cuius verbum non potest predicari de parte extra capta, sequitur sua preiacens. Sed secus est in negativis, in quibus videtur repugnancia plus patere. 30

Et si obicias quod tales exceptive in quibus fit exceptio a predicato non repugnant suis preiacentibus, dum non fuerunt universales vel singulares, sed indiffinitæ; ut patet de talibus: *homo non videt hominem preter seipsum; homo non cognovit mulierem nisi uxorem suam*: dicitur quod ille non sunt proprie exceptive. Ymmo, illis resolutis in exceptivas proprias, tenet regula; ut patet 35 de istis: *Nichil videt datus homo, nisi se ipsum; nullam mulierem cognovit datus homo, nisi uxorem suam*: et sic de ceteris.

1. philosophus B.

1. impossibilis A; *ib.* patet *deest* A.

5. q̄ li A;

*ib.* intellectiva A. 20. f<sup>e</sup> v'a AB.

21. fa v'a AB.

20. in accidentibus A.

25. om̄e esse B.

26. cū above the line A.

27. sed *pro* et B.

30. p̄ B.

31. quod *deest* B.

35. *preter deest* B; *ib.* *preter pro* nisi B.

36. tenetur A.

Et si secundo forcius obicias quod possibile sit  
*omnem hominem preter Sor excipi*: quo posito, patet  
 quod Sor excipitur in ista exceptiva, et per consequens  
 Sor excipitur; et sic exceptiva et suum preiacens sunt  
 A 34<sup>a</sup> compossibilia; et idem solet communiter | argui de hoc  
 sophistice: *Tantum exclusum est exclusum*; et aliis que  
 iudicantur esse insolubilia. Sed dicitur quod contra-  
 dictorium claudit *omnem hominem preter Sor excipi*,  
 quia eo ipso quo sit Sor, excipitur ab exceptioe; et  
 10 sic excipitur, quamvis non sit. Et sic est necessarium  
 quod *tantum exclusum est exclusum*. Verumtamen  
 quantum ad impositiones communiter factas de istis  
 terminis *exclusum*, *exceptum*, etc., quod nichil sit ex-  
 clusum vel exceptum, nisi quod excluditur vel excipitur  
 15 in data exclusiva vel exceptiva: certum est quod hoc  
 est impossibile. Et si ponatur terminos sic significare,  
 admittatur; et respondeatur communiter sicut in obli-  
 gacionibus docetur. Necesse est enim quod multa sint  
 exclusiva vel excepta: ymmo quod quilibet sit exclusum  
 20 vel exceptum; ut necessario, *deus excluditur a creacione*  
*passiva*; et necessario *quidlibet creatum excluditur a*  
*primitate creacionis active*.  
 Sed ulterius notandum quod exceptive, sicut exclusive,  
 exponi possunt gracia pluralitatis vel gracia negacionis;  
 25 ut sic, dicto: *non dedi tibi nisi quatuor*, potest habere  
 talem sensum gracia pluralitatis: *non dedi tibi plus*  
*quam quatuor, et dedi tibi quatuor*, vel talem sensum  
 gracia negacionis vel alietatis: *non dedi tibi non quatuor*  
*et dedi tibi quatuor*; et quilibet talis sensus est impossi-  
 30 bilis. Et talem sensum contingit imponi talibus: *Sor*  
*non est nisi sophista*, posito quod sit magister et so-  
 phista, rector, prebendarius, geometer, et sic de infinitis  
 titullis vel predicabilibus non sinonimis: ut dictum est  
 de exclusivis. Et patet etiam ex dictis quod illud anti-  
 35 quum dictum non habet magnum colorem: "Si tot ex-  
 cipiuntur quot supponuntur, exceptio est impropria";  
 necessario enim tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur; ymmo  
 communiter in eadem exceptiva tot excipiuntur quot  
 supponuntur; ut hic: *nulla res nisi chimera vel res que*

2. "When the verb of the exceptive means itself to except, the exception is affirmed in the preiacent, and thus they are not opposed. Thus, if every A but B is excepted, B being the exception, every A is excepted." But this implies self-contradiction. A peculiar sense may be given to the words *excluded* etc. restraining them to apply only to the proposition in question. This is impossible; but if such a sense be imposed, answers ought to be made as in the exercise of obligations.

Exceptives may be expounded by negation or plurality: I have given only 4 means I have not given more than 4, and I have given 4; or, I have not given not 4 and I have given 4; the latter sense being impossible, as also expositions by difference. A is only B, meaning A is nothing else but B, is necessarily false.

1. est pro sit B. 4. for above the line A. 12. impos A. 16. ponitur B. 17. qm' = conformiter? B. 20. causacione B. 21. quodlibet causa B. 25. et dedi tibi nisi quatuor vel pro potest habere B. 31, 32. posito — rector deest B. 32. et geometer B; ib. multis B. 38, 39. ymmo — ut hic deest A.

In this sense the rule that no exceptive can properly except as many things as it implies, is not true; and is only so in this sense: that to say *Every A* (except every *A*) is *B*, is useless.

The subject should be as a whole, and the thing excepted as a part of it: *Ass* not being comprised in the meaning of *man*, no *man*, except an *ass*, runs, is a faulty exceptive.

II. The supposition of exceptive terms.

The subject, taken together with the excepted term denied of it, distributes the predicate.

The term excepted is supposed indeterminately as regards the predicate, if capable of indetermination, and not otherwise distributed. *If capable of indetermination*; for it may be singular by its nature.

And not otherwise distributed: for it may, either by an added sign or its own meaning, become distributed.

*non est non est*. Verumtamen non est multum utilis modus loquendi dicere: *omnis homo preter hominem omnem currit; uterque istorum preter istum vel alterum istorum est Sor*; et sic de ceteris. Ista tamen est bona sententia, quod oportet ad hoc quod exceptiva sit<sup>5</sup> proprie dicta, quod significatum subiecti intelligatur secundum rationem cuiusdam totius in comparacione ad significatum termini extra capti: ut sunt superiora in comparacione ad inferiora. Animal enim commune est quoddam totum in comparacione ad hominem; et<sup>10</sup> homo communis in comparacione ad istum vel ad istos singulares; et hinc credo ortum esse modum | loquendi B 23<sup>b</sup> de excepcione fienda a toto in quantitate. Et patet quomodo iste sunt improprie: *nullus homo preter asinum currit; Nullus asinus preter istum hominem currit, nullus* 15 *homo preter animal erit*; et cetera similia.

Secundo principaliter patet ex dictis quomodo termini exceptivi supponunt. Unde quo ad supposicionem totalis subiecti potest regulariter observari quod cuiuslibet exceptive aggregatum ex subiecto et opposito termini<sup>20</sup> extra capti supponit mobiliter in comparacione ad terminum predicatum. Unde sequitur: *omnis homo preter Sor currit; iste est homo non Sor; ergo iste currit. Nullus homo preter Sor currit; iste est homo non Sor; ergo, iste non currit*; et sic de singulis. Quo ad suppo-<sup>25</sup> sicionem termini extra capti potest regulariter observari quod cuiuslibet exceptive pars extra capta, capax confusionis, non aliunde confusa stat confuse tantum, indeterminate, in comparacione ad predicatum actum respiciens excipiendi. Ut patet hic: *nullum animal preter* 30 *hominem currit*; non enim sequitur ex hoc | disiuncte A 34<sup>b</sup> vel copulative quod *nullum animal preter Sor currit*, vel *nullum animal preter Platonem currit* etc. Et addidi terminum, *capax*, quia quandoque est terminus extra captus discretus quod non est capax talis confusionis;<sup>35</sup> ut hic: *omnis homo preter istum hominem differt a papa*. Et addo istum terminum: *non aliunde confusa*, quia

3. omnem *deest* B. 4. currit vel est sor B. 7. eiusdem B.  
8, 9. significatum — inferiora *deest* B. 11. communiter A. 15. currit —  
nullus *deest* B. 16. currit B. 17. sed *pro* secundo A. 18. exceptive B.  
19. quod *deest* A. 23. non currit *after* ergo iste B. 24, 25. Nullus —  
quo ad *deest* A. 27, 28. confusionis captarum *pro* capax confusionis A.  
29. indeterminante AB. 30. extrin<sup>di</sup> A, excludendi B. 33. addo istum.  
34 captarum *pro* capax A. 35. capturam *pro* capax A. 36. hominem  
*deest* B.

quandoque ratione signi additi, et quandoque gracia  
materie, stat terminis extra captus mobiliter, saltem in  
comparacione ad predicatum, non attendendo exclu-  
sionem; ut patet in istis tribus exemplis: *nullum animal*  
5 *preter omnem hominem currit; Plato est homo, ergo*  
*Plato currit. Nullum animal preter hominem est animal*  
*rationale vel est; Plato est homo: ergo, Plato est animal*  
*rationale et est. Omne animal preter chimeram vivit, ergo*  
*omne animal, preter istam et istam chimeram (et sic de*  
10 *aliis) vivit.*

Quo ad supposicionem predicati, est eciam regulariter  
observandum quod cuiuslibet exceptive predicatum con-  
fusionis capax non aliunde prohibitum supponit mobi-  
liter, vel in comparacione ad extra captum terminum,  
15 vel ad infinitum terminum extra capti. Verbi gracia, in  
exceptiva affirmativa supponit predicatum mobiliter in  
comparacione infiniti termini extra capti; ut si *omnis*  
*homo preter Sor currit, et hoc est currens, tunc hoc est*  
*non Sor.* Sed in exceptiva negativa supponit mobiliter  
20 in comparacione ad terminum extra captum, ut si  
*nullum animal preter Sor currit, et hoc animal currit,*  
*tunc hoc animal est Sor.* Et cavendum est de mediis  
et terminis respectu quorum fient tales supposiciones;  
talía enim predicata, sicut terminos extra captos,  
25 pretereunt multa confundencia disparium naturarum;  
et ideo dispariter valde confundunt.

Ex predictis infertur 3<sup>o</sup> principaliter quod cuiuslibet  
exceptive affirmativa vel negativa sunt universalis affir-  
mativa et exclusiva affirmativa convertibiles apcius  
30 assignate. Ista regula probatur ex hoc quod istarum  
trium specierum proposicionis in eisdem terminis sunt  
exponentes convertibiles; ut, captis istis tribus: *nichil*  
*preter hominem currit, tantum homo currit et omne*  
*currens est homo:* que sunt A, B, C; patet quod ex-  
35 ponentes A sunt iste: *nichil non homo currit, et homo*  
B 24<sup>a</sup> *currit;* et exponentes B sunt iste: *homo currit et nichil*  
*non homo currit,* quod non est nisi eadem copulativa  
conversa; et exponentes C sunt iste; *currens est homo,*

The predicate has a universal supposition as regards the negative of the excepted term in affirmative, and the term itself in negative propositions.

III. Every exceptive proposition can be turned into a universal affirmative or an exclusive one having the same sense, thus:  
Nothing but B is C, only B is C, and Every C is B come to the same, as can be shown by the identity of their exponents.

1. quandoque before ratione deest A. 2. mo<sup>r</sup> A. 4. illius excep-  
cionis pro tribus exemplis A. 8. et est deest B. 9. similibus pro  
aliis B. 11. exceptive B. 12. 13. captarum confusionis A. 16. mo<sup>r</sup> A.  
17. ad infinitum terminum B. 22. et sic B. 23. et de B; ib. hunc B.  
25. precedant B. 27. interruntur B. 32. tribus proposicionibus B.  
33. currit after homo deest B.

*et nichil est currens quod non sit homo: quarum prima convertitur cum prima exponente et secunda convertitur cum secunda exponente. Et sic universaliter ad omnibus aliis. Cum ergo, sicut exponentes expositorum ad exponentes, sic exposita ad exposita, sequitur generaliter regulam esse veram.*

But there are difficulties in applying this rule for copulated terms and such as are not in the nominative: in which case some deny its application. Example of a universal proposition that it is hard to turn into another.

Sed difficultas est in obliquis et aliis terminis coniunctis invenire illa tria sic proporcionabilia. Ideo multi negant illam esse regulam in coniunctis terminis vel obliquis; ut, posito quod *omnis homo habeat duos asinos*, unum currentem et alium non currentem; tunc *cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit*, sicut et *cuiuslibet hominis asinus non currit*; et tamen non *tantum currens est hominis asinus*, quia *aliud quam currens est cuiuslibet hominis asinus*. Nec sequitur quod *tantum asinus hominis est currens*: quia cum universali stat quotlibet homines currere. Nec sequitur quod *tantum currens quod est hominis est asinus*; quia stat cum casu quod unus asinus qui nullius sit hominis asinus currat, vel qui sit communis ad omnes homines. Et tales sunt instantie de aliis terminis coniunctis, tam respectu verborum ampliatorum, quam respectu aliorum verborum de A preterito et futuro.

My plan for solving these is 1. to change the sentences, so that the universal terms be in the nominative, and 2. to assign a corresponding, exclusive and exceptive. Thus, *Every man's ass runs* becomes: *Every man has an ass that runs*; of every couple of contradictories one is true, becomes Every couple of contradictories has one of its parts true;

Certum tamen est quod regula est universaliter vera: unde pro assignacione talium de obliquo utor ista cautela: resolvo illas universales in alias convertibiles de recto, et tunc assigno exclusivam et exceptivam: ut idem est dicere *cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit*, et, *omnis homo habet asinum currentem*. Ideo cum ista universalis: *cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit*, convertitur ista exclusiva: *tantum habens asinum currentem est homo*, et ista exceptiva *nichil preter habentem asinum currentem est homo*. Cum ista eciam universalis: *quorumlibet parium contradictoriorum alterum est verum*, convertitur ista exclusiva: *tantum habens alteram partem veram est par contradictoriorum*; et ista exceptiva: *nichil nisi habens alteram partem veram est par contradictoriorum*. Hec enim universalis; *omne par contradictoriorum habet*

4. sint pro sicut B. 8. q<sup>te</sup> A. 14. cuius pro cuiuslibet A; *deest* B.  
16. q<sup>te</sup> B; *ib.* quodlibet A; quoslibet B. 19. asinus before currat *deest* B;  
*ib.* sit *deest* B. 22. ampliatio<sup>te</sup> A. 24, 25. Certum — unde *deest* A.  
25. utar B. 32. habens B; *deest* A. 33, 34. quodlibet contradictorium A.  
36, 37. et — hec *deest* B.

- alteram partem veram, convertitur cum prima universali. Hec etiam universalis: cuilibet homini similatur asinus vel obedit bestia, convertitur cum ista: omnis homo habet habitudinem ad asinum sibi similem vel*  
*bestiam obedientem; et per consequens talis erit exclusiva; tantum habens habitudinem ad asinum sibi similem vel bestiam obedientem est homo. Et talis sua exceptiva: nichil nisi habens habitudinem ad asinum sibi similem vel bestiam obedientem est homo. Hec etiam:*  
*omnem hominem videt asinus, convertitur cum ista, omnis homo habet habitudinem ad asinum videntem hominem, vel talem, omnis homo videtur ab asino, et patet de sua exclusiva et exceptiva. Hec etiam: ab omni asino differt homo, convertitur cum ista: omnis asinus ab homine differt; cui equipollet hec: tantum ab*  
 B 24<sup>b</sup> *homine differens est asinus | et hec: nichil, nisi ab homine, differens est asinus. Hec etiam: omni bruto utitur homo, convertitur cum ista: omnis homo habet usum bruti, vel ista: omne brutum est usum ab homine;*  
 20 *et patet exclusiva et exceptiva. Hec etiam: omnem hominem potest Sor videre, convertitur cum ista: omnis homo potest videri a Sor. Et patet quod hec erit exclusiva secum convertibilis: tantum quod potest videri a Sor potest esse homo; et hec sua exceptiva: nichil nisi*  
 25 *quod potest videri a Sor potest esse homo: et sic de ceteris quibuscumque.*
- Nec movet tales universales non habere exclusivas et exceptivas secum convertibiles, ex hoc quod non precise in eisdem terminis sunt signande: quia per  
 30 *idem mille tales proposiciones convertentur per se vel per accidens. Sufficit ergo de similibus terminis et simili sententia invenire exclusivam et exceptivam convertibiles cum quacunque universali affirmativa de inesse; quia hoc dicit regula, et est verum. Et patet*  
 35 *veritas talium sophismatum, tantum verum erit verum; tantum existens potest esse filius tuus vel famulari tibi, tantum papa potest absolvere te a quocunque peccato; et sic de ceteris. Verumtamen, iuxta sensum excludendi gracia pluralitatis, non essent talia concedenda; quia*

*some ass resembles every man: Every man has relation with an ass resembling him;*

*an ass sees every man: Every man is seen by an ass; and many others like these.*

*It does not matter that the terms are changed, if the sense remains the same.*

*Such logicians as exclude exposition by the word 'more', are driven to deny evident truths, v. g. only the true will be true.*

7-9. homo — homo *deest* A. 13. *de deest* A. 15. 16. asinus — asinus *deest* A. 18, 19. *ista — ista deest* A. 19. visum A. 21. *pt' A.* 24, 25. homo — homo *deest* B. 30. tales B; *ib.* converterentur B. 32. mensura *pro* sententia A. 35. *v't' A;* *v'itas* B. 36. episcopus B.

They would have to expound thus: *The True will be true, and nothing not true ex equo will be true*; which is false; for every being has a multitude of attributes unequally true of it. An individual man is not a man *ex equo*, for then he would mean the same thing as 'a man'.

Examples of the second part of the rule; i. e. the assigning of corresponding exclusives and universals to the exceptive propositions.

These complications however give more trouble than profit, and I prefer to let them alone.

But it is undeniable that propositions can be converted one with another beyond the extent of our knowledge:

iuxta illum sensum videtur mihi quod prima foret sic exponenda: *verum erit verum*, et *nichil non ex equo verum erit verum*; et sic de similibus. Unde talibus foret tales universales signande: *Omne verum ex equo erit verum*. Et remanerent omnes tales exclusive secundum 5 talem sensum impossibiles, cum non contingit assignare aliquod ens quin de illo sunt multa communia ineque predicabilia; et per consequens non contingit assignare aliquod ens quod ex equo est alicuiusmodi. Si enim Sor ex equo esset homo, tunc non subiceretur predi- 10 cacioni superioris vel inferioris, vel predicacioni per accidens. Et tales sensus decet sophistas cognoscere ut post delapsum a via sciant ad istam viam divertere et a redargucionis periculo se salvare.

Exempla alterius partis regule sunt talia: *Omnis* 15 *homo preter Sor currit*. | *Omnis homo non Sor currit* A 35<sup>b</sup> *pro tempore pro quo ipse non currit; et tantum currens pro tempore pro quo Sor non currit est homo non-Sor*: que omnia convertuntur. *Omne animal preter hominem currit*; et *omne animal idem non-homini currit pro tempore* 20 *pro quo homo non currit; et tantum currens pro tempore pro quo homo non currit est animal homini non idem*; que eciam convertuntur. *Cuiuslibet hominis asinus preter brunellum currit*; et *omnis homo habens asinum non brunellum habet ipsum currentem pro tempore quo brunellus non* 25 *currit; et tantum habens asinum currentem pro tempore quo brunellus non currit est homo habens asinum non brunellum*: que eciam videntur converti. Sed quia maius fastidium est sollicitari circa tales conglutinationes in huiusmodi proposicionibus quam profectus, ideo malo me 30 et meos sequaces sine huiusmodi sollitacione preterire.

De hoc tamen sum certus, quod quelibet affirmativa habet convertibilitatem cum negativa, et qualiscunque proposicio cum qualibet, ultra hoc quod | nos scimus B 25<sup>a</sup> discutere. Scio enim multos modos dicendi probabiles 35

2—5. ex equo verum — erit verum *deest* A. 6. contingit *twice* B. 7. aliquod *deest* B; *ib.* quando *pro* quin A. 8. secundarie significare *pro* assignare. 11. aut *pro* vel *before* predicacioni. 13. via propria B. 18. quo sor; *pro deest* B. 20, 21. preter hominem non currit idem *pro* idem currens A. 25. pro quo B. 28. magis *pro* maius B. 29. faciendum A; *ib.* et *pro* in A. 30. p̄ctis A. 33. et qualicumque A. 35. nos *pro* modos B; *ib.* probabiles A.

26. We have already seen (p. 97, and note) the word *brunellus*, but with a context that did not enable us to determine its signification.



in materia de exclusivis et exceptivis, quos tenendo oportet aliter dicere quam est dictum: ut aliqui generaliter exponunt per istum terminum *aliud*; et sunt tripartiti; ut quidam concedunt omne nominabile esse, 5 quidam vero dicunt omnia que fuerunt vel erunt, esse. Et quidam concedunt omnia talia: *tantum B instans erit instans, nichil preter filium est deus*; et sic de aliis. Quantum ad exceptivas dicitur, eciam satis probabiliter, quod terminus super quem cadit exceptio potest 10 supponere simpliciter pro suo primario significato, vel personaliter pro quolibet eius supposito. Et iuxta istam equivocacionem in supposicione est varie respondendum; ut, iuxta primam supposicionem, si *omne animal preter asinum currit*, tunc similiter, *nullus 15 asinus currit*. Quantum ad exclusivam negativam potest eciam regulariter observari quod cuilibet exclusive negative tam exceptiva affirmativa quam universalis negativa est convertibilis proporcionabiliter assignata. Ex quo correlative patet quod omnis exclusiva negativa 20 et omnis exceptiva vel universalis negativa cum tali exclusiva convertibilis antecedit ad universalem affirmativam communicantem in terminis cum eadem. Exempli gracia, cum ista exclusiva, *tantum homo non currit*, convertitur hec universalis: *nullum non currens 25 est non homo*; et ista exceptiva: *omne ens preter hominem currit*. Et cum ista: *tantum chimera non potest esse*, convertitur ista: *omne ens preter chimeram potest esse*: et ista: *nullum quod non potest esse, potest esse non chimera*: quod est necessarium, cum suum oppositum 30 sit impossibile. Et cum ista, *tantum substantia non est accidens*, convertitur ista: *omne ens preter substantiam est accidens*, et ista: *nullum non accidens est non substantia*. Omnia tamen ista tria sunt impossibilia, cum necessario sint multa encia, ut veritates de 35 possibili, de preterito, et futuro; et veritates negative,

for there are many manners of expounding that would require quite a different theory.

Those who expound by the idea of difference are divided; some admit that every thing is that has a name; others allow that the past and the future are. Others say that nothing exists but at a given moment.

If the supposition of the term excepted is abstract or personal, the exposition must be varied accordingly. There can be found for every negative exclusive a corresponding affirmative exceptive and a universal negative. Examples.

As for this one: *Only substance is not an accident*, and its convertibles,

1. et de B. 2. oporteret B; *ib.* unde *pro* ut B. 5. non *pro* vero A. 6. tamen B. 7. et *pro* crit B; *ib.* ceteris B. 8. Quantum ad exceptivas *deest* A; *ib.* probatur A. 10. corre<sup>o</sup> A; corre<sup>o</sup> B. 20. affirmativa A. 22. comitatem A. 24. illa B. 26, 27. potest esse — potest esse *deest* A. 28. potest esse *before* non *deest* A. 34. immediata *pro* multa A.

33. *Impossibilia*. They are however famous axioms of the School. But they interfere with Wyclif's conception of universal realities, which cannot be accidents, and still less substances in the ordinary sense.

we must note  
that they are  
false, for many  
things are  
neither; unless  
we widen the  
meaning of  
substance.

And then,  
substance  
becoming the  
same as *being*,  
it would  
follow that an  
accident is a  
non-entity,  
something  
besides being or  
other than a  
being.

A similar case  
occurs with  
exclusive  
propositions  
when they have  
transcendental  
ampliative  
terms.

Thus, *Nothing  
not understood  
is a non-man*  
is necessary;  
yet its changed  
form, *only man*  
is not

*understood*,  
is false.  
But we must  
notice that  
such

propositions  
cannot be  
properly  
exclusive, since  
the  
transcendental  
term (v. g.  
*understood*) can  
be excluded  
from nothing.

And the  
proposition:  
*Only man is  
not understood*,  
is rightly  
convertible  
with: *No non-*

que nec sunt substance nec accidentia. Extendendo  
tamen nomen substance ad omne ens inherens, foret  
concedendum talia esse substantias. Et tunc non  
sequeretur ex ista exclusiva quod *tantum ens non sit*  
*accidens* propter transcendenciam subiecti exclusive  
negative, quamvis arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius  
a parte subiecti propositionis exclusive. Cum ista tamen  
exclusiva, *tantum ens non est accidens*, convertitur ista  
exceptiva affirmativa: *Omne ens preter ens est accidens*,  
supposita eius congruitate, quam satis consonum est  
admittere, sicut admittimus congruitatem istius, *omne*  
*ens aliud ab ente est accidens*. Videtur tamen michi  
quod universalis affirmativa de terminis infinitis com-  
positis non convertitur cum tali exclusiva negativa, cum  
necessarium sit *nullum non accidens esse non ens*, eo  
quod impossibile est *aliquid non accidens esse non ens*. A 36<sup>a</sup>

Et idem videtur de exclusivis habentibus predicata  
terminos transcendentis ampliativos: ut sunt tales termini,  
*intellectum, significatum, apprehensum* etc. Nam | hoc est B 25<sup>b</sup>  
falsum: *tantum homo non intelligitur*; et tamen hoc est  
necessarium: *nullum non intellectum est non homo*: cum  
suum oppositum sit impossibile, ponens aliquid ens  
esse non intellectum. Nec inveni de aliis convertenciam  
talem deficere. Potest tamen dici quod quilibet talis  
exclusiva negativa cuius subiectum est transcendens  
non est congrua, sicut nec exceptiva secum converti-  
bilis; quia transcendens non potest excludi ab aliquo.  
Et sic tollitur prima instantia, dicendo quod antecedens  
non est congruum vel perfectum. Et quoad 2<sup>m</sup> dicitur  
quod talis est universalis negativa: *nullum non ens in-*  
*telligitur non homo*; quod est eque impossibile sicut  
exclusiva negativa. Et corollarium patet ex hoc quod  
omnis talis exclusiva infert exceptivam affirmativam  
habentem universalem affirmativam alteram eius ex-  
ponentem; ergo, omnis talis exclusiva infert universalem  
affirmativam; et per idem omnis universalis negativa  
secum convertibilis. Omnis etiam exceptiva negativa  
convertibilis est cum exclusiva affirmativa; et illa cum

1. non *pro* nec *before* sunt B.  
ista B. 5. sibi *pro* subiecti B.  
vertitur — accidens *twice* AB.

*ib.* sit *pro* est B. 17. *pta* A.  
nisi B. 19. etc. *deest* B.  
30. erit *pro* est B.

2. non inherens B.

7. tantum *pro* tamen A.

13. negativa B.

4. tali *pro*  
8, 9. con-  
16. quod cum B;

18. ampliaciones B; *ib.* scilicet ter-  
21. int<sup>m</sup> A. 23. int<sup>m</sup> A; ante B.

universali affirmativa: et patet totum corollarium. Nota  
tamen quod nec quolibet universalis negativa infert  
exceptivam affirmativam aut exclusivam negativam; nec  
quolibet exceptiva affirmativa infert exclusivam negativam.  
5 Ideo, quando sic inferunt, hoc est gracia terminorum.  
In istis autem inveni maiorem sollicitudinem quam  
profectum. Sequitur de modalibus.

*entity is understood, that is a not man, being as false as the former. Remark that not every universal negative can be turned into an affirmative exceptive, or an exclusive negative proposition; nor can every affirmative exceptive infer a negative exclusive one.*

1. et ita B; *ib.* Non pro Nota.      2. nec *deest* A.      5. inferuntur B.  
7. etc. *pro* Sequitur de modalibus B.

---

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMPRIMUM.

This chapter deals with modal, viz., necessary and impossible propositions.

Any term modifying the sense of the *nexus* (or *copula*) is modal: as, *true*, *false*, *necessary*, *contingent*, etc.; *known*, *doubted*, etc.

But the four terms, necessary, etc. besides the modification they bring, are opposed to each other.

Sequitur de modalibus pertractandum; et primo de necessario et impossibili, propter eorum connexionem. Omni enim necessario opponitur impossibile, et econtra; et ideo, sicut cetera opposita, eidem subiacent discipline. 5


Primo tamen videndum est in communi qui termini faciunt propositiones modales. Et videtur michi probabiliter posse dici omnem terminum determinativum connexi natum facere propositionem modalem; ut sunt isti termini: *verum*, *falsum*, et quatuor famosi termini modales, scilicet: *necessarium*, *contingens*, etc.; cum istis terminis: *scitum*, *dubitatum*, *creditum*, *ignoratum*, *intellectum*, *significatum*, et termini consimiles, etc. Omnes enim tales nati sunt supponere pro modo et determinare dictum propositionis. 10

Quatuor tamen famosi termini modales, scilicet: *necessarium*, *impossibile*, *possibile* et *contingens*, superaddunt super significatum dicti eius qualitatem et condiciones contrarias, contradictorias, et subalternas et subcontrarias secundum figuram quadrangularem propositionum simplicium *de inesse*. Et ideo significanter 20

1. Cap. *deest* AB. 2. Initial S in blue ink A; *deest* B. 3. *connexio* B. 8. determinativum AB; *ib.* complexi B. 6. *propositionem deest* B; *ib.* tales *pro* isti B. 10, 11. scilicet — cum *above the line* A. 13. *ceteri pro* termini B; *ib.* etc. *deest* B. 17, 18. *contradiciones pro* et condiciones A. 18. *contradictorias deest* B.

20. *De inesse*. See the figure and explanation in the first part of *Logica*.

A is necessary.



A is possible.

Subcontraries

A is impossible.

A is contingent.

We must add to this diagram the remark that in the idea of Aristotle, *necessary* means merely "impossible not to be", and *contingent* "possible not to be".

facit de illis philosophus mencionem. Sunt ergo isti termini: *necessarium* et *impossibile* multiplices. Quandoque enim omne utile dicitur necessarium; ut *pecunia* et *panni*. Quandoque res quam oportet esse; ut *deus*.

5 Quandoque sumitur pro quacunque veritate que non potest non esse; ut *me non esse asinum*; quandoque pro veritate secundum quid vel condicionaliter necessaria; ut *passio frigidi applicata calido sufficienti*, et quandoque modaliter per viam circumlocucionis supplendo  
10 cum alio vicem verbi; ut hic: *necessarium* vel *neesse est te fuisse*; hoc est *oportet* vel *requiritur te fuisse*. Et tres ultime significaciones proporcionales duabus primis pertinent logico.

B 26<sup>a</sup> Unde necessarium tercio modo dictum est tripliciter

15 subdivisum. Aliquid enim est per se et primo necessarium, ut *deum esse*; aliquid est per se secundo necessarium, quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit non esse; ut *dyametrum non esse cometrum*; et aliquid quod non potest non esse sed potuit; ut *me fuisse*; et illud vocatur  
A 36<sup>b</sup> per accidens | necessarium. Et omnia ista necessaria conveniunt in hoc quod non possunt non esse; sed differunt in hoc quod primum est per se sed non ab alio, secundum est ab alio sed non potuit non esse; sed tertium est per accidens necessarium, quia est  
25 necessarium quod potuit non esse.

Si autem sumatur necessarium secundum quid, hoc contingit tripliciter: vel quod sit necessitas *antecedens*, vel *consequens*, vel *concomitans*. *Antecedens* ut causa  
contingentis, inferens posterius naturaliter; ut *deum*  
30 *velle Sor esse* se habet ad *Sor esse*. Et dicitur necessitas, antecedens, quia necessario, illo posito, ponitur *Sor esse*; et illud est necessitas consequens. Necessitas concomitans est veritas contingens determinate concomitans alteram; ut *me esse tecum in hoc instanti*, et omne con-  
35 tingens determinate verum. Nec sunt ista tria distincta ex opposito; cum contingit idem respectu diversorum esse necessarium antecedens, necessitatem consequentem, et

General meanings of *necessary*:  
1. what is useful;  
2. the absolute Being;  
3. any absolute truth;  
4. any event that must follow certain conditions;  
5. it stands for the verb *must*; and the 3 last meanings are the logician's special province.  
Special divisions:  
*Necessary*, as above (36), has three significations.  
1. A first self-necessary truth;  
2. A secondary self-necessary truth that never was nor will be untrue;  
3. an accidentally necessary truth, that cannot, but might have been untrue.

Relative necessity is divided into *antecedent* when its existence causes the existence of another;  
*consequent*, when its existence is caused by antecedent necessity; and *concomitant*, when it merely accompanies another event. These are not opposed, and

1. Iecit B. 2. et *deest* B. 3. inutile A. 4. quam *deest* B.  
8. applicato B. 10. ubi A; vi B. 11. est *before* et *deest* A. 16. enim  
pro est B. 20. *ans* B. 31. antecedens *deest* A. 37. *ans* AB.

18. *Cometrum* must mean here *commensurabilem*. In other parts of *Logica*, *dyameter* is generally feminine.

the same thing  
may be  
necessary in all  
the three ways.

All three are  
contingent in  
themselves and  
only  
conditionally  
necessary;  
but antecedent  
necessity  
implies  
something that  
naturally  
follows,  
consequent to  
something that  
precedes by  
nature, both  
being at the  
same time; as a  
lunar eclipse  
and the relative  
positions of the  
sun, moon and  
earth.

Concomitant  
necessity  
excludes all  
idea of cause  
on either side.  
A three-fold  
subdivision of  
antecedent  
necessity:  
necessity of  
volition, of  
nature, and of  
coercion:  
as God  
causes anything  
by volition,  
fire burns by  
nature,  
and the  
robber's captive  
pays a ransom  
by coercion.  
The two latter  
exclude liberty  
of action.

We are not,  
however, bound  
to admit any of  
these  
expressions.  
I give them only  
to point out in  
what sense they  
are used.  
Impossible has  
similar  
divisions; the

necessitatem concomitantem. Omne namque verum est aliquo istorum modorum necessarium. Et ideo sophiste non acceptant istas significaciones. Conveniunt autem omnes iste necessitates in hoc quod sunt absolute contingentes et condicionaliter vel secundum quid necessarie; ut *5 equus est necessarius* ex suppositione, puta *ad equitandum*, et *navis, ad navigandum*; sed ratio prime differt a ratione secunde necessitatis ex hoc quod prima necessitas dicitur in comparacione ad naturaliter posterius, ipsis tamen necessitatibus temporaliter coequis; et ratio *10* secunde necessitatis e contrario dicitur in comparacione ad causam ipsa naturaliter priorem, sed tempore coequevam; ut *eclipsis lune* est necessitas consequens ad *dynametricalem interposicionem terre inter solem et lunam*, que est respectu illius necessitatis antecedens, et sic *15* quilibet effectus dicitur in comparacione ad causam aliquam necessitas consequens, et in comparacione ad eius effectum necessitas antecedens. Tercia eciam necessitas dicit determinacionem ad *esse* cum alio, sine hoc quod alterum sit causa reliqui vel causatum. *20*

Et est de necessitate antecedentis ulterius triplex subdivisio, cum aliqua sit talis necessitas *volicionis*; ut si volicio mea vel volicio dei sit causa necessitans aliud non coacta; alia necessitas *naturalis*, ut necessitas qua ignis applicatus ad combustibile subdominans agit vel *25* incipit agere; sed tertia, necessitas *coaccionis*, est necessitas qua predo cogit suum captivum ipsum redimere; et ista sonat in indigenciam. | Et iste duo *B 26<sup>b</sup>* posteriores necessitates excludunt libertatem a sic necessitante. Istas tamen significaciones plus exprimo *30* gracia concipiendi auctores quam gracia sic loquendi. Videtur enim quod gracia brevitatis fuerunt tales significaciones introducte: et ideo non tenetur logicus nisi voluntarie huiusmodi significaciones acceptare.

Conformis autem multiplicitas est significacionis istius *35* termini *impossibile*: ut aliquid est *simpliciter* impossibile, scilicet quod non potest esse, ut *hominem esse asinum*, et aliquid dicitur impossibile *secundum quid*; puta illud

7. et *deest* A. 8. necessitatis *deest* B. 11. e — dicitur *deest*; e contra A.  
12, 13. coequam B. 20. *tm* pro causatum B. 21. antecedentibus A.  
24. coactum AB; *ib.* est pro alia B; *ib.* ut necessitas *deest* A. 26. ne-  
cessitas *deest* B. 27. quam B. 27, 28. redimere A. 30. *neccitate* AB.  
38. aliud B; *ib.* tale pro illud.

quod a data causa non potest fieri, cum sit factibile. Et simpliciter impossibile aliquid est per se primo impossibile, ut *deum non esse*, aliquid per se secundo impossibile; ut *idem simul esse et non esse*, et talia que non possunt nec potuerunt esse; aliud aut est per accidens, ut illud quod non potest esse sed potuit condam esse: ut *me non fuisse*. Et ut breviter dicam, quot modis dicitur *necessarium*, tot modis correspondentibus sumendum est *impossibile*. Nec solum significata propositionum sunt necessaria vel impossibilia, sed denominative et improprie propositiones ille. Et tot modis dicuntur propositiones esse necessarie vel impossibiles, quot modis significata sua primaria sunt necessaria vel impossibilia.

*absolutely and the relatively impossible; what is primarily, what is secondarily impossible by its own essence; and what is only accidentally impossible: in short, the meanings of impossibility answer to those of necessity.*

Loquamur autem de simpliciter necessario vel impossibili: quia aliud non conceditur a sophistis esse necessarium vel impossibile: et videamus quomodo propositiones de necessario et de impossibili ratione illorum terminorum exponi | debeant. Vocatur enim propositio necessaria, si primarie significat sicut necesse est esse; et impossibilis, si primarie significat sicut non potest esse, ut dictum est in principio tractatus proximi. Sed dicitur propositio de necessario vel de impossibili, dum talis terminus participatur ab illa, sive fuerit necessaria, sive impossibilis vel contingens; et sic de aliis modalibus sciendum.

As sophists admit no other necessity or impossibility but that which is absolute, we shall take that meaning, and show how necessary and impossible propositions (i. e. propositions modified by those terms) should be expounded.

Unde potest pro regula observari quod quolibet propositio de necessario ratione talis termini exponenda exponi debet per copulativam, cuius prima pars erit propositio de *inesse* sui dicti, et secunda pars erit propositio de impossibili et opposito talis dicti. Verbi gratia, ista propositio, *Necesse est omnem rem esse*, debet sic exponi: *omnis res est et non potest esse quin omnis res est vel quod non omnis res est; ergo necesse est omnem rem esse*. Et conformiter exponuntur tales: *necessarium est omnem rem esse, necessario omnis res est*, et cuncte consimiles. Et addo istam particulam "ratione talis termini exponenda", quia quandoque propositio de necessario habet unum terminum exponibilem

*Rule:* Every 'necessary' proposition, if it has to be expounded according to that term, must be expressed by a copulative, of which the first part expresses its meaning without the modal term, and the second is an 'impossible' proposition, having contradictory terms. Examples.

2. super *pro* simpliciter A. 5. nec *pro* non B; *ib.* a' *pro* aliud A; *ib.* autem *pro* aut. 6. impossibile B. 8. q' *pro* quot A; *ib.* tot *deest* A. 9. sumitur B. 20. si aut B. 21. pu'ttpia' A. 25. sic est B. 29. per unam B. 36. et necessario *before* omnis B. 38. exponetur exponenda B.

We say 'it it  
has to be  
expounded  
according to  
that term'  
because it  
cannot always  
be expounded;  
and because  
*necessary* is  
sometimes taken  
as an adjective;  
it then is  
simply  
categorical, and  
the exposition  
of the  
proposition  
becomes an  
analysis: *A is  
necessary*; i. e.  
*This is A; this  
is necessary;  
therefore, A is  
necessary.*

But the rule is  
to be followed  
when  
*necessary* is  
modal; and the  
same may be  
said of  
*impossible*,  
*contingent*, etc.

I follow as a  
rule to take the  
sense as  
divided, when  
the modal term  
is between the  
subject and the  
verb; and when  
it begins or  
ends the  
proposition, as  
compound or  
divided  
indifferently.

priorem, ultra quem non fiet saltus. Sed propositio  
ratione illius primi termini exponetur, ut patet de  
istis: | *Omnis homo necessario est; Tantum aliquid* B 27<sup>a</sup>  
*necessario est*; et cetera. Prima enim exponetur ut  
universalis affirmativa, et 2<sup>a</sup> ut exclusiva affirmativa, 5  
iuxta regulam tractatus proximi. Notandum quod tales  
termini modales, adiuncti dictis propositionum vel  
equivalentibus, possunt sumi quandoque kathegorice et  
nominaliter, et quandoque sinkathegorice et modaliter;  
ut sic, dicto: *necessarium est hominem esse*, potest iste 10  
terminus, *necessarium*, sumi nominaliter, ita quod propo-  
sicio sit indefinita, significans principaliter quod aliqua  
necessitas est hominem esse (quod est verum); et tunc  
debet propositio probari resolutorie per resolutionem  
istius termini *necessarium*, isto modo; *hoc est hominem* 15  
*esse*, demonstrando illam veritatem communem quam  
in logica vocamus naturam hominis communem et  
speciem specialissimam; *et hoc est necessarium*; ergo,  
*necessarium est hominem esse*. Et minor patet ex hoc  
quia illa natura communis non potest non esse. Dum 20  
autem modaliter sumitur et sinkathegorice, tunc isti  
duo termini *necessarium est* sumuntur pro isto termino  
*oportet*, et exponitur propositio modaliter, ut docet regula  
supra dicta. Nec alicubi est diversitas in talibus quoad  
veritatem propositionis, sive uno modo sive alio 25  
sumantur; saltem secundum ponentes res communes,  
veritates negativas de possibili, de preterito, et futuro.  
Et conformiter sciendum est de istis terminis, *im-*  
*possibile*, *contingens*, et *contingens non*.

Unde est michi regula generalis quod quandocunque 30  
talis terminus modalis mediat inter subiectum et verbum,  
sensus divisus pretenditur, dum non fuerit limitacio  
aliunde; sed quandocunque totaliter precedit vel sequitur,  
propositio indifferenter sumi poterit in sensu composito  
vel diviso: ut sic, dicto *omnem hominem contingit non* 35  
*esse*, est sensus divisus; sed sic, dicto *natura humana*  
*communis necessario est*, sensus compositus est propter  
limitacionem termini secunde intencionis ad suppo-

1. sed tota B. 4. expo<sup>r</sup> B. 6. tamen B. 8. kathegreumatice A.  
9. et quandoque — modaliter *in marg.* A. 10. dicendo B. 14. resolvi  
ex particulari *pro* probari B. 20. quod B. 22. sumere *pro* sumuntur A;  
*ib.* verbo B. 23. propositio *deest* A. 25. alio modo. 26. suatur B.  
28. faciendum A. 33. scilicet *pro* sed A; *ib.* subsequitur B. 34. pos-  
test B. 37. et hoc propter B.



sicionem simplicem. Illum enim voco sensum compositum qui precedit unum commune pro quo verificatur, dum tamen pro nullo singulari illius communis; ut *hominem esse est necessarium*, et tamen nullus homo est ille. Et sensum divisum voco sensum qui requirit singulare pro quo propositio verificatur. ut hic: *necessario homo est mortalis*. Et sic sensui composito deservit suppositio simplex, et sensui diviso deservit  
 A 37<sup>b</sup> suppositio personalis. | Nec obstat eandem propositionem sumi secundum diversas partes, tam in sensu composito quam diviso.

The compound sense is that which is true of the thing in general, not of the individual; the divided sense is the contrary.

Exemplum secunde partis regule est tale: *omnem hominem esse est necessarium; necessarium est instans vel aliquod corruptibile esse*; utraque istarum potest  
 15 sumi in sensu composito qui est verus, et in sensu diviso qui est falsus. Nec ex hoc accidit confusio respondendi; iuxta prius dicta quecunque talis propositio concedi debet simpliciter, cum habuerit unum primarium sensum verum. Et ex hoc patet talia sophismata esse vera: *necessario aliquid est quod non necessario est; omnem hominem esse est contingens et omnem hominem esse est necessarium*, et tamen nullum necessarium est contingens. Mutatur enim suppositio in  
 B 27<sup>b</sup> talibus; | *necessarium est hominem esse et contingens est hominem esse*; sed non contingens est hominem non esse, accipiendo dictum negative; nec contingit hominem non esse. Si enim iste terminus, *contingens*, sumatur nominaliter indefinite, et dictum negative, tunc falsum est quod *contingens est hominem non esse*, quia *hominem non esse* non est, cum *nullum hominem non esse* est.  
 30 Nec sumendo modaliter est propositio vera, cum impossibile sit hominem non esse.

Examples of the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the rule: propositions can be understood both ways, and are either true or false; but whenever one primary sense is true, there is no difficulty about granting them simply. As, v. g. *Necessarily something is, which is not necessarily etc.*, is true; for the supposition of the words is not the same. Man must exist as an essence; but there is no necessity for any individual man to exist.

2. pretendit B. 3. verineatur propositio B. 5. solum voco sensum divisum B. 6. singularem propositionem pro qua B; *ib.* propositio *deest* B; *ib.* verificaretur B. 7. morlis = moralis' AB. 10. quam in sensu B. 13, 14. aliquod instans vel *pro* instans vel aliquod A. 14. utraque autem B. 17. quia iuxta B. 20. est vel erit B. 21. est vel erit *pro* est *before* omnem B. 23. suppositio *deest* B. 24. suppositio necessarium B. 28. infinite B. 29. hominem est *before* non esse B.

1—5. *Sensum compositum — divisum*. This is not quite the usual sense in which the distinction is taken by the school. It would be used, v. g., to confute the following sophism: *Qui nunc est mortuus heri vixit; atqui Pompeius nunc est mortuus; ergo, heri vixit*. The Dominicans made great use of it in their controversy against the Jesuits, on the question of grace and free-will.

Again, taking  
*necessary*  
 substantively,  
 we must grant  
 that the future  
 existence of the  
 soul of  
 Antichrist is a  
 necessity;

Patet etiam quod *anima anticristi necessario erit*, acci-  
 piendo istum terminum, *necessario*, nominaliter; sicut  
*omne quod erit necessario erit, et erit necessario*. Non  
 tamen omnem rem necesse est *esse vel fore*, nec  
 necesse est omnem rem *fore*, quamvis necesse sit omnem  
 rem *esse*, eo quod stat aliquam rem *esse* et *nunquam*  
*fore*; ut patet de corporibus inanimatis. Patet etiam  
 quod in casu communi *necessarium erit animam anti-*  
*cristi esse et fore*, sicut *necessarium est deum causam*  
*mei esse*; nam *hoc erit animam anticristi esse*, (demon-  
 strando veritatem absolutam que erit *istam rem esse*  
 vel, *ista res est*) et *hoc erit necessarium*; ergo, *necessarium*  
*est animam anticristi esse*; et sic de secunda conclusionem,  
 tenendo tamen istum terminum, *necessario*, modaliter;  
 tunc erit *necessarium istam rem esse vel fore*, sicut  
*istam rem fore* erit *necessarium*, sed non erit *neces-*  
*sarium animam anticristi fore vel esse*, sicut illam rem  
 fore erit *necessarium*: nisi fore erit resurreccio mor-  
 tuorum, qui perpetuo manebunt in instantibus limitandis,  
 ut ponunt theologi.

that is, its  
 futurity *will be*  
 a necessity,  
 though it is not  
*now* so;  
 which is true  
 of many other  
 things.

Unde, tenendo istum terminum, *necessarium*, utro-  
 que modaliter, differt multum dicere quod *necessarium*  
*erit ipsam fore* et dicere quod *necesse est ipsam fore*.  
 Si enim oportebit ipsam fore, tunc *necessarium* erit  
 ipsam fore, et econtra; et ad hoc sufficit quod aliquando  
*erit ita quod oportet ipsam fore*. Sed si *necessarium*  
 est ipsam fore ad sensum limitatum, tunc oportebit  
 quod ipsa erit; multa tamen oportebit fieri que iam  
 non oportet fieri.

The  
 proposition:  
*A will be*  
*necessary*,  
 ought  
 therefore to be  
 first analysed  
 by taking  
*necessary* to  
 mean *must*, and  
 proving it by  
 means of its  
 singulars.

Unde ista propositio, *necessarium erit sic esse*, non  
 primo exponitur ratione istius termini *necessarium*.  
 Sed, cum idem sit dicere, *necessarium erit*, et *oportebit*,  
 resolvetur ratione temporis connotati isto modo: *tunc*  
*necessarium erit sic esse*; ergo *necessarium erit sic esse*.  
 Et antecedens probatur: *tunc erit quod sic est, et tunc*  
*erit ita quod non potest non sic esse*: ergo *tunc erit*  
*necessarium sic esse*, vel *tunc necessario erit sic esse*:  
 quod habeo pro eodem. Et iste exponentes, *tunc*  
*sic erit, et non potest esse quin tunc sic erit*, ex-  
 ponunt istam, *necessarium est quod tunc sic erit*; et ad

12. est *deest* A. 14. *necessario deest* B. 17, 18. sicut — nisi  
*deest* A. 22. quod *deest* B. 27. 03 B. 31. exponitur B. 33. enim  
 pro resolvitur B. 35. sic tunc B: *ib.* ita quod B. 37. omne pro  
 esse A; *ib.* *necessarium before* erit B. 39. sic after tunc *deest* B.

eodem modo de propositionibus de preterito et de posse.

Et iuxta hoc conceditur quod *possibile est deum* In this sense it  
*creantem me non esse* et tamen *nullo modo deus creans* is possible for  
 5 *me potest non esse*. Et patet quod oportet talis con- God, creating  
 A 38<sup>a</sup> sequencia: *omnis res absoluta que non est | et potest* me, not to be;  
*esse, potest incipere esse et non necessario erit*. Sed *deus* yet God cannot  
*creans filium meum potest esse una res absoluta, et non* create and  
 B 28<sup>a</sup> *est; ergo, potest incipere esse | vel non necessario erit;* not be.  
 10 quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito And  
 quod non habeam filium, sed habebō. Maior est etiam supposing that  
 vera; quia quamvis multa, etiam que non sunt, possunt I have no son,  
 esse et non incipere esse, sicut tales veritates affirmative but am to have  
 15 de futuro, *filius meus erit* etc; et multe sunt que possunt one: then God  
 non esse sed non desinere esse, ut tales veritates *can be and is*  
 negative de futuro *filius meus non erit*; tamen hoc est *not* creating my  
 impossibile de re aliqua absoluta. Et minor argumenti son, and is,  
 negati patet ex hoc quod, si *filius meus non est et* therefore, not  
*potest esse, tunc deus creans filium meum non est sed* necessarily so.  
 20 *potest esse res absoluta*. Sed antecedens est verum, ut  
 suppono et credo: ideo et consequens. Et tamen con- This  
 sequens argumenti facti principaliter est impossibile, conclusion,  
 25 terminorum: sicut exemplariter potes elicere ex predictis. however, is  
 videlicet quod *deus creans filium meum potest non esse*. evidently false.

Et tales sunt multe sophisticaciones ratione istorum There are many  
 30 terminorum: sicut exemplariter potes elicere ex predictis. similar fallacies  
 Hoc modale *impossibile* non habet exponentes, sicut on these  
 nec universalis affirmativa *de inesse*. Sed ille terminus, subjects.  
 35 *necessarium*, exponitur copulative sicut universalis affir-  
 mativa diversimode. Verumtamen propositio de im- Though  
 40 possibili probari potest a priori, a posteriori, et ex 'impossible'  
 opposito, et ab equo. A priori: ut per hoc quod impos- propositions  
 sibile est duos angulos causatas ex incidencia unius cannot be  
 45 linee recte super aliam lineam rectam, excedere aut expounded, yet  
 diminuere a duobus angulis rectis; et cum necessario, they can be  
 50 si duabus lineis eque distantibus linea supervenerit, proved in the  
 duo anguli coalterni et angulus extrinsecus ac intrinsecus four usual  
 sibi oppositus sunt equales, probatur quod impossibile ways:

A priori, v. g.  
 proving that it  
 is impossible  
 for the three  
 angles of a  
 triangle to be  
 greater than  
 2 right angles,

1. futuro *pro* preterito B; *ib.* de *after* et *twice* B. 4. nullus *pro*  
 nullo modo B. 5. non valet *pro* oportet B. 7. vel *pro* et B. 9. et  
*pro* vel B. 10. *quod* B. 11. enim est *pro* est etiam B. 15. et non  
*pro* sed non B; *ib.* sicut *pro* ut B. 18. a *pro* quod si B. 21. erat  
*pro* et *after* ideo A; *ib.* et *before* tamen *deest* B. 22. principaliter  
*deest* B. 23. non potest B. 25. potest elicere quilibet B. 27. ne-  
 gativa B. 33. lineam rectam *deest* A. 34. rectis *deest* B; *ib.* et tamen  
 cum hoc B. 36. quo alterni A.

on account of  
previous  
mathematical  
truths on which  
it depends.

*A posteriori*,  
proving that  
every singular  
of a universal  
is impossible,  
and therefore  
the universal  
itself.

*Ab aequo*,  
proving that its  
opposite is  
necessary;

for every  
impossible  
proposition  
implies the  
necessity of its  
opposite, and  
vice versa.

There is yet  
another mode  
of proving these  
propositions:  
by taking the  
signification of  
the proposition  
and affirming  
that it is  
impossible:

wrongly thus:

*A cannot*  
*possibly be B*,  
i. e., *This*  
*proposition is*  
*impossible*;

*A is B*;  
rightly, thus:  
*It cannot be*  
*that A is B*.

And thus we  
cannot conclude

*This is*  
impossible,  
therefore *this is*,  
because in the  
first proposition  
*impossible* is  
equivalent to  
the verb *it*  
*must not be*  
(oportet non).

est tres angulos trianguli rectilinee supperaddere vel  
deficere ab equalitate duorum rectorum. *A posteriori*,  
ut sic; *omnem chimeram impossibile est esse; ergo*,  
*impossibile est chimeram esse. Ex opposito*, capiendo  
oppositum contradiccionis proposicionis talis de impossi- 5  
bili, et deducendo ad inconveniens; ut probari potest  
quod *impossibile est me esse asinum*, quia, dato opposito  
quod possibile est me esse asinum, sequitur posterius  
quod possibile sit idem esse et non esse. Et *ab equo*  
probari potest quecunque talis proposicio probanda, 10  
proposicione de necessario et opposito dicto: ut, si  
*necesse sit me non esse asinum, impossibile est me esse*  
*asinum*. Est enim regula generalis quod quecunque  
proposicio de impossibili infert proposicionem de ne-  
cessario et dicto opposito, et econtra: ut si necessarium 15  
est deum esse, impossibile est ipsum non esse, et econtra;  
et talis proposicio de necessario probari potest expositorie.

Sed est alius modus probandi tales proposiciones de  
modis *a posteriori*, per capcionem proposicionum sic  
primarie significancium: que proposiciones sunt impossi- 20  
biles, necessarie, vel contingentes. Et ista probacio est  
adco usitata, quod putant antecedens converti cum con-  
sequente. Unde multi erronee putant quod talis propo-  
sicio, *impossibile est chimeram esse*, significat principaliter  
quod, *talis proposicio est impossibilis*: | "*chimera est*". B 28<sup>b</sup>  
Sed illud non videtur, cum diferencia modalis conver-  
titur cum ista negativa: *non potest esse quod chimera*  
*sit*; et sic de ceteris iudicabis. Notandum quod iste  
terminus, *impossibile*, potest accipi dupliciter: vel  
modaliter, contrarie ad istum terminum *necessarium*, 30  
ita quod convertatur cum isto termino *oportet non*, vel  
aliter nominaliter, pro significato impossibili; ut in  
istis, *hominem esse asinum est impossibile. et hoc est*  
*impossibile* (demonstrando istam proposicionem, *homo*  
*est asinus*). Unde non sequitur: | *hoc est falsum vel* A 38<sup>b</sup>  
*impossibile: ergo hoc est*, sed sequitur potius oppositum,  
cum terminus sit distrahens.

1. est deest A. 5. talis *pro* contradiccionis A. 10. proposicio  
deest B. 11. cōpōmū A; cōpōm B. 13. regula deest; Regula in marg. B.  
14. convertibiliter *pro* infert B. 16. deum *pro* ipsum B. 17. ut *pro* et B.  
19. capciones B. 21. contingentes necessarie; vel deest B. 22. visitata B;  
ib. putatur B. 23. errantes B. 23, 24. tales proporciones *before* talis B.  
28. Nondum B; ib. tamen quod B. 26. dupliciter deest A. 32. fig<sup>o</sup> A;  
signo B. 32, 33. in istis deest B. 33. est *after* hoc deest. 35. est  
*before* asinus deest B.

- Et ex hoc patet quod nulla natura impossibilis mutabitur in necessarium, vel verum in falsum, aut e contra. Quondam enim fuit falsum quod *ego fui*, et iam necessarium est; et sic illud quod quondam fuit falsum iam est necessarium: sed quando fuit falsum tunc non fuit; et ideo non mutabiliter. Possibile tamen est quod verum contingens fiet necessarium; ut patet de tali: *fuit ita quod anticristus erit*, et ita de multis similibus.
- Et iuxta istam duplicem acceptionem istius termini *impossibile*, sunt multa sophismata, ut talia: *Possibile est impossibile esse verum, impossibile est possibile esse verum, necessarium est possibile non esse verum, te scire omne necessarium esse verum est impossibile*, et sic de multis sophismatibus que aput me modice appreciantur. Prima patet de tali proposicione: *ego non sum in mente mea*; vel de tali: *in mente nulla propositio est*; quorum utraque est possibilis, sed neutra potest esse vera. Primum tamen potest habere convertibile, et sic significando potest esse verum, sed 2<sup>a</sup> non tunc. *Talem propositionem est impossibile esse veram, et talis propositio est quoddam possibile: et sic impossibile est possibile esse verum*. Et iuxta conformem sensum conceditur quod *propositionem impossibilem in voce vel scripto possibile est esse veram, et sic impossibile est possibile esse verum*; et cum contradiccio non sit nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis, cum hoc stat quod *impossibile est possibile esse verum*, eo quod *necessarium* (quod est verum) *est possibile esse verum*. Tercia conclusio patet de proposicione necessaria que potest non esse. Et 2<sup>a</sup> conclusio patet, capiendo talem propositionem: *te scire omne necessarium esse verum*; que est impossibilis, saltem distincta sciencia elicit, cum necessario sunt multa necessaria que sic non scis; et per consequens *te scire omne necessarium esse verum est impossibile*. Sed de istis sufficiens.

So the impossible cannot by any means become necessary; although that which is at one time one may at another time become the other.

Many fallacies on this subject exist, but I value them little: As, that the impossible may possibly be true, v. g. when I say: *No proposition is in my mind*;

or that it is necessary for a given possible not to be true; v. g. when a given proposition (which is a thing possible) is necessarily false;

or that my knowledge of every thing necessary is impossible; which must be granted or distinct, not of general knowledge.

1. Et *deest* B. 2. mutab'r A. 3. illud *deest* A; *ib.* illud *pro* quod B.  
6. mutab'r A; mutabatur B. 8. ita de *deest* A. 15. modicum B.  
16, 17. *mente* A; *mente* B. 17. de *deest* B; *ib.* in mente *deest* B. 19. con-  
vertibilem quod; et *deest* B. 20, 21. verum — veram *deest* A. 22. ideo  
*pro* et sic B. 27. quod possibile B. 28, 29. quod est verum *deest* A.  
30. et *deest* B. 31. propositionem B. 33. loquendo de *pro* saltem B.  
34. *it'* *pro* scis B. 35. omne *pro* esse A. 36. Sed — sufficiens *deest*;  
etc. B.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMSECUNDUM.

Of Possible to  
be and of  
Possible not  
to be, or the  
affirmatively  
and the  
negatively  
Contingent.

When  
Contingent is  
taken as a  
modal term, it  
contradicts or  
is subalternate  
to the  
corresponding  
propositions  
affirming  
impossibility,  
or necessity;

but not when  
taken as a  
noun.

Divisions: into  
contingent  
by nature, or  
indifferently;  
and it by  
nature, either  
always so, or  
in most cases,  
or in few cases.

We must  
premise that  
any  
proposition,

Sequitur de aliis speciebus modalium pertractandum, duabus prioribus contradictoriis et eciam subalternis: scilicet *contingenti affirmativo* et *contingenti negativo*. Ubi primo sciendum quod iste terminus, *contingens*,<sup>5</sup> potest quandoque sumi modaliter et quandoque nominaliter. Modaliter quando, per viam circumlocucionis cum verbo substantivo, suplet vicem talis impersonalis: *contingit*, vel *potest esse*. Et sic propositio de contingenti affirmativo subalternatur propositioni de necessario<sup>10</sup> affirmativo, et econtra dicit propositionem de impossibili. Ut formaliter sequitur; *necesse est deum esse, ergo contingit, potest esse, vel contingens | est deum esse*. Et B 29<sup>a</sup> huic contradicit hec, *impossibile est deum esse*. Et ad istum sensum universaliter ex propositione de necessario<sup>15</sup> sequitur propositio de contingenti, tamquam sibi subalternata. Quandoque sumitur nominaliter, pro veritate que est et potest non esse; ut: *contingens est deum esse causam mei*, quia est quod deus est causa mei, et potest non esse quod deus sit causa mei; et sic non<sup>20</sup> subalternatur modali primi ordinis, nec contradicit modali<sup>21</sup> ordinis.

Et talium contingencium est triplex divisio. Quoddam enim est contingens natum, et quoddam contingens ad utrumlibet. Et contingencium natorum quoddam est<sup>25</sup> contingens semper et quoddam contingens non semper. Et talium quoddam est contingens in maiori parte et quoddam contingens in minori parte.

Pro quorum discussione cognoscenda, primo notandum quod propositio determinate vera vel determinate<sup>30</sup>

1. Cap. deest AB. 2. Initial S in blue ink A. 3. ac pro et eciam B. 4. scilicet de B; *ib.* et de B. 13, 14. Et — et ad deest B. 16. propositio sibi B. 20. quia pro quod B. 21. prioris B. 24. quoddam est B. 26. ut semper B; *ib.* quoddam est B. 27, 28. parte deest in both places B. 30. est quod B.

falsa differt a propositione indeterminate vera vel indeterminate falsa, in hoc quod propositio determinate | vera est propositio vera pro aliquo instanti, et non potest esse quin sic vel fuit vera pro eodem instanti: et sic de propositione determinate falsa. Ex quo patet (a posteriori tamen) quod veritas determinata est veritas pro aliquo instanti existens, et necesse est ipsam esse vel fuisse pro eodem instanti: et sic de falsitate. Indeterminata veritas vel falsitas est que pro aliquo instanti est et potest esse, que nec est nec fuit pro eodem; et propositio illam significans primarie est indeterminate vera vel indeterminate falsa. Exempla omnium istorum: hec est determinate vera: *ego sum*; quia est vera pro hoc instanti, et necesse est quod est vel fuit vera pro eodem. Et per idem eius oppositum est determinate falsum, et *me esse* est determinate verum, quia est in aliquo instanti et necesse est ipsum esse vel fuisse pro eodem: et per idem *me non esse* est determinate falsum. Sed ista propositio, *ego curram*, posito quod sit vera, est indeterminate vera, quia non est vera pro aliquo instanti, et potest esse quod nec est nec fuit vera pro eodem: et per idem, posito quod sit falsa, est indeterminate falsa; et veritas vel falsitas significata per ipsam indeterminate est veritas vel falsitas.

either true or false, is so determinately or indeterminately; i. e., it must apply to a given instant of time in the former case,

and not in the latter.

V. g. *I exist*, is determinately true at a given instant of time; and its opposite is false in the same manner;

whereas, *I shall run*, if true, is so independently of any given instant; and likewise it false.

Corollaries.

1. Every necessary proposition is determinately true, and every impossible proposition, determinately false.

Et ex hoc patent aliquae regule. Prima, quod omnis propositio necessario, sicut et eius significatum primum, est determinate vera et necessaria; et omnis propositio impossibilis est determinate falsa et impossibilis; et eius significatum primum non est, et est determinate falsum, cum a nulla potencia potest esse. Idem patet ex descriptione *determinate* et descriptione *impossibilis* et *necessarii*.

Secunda regula quod de presenti, et de preterito et futuro, contingit propositiones contingentes | tam deter-

2. Propositions concerning the past or future may be

1. et *pro* vel A. 2. 3. indeterminate A. 4.  $\widehat{q\dot{u}}$  = quando A; *ib.* vel *deest*. 5. instanti *deest* A. 10. quod *pro* que B. 11. illa B. 12. et exempla B. 14. sit vera *pro* est B. 15. instanti et B. 16. in *pro* me B. 17. *pro pro* in B. 18. *Z pro* est A. 20. non *deest* AB. 22. instanti et B. 23. vel *pro* et B. 24. est indeterminata B. 25. falsum A. 27. quod *pro* eius B. 27, 28. necessaria est determinate vera et necessaria, sicut et eius significatum primum est determinate verum et necessarium *pro* necessario — necessaria B. 30. determinate non B; *ib.* et est *deest* B. 31. etiam *pro* falsum B; *ib.* potn<sup>a</sup> A; *ib.* illud B; *ib.* pt AB. 32. determinati B; *ib.* de exscriptioe B. 34. regula *deest* A.

determinately or  
indeterminately  
true or false;  
determinately,  
as: I exist;

indeterminately,  
as: *it was true*  
or *it is true*  
*that Socrates*  
*will be a*  
*bishop*; or:  
*Socrates will*  
*be a bishop*.

3. If one of two  
opposites is  
determinately  
true or false,  
the other is so  
likewise.

4. All  
indetermination  
depends upon  
a something  
to happen in  
the future;  
propositions  
concerning the  
present or the  
past, if  
determinately  
true, are in so  
far necessary.

It follows that  
the ultimate  
cause of all  
indetermination  
is God.

minate quam indeterminate esse veras; et tam deter-  
minate quam indeterminate esse falsas. Exemplum  
primi; hoc est determinate verum: *ego sum*, et eius  
oppositum determinate falsum. Hec etiam est contingens  
et determinate verum; *ita fuit quod ego sum in instanti* 5  
*quod est presens*; et eius oppositum est determinate  
falsum. Hoc est determinate verum: *sol orietur cras*, et  
eius oppositum est determinate falsum. Exemplum 2<sup>e</sup>  
partis regule patet de istis et eius oppositis: *ita fuit*  
*quod Sor erit episcopus*; *ita est quod Sor erit episcopus*; 10  
et: *Sor erit episcopus*, posito quod Sor erit episcopus,  
et non sit determinatum quod sic erit. Nam quelibet  
talium est indeterminate vera, et quodlibet suorum  
oppositorum est indeterminate falsum; et patet regula.  
Idem etiam est intelligendum de veritatibus primarie 15  
significatis per tales proposiciones.

3<sup>a</sup> regula est, quod si unum oppositorum sit deter-  
minate verum, reliquum est determinate falsum; et  
similiter e converso: ut hoc est determinate verum,  
*ego sum*; ideo determinate est falsum quod *ego non* 20  
*sum*. Et sic de ceteris. Et patet ista regula ex de-  
scripcione determinate veri et determinate falsi.

4<sup>a</sup> regula est ista. Omnis indeterminacio veritatis  
aut falsitatis in futuricione scibilis est fundata. Illud  
patet per hoc quod omnis veritas de preterito non 25  
dependens a tali futuricione est necessitas; ut patet de  
talibus: *ego non fui asinus*, *ego fui septennis*, *non fui*  
*Parisiis in B instanti*; et sic de ceteris similibus quibus-  
cunque. Et omnis veritas de presenti non dependens a  
futuricione factibilis determinate est; ut patet ex de- 30  
scripcione determinati. Relinquitur ergo quod omne  
indeterminate verum vel indeterminate falsum ratione  
talis futuricionis sit huiusmodi. Verumtamen, cum omnis  
talis futuricio dependeat a presenti, ymmo a prima  
causa, patet quod omnis talis | indeterminacionis causa A 39<sup>b</sup>

7. etiam est B.

8. erit *pro* est B.

31. dependet A.

9. regule *deest* B; *ib.* eis A.

11. et sic patet 2<sup>a</sup> pars B.

24. vel *pro* ant B.

28. pifius A; pifius B;

*ib.* con *pro* ceteris B.

10, 11. *ita* —

17. est *pro* sit B.

25. ex *pro* per B.

26. a

30. est *deest* A.

5. *Verum*. Wyclif seems to offend very often against the  
rule of genders; but whenever it is possible, as here, to suppose  
*aliquid* (or an equivalent) to be understood, I have preferred  
leaving the text as it stands.



ultima erit deus. Et ex istis patet regula Aristotelis quod omne quod est independens a futuricione entis quod non est quando est, determinate et eciam inevitabiliter est: quod Aristoteles vocat necesse esse. Deus enim non potest facere quin *ego sum vel fui in hoc instanti*; potest tamen facere quod ego non sum nec fui futurus quadragenarius in hoc instanti; et quod iste motus nec est nec fuit in hoc instanti, et sic de multis veritatibus de presenti dependentibus a futuricionibus encium que non sunt. Ymmo talis negativa, *ego non fui Rome*. dependet a futuricione, scilicet ab ista negativa: *ego non ero Rome*, et falsitas istius, *ego non fui episcopus*, dependet a futuricione aliqua negativa vel negacione futuricionis.

To be independent of any other being is to be necessary. Though God cannot alter the fact of our existence, He can alter all our future attributes which are, either now or in the past, connected therewith. *I was not in Rome* depends on whether *I shall not be in Rome* is to be true.

B 30<sup>a</sup> Istis | premissis, dico quod descriptive contingens ad utrumlibet est contingens indeterminate verum vel indeterminate falsum; et contingens natum est contingens determinate verum vel determinate falsum. Ex quo patet quod contingens sufficienter in istas duas species est divisum; et addo sub distincione divisi primam partem regule; quia omne contingens, sive omnis propositio, est determinate vera sive falsa in sensu composito; sed nullum contingens ad utrumlibet est determinate verum vel determinate falsum: sicut patet de talibus; *ego disputabo, ego respondebo*, et similibus de futuro, que possunt principiari a voluntate humana. Solum enim talia creduntur esse contingencia ad utrumlibet; et alia, sive sint de futuro, sive non, creduntur esse determinate vera vel determinate falsa; ut *hyemem esse futuram, pestilenciam, tempestatem, vel coniunctionem*, vel quemcunque effectum non impedibilem ab homine, esse futurum. Omnia enim talia creduntur determinate esse vera vel determinate falsa. Illud tamen est alterius negocii alcioris.

That which is indifferently contingent is indeterminate true or false; that which is contingent by nature, determinately so. And though every proposition taken in the compound sense must be determinately true or false, yet such as depend on the human will, and those alone, are believed to be indifferently contingent.

35 Contingens natum vel est contingens semper, vel contingens in maiori vel contingens in minori parte. Contingens semper alias sic descripsi: contingens semper est contingens natum cuius est causa effectiva quoad

The contingent by nature: Always so, when its cause, naturally ordered to produce this effect, cannot

1. erat A. 2. quod before omne deest A. 3. eciam deest B.  
8. multis aliis B. 10. quo A. 11. scilicet ab deest A; ib. illa B.  
12. et sic B. 13. existens pro episcopus A. 17, 18. falsum — falsum  
deest B. 20. divisi B. 21. sicut B. 22. vel determinate pro sive B.  
25. et sic de B. 27. dicuntur vel pro talia. 28. non de futuro B.  
29. esse deest B. 30. vel deest B. 35. en-m natum B. 36. parte vel  
before contingens B. 37. sicut B. 37, 38. est semper B.

be prevented:  
as the  
movements of  
the heavenly  
bodies, which  
always take  
place, given  
their cause:

*In most cases,*  
when its cause  
can be  
prevented: as  
the usual  
conformation  
of parts of the  
body.

*In few cases,*  
when its cause  
is not naturally  
ordered to that  
effect: as, v. g.  
monsters.

Three  
corollaries.  
I. To every  
proposition as  
to what  
happens in few  
cases, there  
corresponds a  
contradictory  
as to what  
happens for the  
most part: but  
not universally.

As nature  
always orders  
everything one  
way or another,  
if one event  
happens in few  
cases, its  
negation  
happens in  
many.

To be born  
with more than  
five fingers on  
each hand  
happens in few  
cases: not to  
be born thus,  
in many.

The former  
case is  
therefore not  
according to  
the intention of  
nature.

hoc non impedibilis naturaliter ordinata, ut sunt eclipses,  
coniunciones, et talia que sunt in celestibus. Et ortus  
est modus loquendi quod sit semper contingens, non  
absolute 'quoad tempus, sed condicionaliter quoad  
causam; ut semper, posita diametrali oppositione terre 5  
inter solem et lunam, fit eclipsis lune. Contingens  
tamen in maiori parte vocavi contingens natum cuius  
est causa effectiva quoad hoc, impedibilis, naturaliter  
ordinata: ut sunt naturales informaciones membrorum  
et effectus qui sunt in spera corruptibilium ab intento 10  
nature. Contingens in minori parte vocavi contingens  
natum cuius non est causa effectiva ad hoc naturaliter  
ordinata, ut sunt peccata nature et alia que sunt preter  
naturam.

Et ex istis patent 3<sup>a</sup>. Primo, quod omni propositioni 15  
contingenti in minori parte nata est propositio con-  
tingens in maiori contradicere; sed non universaliter;  
et e converso. Si enim sit contingens in minori parte,  
tunc est contingens natum, significans primarie effectum  
cuius non est causa effectiva naturaliter ordinata; et 20  
per consequens eius oppositum formatum erit contingens  
natum, significans | primarie effectum cuius est causa B 30<sup>t</sup>  
effectiva, naturaliter ordinata: natura enim semper ordinat  
unam partem vel alteram contingentis communis nati.  
Ut ista, *homo nascitur cum sex digitis in una manu.* 25  
contradicit huic: *nemo sic nascitur*, que est ordinaria  
affirmativa, quamvis casualiter | oppositum eveniat. A 40<sup>s</sup>  
Sicut enim natura ordinat quod omnis homo nasciturus  
nascetur tantum cum 5 digitis in una manu, ita ordinat  
naturaliter consequens, scilicet quod nemo nascetur 30  
cum pluribus quam 5 digitis in una manu; quamvis  
hoc sit falsum et non impletum quoad omnia singularia:  
quod creditur fieri pro peccato primi hominis. Et  
eodem modo, nato agno monstruoso cum duobus  
capitibus, aut orbato, solum cum duobus pedibus, talis 35  
propositio, *nullus agnus sic nascitur*, est contingens in  
minori parte, quia non est naturaliter ordinatum a  
prima institutione nature quod sic fieret.

1. impeditur B; *ib.* et *pro* eclipses B. 2. huiusmodi *pro* talia B.  
6. *ut* B. 7. tamen *deest* B. 8. impossibilis B. 10. ab intento  
*deest* A. 11. autem in B. 12. quo ad B. 18. et *deest* AB.  
24. partem *pro* alteram B. 25. isti A: iste B; *ib.* nascetur B.  
26. nascetur B. 28. nascitur A. 31. digitis quam quinque B.  
34. monstro A.

Difficultas tamen est magna, utrum natura intendit singularia, et utrum ordinavit quod non fierent talia monstra vel orbata. Et videtur michi quod intendit singularia, et intendit monstra, et alia peccata; hoc tamen est ex viciatione et preter primariam ordinationem nature. Et tamen talia dicuntur quo ad naturam viciatam fieri naturaliter et ab eius intento, non naturaliter, sed preternaturaliter sibi ordinato. Illud autem quod primarie fuit sibi ordinatum, et non illud quod secundarie propter defectum voluntatis, dicitur sibi naturaliter ordinatum. Sic ergo natura ordinat quod tunc fiet talis effectus, et quod tunc non fiet talis. Et sic forte est contingens in maiori parte quod non nascitur homo cum 5 digitis, quia contingens est in maiori parte quod non nascitur homo.

Et ex nullo contingenti in maiori parte sequitur contingens ad utrumlibet, vel contingens in minori; et sic alicui contingenti in maiori parte contradicit contingens in minori, et alicui non. Sed omni contingenti ad utrumlibet contradicit contingens ad utrumlibet; sicut omni contingenti semper contradicit contingens semper, et omni propositioni contingenti in minori contradicit contingens in minori. Ymmo solum affirmativa, vel sibi equivalens, est contingens in minori. Omne ergo singulare contingentis communis est in eadem specie contingentis cum illo communi, ut *me esse generatum cum quinque digitis in una manu* est contingens in maiori parte, | et *me esse casurum* est contingens ad utrumlibet. Sed *me habere talem morbum* est contingens in minori parte. Ista tamen sunt confusa iuvenibus, tum quia supponunt consequentiam, tum quia quandoque fit locutio de signis

A very difficult question: whether nature intends each singular effect, including monsters: I think it does; but monsters are only the secondary intention of viciated nature. Only what happens for the most part is in the primary intention of nature; and thus, as birth is contingent in few cases, so is birth with five fingers on each hand. No 'contingent in most cases' implies anything contingent in few, or indifferently; but the contradictory of the two latter is a proposition of the same kind. And every singular of a given contingent proposition is of the same kind as its universal. But young scholars, for several reasons, have difficulty in conceiving these points clearly.

2. ordinat B. 3. monstra et intendit B. 5. pt A. 8. enim pro autem B. 9. mo i<sup>d</sup> q B. 10. 7 ai'e A; secundario B. 11. naturaliter B; ib. fiat B. 12. fiat B. 13. nascatur B. 15. nascatur B. 17. contingens — contingens deest P. 21. sic B. 23. propositio contingens B. 28. cursurum B. 31. communia iuven' A. 31, 32. omnia pro consequentiam B.

16. *In minori*. It would seem, on the contrary, that a proposition beginning by *most* implies another beginning by *some*, or *few*, and contradicting it. If *most A's are B's*, we naturally conclude that *some*, or *few*, *A's are not B's*. But Wyclif takes such propositions as not excluding universality; as we may say: *Most English merchants are honourable*, without wishing to imply that some are certainly not so.

et quandoque de signatis, tum 3<sup>o</sup> quia supponunt multa sophistis ignota.

II. Some events may be said to take place by chance.

Chance implies a cause which, without intending it, produces an event that takes place in few cases; fortune implies the idea of action against that cause.

The meeting of a debtor with his creditor may be

*fortuitous* as regards the former, but not the latter; a stone breaks a man's head: it is a *chance* as concerns the stone and the sufferer, but not as regards the thrower.

But 'to happen by chance' or 'by fortune' and 'to happen accidentally' or 'fortuitously', do not mean the same, unless in the first case 'by chance' or 'by fortune' are understood adverbially:

it taken as nouns, they stand for the existing cause, producing a given effect which it does not intend.

Secundo principaliter patet quomodo inferendum est aliqua casualiter vel fortuito evenire. Casus enim est causa effectans preter eius intentum contingens aliquid in minori; et talis effectus dicitur quo ad talem causam casualiter evenire. Sed fortuna superaddit casui causam opposito agentem, ut homo. Talia ergo dicuntur fortuite vel casualiter evenire que sunt contingencia in minori ab aliqua causa effectiva, sine eius intento vel proposito huiusmodi producendi; ut invencio debitoris in foro non intendentis illam invencionem vel obviam sed proponentis unum aliquid aliud, dicitur fortuita quo ad illum non sic proponentem, et non fortuita quoad alium illam principaliter proponentem. Et fraccio capitis dicitur casualis quoad lapidem frangentem et illum capitatum, et proposita quo ad iacentem; et sic isti termini, *casuale*, *deliberatum*, *propositum*, et *naturale*, non distinguntur ex opposito, cum respectu diversorum idem sit casuale et propositum. |

A 40<sup>b</sup>

Nota tamen quod ista multum differunt: *hoc fit a casu* vel *a fortuna*, et: *hoc fit casualiter* vel *fortuite*: et sic de similibus. Stat enim effectum per se intentum et propositum sibi a casu vel fortuna, que respectu eius effectus non est casus vel fortuna, sed respectu alterius. Ideo isti termini, *a casu*, et *a fortuna*, quandoque sumuntur modaliter et aliquando nominaliter; modaliter quando convertuntur pro adverbiiis, et nominaliter quando sumuntur pro illis causis efficientibus que respectu aliquorum effectuum sunt casus vel fortune. Et fit sensus compositus vel divisus cum istis terminis, *casuale* et *fortuitum*, sicut cum aliis modalibus: ut casuale est quo ad causam aliquam quod *iste homo desideratus a Sor nascatur*, et non est casuale ad

1. et *deest* B. 3. sed *pro* secundo A. 4. et *pro* vel B. 5. *qñ*\* A; *ib.* aliud A. 7. tamen *pro* causam B. 8. agente A; *ib.* enim B. 12. intencionem B. 13. ad *pro* aliquid A. 14. et *deest* B. 15. et dicitur B; *ib.* lapidis *pro* capitis A. 17. *ppot*\* A; *ib.* quoad illum iacentem B. 18. naturaliter B. 20. oppositum AB. 24. et *pro* vel B. 27. quandoque *pro* aliquando. 28. convertitur A; *ib.* cum *pro* pro AB.

6. Wyclif's definition of chance is narrower than the modern meaning. A 'toss-up' would in his opinion, not be chance, since 'heads' turn up in the long run as often as 'tails', and are, therefore, not contingent in *minori*.

eandem causam quod *iste homo nascatur*. Et sic forte est de contingenti semper, de contingente in maiori parte et de contingenti in minori parte: et specialiter apud illos qui dicunt quod respectu cuiuscunque effectus est volicio dei causa naturaliter antecedens. Quodlibet ergo singulare contingens universalis necessarii  
 B 32<sup>b</sup> est | contingens semper: ut *istum hominem esse*, et sic de similibus; cum, posita ista anima actuante, ponitur iste homo. Nec oportet, si aliquod ens fit a natura, quod fiat naturaliter; quia omne peccatum fit a natura; sed oportet quod fiat ex primaria inclinacione nature vel activa vel passiva, ad hoc quod fiat naturaliter. Unde stat eundem effectum fieri naturaliter et violente; naturaliter quo ad naturam passivam, et violente quo ad naturam activam, sicut patet de multis alteracionibus. Ymmo stat eandem denominacionem esse unam nature agenti naturalem et alteri violentam.

Unde ista non repugnant, *naturale* et *casuale* vel *violentum*; et multo magis ista non repugnant, *naturale*,  
 20 *supernaturale*, *voluntarium* et *artificiale*, cum idem potest respectu diversorum esse simul tale et tale. Unde nullum bonum potest fieri, nisi naturaliter vel voluntarie. Et sic creditur idem quo ad voluntatem dei infrustrabilem esse contingens semper quod nos  
 25 ponimus contingens in maiori respectu cause 2<sup>e</sup>. Et eadem productio anime est preternaturalis respectu dei, que quo ad naturam est naturalis; ymmo omne productum producitur supernaturaliter ab eo quo ad causas secundas; sic quod ipse naturaliter et voluntarie  
 30 facit hoc: et in comparacione ad causas secundas sit supernaturaliter. Sed in significacione talium est magna dissensio, cum aliqui distinguunt talia ex opposito, et, ut videtur michi, minus bene.

Tercio principaliter patet quomodo tales proposiciones  
 35 affirmative de preterito et futuro cum talibus determinacionibus determinate, ad utrumlibet casualiter contingit; et cetere probari debent per resolutionem

In the latter sense, all that happens contingently might be said to take place by chance, as to its merely natural causes.

'Naturally' means not only 'by nature', but 'as following the primitive tendency of nature'. So the same effect may be both natural and against nature.

There is no contradiction between the natural and the fortuitous or violent; still less between the natural, the supernatural, the voluntary, and the artificial: the same thing can be all these at once. What God wills to take place always takes place, though we say that its cause produces it only in most cases; natural as to the latter, it is supernatural in its First Cause. III. It is thus clear how propositions determinately true in the past or future tense may be

3. parte — parte *deest* A. 4. regula *pro* respectu B. 5. causa dei A.  
 8. posita cum AB; *ib.* omnia *pro* anima B; *ib.* actūte A. 9. quod si B.  
 10. quod — quia *deest* B; *ib.* quod — natura *twice* A. 12. vel *before* activa  
*deest* B. 13. 14. et violente naturaliter *deest* A. 16. denominacionem  
*deest* B. 17. violentem B. 18. causale *pro* et casuale B. 30. quo ad B;  
*ib.* fit B. 36. 37. qtingēt' A; qtingūt' B. 37. cum *pro* cetere A.

indifferently  
contingent at  
the same time:  
while such as  
are  
indeterminate  
should not be  
expounded, but  
analysed  
according to the  
tense.

The verb *to be*  
as affirmative is  
alone modified  
in such cases,  
not the whole  
compound.

So v. g. God  
is (contingently)  
able to cause;  
yet His power  
is not  
contingent.

This means:  
He has power  
to cause  
contingently.

*This will*  
*necessarily take*  
*place; i. e.,*  
*it will be*  
*necessary for*  
*this to take*  
*place.*

*God can*  
*necessarily*  
*create man;*  
*i. e., His power*  
*to create is*  
*necessary.*

And a  
determinate  
future is  
necessary only  
in the future.

temporis verbi, et non primo per exponentes talium  
terminorum modalium: ut, *Sor* indeterminate *fuit futurus*  
*et adhuc est*, si non sit dare ultimum instans esse  
hominis; et *sic Sor* contingenter ad utrumlibet *facturus*  
*fuit tale opus*, et post determinacionem non; et sic 5  
casualiter potest mors hominis esse ex intoxicacione,  
cum tamen necessario potest esse ex intoxicacione.  
Stat enim talem terminum determinare hoc verbum  
*esse*, ratione actus verbi, et non ratione tocius compo-  
sicionis, ut patet in talibus: *contingenter potest homo* 10  
*esse, casualiter potest frangere caput Sortis*. Et ex hoc  
patet solucio ad illud argumentum; *qualitercunque deus*  
*causat me potest causare me; sed contingenter causat*  
*me; ergo, contingenter potest causare me*. Conclusio  
enim est vera, cum | iste terminus *contingenter* deter- B 32<sup>a</sup>  
minat hoc verbum | *causare*, ratione sui actus et non A 41<sup>a</sup>  
ratione tocius connexi. Et sic hoc erit necessario, vel  
necessario erit, quia tunc erit ita quod hoc necessario  
est; et tamen non est necesse, sed erit necesse hoc  
fore. Et illud multum discrepat a communi conceptu 20  
sophistarum. Unde non sequitur: *necessario potest deus*  
*creare hominem; ergo, non contingenter potest creare*  
*hominem*. Nec sequitur: *necessario hoc erit; ergo, non*  
*potest esse quin hoc erit*; et sic de ceteris. Prima non  
valet, quia creacio potest esse contingens, quamvis 25  
potencia sit necessaria. Et secunda non valet, quia,  
cum modi sunt oppositiones, non distribuunt verba  
pro differentiis temporum, sicut faciunt negaciones  
precedentes. Et ideo si *hoc erit necessario*, quia in B

1. *contingenter deest* A. 6, 7. intoxicacione — intoxicacione *deest* A.  
a. vocis *pro* tocius A. 10. de *pro* in B. 11. potest B. 13. potest  
deus B; *ib.* deus causat B. 14. deus potest B. 17. sui tocius  
complexi B. 21. *fophis*<sup>21</sup> A. 24. *similibus pro* ceteris B; *ib.* enim  
consequencia *pro* prima non B. 25. tanto *pro* creacio. 26. n'o non A.  
27. distribuentes B.

17. *Hoc erit necessario*. Later scholastics (particularly Suarez and the Molinists) deny this necessity; or rather they substitute for it the word *certainly* or *logical* necessity; which they assert to be merely in the mind. For instance: I have a bird in my hand: I shall either kill it or not: one of the two future contradictories is *certain*, but this certitude, depending on my free-will, is not necessary; and God knows it thus. Thomists, of course, dispute this position. It seems to be that of Wyclif, though he uses other terms.

*instanti erit necessario, non tamen non poterit non fore, sed aliquando erit ita quod hoc non poterit non fore.*

Et ex hoc patet dispositio figure in talibus modalibus. Nam isti termini, *possibile est, contingens est, contingit, potest esse*, quos habeo pro eodem, contradicunt huic termino, *impossibile est*, et non iste terminus *possibile est* vel *contingens est*, nominaliter sumptus; cum nec sit impossibile *me currere*, nec  
 10 *contingens* (hoc est, veritas *contingens*), est veritas *contingens*, si *contingit me currere*. Et conformiter isti termini, *contingit non, possibile vel contingens est*, non contradicunt huic termino, *necessarium*. Unde generaliter ad contradictorium in modalibus assignanda sinonimis dictis, modi contradictorii debent  
 15 addi; ut ista contradicunt: *necesse est omnem hominem esse* et *contingit hominem non esse*; et *necesse est omnem hominem non esse*, et hec contrariantur: *impossibile est omnem hominem esse*, et, *necesse est*  
 20 *omnem hominem esse*. Et illis subalternatur ista; *contingit omnem hominem esse*, et, *contingit non omnem hominem esse*. Et sic de similibus. Non ergo debent mutari dicta in contradictoria vel contraria, sed semper sunt sinonima capienda. Non debent verba mutari in  
 25 verba de preterito vel futuro; ut sic: *necessarium erit anticristum esse*; *possibile erit ipsum non esse etc.* sed sic: *necessarium est quod ipse erit, possibile est quod non erit*: ita quod modi semper includant verba de presenti, etc.

30 Et patet quomodo talia probari possunt quadrupliciter a priori; ut sic: *necesse est deum esse, ergo contingit deum esse; impossibile est chimeram esse, ergo contingit illam non esse. A posteriori*; ut: ista propositio est possibilis: "tu es", que primarie significat te  
 35 esse; ergo possibile est te esse. Ex opposito, ut: non

Aristotle's diagram shows this, for he opposes 'impossible to be' etc. to 'possible to be' etc.; not the nouns impossible and possible, as such.

As a general rule, when opposites to modal propositions have to be assigned the contradictory, contrary or subalternate terms must be employed:

The pure signification of the proposition should be left as it is, and the modal terms always joined to a verb in the present.

All these can be proved in the usual four-fold manner: a priori, as: A must be B; therefore A can be B; or: A cannot be B, therefore.

1. aliquando pro non before poterit A. 2. forte A. 3. forte A.  
 2-4. sed — Et deest B. 7. est deest A. 8. contingens est et possibile est B; est deest A. 10. est — contingens twice deest B. 11. sed pro si B. 14. contradiccionem B. 17. esse animal before et contingit B; ib. animal et before necesse B. 17. 18. vel contingit non omnem hominem esse animal pro et after non esse — esse B. 18. non deest A. 20. subalternantur tunc B. 20. anticristum pro ipsum B.

27. hic pro sic A; ib. pctm pro necessarium B. 28. ipse non B; ib. includentur B. 32. deum pro chimeram B. 33. deum pro illam B.

possibly *A* is  
not *B*; a  
posteriori:  
*A* is *B*, is a  
possible  
proposition  
therefore  
possibly *A* is *B*.  
Ex opposito:  
the opposite of  
*A* is *B* is  
impossible;  
therefore  
possibly *A* is *B*.  
Ex aequo: *A* is  
not  
necessarily *B*;  
therefore *A* is *B*  
contingently.

sequitur | *contradiccio ex hoc quod tu es*, sicut patet B 32<sup>b</sup>  
capiendo eius oppositum: ergo, possibile est te esse.  
Ex equo: ut: non necesse est te esse: ergo, contingit te  
non esse. Et correspondenter subalternata negativa.  
Et tanta de istis modalibus dicta sufficiant pro pre-5  
senti.

3. non esse ergo *A*.

1. B 32<sup>b</sup> is blank, as also seventeen leaves that follow, of  
which four have been cut, and nine torn out, so that there remain  
only four. The pagination (B 33<sup>a</sup>) is continued *after* the blank  
leaves. As may have been seen, the MS. B, notwithstanding a  
good many defects, is superior to A. The third part of *Logica*,  
forming a separate volume, is only in B; and from here to the  
end of this volume, we have only A. We are, therefore, now  
entering on the most difficult part of the work; for the matter  
of the first part (also unique in A) was comparatively easy.



## CAPITULUM DECIMUMTERCIUM.

Sequitur de sex alijs generibus terminorum, ratione quorum accidunt sophisticaciones in proposicionibus medijs, pertractandum; scilicet de *scire* et *dubitare*, de *incipit* et *desinit*, de *per se* et *per accidens*, de istis terminis *infinitum* et *immediate*; de terminis *comparativis* et de terminis *de plurali*.

Et primo de *scire* et *dubitare*. Ubi primo notandum quod hec verba sunt equivoca valde. Aliquod est enim *scire actuale*, et aliquod *habituale*; et hec differunt in hoc quod omne *scire actualiter* est actus de predicamento accionis, et *scire habituale* est habitus de prima specie qualitatis. Et utrumque membrum subdividitur; nam *scire habituale* vel est improprie dictum; | ut sciencia universalium necessariorum experimentalium: sicut est sciencia talium; *omnis homo est, omnis ignis est calidus*. Sciencia magis proprie dicta est sciencia principiorum; sicut sciencia talium; *nichil simul est et non est, omnis numerus est par vel impar*, etc. Sed sciencia maxime proprie dicta est sciencia conclusionis ostensive demonstrate; ut sciencia qua scitur omnem datam lineam rectam esse basem trianguli, rectilineam vocando lineam datam, cui convenit equalem lineam rectam ab utroque extremo quo et similibus protrahere, sicut non est dyiameter mundi. Sciencia actualis vel est

The rest of this second part consists in an examination of *knowledge* and *doubt*, *beginning* and *ending*, the infinitely *great* and *small*, *comparative* terms and terms in the *plural*. Both 'to know' and 'to doubt' have various meanings. There is actual and habitual knowledge; the latter divided into experimental knowledge of necessary facts as v. g. *fire is warm*, the knowledge of principles, v. g. the principle of contradiction, or that all numbers are odd or even; and deductive knowledge; as when we know that every given line is, and that the diameter of

1. Cap. *deest* A.      2. *Initial S in red ink* A.      11. de actō A.  
14. *proprie* A.      15. exp<sup>nn</sup>q<sup>m</sup> A.      25. *dyamet'* m̃di A.

6. *Immediatis*. In Wyclif's system, as developed more at length in the third part of *Logica*, the extended is made up of mathematical points (*non quantis*) immediately touching each other. This will account for my translation of the term by 'infinitely small'. 25. *Diameter mundi*. So far as I can understand, Wyclif considers the world as an enormous sphere, beyond which there is *no space*. The diameter of the world is therefore not a *given* line, i. e. one that can be produced. This explains one point; still I do not see how the world's diameter cannot be the base of a triangle, unless indeed the world is supposed infinitely great.

the world  
cannot be  
the base of a  
triangle.  
Actual  
knowledge  
is either the  
actuality of  
habitual  
knowledge or of  
a contingent  
object, either  
by the senses,  
or by the  
perception  
(called by  
Grosseteste  
*erratical*  
knowledge) of  
intrinsic  
quality.  
Again, both  
actual and  
habitual  
knowledge  
are either  
distinct or  
confused;  
distinct  
as to their first  
object;  
confused as to  
others,  
secondarily  
implied therein.

In this sense  
(confusedly) we  
may know all,  
even that of  
which we  
doubt;

but knowledge  
is generally  
taken to mean  
distinct  
knowledge.  
Asked 'if the  
Pope is in  
Rome?' we  
answer that we  
do not know;  
i.e. as concerns  
the present  
moment,  
and it is thus  
that logicians  
have affirmed  
that we do not  
know that of  
which we doubt  
or are ignorant.

actualis apprehensio necessarii, de quo habetur habitus, vel est actualis apprehensio contingentis, de quo nec habetur nec haberi potest habitus: ut sciencia qua scio te sedere. Et hoc contingit dupliciter, vel quod sit sciencia actualis *sensualis*, que vocatur noticia sensitiva; 5 ut scio quod ista albedo est vel aliquod quod sencio: vel sciencia actualis *erratica* alicuius virtutis interioris; et hec contingit esse *de presente*, ut scio Sortem amicum esse meum, et [me] amicum eius esse; vel *absente*; ut scio Romam esse pulcram civitatem, et hominem 10 esse in Anglia. Et de tali scibili, ut videtur michi, potest esse quedam dispositio quam Linconiensis vocat scienciam erraticam vel scienciam communiter dictam.

Ulterius sciendum [quod tam] sciencia actualis quam sciencia habitualis subdividitur, cum aliqua talis sit 15 *distincta* et alia *confusa*; *distincta* respectu illius ad quod principaliter terminatur, et *confusa*, respectu illius ad quod secundarie terminatur. Verbi gracia, in sciendo omnem hominem in sciencia universalis, scio istum hominem esse, ipso existente; sed ista sciencia 20 terminatur principaliter ad naturam communem, ratione cuius est sciencia universalis; et respectu illius est sciencia *distincta*, cum per illam distincte scitur omnem hominem esse, sed *confuse*; vel in universalis scitur istum hominem esse, quia ista sciencia, respectu talis 25 singularis, est *confusa* et per aliud secundarie terminatur. Et iuxta istum sensum conceditur quod quilibet homo scit omnia ista sciencia transcendente omnia, sicut et per consequens scit sibi dubium, et sibi in particulari ignotum. Et sic, quicquid homo adiscit, prius scivit 30 confuse; et sic omnis malus actualiter ignorans *distincte*. Sed communiter restringitur *scire* ad *distincte scire*, ut quando queritur ab aliquo *utrum papa est Rome?* et ipse dubitat, dicit quod nescit: quod intelligendum est cum modificacione quod nescit vel ignorat in particu- 35 lari. Et illum sensum habuerunt illi famosi logici et subtiles qui scripserunt quod, sive *scire* proprie singulariter, sive communiter, nichil scitur ab aliquo, quod eidem est dubium. Et cum unum oppositorum tot modis dicitur quot et reliqui, patet quod *ignorare* et 40 *nescire* tot modis correspondentibus possunt sumi.

6. ad *pro* aliquod A. 8. esse amicum esse A. 9. me *deest* A.  
11. scibili A. 14. quod tam *deest* A. 26. per *deest* A. 28. sunt *pro*  
sicut A. 31. malus — *distincte sic* A. 37, 38. fu'ar A. 40. quot et tot A.

Potest ergo dici pro descripción habenda de isto termino, *scire*, quo ad membra equivocata, quod sicut *scire* habituale est habituari vel habere habitum cognitum, sic *scire* actuale est credere sine contraria formidine veritatem. Sicut enim habere motum est moveri, et  
 A 42<sup>a</sup> habere veritatem est esse virtuosum, sic habere habitum cognitum est scire vel cognoscere. Et *scire* actuale, cum sit actus adherendi vel credendi, dicit ultra actum illum, existenciam crediti; quia impossibile est quod non ens  
 10 sit scitum vel cognitum, nisi forte homo ampliet istos terminos ad quamcunque apprehensionem, sicut faciunt theologi.

Actual knowledge is an act of unhesitating belief in the truth.

Thus what is believed must actually exist; a nonentity cannot be known.

Et ex isto patet quod *scire* actuale per accidens est scire, sed per se est credere; et eadem credulitas pura  
 15 que est sciencia, credito existente, foret non sciencia, illo credito non existente; ut si, per primam medietatem hore credidi sine hesitatione quod papa est, cum hoc quod fuit ita continue, et per secundam continue eandem credulitatem puram, cum hoc quod ipse non  
 20 sit, tunc ille actus qui per primum tempus fuit sciencia, per 2<sup>m</sup> tempus erit non sciencia. Aliqui tamen ponunt aggregata per accidens, et sic dicunt scienciam talem esse aggregatam ex actu et relacione, et illud desinere esse ad desicionem relacionis. Sed, quomodo-  
 25 cunque sit ad hoc, concedendum est quod *scire* est per accidens scire.

And what is knowledge while its object exists, ceases to be so when the object exists no longer: if the Pope were to die, my knowledge of his existence would no longer be knowledge.

Secundo patet quod quantumcunque remissa credulitas veritatis, cum hoc quod sit pura, sine hesitatione, est sciencia. Unde stat quod una credulitas discibilis  
 30 sit sciencia, et alia credulitas eiusdem intensior sit non sciencia propter formidinem oppositi. Et sic laici qui non dubitant vel discurrunt circa media certificanda de credito, frequenter sciunt ubi literati, et specialiter philosophi, querentes demonstrationes ignorant. Aliqui  
 35 enim tantum querunt medium inevitabiliter concludens et per se notum in talibus, quod dubitant, quacunque

It is sufficient for knowledge that the belief, however faint, be unhesitating, and the object true.

And thus the unlettered very frequently know that of which philosophers doubt; for the latter wishing to prove by conclusive evident demonstrations

1. dici A. 6. after habere, hec *very indistinct* A. 14. idem *pro* eadem.  
 21. et per A. 24. deficōm *pro* desicionem A. 27, 28. increduli<sup>a</sup> A.  
 31. logici A. 32. ctificā<sup>a</sup> A.

34. *Aliqui* etc. This passage reminds us very strikingly of the beginning of Descartes' *Discours sur la méthode*, and proves that Scholastics were far from being so dogmatical as is generally believed.

the existence of all things, doubt the evidence of their senses, which is the only one we can have in such matters.

substantia vel re sensibili ostensa, utrum iam sit, et sic utrum dormiunt aut vigilant, et breuiter omne sensibile; quia, ut dicunt, omnis apparencia posita posset creari cum hoc quod esset illusio. Layci autem non querunt tale medium, sed adherent sine formidine<sup>5</sup> nec sollicitando de medio; et sic satis sciunt, quia aliter non est talis materia a nobis nunc scibilis.

It follows that if unhesitating belief in anything is not knowledge, the thing itself is not true; for if it were, it would fulfil the definition of the conditions of knowledge. Questions put to a man convinced of a fact may to some degree diminish his knowledge by producing doubt. In the case of so called 'obligations' we may have to affirm a thing, deny our knowledge of it, and grant that we do both. But if by 'to know' we mean 'to know actually and distinctly', then there can be no such confusion; we do not know that of which we doubt, in the same way as that of which we do not doubt. Sophisms cannot be made in these matters with incomplext, but only with complex propositions.

Et ex hoc patet 3<sup>o</sup> quod talis consequencia est concedenda, cum non scis 'sic' et credis 'sic' sine *hesitacione*; ergo, 'sic' non est, iuxta regulam in con-<sup>10</sup> sequenciis. Demonstrando enim per ly 'sic' quod iste est argenteus denarius, dum de facto sit cupreus, et supposito quod credas sic sine formidine, nichil deficit a sciencia tua respectu illius, nisi quod illud sit. Unde evidencie et interrogaciones facte homini<sup>15</sup> scienti datum scibile possunt facere ipsum, ratione dubitacionis, aliquid nescire illud, ipso stante. Et patet, ex regulis obligacionum et hic dictis, quomodo, posito tibi quod credas sine *hesitacione* quod *filius tuus sit*, habeas postmodum negare in casu<sup>20</sup> quod tu scis quod *filius tuus est*; ymmo, negare quod *filius tuus est* et concedere quod *simul negas et credis sine hesitacione unum et idem*. Sed cum in equivocis non est contradiccio, supponatur quod fiat locucio solum de *scire actuali et distincto*, restrin-<sup>25</sup> gendo terminum solum ad illud, *scire*. Et sic nichil scitur ab aliquo quod dubitatur eodem actu ab eodem, sicut patet ex descriptioe supposita. Homo non scit aliquam proposicionem esse veram quam ignorat et dubitat esse veram, sicut scit quod aliquid est | quod A 42<sup>b</sup> non sic scit; ymmo hominem esse scit et hominem esse dubitat. Unde respectu complexorum vel equivalencium fiunt sophismata cum talibus verbis et non respectu incomplexorum; ut hoc non est sophisma; *scio aliquam proposicionem esse et aliquam proposicionem scio*,<sup>35</sup> sed hoc: *scio aliquam proposicionem esse veram, et aliquam proposicionem scio esse falsam*. Stat enim me scire in universalis aliquam proposicionem esse veram, cum hoc quod nullam sic credam esse in mente mea vel in mundo.<sup>40</sup>

Solution of the usual fallacies in this matter.

Et sic ex dictis hic et alibi patet solucio ad consequencia argumenta que in communibus casibus huius

materie solent fieri. Ut, posito quod scias quod A est altera istarum: *deus est, homo est asinus*, quarum primam scias esse necessariam et secundam impossibilem, sed dubites que istarum sit A; patet quod casus est impossibilis, cum non sit possibile A esse talem propositionem: sed, admissio gracia argumenti, per A intelligatur altera istarum indistincte, sic quod A sit talis propositio: hoc potest dupliciter intelligi; vel quod iste terminus, A significet convertibiliter cum isto termino, *altera istarum*, et tunc non est difficultas respondendi, quia tunc scis A esse verum et A scis [non] esse verum. Ymmo proposito A, habes querere quid A proponitur, cum sint duo A. Sed secundo modo, magis ad propositum difficultatis, potest iste terminus A intelligi convertibiliter cum isto termino, *alterum istorum*, cui imponitur talis terminus A ad significandum. Sic enim frequenter mixtim concepimus nomina rerum cum ipsis rebus, sicut patet de talibus: hic est Johannes, Vilhelmus, Robertus, etc. Et tunc conceditur in casu quod A scis esse verum, et non dubitas A, sed dubitas A esse verum, et dubitas A esse falsum; et, proposito A, ipsum est concedendum. Sed quando opponens dicit "propono tibi A"; respondens sine pluri habet hoc negare. Sed potest dicere quod proponat, et respondebit. Et conformis est solutio ad talem casum.

Ponatur quod scias alteram istarum esse veram, *rex sedet; nullus rex sedet*, sed quod utramque dubites esse veram, sciendo quod A sit unum istorum, et unum A omne A. Admissio enim isto casu impossibili, gracia communicandi, est triplex responsio. Prima, que intel-

Suppose that by A is meant either an evident or an absurd proposition, it not being known which: this is an impossible case, since A cannot be either of the two. But admitting this for the argument's sake, it may have two meanings. Either A stands for one of the two propositions; then it is evident that A is true, and also not true. So then it must be asked which A is meant, since there are two 'one of the two'. Or it stands for one of the two things signified by the propositions; as names are often made to stand for things. Then we must say that we know A and without doubting it we doubt its truth or its falsehood;

6. p<sup>a</sup> A. 11. *istis (i probably punctuation) after tunc A: ib. non deest A.* 12. quod A.

1. *Ut, posito.* Wyclif supposes the difficulty known, and hardly states it. It is as follows: A being one of two propositions (which it is, is not known), but one of them is known to be evident and the other absurd: the question comes: What do you know about A? If you say, 'Nothing', then whichever proposition it signifies this is false, for you know something about them. If you say: 'It is true' or 'It is false', the sophist gives you its meaning, so as to stultify your assertion. If you say: 'It is both', this is also wrong, since A is not both propositions. — Logicians would at the present day answer: It is either true or false, according as it may happen to stand for one proposition or the other.

or simply deny that A is proposed to us. If A means one of two contradictory, neither of which is known as true, there are three solutions.

1. A stands for 'one of these two'; then it does not follow that if A is true, both are true.

2. A stands for *this proposition*, then it is impossible to know that A is true, without knowing whether the proposition for which it stands is true.

3. A stands for *the one proposition of the two that is true*; in this case, A is true, but it does not follow that either proposition chosen at random, is so. Thus we cannot know any person as a singular, without knowing who he is.

Or we may grant that we know *this* to be *this* in general, but not *this* or that person separately.

ligit A esse terminum communem, convertibilem cum isto termino, *unum istorum*; et tunc non sequitur, si A est verum, *hoc est verum*, quocunque illarum demonstretur. Nec sequitur *omnem propositionem quam scis esse veram scis*; sed tu scis A *proposicionem esse veram*: 5 *ergo, tu scis A proposicionem*, quia tu scis A esse verum: sed *nullum A scis esse verum*, ymmo esse verum scitur a te, et A esse verum dubitatur a te, in sensu diviso. Si autem (et sic magis ad propositum) hoc nomen A sit singulare, convertibile cum tali *hoc*, vo- 10 catum tali nomine A, demonstrando illam quecunque fuerit vera: patet quod casus est impossibilis, cum idem sit scire A omne verum istorum et scire *hoc*, vocatum tali nomine, A, esse verum istorum: quod repugnat casui. Si autem tercio ponatur quod iste 15 terminus A convertatur cum isto, *verum istorum*, vocatum tali nomine A, tunc patet quod non sequitur, si A est verum, *hoc est verum*, demonstrando illud quod est A. Ymmo repugnat casui te cognoscere istam consequenciam sic significantem esse bonam, cum ad 20 cognicionem bonitatis illius, communem sic significantis, requiritur cognoscere quid iste terminus *hoc* demonstrat.

Et ex eodem patet quomodo non est possibile, *me scire hoc esse hoc*, et *nescire hoc esse Sortem*. Sed dubitatur utrum sit | Sor vel Plato, nisi cointelligendo A 43<sup>a</sup> cum nominibus propriis appellacionem secundum talia nomina; ita quod idem sit *hoc esse Sor* et *hoc esse hoc vocatum tali nomine, Sor*. Et patet quod sic ista propositio, *homo hic est Sor*, non significat primarie *hoc esse hoc*, nec primarie significat quod *hoc est Sor* 30 *vel Plato*; sed significat primarie quod *hoc est hoc vocatum tali nomine Sor*. Et iuxta hoc conceditur in casu quod *tu scis hoc esse hoc*, sed *non scis hoc esse Sor*; et scis *hoc esse Sor vel Platonem*; sed *nec divisim scis hoc esse Sor*, *nec divisim scis hoc esse Platonem*. Nec 35 sequitur quod *hoc potest esse asinus*, propter vocacionem tali nomine, *asinus*; quia propria nomina et non talia communia connotant taliter res secunde imposicionis.

1. t'm<sup>9</sup> pro terminum A. 13. v'm A. 14. v'm A. 16. v'm A.  
18. v'm A. 23. exodem A. 26. sic pro hic A. 33. omne pro esse  
before hoc A. 34. divisam A. 35. divisam A.

3. *Quocunque illarum*. Here, and l. 27 and 28 of p. 181, there seems to be a confusion of genders. But I think Wyclif understands in one case *proposicionem*, and in the other, *terminum* (p. 181, l. 15).

Patet etiam noscentibus artem obligatoriam solutio ad illos consimiles casus, in quibus non certificatur de significato termini demonstrativi; ut, posito quod scias quid demonstratur per subiectum huius, *hoc est homo*, et nichil dubites *hoc esse hominem*, omnibus aliis terminis solum primarie significantibus; tunc ista propositio, *hoc est homo*, quoad significationem primariam tibi cognitam est scita a te esse vera, vel scita a te esse falsa, sicut esset nullo circumposito. Ideo, cum non sis limitatus per casum quid demonstrativum significet, potes et debes eligere quodcunque singulare volueris significari per ipsum; et iuxta hoc concedere vel negare, sicut faceres absque casu. Si enim proponatur michi, *hoc est*, et voluero, gracia communicandi, querere quid opponens demonstrat, et noluerit michi certificare; ego eligerem unum quod scio esse vel quod scio non esse; et iuxta hoc concederem propositionem, vel negarem. Nec refert quid horum fecero; nec habebit opponens argumentum contra me, ut patebat in materia de obligationibus.

Or take the case in which no particular meaning is attached to the demonstrative, *this*, as: *This is a man*. I can ask my opponent what particular being he means by *this*; if he refuses to say, my duty is to choose any one I like, and deny or grant the proposition accordingly.

Ex eadem autem sententia patet quomodo sit respondendum, posito quod A et B propositiones sciuntur a te, et si dubitetur a te, non existentibus aliis, A, vel B, vel C, quam istis; et sic transpantur quod nescias que sit A, vel B, aut que C. Nam casus est possibilis, quia stat cum isto casu quod nescias que illorum sit A, vel B, vel C, cum stat A sciri a te et te nescire quod A scitur a te, vel quod est in rerum natura. Et hoc iuvat multum ad possibilitatem casus; quia stat te scire hoc sciri a te, et hoc esse A, et tamen te [non] scire A sciri a te. Nec sequitur, *latet te A sciri a te*; ergo *dubitas A sciri a te*, quia multa latent te de quibus non consideras semper, loquendo iuxta primam limitationem significationis. Stat etiam quod scias A sciri a te et, illo proposito, non cognoscere quod illud A scitur a te; quamvis bene scias tam A quam B sciri

If of three propositions, A, B, and C, no others existing, A and B are known, and C not; and they are so mixed that it is not known which is which, it is clear that A, v. g. is not known; and yet we know that we know A.

But we can know A and yet not know which it is, and this doubt is a consequence of our knowledge.

10. causam A; *ib.* dem<sup>ra</sup> A. 18. quod A. 19. pte<sup>h</sup> A. 30. non deest A.

21. I may be mistaken, but this is how I understand the following difficulty. Three written propositions, v. g. I exist, England is in Europe, and  $x = \frac{1}{2}y$  are each put into a box, so that the respondent does not know in which they are. He is then asked: Do you know the proposition that is in this box? The answer is: I know it in so far as it is one of the three, i. e. indistinctly.

The direct act of knowledge may exist without being accompanied by the act of reflecting upon it.

And we may know what we think we do not know: as v. g. when we know an experimental proposition, and doubt whether it can be known without an operation of the senses.

So it by no means follows that we do not know a thing, because we doubt whether that is knowledge.

All this depends on the fact that actual knowledge can be of only one thing at a time.

We may know the premises, and see that the syllogism is good, and yet doubt whether the conclusion is true.

But when we speak of cognition in general as a state of mind, it is otherwise; and those who have denied this verbally seem to mean the same as we.

We can know a proposition in three ways: by knowing its existence, or its significance, or its truth.

a te et sic dubitari a te. Tria prima patent ex dictis; et quartum patet ex hoc quod, quacunque proposicione proposita, non, si *scis illam*, *scis* distincte *te scire illam*, vel dubitas te scire illam; sed stat te scire illam, cum actus sciendi directus posset esse sine tali actu reflexo. Nec sequitur, *tu scis illam; ergo, non consideras utrum scis illam*: sed stat cum hoc quod nescias (vel non scias) te scire illam, ymmo, quod dubites ac credas te nescire illam. Ut, posito quod credas | quod A43<sup>b</sup> ad sciendum talem sensibilem proposicionem requiritur 10 eius noticia sensualis (ut multi opinantur); vel quod dubites utrum requiritur eius noticia sensualis; tunc, posito quod credas unam veram proposicionem sensibilem sine dubitatione, patet quod scis illam iuxta unum modum loquendi, et nescis quod dubitas utrum 15 scias illam: ergo, etc. Ex hoc eciam patet quod non sequitur, si *consequencia sit bona et antecedens eius sit scitum a te*, quod *consequens sciatur a te*. Nec sequitur: *tu nescis quod hoc scitur a te; ergo, hoc non scitur a te*.

Et ratio omnium talium est quia, cum solum loquitur 20 de sciencia actuali, stat elicere unum talem actum, non eliciendo reliquum. Ymmo, non video quin stat communiter scire consequenciam esse bonam, et scire antecedens, nesciendo consequens, putando vel dubitando falsum sequi ex vero. Aliter tamen dicendum est, 25 loquendo de sciencia in universali; sic enim loquendo, si quidquam scis, aliquid scis. Credo tamen quod alii, dicentes verbaliter oppositum, habuerunt sanum conceptum quem nunc non oportet explicare. Sed pro casu et conclusione declaranda, supponitur quod scire pro 30 posicionem possit tripliciter intelligi: vel communiter, sciendo illam esse, vel proprie, cognoscendo illam significare aliquammodo primarie et cognoscere sic esse; vel 3<sup>o</sup> magis proprie, cognoscendo proposicionem sibi significantem esse veram; et ista significacio est famosa; 35 et sic de *dubitare* et *ignorare*. Primo modo non est inconveniens proposicionem scitam vel cognitam ab homine esse sibi dubiam; sed inconveniens esset idem

6. non *deest* A. 6, 7. *considerans* A. 23. *videro* A.

26. Wyclif most likely alludes to the effect produced by those arguments of abstruse metaphysic which Kant calls the Antinomia of pure Reason. Otherwise such a state of mind would be very unsound.



complexum esse distincte scitum et oppositè dubium. Secundo modo loquendo, contingit proposicionem esse scitam ab homine, cum hoc quod, illa demonstrata sibi, nesciat utrum sit vera. Ut ponatur quod, communiter sciendo, Sor Oxonie sciat A esse proposicionem asoream et B auream, quarum prima significat primarie "deum esse", et 2<sup>a</sup> significat primarie "mundum esse"; et dubitet C proposicionem argenteam, que primarie significat "populum sedere": et sint in Grecia significantes figuratè modo greco; et patet conclusio. Sic enim communiter scio quod rex vel aliud absens est; et tamen, illo proposito, non sensualiter scio illum regem esse; et sic de qualibet illarum proposicionum grecarum. Nec sunt due prime significaciones extranee; quia ad cognoscendum rem sufficit cognoscere ipsam esse; cum ergo omne *scire* sit cognoscere, et econtra, sicut omnis noticia est sciencia et econtra, qualiter non sciretur propositio, ipsa cognita? sic enim sciuntur omnia mundi ex hoc quod scitur illa esse. Nec est secunda significacio extranea, quia secundum famosos logicos, proposita vera proposicione quam homo dubitat esse proposicionem, dum adhuc non cognoscit eius significacionem, dubitat illam in quantum dubitat qualiter illa significat, sic quod illa non significat sibi quater, ergo non dubitat proposicionem absentem.

So likewise of doubt and ignorance. The third sort of cognition is most famous; the first sort does not exclude doubt from the two other points of view; nor the second from the third.

These significations are really intrinsic; the knowledge that a proposition exists,

or that it means thus and thus, is true knowledge.

Similiter, *homo scit regem sedere*, cum hoc tamen quod illud | scitum non moveat illum; ergo non repugnat scire signum et significatum, saltem abstractivè, sine hoc quod ipsum moveat scientem, vel natum sit movere. Sic enim stat cognoscere quaecunque rem sine hoc quod illa moveat, sicut patet de deo sciente omnem proposicionem veram; ergo non est de ratione sciendi proposicionem quod illa moveat sic scientem. Ymmo (iuxta striccius loquentes de sciencia propositionis, dicentes quod requiritur scire qualitercunque illa significat; et sic scire illam significare, cum hoc quod non repugnat scire illam) stat existentem Oxonie

There is no necessity for the thing known to act upon the subject that knows,

as v. g. in the case of God's knowledge.

Some go so far as to say that a man in Oxford can

9. pplm A; *ib.* lint A. 29. est *pro* sit A.

4. *Ut ponatur.* Having been able to make nothing of this sentence, I have left it as it stands. The allusion to propositions *azure*, or, and *argent*, seems to give different symbolical meanings to these colours, which would signify otherwise in Greece than at Oxford.

know that the  
the Pope is in  
Rome, as a  
non-sensible  
fact.

The like  
knowledge may  
also exist for  
things present.  
Let A, B, and  
C be three

plates of gold  
on which are  
respectively

graven, on one  
side the three  
letters, on the  
other "God is",

"Heaven is",  
and "The Pope  
is"; let the

sides on which  
the letters are  
engraved be  
turned round;

we may know  
the three  
propositions

without  
knowing to  
which the

letters belong.  
We may know

a man, and yet  
not know him,  
if disguised.

The pronoun  
'this' has

infinite shades  
of meaning.

I know that  
'this' person is

Pope, knowing  
that there is

one; and yet if  
I saw him,

I might doubt.  
Thus we may

know and  
doubt the

same 'this', but  
signifying

differently.

Other  
examples.

scire papam Rome. si contingens scitur ab absente  
sicut cognoscatur, cognoscendo illud esse. Nec solum  
patet casus de proposicionibus absentibus, sed de pre-  
sentibus; et hoc dupliciter; vel quod cognoscas que sit  
scita a te, et que tibi dubia, sed nescias que sit A, 5  
vel B, vel C; vel aliter quod A, B, C, sint tres lamine  
auree habentes ex uno latere figuras istarum trium  
literarum et ex alio latere figuras istarum trium pro-  
posicionem, *deus est, celum est, papa est*; et sint primo  
obiectata secundum latera proportionaliter figurata, et 10  
postmodum obiciantur sibi secundum latera opposita,  
figurata literaliter; et contingat casualiter quod A signi-  
ficet tibi *deum esse*, B, *celum esse*, et C, *papam esse*,  
te ignorante quid illorum sit A, quid B, et quid C;  
et cum hoc ignores que illarum sit tibi dubia, ut 15  
dictum est esse possibile. Et patet casus, petito quod  
corpus totum sit proposicio; et in isto casu videtur  
5<sup>a</sup> conclusio proposita esse vera.

Patet eciam solucio ad tales casus, posito quod *scias*  
*illum quem heri vidisti esse Sor* et sit hodie coram te 20  
aliter indutus, sic quod credas illum non esse Sor. Pro  
quorum solucione notandum quod illud pronomen  
demonstrativum potest 2<sup>m</sup> infinitos gradus connotandi  
proprietas vel accidentia significare; ut, sciendo pa-  
pam esse, scio *istum* papam esse, demonstrando con- 25  
clusionem "*istum quem credo esse papam*"; et tamen,  
illo proposito michi, ego dubitarem illum esse papam;  
et sic de infinitis aliis gradibus discrete demonstrandi,  
vel quo ad sensum, vel quo ad intellectum. Unde  
videtur michi quod precise eadem re demonstrata, scio 30  
hoc esse, et dubito hoc esse; sic tamen quod iste ter-  
minus, *hoc*, diverse connotet. Ut, posito quod Sor sit  
coram me, cuius unam partem videam auferri et putem  
quod sit res inanimata; tunc "*hoc*" scio *esse* (demon-  
strando illam rem quam iam video), et *credo "hoc" non* 35  
*esse* (demonstrando illam eandem rem quam nunc video  
et prius vidi). Et sic de demonstracione intellectuali;  
"*hoc*" scio *esse Sor* (demonstrando illum hominem quem  
heri vidi et quem nunc video); et demonstracione sen-  
sativa "*hoc*" dubito [*esse*] Sor (demonstrando eundem 40

3. *dt pro de after* sed A.  
*before B and before C.* A.  
40. *esse deest* A.

11. *quod pro quid before* illorum *and*  
15. *que illarum twice* A. 22. *nondum* A.

quem demonstro demonstracione intellectuali). Semper enim in talibus demonstracionibus est dare dispartes connotaciones, racione quarum non est convertibilis inter voces consimiles, nec contradiccio inter voces que  
5 videntur contradicere.

Et ex isto videtur michi probabile quod possibile sit idem diversimode scire et dubitari ab eodem. Pro quo sciendum quod contingit de eodem habere quotlibet sciencias, tam actuales quam habituales, ut *sciendo omnem* | *rem esse*, sive in actu, sive in habitu, scio confuse *hoc esse Sor*, demonstrando Sortem. Et sic sciendo omnem substanciam esse, omnem hominem esse, omne animal esse, et breviter quodcunque superius, sive in actu, sive in habitu; ymmo quando due proprietates accidentales conveniunt in eodem singulari, sicut scire illud actualiter et singulariter secundum unam proprietatem, et dubitare vel ignorare illud secundum aliam proprietatem; nisi forte diceret aliquis quod ignoratur vel dubitatur illa proprietas et non  
10 illud: ut in casu; *hoc esse Sor scitur a te* in singulari actu intellectus, habito de antiquis intelleccionibus absolutis. Et eadem veritas, que est hec, *esse Sor*, dubitatur a te actualiter et distincte actu singulari, habito demonstracionibus elicitis ex sensu, que non sunt in  
25 toto sermone cum prioribus, propter diversitatem connotantis circumstantie individuantis. Nec est idem ultimum singulare primo scitum utraque illarum scienciarum, sed singulariter commune ad infinitas circumstantias accidentales. Et sic contingit dubitare vel ignorare in  
30 universalis aliquo quod scitur in singulari: ut patet de istis; *omnis homo est non orbatus*, et *iste homo est non orbatus*, quarum prima dubitatur et 2<sup>a</sup> scitur; non tamen possibile est quicquam sciri in singulari, nisi illud sciatur in universalis.

35 Nec sequitur, *hoc ignoratur vel nescitur in singulari*, ergo, *hoc nescitur*: quia ista includunt negacionem, et non dubitantur. Lapis enim nescit, quia *non scit*; sed nichil ignorat, nisi quod natum est scire aliquid sciencia qua caret. Et *intelligitur* dividitur vel simpliciter vel  
40 secundum quid. Unde *ignorare* non est actus sed privacio; ideo non sequitur: *dubito hoc, ergo ignoro hoc*, nec econtra, cum ignoro multa de quibus non considero.

The same person may doubt and know the same thing in different ways. Knowing that all Being, all substance, every man etc., exists, he knows that *this man exists*, but vaguely.

Likewise, when two accidents are present together; but then it may be said that the accidents, not the thing itself, are unknown or doubted.

What we know first is not the individual with all its properties, but the Universal to which all properties are but accidents. We may thus doubt if *every man is a cripple*, knowing that *this man is one*; but the reverse is false. 'To be unaware of' is more negative than 'not to know'; a stone does not know and yet is not 'unaware'. The latter requires a natural capacity for knowledge.

'To be unaware' is not an act but a mere privation.

We may also doubt what we do not know; but to doubt and know from the same point of view is impossible; when we know, we believe without hesitation, i. e. without any fear whatever of the contrary.

This confusion does not hold with the other mental acts, since

understanding, imagination, etc., have no contrary, like ignorance and knowledge.

In these cases we must analyse the propositions, putting the singulars in the place of the universal subject, and the definition of the verb for the verb itself.

For 'to will' there is another difficulty. We can will one thing conditionally and its opposite absolutely; as when an individual is obliged to throw his goods into the sea (in a storm).

Some say that several other mental acts, more or less connected with the will, are in the same case.

Ymmo dubito quod vel potest ignorari; ut, demonstrato hoc, *dubito hoc esse asinum*. Hoc tamen non est possibile, quod homo distincte et actualiter sciat et dubitet illud secundum idem eodem habitu. Unde, sic dicto, *tu credis hoc sine hesitatione*, excluditur omnis hesitacio 5 concomitans; quia iste terminus, *sine*, mobilitat terminum sequentem; ut, *tu non es sine capite, nisi omni capite tuo careas*; et per idem *non credis quicquam sine aliqua hesitatione, nisi non hesites*. Ideo addidi istum terminum, *contraria*; ita quod formido *contraria* credulitati sit 10 respectu eiusdem crediti, ad quod utraque principaliter terminatur.

Et patet quod non est dicendum in aliis significacionibus actum anime. *Intelligere* namque, *ymaginari*, *apprehendere*, *concipere*, et talia que non habent actus 15 contrarios quos confuse concluderent, non faciunt sophismata, ut ista, *scire*, *dubitare*, *ignorare*, *velle*, *appetere*, et cetera restricta ad actus distinctos. Et patet quomodo talia debent probari: *Scitur omnem hominem esse, dubitatur papam esse*, in quibus primus terminus 20 est officialis, faciens sensum compositum; debet enim verbum resolvi ad verbum de subiecto singulari et per comunicacionem fiet probacio, per descripcionem talis verbi officialis, ut, *ego scio omnem hominem esse scientificum*, terminatum principaliter ad hoc, vel quia 25 actualiter *credo hoc existens*, sine formidine contraria.

Sed de *velle* est una nova difficultas, cum homo potest velle contradictoria volicionibus equivocis 2<sup>m</sup> | quid, vel condicionaliter, et volicionibus absolutis: ut A 45<sup>a</sup> *Sor vult in casu communi proicere merces in mari*, et 30 *vult salvare easdem*. Ymmo, *vult proicere ipsas in mare*. *Vult eciam Plato incontinenens continere* et *vult appetitu sensitivo [non] continere*; et sic de *velle* in universalis et *velle* in singulari, et, secundum aliquos, de *velle*, *intelligere*, *amare*, et similibus in actu vel in 35 habitu. Videtur tamen michi quod omne *velle*, *nolle*, omne *intelligere*, et omne *dubitare*, sit actuale, quamvis frequenter sit oppositum verificatum. Et forte sic intellexerunt logici quos sepius memoravi, dicentes quod si homo scit, dubitat vel ignorat etc., tunc scit quod scit, 40

1. vi A; *ib.* ignorare A.      6. communicans A.      23. *ymom* A.  
30. *gi* A.      33. *Bico*; non *deest* A.      38. *vificatum* = verificatum?

- quod dubitat, quod ignorat etc. eo quod non deficit assensui nisi consideracio. Videtur tamen quod possibile est ignorare particulariter sensitive quod ignorans scit particulariter intellective; ut patet de ista; *hoc est* 5 *Jupiter*, quam philosophus, non cognoscens planetas sensualiter scit intellectualiter; et, demonstrato Sor ad sensum, contingit homines dubitare utrum hoc sciunt esse Sortem, cum hoc existente cum paribus, id quod heri viderunt sciunt quod sit Sor, et hoc dubitant.
- 10 Certum enim est quod non oportet ad quemcunque ratum habere actum et reflexum, ut alibi probabitur.
- De significacione autem verbi in actu vel habitu non fiat controversia, sed concedatur quod idem est diversi-  
mode volitum et nolitum ab eodem. Et ex hoc michi 15 videtur quod non sequitur, *hoc est volitum ab isto*, ergo *hoc non est nolitum ab isto*; sed sequitur, iudicio meo: *tu vis percutere istum, et scis quod iste est sacerdos; ergo vis percutere sacerdotem*. Nec movet ad credendum consequenciam non valere, quod *tu velles* 20 *illum non esse sacerdotem, et sic percutere illum non sacerdotem*, quia homo multa voluntarie facit que vellet non facere. Licet enim homo scienter percuciet sacerdotem, unum habet retrahens se a percussione sacerdotis (quod scit ipsum esse sacerdotem), et aliud 25 excitans cum ad percuciendum sacerdotem. Et utroque movente ipsius voluntatem ad opposita, puta ad non percuciendum istum sacerdotem et ad percuciendum istum sacerdotem, evidenciam forcior movet voluntatem ad faciendum ipsam, precipere organis scienter ad percussione[m] sacerdotis; ideo certum est quod habet quamdam volicionem ad hoc, sed non sine volicione opposita.
- Et sic ex dictis potest colligi quod regulariter talia verba restricta confundant et immobilitant terminos tam 35 distributivos quam non distributivos virtualiter subsequentes. Ut non sequitur, *tu distince scis omnem hominem esse; iste est homo; ergo scis istum hominem esse*. Tamen distince scis naturam esse, et nullam singularem naturam, sed communem sic scis esse; et 40 sic de aliis verbis, restrictis ad significacionem secundum

But in my opinion verbs, taken in this sense, imply actuality, and it is thus that we may understand logicians when they say that a man cannot know without knowing that he knows, etc. Yet we can know about v. g. the planet Jupiter, without being able to recognize it; or a person whom we have seen, though we doubt if he be the same. We will not dispute about the meaning of these verbs implying actuality; what is at once willed and not willed, is so in a different manner. A man may strike a priest, and at the same time, knowing he is a priest, wish not to strike him: here are two motives in opposition, but the stronger one predominates and is the cause of the blow. There are thus two acts of the will; one is certain, since it has its effect; the other is opposed to it. These verbs do not render the following terms distributive. Thus it does not follow that, knowing a universal, I

2. affm A. 8. exnte A.  
17. mea A. 19. vellens A.  
38, 39. n3 pro naturam A.

9. scit pro sit A.  
22. percucies A.

11. probabiliter A.  
28. et evidenciam A.

know all its  
particulars,  
unless the sense  
is restricted to  
confused  
knowledge; and  
so of the other  
verbs.

In these  
matters I may  
have strayed  
from the path  
of my  
predecessors,  
either through  
insufficient  
understanding  
of their  
meaning, or on  
account of  
verbal  
ambiguities.

quam faciunt sensum compositum et divisum. Et sic  
restringunt aliqui *significare* ad primarie, et *intelligere*,  
*ymaginari* etc. ad primarie *intelligere*, *ymaginari* etc.;  
et sic in multis accidit verbalis diversitas opinandi, in  
quibus eadem sententia est substrata, etc. Et forte 5  
quod in ista materia prevarico a prioribus patribus  
qui istam materiam ultra hoc quod scio concipere  
digesserunt, vel est ex equivocacione in terminis, vel  
ex hoc quod eorum subtilem et profundam sententiam  
non concipio satis plene. 10

6. p<sup>ario</sup> *pro* prevarico A; *th. p<sup>ribz</sup>* *pro* patribus A.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMQUARTUM.

Sequitur de istis verbis *incipit* et *desinit* pertractandum. Ubi primo notandum quod non est possibile quicquam incipere vel desinere esse, nisi effectum. Illud patet ex  
 5 hoc quod ex equo omnis incepcio vel desicio est generacio aut corrupcio. Ergo non scit quicquam incipere esse vel desinere, nisi generabile vel corruptibile; et per consequens, nisi effectum; cuiusmodi sunt talia: *deus est causa mei; deus est in tempore*, et cetera  
 10 similia.

Unde, ad concludendum ex quo aliquid ens incipet esse, sufficit quod nunc sit effectus et immediate ante instans quod est presens non fuerit; vel nunc non sit et immediate post instans quod est presens erit. Et  
 15 hoc est quod solet dici: hoc verbum, *incipit*, debere disiunctim exponi per remocionem de presenti et posicionem de futuro; vel per posicionem de presenti et remocionem de preterito; ut, si *Sor nunc est effectus et non prius fuit*, tunc incipit esse. Vel si non est in  
 20 instanti quod est presens, et immediate post illud erit, tunc incipit esse. Et sic de *desinit*. Si enim quicquam desinit esse, tunc non est [et] immediate ante instans quod est presens fuit; vel nunc est effectus et immediate post instans quod est presens non erit. Et hoc est  
 25 quod antiquitus solet dici, hoc verbum, *desinit*, debere exponi sub distincione per remocionem de presenti et posicionem de preterito, vel per posicionem de presenti et remocionem de futuro. Ut si A nunc non est, et immediate ante instans quod est presens fuit, tunc  
 30 ipsum desinit esse; vel si ipsum nunc est effectus, et immediate post instans quod est presens non erit, tunc eciam desinit esse.

Of beginning and end. Nothing can either begin or end, but what is made, since both imply generation and dissolution.

To begin is to be made now, and not the instant immediately before. 'To begin' must, therefore, be expounded by denying the present and positing the past. Or by positing the present and denying the past. 'To end' conversely: we either assert the past and deny the present, or assert the present, denying the future.

1. Cap. *deest* A.      2. Initial S in blue ink A.      11. incipere A.  
 12. n<sup>o</sup> *pro* nunc A.      22. et *deest* A.

But neither God nor any of the eternal truths began to be when the world began, for then they would be made: which is absurd.

These truths are effects only in so far as God keeps them in their essential being. To make is to produce what is not.

Yet it would be false to say that God or any eternal truth was before the world; rather is, since eternity is anterior to that instant, not in time but by nature.

I used to expound such propositions: *A begins to be, by: immediately before the present instant* *A neither is nor was*; which would be false of God and eternal truths. Here we must extend the meaning of *instant* to duration, which is eternal, though not successive. And this eternally present instant is coeval with the essence of the Created.

The term *before* may by analogy be thus made to signify priority both of nature and of time. The former method of

Et patet quod, si essemus in primo instanti mundi et temporis, *deus non inciperet esse*, nec quod *homo non est asinus* aut aliqua talis veritas eterna inciperet esse deus: in quo non inciperet esse, quia tunc generaretur et foret effectus: quod est impossibile. Nec tales veritates eterne inciperent esse, quamvis quodammodo sint effectus in quantum sunt ab alio essentialiter conservata: quia non sunt effectus corruptibiles vel generabiles; de quibus propter famosam significacionem solummodo est locutum. *Efficere* enim proprie est producere quod non est, vel quod incipit esse. Sed communiter efficere est conservare: ideo etc. Verumtamen nunc est verum quod nec deus nec aliqua veritas prius *fuit*, sed prius *est*; quia eternitate est ante instans, et iam incipit esse quod prius et ante primum instans talia fuerunt, non tempore, sed natura: sed quod deus in tempore vel in instanti hoc est efficiens, et nunc incipit esse, cum dependeat a tempore vel instanti.

Unde exposui quondam tales propositiones: *A incipit esse*, per tales negativas: *immediate ante instans quod est presens* *A nec est nec fuit*; quod est falsum de deo et ceteris eternis pro primum instanti mundi; quia sicut immediate ante mundum anterioritate naturali, nunc est verum quod aliqua res creata prius naturaliter est, quam est iam modo vel nunc. Pro quo notandum quod isti termini sunt communes, significantes convertibiliter cum isto termino, in instanti quod est presens, extendendo instans ad mensuram: mutati *esse* in motu sensibili continuo, et mensuram quamcunque indivisibilem rei mutabilis, secundum quod hoc, non tempus, ampliat<sup>4</sup>ur ad significandum tempus sensibile et evum. Sic enim eque primo naturaliter sicut est *esse* rei create, est instans quod est presens; non hoc, sed commune. Patet ergo quod naturaliter est prius instans presens quam quecunque res | creata incipiens esse, ut videtur; cum iste terminus *ante* possit simul analogice significare prioritatem naturalem et prioritatem temporalem que in eodem instanti est cum suo posteriori.

Quare ista propositio, *A incipit esse*, non debeat sic exponi: *A est in instanti quod est presens, et immediate*

4. qua A. 1. 5. generaret A. 5. effēs A. 7. effēs A. 7, 8. confu'ta A. 17. effēs A. 23. anti'ori'te A; ib. ne pro nunc A.



*ante instans quod est presens non est vel fuit*, ita quod negatur utraque prioritas tam temporis quam nature. Facilior est tamen et famosior expositio superius posita, et conveniencior modo loquendi, quam illa que dicit  
 5 quod si quicquam incipit esse, tunc nunc primo est vel nunc ultimo non est, et econtra: similiter, si desinit esse, tunc nunc ultimo est, vel nunc primo non est. Nam iuxta hoc non esset rationale idem multis vicibus incipere vel desinere aliquid se habere.  
 10 Tenendo ergo istam primam expositionem, ordinandi sunt termini secundum quod priores logici docuerunt.

Unde talis propositio: *Sor incipit moveri*, debet exponi per talem affirmativam: *Sor immediate post instans quod est presens movebitur*; quia si sic diceretur, *Sor*  
 15 *non movetur et immediate post hoc A instans movebitur*; ergo, *incipit moveri*, non exponeretur propositio per suum convertibile, cum tamen de ratione exponencium sit quod simul sumpte convertantur cum exposito. Nec valeret consequencia, si pluraliter cum heri fuit  
 20 antecedens verum, sed consequens falsum, ut suppono. Nec sufficit addere quod *immediate post presens instans Sor movebitur*; quia cum quodlibet instans erit presens, si *Sor movetur immediate post instans presens, movebitur*. Exponenda sunt ergo ista verba modo dicto. Sed  
 25 attendendum est quod sunt primi termini communes de presenti; quia si non, verificande sunt propositiones secundum exigenciam terminorum, ut superius dictum est; ut si *tunc fuit vel erit ita quod Sor incipit moveri*, tunc *incepit vel incipiet moveri*: et sic de ceteris pro-  
 30 bandis per resolutionem verbi de preterito vel futuro.

Controversia tamen est, utrum negacio debet post-poni isto termino *immediate* vel anteponi, ut in ymaginacionibus communibus, ubi *A immediate post instans quod est presens tanget A B*; et alii postponunt.  
 35 Capiatur ergo unum spacium pedale, cuius una medietas orientalis dividatur in suas partes proporcionales minores versus medium punctum, et sit B nomen commune ad quemlibet punctum alicuius illarum par-  
 40 cium imparium, vel medietatis occidentalis que nunc primo sit pertransita ab A spacio quod continuabit

exposition is therefore preferable to saying that to *begin* is the first *now* of being and the last of non-being; and that to *end* is the last *now* of being and the first of non-being.

According to this the same being could not have the same mode several times.

Thus, *A begins to be B*, should be thus expounded: *A will be B immediately after the present instant*; if we said: *A is not B and will be B immediately* etc., it would be impossible to convert this with the other proposition.

There is some doubt as to whether the negation should come before or after the word *immediately*.

A mathematical reasoning taken from movement in space, to prove that the negation ought more probably to be placed before.

5. non *pro* nunc A. 7. non *pro* nunc *before* ultimo A. 10. pl'r A.  
 20. s' *pro* sed A. 31, 32. pponi A. 32. istum terminum A. 37. n' *pro* nomen A.

motum suum uniformem, pertransiēdo totum spaciū in hora adequate; et sic nomen commune ad quemlibet punctum paris partis illius diccionis, vel quarte pertransite, terminante ad medium punctum ubi iam est A, tunc videtur iuxta preponentes negacionem quod A tam desinit tangere B quam C, cum tamen per quartam horam precedentem tetigit tam B quam C, et nunc tangit, et immediate post hoc tanget: sed immediate post hoc non tanget B, et immediate post hoc non tanget C: et iuxta preponentes negacionem non desinit tangere B, nec desinit tangere C, cum ista propositio, *A tangit B*, sit nunc vera: et tamen immediate post erit vera. Ideo, ceteris paribus, in principio istius hore fuit futura vera per maius tempus quam per medietatem hore; ergo non desinit | A tangere B, cum nunc A 46<sup>b</sup> tangit et continue ante hoc tetigit, et continuabit contactum B ultra hoc instans. Videtur tamen quod A desinit tangere B, quia hoc est ultimum instans duracionis integre contactus A et B; Ymo unus qui correspondenter viveret et corrumperetur, inciperet mori. Illa ergo posicio que preponit negacionem est multis probabilior.

If anything begins, its beginning also begins, since it cannot exist in time; if it ends, its end also ends.

Ex quo patet quod si aliquid ens incipit vel desinit esse, ipsum incipit vel desinit incipere vel desinere esse, et universaliter e converso. Si enim quicquam incipit vel desinit esse, tunc incepcio qua incipit vel desinit esse; cum nulla incepcio vel desicio possit esse temporalis. Sequitur quod illa incipit et desinit esse, et per consequens primum ens datum incipit et desinit incipere esse. Unde, ymaginato quod instans presens sit medium instans huius hore, cuius utraque pars dividatur in suas proporcionales minores versus hoc instans

If we imagine a person, moving to and fro in space, there will be a point where he comes to a stop, and that point will be at once the beginning and the end of movement and of rest.

quod est presens, et quod Sor in qualibet parte pari illarum secundum datam connotacionem quiescat et in qualibet parte impari moveatur motu opposito ymaginacionem, cum in hoc instanti incipit Sor moveri, et in hoc instanti incipit quiescere; et tamen immediate post hoc incipiet moveri: et sic de *quiescere*. Ymmo cum non movetur et immediate post hoc movebitur et immediate ante hoc non movebatur, et tamen incipit

2. non *pro* nomen A. 5. proponentes A. 8. *post* A. 10. proponentes A. 14. v *pro* vera A.

moveri, et desinit non moveri, sicut immediate ante hoc desiit non moveri, et immediate post desinet non moveri. Et tamen nec est inceptio nec desicio continua, quia ad talem continuacionem quod per tempus immediatum  
5 ante instans quod est presens, et per tempus immediatum post instans quod est presens fuit et erit tempus talis inceptiois vel desicionis, que sit modo.

Aliter tamen senciunt qui ponunt continuum componi ex indivisibilibus, ut tempus ex instantibus, lineam ex  
10 punctis, superficiem ex lineis, et corpus ex superficibus, motus ex *mutari*, et sic de aliis inficienter sumptis; et aliter hoc negantes. Primum enim dicit quod impossibile est aliquod ens incipere vel desinere esse, nisi per posicionem de presenti; et sic duo instancia erunt  
15 immediata; sicut duo puncta faciendo quantitatem discrete magnam, sed nullam continue magnam nisi fuerint infinita; et isti opposicioni ego adhereo.

Alia tamen opinio est famosior, que dicit quod successiva incipient vel desinent esse per remocionem  
20 de presenti, permanencia et subita incipient esse per posicionem de presenti, et desinent esse, aliqua per posicionem de presenti et aliqua per remocionem de presenti; ut animatum et inanimatum, naturaliter corrupta per remocionem de presenti et habencia formas  
25 extensas, quandoque violenter corrumpuntur more subitorum per posicionem de presenti; sed totum illud est alibi discussum rationibus huic materie.

In ista tamen materia relinquo iuvenibus partem sue apparencie plus consonam sustinendam, ponens ulterius  
30 tanquam rationem quod argumentando a proposicione modali de *incipere* ad proposicionem modalem de *desinere* cum dicto opposito, tenet consequencia et econtra. Verbi gracia, sequitur: *Iam incipit esse quod hoc est; ergo iam desinit esse quod non est*; et econtra. *Iam incipit esse quod nulla chimera est; ergo iam desinit esse quod aliqua chimera est. Iam incipit esse quod omnis fenix est; ergo, iam desinit esse quod fenix non est*. Et sic universaliter de aliis. Tenet autem ista regula  
35 per istum conceptum: | necessario cuiuslibet contradiccionis alterum est verum et non utrumque: ideo ad inceptioem unius partis sequitur desicio alterius; et econtra.

Two contrary positions, one (Wyclif's) affirming that the Continuous is made up of indivisible parts, because every beginning or ending is something separately present;

the other, more common, making successive things begin or end by negation of the present, and permanent things begin by affirmation of the present, and end by an affirmation or a denial.

I leave my scholars free to choose which side they think best.

From a proposition of beginning to one of ending (and vice versa) with an opposite signification, the consequence holds good. If *A begins to be B*, then *A ceases to be not B*, etc., for of two contradictories one must be, and both cannot be, true.

But sometimes  
'to begin' and  
'to end' are  
modal terms  
and sometimes  
they merely  
form a  
categorical  
proposition.  
Either *It begins*  
*to be true that*  
*A is B*, or  
*A begins to*  
*be B*.  
The preceding  
rule is absolute  
in the former  
case.  
In the latter,  
every  
categorical with  
the verb *to*  
*begin* inters  
another with the  
opposite  
predicate and  
the verb *to end*.  
But we must  
take care that  
the opposite of  
the verb  
following *to*  
*begin* or *to end*  
is taken, not  
the latter part  
of the  
predicate only.  
It is thus seen  
that *to begin*  
must be  
expounded  
either by  
denying the  
present and  
affirming the  
past (as when  
the predicate is  
negative) or by  
positing the  
present and  
denying the  
past; and  
conversely for  
*to end*.  
But can we say  
that, at the  
Creation, all  
things,  
beginning to be,  
came to an end  
of not-being? or  
that, were God  
to annihilate  
all things, they  
would begin not  
to be?

Sed notandum quod isti termini, *incipit* et *desinit*,  
tenentur quandoque modaliter, ita quod dicta terminent  
ipsos vel equivalenter; et quandoque componunt pro-  
posicionem mere *de inesse*. Exemplum primum est tale:  
*iam incipit esse ita quod omnis mula currit*; exemplum 5  
2<sup>i</sup> est tale, *incipit omnis mula currere*, quod tantum  
valet quantum ista: *omnis mula incipit currere*, ut prius  
dictum est in consimili; et de primo modo proposito  
*de inesse* tenet regula. Sed quo ad secundum modum,  
potest regulariter observari quod omnis pure kathegorica 10  
cuius tale verbum *incipit* est copula principalis infert  
kathegoricam de subiecto consimili et predicato opposito,  
cuius tale verbum *desinit* est copula, et econtra; ut  
sequitur: *omnis mula incipit esse, ergo omnis mula*  
*desinit non esse*. *Nemo incipit esse albus: ergo, nemo* 15  
*non desinit esse albus*. Et sic de similibus. Sed cavendum  
est quod capiatur oppositum verbi et non solum oppo-  
situm termini qui est pars predicatorum; ut non sequitur;  
*omnis homo incipit esse currens, ergo omnis homo desinit*  
*esse* [non] *currens*; sicut patet, posito quod multi inci- 20  
pientes esse incipient currere; sed bene sequitur quod  
*omnis homo desinit non esse currens*.

Et ex hoc patet per modalem correspondentem, quod  
hoc verbum, *incipit*, est exponibile nunc per remocionem  
de presenti et per posicionem de preterito, sicut hoc 25  
verbum *desinit*; ut patet de ista, *Sor incipit non esse*,  
et nunc per posicionem de presenti et remocionem de  
futuro; ut patet de tali, *iste lapis incipit non esse*; et  
contra de *desinit*. Ymmo, ut breviter dicam, quecumque  
exponentes exponunt hoc verbum *incipit*, sunt expositive 30  
huius verbi *desinit*, terminati dicto vel predicate oppo-  
sito; et econtra.

Difficultas tamen est de inceptiōe temporis et desi-  
cione temporis; videtur enim quod omnis creatura in  
primo instanti mundi desinit non esse, si sit, et incipit 35  
esse. Et sic, si deus adnichilaret omnem creaturam,  
tunc quolibet inciperet non esse; cum tamen omnis  
desicio sit respectu temporis futuri. Ideo dici potest  
quod gracia materie tenent consequencie supradicte;

1. nondum A. 5. nullā pro mula A. 6. nullā pro mula A.  
7. nū pro mula A; ib. incipit currit A. 8. positum A. 9. mo<sup>m</sup>  
pro modum A. 20. non deest A. 24. ne pro nunc A. 30. exposit<sup>e</sup> A.  
37. quilibet A. 30. t3 que supradce A.

quia iam est impossibile quod quelibet creatura inciperet vel desineret esse. Conceditur tamen quod ista verba sic significant sicut expositum est. Unde, ponendo continuum componi ex non quantis exponeret ista verba  
 5 altero istorum modorum; si ens incipit, incipit esse; tunc est effectus, et in instanti proximo preterito non fuit; et econtra; si vero desinit esse, tunc est effectus et in instanti proximo futuro non erit, et econtra. Vel aliter, per ista adverbia *primo* et *ultimo*; quia omnis  
 10 incepcio dicit principiacionem vel iniciacionem rei, sicut desicio dicit eius terminacionem. Unde, primo resolvi proposicionem exponendam per tale verbum in rem verbi principalis, et tunc probare proposicionem expositorie, modo indiffinitarum. Verbi gracia, si *Sor*  
 15 *incipit esse albus*, tunc *albedine integra nunc primo est albus*, et econtra. Si *Sor incipit currere*, tunc *cursu integro nunc primo currit*; et econtra. Si *incipit esse*, tunc *duracione integra nunc primo est*. Et sic de *desinere*. Et proposui talem terminum, significantem  
 20 actum verbi sequentis, quia aliter sequeretur quod nichil possit his incipere currere, vel loqui; et sic de ceteris. Addidi eciam istum terminum, *integra*, ad excludendum | significatum verbi, quod est pars alterius consimilis speciei; quia alias sequeretur mobile continue  
 25 incipere moveri; et sic de aliis. Et illud videtur michi brevius et facilius, supposito fundamento, quam exponere per ita longas exponentes.

Ex istis autem exposicionibus, ut ex primis, secuntur alique regule et conclusiones declarande. Prima regula,  
 30 quod si aliquod ens habebit aliquam denominacionem, cum hoc quod non habeat modo talem, ipsum incipit vel incipiet habere talem, sive fuerit denominacio absoluta sive denominacio respectiva; ut: si *Sor erit tantus*  
*quantus erit Plato et nunc non est tantus*, tunc *incipit*  
 35 *vel incipiet esse tantus*. Si *A erit immediatum B*, et

But such consequences hold good only when the matter is possible, and in these cases it is not, though the verbs mean here as elsewhere. Those who admit time to be made up of instants would explain beginning and ending thus: *beginning*: a thing *is* now, and was not the instant before; *ending*: a thing *is* now, and the next instant will not be. Or by first or last being or not-being. Thus: *a person begins to be white*, i. e. he has the entire quality 'whiteness' now for the first time. I affirm the act of the second verb as taking place, and add *entire*, to deny that 'beginning' brings any essential difference.

Rules: 1. If any quality will belong to any subject that has it not now, it begins or will begin to have them.

2. *Contr* A. 30. *libit* A. 31. *mo pro modo* A.

11. All this is extremely important, as will appear later in Logica, Third Part. 32. *Incipit vel incipiet*. I have difficulty in reconciling these words with those above, affirming that to begin is to *have* the entire quality now for the first time. Here on the contrary, Wyclif says 'cum hoc quod *modo non* habeat talem'. Very likely the solution is to give *habeat* the usual, not the inchoative meaning.

nunc non est ipsum, incipit vel incipiet esse sibi immediate; et sic denominatione negativa. Unde in communibus casibus, si non est dare instans pro quo erit ita quod *Sor est tantus, quantus erit Plato*, tunc *Sor non erit tantus, quantus erit Plato*; et sic de aliis positionibus de preterito et futuro.

2. If a subject has or has had a quality which it never had before, it begins or will begin to have it. There must be one last instant in life, when a man has been as old as ever he was.

Secunda regula est talis. Si aliquod ens habet vel habuit aliam formam dominantem quam prius non habuit, ipsum incipit vel incipiet esse taliter informatum; ut si *Sor fuit ita senex sicut fuit*, tunc *incipiet esse ita senex sicut fuit*. Unde *nemo fuit ita senex sicut fuit*, nisi aliquod fuerit ultimum eius instans. Nec *virtuosus fuit ita bonus sicut [fuit]*, posito quod crescat in virtute et bonitate usque ad primum instans non esse eius, nisi forte aliquod fuerit ultimum instans eius; et sic de ceteris.

3. If a subject is to lose a quality which it now has or has had before, it either ends or will end the having of that quality. If a person will not be during two instants and was during two instants, then he will end his being during two instants: this is the conclusion of such as do not admit time to be made up of single instants.

They make things begin and end, not in one instant but in an infinite multitude: some, however, deny this.

4. If any subject has (or had) not the quality it had before, it ends or has ended, as regards that quality. God's lordship is everlasting, but his being is

Tercia regula, si aliquod ens aliquando non erit informatum sicut ipsum modo est vel prius fuit, ipsum desinit vel desinet esse taliter informatum, extendendo hoc nomen, forma, ad quamcunque formam substantialem vel accidentalem: illud patet ex descriptionibus terminorum et regulis prioribus. Ut, si *Sor aliquando non erit in duobus instantibus et prius erat in duobus instantibus*, ipse *desinit vel desinet esse in duobus instantibus*; saltem secundum negantes continuum componi ex indivisibilibus. Unde, quantumcunque res permanens fucatur, continue desinet et continue incipiet esse in infinitis instantibus; non una incepcone vel desicione continua, sed infinitis; quamvis aliqui illud negant, dicentes quod 2<sup>a</sup> exponens erit talis: *immediate post instans quod est presens, erit ita quod est in tot instantibus*. Et hii concedunt quod *omne album, quandocunque fuit, fuit album*; et sic de ceteris. Standum est ergo probabiliter prime expositioni.

4<sup>a</sup> regula, si aliquod ens non sit vel fuerit aliqua- liter informatum qualiter ipsum prius fuerit, ipsum desinit vel desiit esse taliter informatum. Et patet quod deus non desiit creare domino, quia semper fuit dominus: prius tamen naturaliter est et fuit, quam fuit dominus. Ymmo, prius naturaliter est *dominus vel non*

13. fuit before posito deest A. 27. fucatur pro fucatur A. 31. exponi A.

38. duo A. 39. post pro prius A. 40. prius A.

*dominus*, quam est dominus: sed nec prius naturaliter est dominus quam est dominus, nec prius naturaliter est dominus quam est [non] dominus. Falsum est ergo quod in eternitate est non dominus; nec sequitur, in eternitate non est dominus et in eternitate est; ergo, in eternitate est non dominus. Sed de hoc sufficiens pro hoc loco. Conclusiones sunt multe; ut, *Sor incipit scire tres proposiciones, sed non incipit scire aliam vel alias*; ymmo, *solum unam incepit scire*, posito quod Sor nunc solum sciat tres proposiciones quarum terciam incipiat scire et duas continue scivit et continue sciet; et patet A 48<sup>a</sup> conclusio. | Unde, si incipit scire unam, incipit scire duas, incipit scire alias; sed hoc non sequitur de ulteriori termino naturali, quia stat quod continue ante hoc scivit duas, et continue post hoc sciet duas, et nunc sciat 3<sup>s</sup>. Et ideo non, si incipit scire 3<sup>s</sup>, incipit scire alias magis, vel perinde cum aliis terminis numerabilibus.

2<sup>a</sup> conclusio; Sor incipit scire tantum duas propositiones, et tamen incipit scire mille, posito quod nunc primo sciat duas et quod post hoc immediate sciet mille cum illis; et patet conclusio. Ymmo, in casu isto, Sor desinit solum scire duas proposiciones, et tamen nichil desinit scire. Ymmo, in casu possibili non solum duas, sed plures quam mille incipit scire; et tamen nec scivit nec sciet plures quam mille, posito quod duo e contra proposicionum incipiant sciri ab illo, et quod erit ita quod scit plures quam mille. Unde Sor non solum incipit scire duas proposiciones, quamvis solum sit incipiens scire duas. Et patet quomodo est possibile Sor desinere scire decem et tamen solum unam, solum duas (et sic de quotlibet usque ad decem inclusive) desinere scire in diversis casibus

3<sup>a</sup> conclusio: Sor incipit videre omnem hominem, et ipse nichil incipit videre, posito quod continue videat se et tres alios, sic quod nichil incipiat vel desinat

anterior to his lordship.

He is naturally Lord-or-not-Lord;

but neither lordship nor not-lordship is prior in Him.

We cannot, therefore say that in eternity, before creation, He was not-Lord.

Corollaries.

First. To begin one thing may imply the beginning of many others that follow; but it is not itself that beginning.

Second. If two things only begin to be known, and

immediately afterwards a thousand others

with them, this thousand begins

to be known with the first; so also of

ending.

Thus a person is actually

beginning to know only

those two, and yet he begins

potentially to know many

others.

Third.

Suppose that a man sees at a

given instant only himself

and three

1. p<sup>o</sup> A.    2. p<sup>o</sup>us A.    3. non deest A.    10. tertia A.    19. cō<sup>o</sup> pro conclusio A; ib. So<sup>o</sup>r A.    27. cō<sup>o</sup> pro e contra A.    30. scit pro sit A.

7. I confess that there is a great deal in these corollaries which I have not understood. In the side notes, here and elsewhere, I have given that part of the sense which seems most reasonable.

others; that a  
fifth man at  
that very  
instant ceases  
to exist and  
that there are  
no other men  
but these; the  
first man  
begins to see  
all men, but by  
accident.

videre, sed quod immediate ante hoc fuit quintus homo  
non visus qui iam desinat esse, et non sunt homines  
nisi quatuor quos videt: et patet conclusio. Unde, in  
casu isto, nullius visionis est incepicio, sed illius veri-  
tatis, que est *videre omnes homines*; sed per accidens, 5  
cum stat eandem visionem collectivam nunc esse visionem  
omnium hominum. Unde querenti quod ens incipit esse,  
dicitur quod hoc ens: *ista quatuor sunt omnes homines*,  
incipit esse: et exinde, simpliciter loquendo, quod *Sor*  
*videt omnes homines* incipit esse. Et patet quod non est 10  
possibile unum ens incipere vel desinere esse, nisi  
infinita encia et incipiant et desinant esse.

Fourth. If A,  
being in motion,  
moves, now  
slower, now  
faster,  
according to a  
fixed standard,  
continually  
increasing  
its speed and  
slowness, we  
must conclude  
that it will  
move infinitely  
fast and slow;

Quarta conclusio: infinitum velociter hoc A movebitur,  
et infinitum tarde hoc idem movebitur. Et iam quiescet,  
et immediate post hoc quiescet; et tamen nec infinitum 15  
tarde nec infinitum velociter incipit vel incipiet moveri,  
posito quod A sit unum mobile quod in 2<sup>a</sup> medietate  
istius hore movebitur uniformiter, gradu ut duo; que  
medietas sit prima eius pars porporcionalis, et in 2<sup>a</sup>  
parte porporcionalis remittat motum A, gradu ut duo 20  
usque ad duo gradum; in tercia quiescat, et 4<sup>a</sup> moveatur  
uniformiter gradu ut quatuor; in 5<sup>a</sup> remittat usque ad  
duo gradum; in sexta quiescat; in septima moveatur  
uniformiter, gradu ut 8; et sic continue. Tunc posito  
quod nunc sit principium hore, patet conclusio; nam 25  
nichil preter infinitum velociter vel infinitum tarde  
immediate post hoc moveri; nec aliquid potest sic velo-  
citer vel sic tarde incipere moveri. Unde, non sequitur:  
*infinitum velociter hoc A movebitur; ergo aliquando in-*  
*finitum velociter movebitur*, quia non in aliquo tempore, 30  
vel in aliqua eius parte, vel in aliquo eius instanti.

but not that  
this will happen  
at any time,  
part of time, or  
instant.

Some say that  
infinite speed  
and slowness is  
imaginable and  
may take place  
in a given  
time.  
They suppose  
an infinite  
series of  
moving  
bodies, each  
member of the  
series moving  
faster and  
slower than the  
preceding one,

Et hoc tollit multas conclusiones in ista materia,  
que concedunt quod infinitum velociter et infinitum  
tarde incipit hoc moveri in casu posito; et ita concedunt  
in casu ymaginabili quod aliqua sunt infinita mobilia 35  
et quodcunque illorum porporcionabiliter, ut incipit A 48<sup>b</sup>  
velocius moveri, incipit ipsum tardius moveri, et econtra.  
Ut dividatur hora cuius hoc est primum instans in  
partes porporcionales minores versus hoc instans, et  
sint infinita mobilia, quorum primum per primam 40  
partem moveatur gradu ut 1, per 2<sup>am</sup> gradu sub 2<sup>10</sup>,



per 3<sup>am</sup> gradu ut duo, per quartam gradu sub duplo ad illum quo movebatur per secundam: et sic in infinitum. Et duplet 2<sup>m</sup> mobile primum in qualibet parte impari et velocitate, et duplet ipsum in qualibet parte 5 pari in tarditate. Et sic de quotlibet mobili posteriori quo ad proxime precedens. Et tunc probant conclusionem per hoc quod quotlibet istorum infinitum tarde incipiet moveri, et infinitum velociter incipit moveri; et tamen infinitum velocius incipit aliquod istorum moveri primo 10 mobili et infinitum tardius incipit aliquod istorum moveri primo vel quocunque reliquo assignando.

Sed videtur michi quod propositiones sumpte in probacione sunt negande, quia non est dare gradum velocitatis vel tarditatis qua aliquod istorum incipit 15 moveri; ergo non est dare proporcionem in quam unum velocius reliquo incipit moveri. Ideo nullum istorum infinitum velociter vel infinitum tarde incipit moveri. Conceditur tamen quod 2<sup>m</sup> incipit in 2<sup>do</sup> velocius moveri primo, et incipit in duplo tardius moveri primo, sed non 20 quam primum; nec tardius nec velocius incipit moveri quam primum. Nec oportet, si infinitum velociter vel infinitum tarde hoc movebitur, quod aliquando erit ita quod infinitum tarde vel infinitum velociter movetur, quia iste terminus, *infinitum*, confundit tempus verbi. 25 Ideo refert dicere: *hoc movebitur in infinitum velociter, et in infinitum velociter hoc movebitur*. Conceditur tamen quod, si Sor pertransibit B spacium, quod aliquando erit ita quod pertransit illud, cum idem sit *pertransire et esse in pertransiendo*. Et sic, si erit per horam, ali- 30 quando erit ita quod est per horam. Unde, concedentes quod *Sor ante finem infinitum velociter movebitur, sed in nullo instanti*, habent concedere multas conclusiones similes iam narratis,

Multa autem alia sunt sophismata in terminis comparativis, de quibus post modum: ut sunt talia, *Sor incipit moveri aliquo gradu intensioris*, videlicet quatuor: in quo casu concedunt quidam quod Sor incipit velocius moveri quam ipsemet incipit moveri, cum tamen incipit infinitum tarde moveri; sed infinitum velocius moveri 40 Platone, qui incepit a non gradu intensioris et a non gradu motus moveri, sicut infinitum velocius illo incipit

according to a fixed ratio; the first varying in speed during every indivisible part of an hour, each of the others will begin to move infinitely fast and slow; and one of them will begin to move infinitely faster and slower than the first. But I think that the assumption: i. e. the assigning of a ratio of speed for the beginning of movement, ought here to be denied. Yet the second member of the series begins to move, say, twice as fast and as slow as the first in different senses (*primo*, sed non *quam primum*). And as the Infinite confounds all tenses, we cannot conclude that an infinitely quick motion will take place at any given time.

5. *mob* pro mobili A.  
36. *vel* pro videlicet A.

6. *plit* pro probant A.

35. *mom* A.

There are many other subtle arguments in this matter: v. g. that if A begins to move with a speed = 4 and B with a speed = 0, A begins to move infinitely faster; but this may be denied.

moveri. Sed ista credo probabiliter posse negari. Concedo tamen primam conclusionem negativam, si non est dare instancia immediata; quia aliter sunt tales casus impossibiles.

These verbs allow of no distribution of the terms after the verbs that follow them. Thus we cannot conclude, from the beginning of an act concerning a universal, to the beginning of one concerning the particular.

Ex istis dictis elicere potes consimiles conclusiones, 5 et perpendere quod ista verba tam immobilitant terminos distributos quam non distributos, sequentes verba suorum dictorum. Ut non sequitur; *Sor incipit scire*; nec sequitur: *tu incipis videre omnem hominem; iste est homo; ergo incipis videre istum*. Et sic de ceteris. Sed bene sequitur, 10 *iam incipit omne quod est esse; ergo, iam incipit hoc esse*, et sic de ista; *iam incipit esse omne quod est*; quia utrumque est idem cum isto: *omne quod est incipit esse*, ratione congruitatis, ut dictum est. Quandoque tamen gracia terminorum tenet consequencia cum istis 15 verbis ab inferiori ad suum superius. Et tanta de istis verbis sufficiat pro presenti. Sequitur capitulum. |

17. Sequit<sup>r</sup> eam in textu A.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMQUINTUM.

A 49<sup>a</sup> Sequitur de istis duobus terminis, *per se* et *per accidens*, pertractandum. Ubi primo notandum quod uterque istorum terminorum potest sumi kathegorice vel  
 5 sinkathegorice. Kathegorice, quando significant pro singularibus suorum primo significatorum; ut, *homo per se est albus*, quia ipse causa sue albacionis, et *superficies est per accidens quanta*, quia per se est quanta et ipsa est accidens. Sed sinkathegorice sumendo terminos,  
 10 faciunt sensum compositum et divisum, et habent certas exponentes, ut post docebitur.

Secundo, notandum quod iste terminus, *per*, potest significare circumstanciam cause, ut hoc: *omne causatum est per deum*. Aliquando circumstanciam loci vel tem-  
 15 poris, ut *Sor transiit per istam viam et duravit per illud tempus*. Aliquando, circumstanciam iurandi, ut: *per deum ego sic feci*; quod tantum sonat; *inroco deum in testem quod sic feci*. Et aliquando significat negative exclusionem cause alterius ut, *deus est per semetipsum*; hoc est, *deus*  
 20 *est et non per aliam causam*.

Tercio, notandum quod 5<sup>r</sup> dicitur ens *per se*; vel includendo omne per se existens in genere; ut sic, omnis substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relacio, accio, passio, habitus, est per se ens. 2<sup>o</sup> excludit inherenciam acci-  
 25 dentalem a per se existente in genere; et sic omnis substantia est per se ens. 3<sup>o</sup> excludit parcialem inexistentiam; et isto modo omnis substantia integra est per se ens, et non pars substantie. 4<sup>o</sup> excludit causam materiale et formalem; ut intelligencie; sed quinto modo exclu-  
 30 dendo omnem causam: ut, solum deus est per se ipsum: *Per accidens* potest intelligi tot modis quot modis dicitur accidens; ut aliquod est accidens separabile, et aliquod

Of what is *per se* and *per accidens*.  
 Remarks.  
 1. That these terms are sometimes categorical, sometimes syncategorical.

2. That *per* may signify either a causal, or a local or temporal condition, or serve to express an oath, or indicate the negation of another cause.

3. That a thing is called *per se*, either as belonging to a genus, or as a substance, or as a complete individual, or as an intelligent being, or as the uncaused Being. *Per accidens* may be understood in as many ways as *accident*.

1. Cap. deest A. 2. Initial S in blue ink A. 10. fa<sup>u</sup>t A. 27. et sic isto. 29. isto pro quinto A.

Some accidents;  
v. g. are  
separable,  
some  
inseparable;

not that any  
can be really  
separated,  
but their  
subjects may  
fail, or they  
themselves.  
A universal  
accident may  
thus be  
separated from  
its individual,  
but not as  
individualized.  
All accidents  
that can be  
absent, and  
only such, are  
separable; and  
conversely of  
those  
inseparable;

but some,  
separable from  
individuals, are  
inseparable  
from the  
species.

To expound a  
syncategorical  
proposition  
with *per se*,  
we take a  
universal  
causal  
proposition,  
and another  
negative  
possible, each  
having the same  
terms.  
A is B *per se*;  
i. e. A, because  
it is A, is B;  
and no A can  
be not-B.  
It is thus  
necessary that

inseparabile. Separabile est accidens quod possibile est,  
secundum aliquod eius individuum, deesse subiecto cui  
prius infuit; ut albedo. Accidens inseparabile est quod  
secundum nullum eius individuum potest deesse; ut  
simitas, et cetera passiones. Unde videtur esse falsum <sup>5</sup>  
quod accidens potest separari a subiecto, cum separacio  
requirit existenciam separatorum; sed deesse potuit  
subiectum et carenciam illius quod infuit. Ideo credo  
quod philosophi sic loquentes concesserunt quod accidens  
universale separatur a tali subiecto, dum fuerit in ali- <sup>10</sup>  
quo; sed, postquam fuit in illo, non sit in illo secundum  
aliquod eius individuum. Quia tamen grave est describere  
universali descriptione que non competit cuilibet eius  
individuo, potest dici quod omne accidens quod est in  
subiecto suo primario a quo potest deesse, est accidens <sup>15</sup>  
separabile, et solum tale; et omne accidens quod est in  
subiecto suo primario a quo non potest deesse [est]  
accidens inseparabile, et solum tale; et sic quelibet  
quantitas partis celi est accidens inseparabile; albedo in  
nive, nigredo in plumis corvi sunt secundum speciem <sup>20</sup>  
accidencia inseparabilia. Ymmo multa accidentia sunt  
separabilia quo ad individua, inseparabilia quo ad genus;  
ut qualitas, quantitas, relacio, et multa talia sunt quo  
ad genus inseparabilia; et tamen quo ad individua vel  
species possunt deesse, ut nemo potest esse, nisi fuerit <sup>25</sup>  
sic qualis, quantus, qualis, relatus; et sic tamen multi  
possunt esse, quamvis non sint septipedales, albi, aut  
patres.

Sumendo ergo istum terminum *per se* syncategorice,  
debet propositio racione illius termini exponibilis exponi <sup>30</sup>  
per universalem affirmativam de causali et per nega-  
tivam de possibili et communicantes in extremis cum  
proposicione principaliter exponenda; ut si *per se homo*  
*est risibilis*, tunc *omnis homo, quia homo, est risibilis*,  
et *nemo sub aliquo gradu homo potest esse non sic risi- <sup>35</sup>*  
*bilis*; et econtra. Et sic, quandoque predicatur |  
genus, diferencia, vel proprium de sua specie vel in- <sup>A 49<sup>b</sup></sup>  
dividuo, est *per se* predicacio per previam particulam.  
Patet quod non *per se* homo est animal, quia tunc omne  
animal esset homo; et per eandem patet quod non *per* <sup>40</sup>

4. solum *pro* secundum A. 9. cederunt A. 10. n. a'o *pro*  
aliquo A. 11. sunt *pro* secundum A. 17. est *deest* A. 27. aut A.  
32. et *pro* in A. 38. p'cio A. 40. peandem *pro* per eandem A.

se homo risibile est, quia tunc aliquid, quia esset risibile, esset et homo. Et per 2<sup>am</sup> patet quod non per se homo est quantus, quia tunc proporcionabiliter sibi correspondent humanitas et quantitas; et per consequens, 5 necessario omnis homo est eque magnus cum alio. Si autem ista expositio sit minus nota quam ratio speciei vel proprii, arguatur quod *A per se est B*, per hoc quod *B est per se superius, vel passio A*.

Sunt ergo duo tales modi predicandi per se: vel per 10 se *primo* vel per se *secundo*. Per se primo, quando genus vel differencia per se predicatur. Per se secundo, quando passio vel proprium per se predicatur. Et ad expositorye concludendum aliquid per se primo inesse alteri, debet addi ad universalem affirmativam illam terminus de 15 *essencia* vel *formaliter*; ut si *omnis albedo de essencia sua sit color*, et *nulla albedo, sub aliquo gradu potest esse non sic color*; tunc *per se primo albedo est color*. Genus enim et differencia sunt de essencia sui inferioris, quia sunt priores, ingredientes eius compositionem quid- 20 ditativam. Sed per se secundo homo est risibilis, susceptivus discipline, etc: quia per se est talis; et prius naturaliter est homo quam talis. Et utraque divisio capit subdivisionem, cum aliquid potest inesse alteri per se, primo, et *immediate*; ut [per se primo et immediate] homo 25 est animal sed non corpus vel substantia; quia ex hoc est corpus vel substantia quod est animal, et non est genus nisi propinquius, consequencia: animal. Ideo per se primo et immediate est homo animal. Et conformiter est homo per se secundo et immediate risibilis, 30 sed per se secundo erit immediate susceptivus discipline, cum bruta sint disciplinabilia. Quandocunque ergo aliqua passio convertitur cum suo subiecto, tunc illud est eius subiectum primum et per se 2<sup>o</sup> immediate sic passionatum; ut triangulus rectilineus est primum subiec- 35 tum 3<sup>a</sup> angulorum equalia duobus rectis; sed isochelēs est subiectum secundarium huiusmodi passionis.

Propositio ratione illius termini *per accidens* exponenda debet exponi per suam preiacentem et per affirmativam de possibili que in predicato communicent

the predicate  
be an  
essential part  
of the  
subject;

at least when  
the predication  
is primary;  
when  
secondary, it  
may be a  
property of or  
a happening to  
the subject.  
In the first  
place the  
expository  
clause  
(because . . . )  
amounts to  
*essentially*,  
for genus and  
difference  
belong to the  
essence of  
inferior  
concepts.  
In the second  
place, the  
predicate does  
not need to be  
an essential.  
Another  
subdivision:  
what is or is  
not *per se*  
immediately,  
as: man is more  
immediately  
an animal than  
a substance,  
though both  
are equally  
essential.

The subject  
thus predicated,  
is either  
primary or  
secondary, etc.

Propositions,  
containing *per*  
*accidens*, are to  
be expounded  
i. by a  
prejacent: i. e.  
the same

5. que *pro* eque A. 9. probandi A. 11. item A. 21. ut — im-  
mediate *deest* A. 27. una *pro* consequencia A. 30. immediate? A.  
32. quatuor A. 33. 2<sup>o</sup> (etc.) A. 35. 3<sup>a</sup> angulorum A. 37. Pro<sup>o</sup> A.

proposition minus the *per accidens*; 2. by another affirmative 'possible' proposition. *A is B per accidens*; i. e. *A is B*, and *A may be not B thus and to this extent*; the two last words introduced to express the kind and intensity of the quality predicated. So every predication of an accident to a substance is *per accidens*; so of two different orders of individuals; v. g. a musician builds *per accidens*, but a builder builds *per se*; because *builder* and the act of *building* are in the same order of ideas; but not *musician* and *this same act*.

It is, therefore, clear 1. that *per se* and *per accidens* are not opposed, if taken in different senses. In one sense everything created is *per accidens*. They even imply each other in many respects; as a body is felt *per se* (since it is its nature) and yet *per accidens* (by its colour, etc.).

preiacenti; ut, si homo est quantus, et taliter quantum potest esse non sic quantum, tunc per accidens homo est quantus; et dicit iste terminus, *taliter*, speciem quantitatis, et iste, *sic*, gradus speciei. Unde, eo ipso quod aliqua species vel individuum alicuius generis fuerit accidens, ipsum est accidens; ut, quia quantitas mea est michi accidens, ideo quantitas cuiuscunque partis celi, cum sit cuiusdem speciei, est sibi accidens; non quod possit separari ab alia parte, sed (quia taliter quantum) potest esse non ita quantum; et sic de caliditate ignis, et ceteris accidentibus inseparabilibus.

Et patet quomodo omnis predicacio denominativa alicuius predicati accidentis de substantia est predicacio per accidens. Ymmo, predicacio unius concreti de alio concreto alterius ordinis est predicacio per accidens; et in talibus dicunt auctores accidens accidere accidenti; ut *per accidens musicus edificat*, sed *per se edificator edificat*, intelligendo istum terminum, *edificat*, ut dicit aptitudinem ad edificandum. Nam omnis edificator, quia talis, est edificativus; et non stat quod sit edificator, nisi sit proporcionabiliter edificativus. Ideo *per se edificator est edificativus*. Sed *musicus est edificativus*, et possibile est musicum non esse proporcionabiliter edificativum; ideo *per accidens musicus edificat*. Et sic respectu terminorum accidentalium debet secunda exponens sumi in sensu composito; | et aliter non. Et ista dicta plus sapient logicis et methaphysicis quam sophistis

Ex istis patent multa; primo, quod, sic isti termini, *per se*, et, *per accidens*, sumpti equivoce non sunt oppositi. Nam omnis substantia, sive omnis res creata, per accidens est quicquam est, quia per conservacionem dei, que est sibi accidens, cuius ipsum tempus sit accidens; ita quod isti termini *per se* et *per accidens* in multis mutuo se inferunt in substantia, ut substantia modalis est per se 2<sup>o</sup> sensibilis, saltim si est predicacio passionis de suo subiecto; et tamen est sensibilis *per accidens* sibi, ut puta per colorem, vel aliam qualitatem sensibilem. Et illa qualitas est per se primo modo sensibilis, quia de natura sibi essentiali [habet] dispositionem propinquam ut senciatur.

40

3. dicit A. 10. qui A. 28. si *pro* sic A. 32. 1<sup>a</sup> *pro* tempus A.  
39. habet *deest* A.

- 2<sup>o</sup> patet quomodo isti termini, *per se* et *per acci-*  
*dens*, sinkathegorice sumpti, respectu eiusdem deter-  
 minabilis opponuntur, ut *si per se homo est racionalis*,  
 tunc *non potest esse homo nisi fuerit racionalis*; et *si per*  
 5 *accidens homo sit racionalis*, tunc *potest esse non ra-*  
*cionalis*. Unde non *per se* corpus compositum ex forma  
 et materia est quantum, quoniam ipsum potest esse non  
 quantum, ut communiter tenetur; vel saltem non pro-  
 porcionabiliter, ut est corpus, est quantum. Nec *per se*  
 10 talis substantia similatur alteri impertinenti, cum talis  
 alteri assimilatio potest esse non sibi assimilata. Videtur  
 tamen michi quod omnis res causata *per se* est causata,  
 conservatur, dependet, etc. cum cuiuscunque talis com-  
 munis passio sit causari, dependere, etc.
- 15 3<sup>o</sup> patet quomodo *per se* predicatio et predicatio *per*  
*accidens* sunt in multis passionibus differentes. Primo  
 quod omnis affirmativa de *per se* infert universalem  
 affirmativam, sed non omnis talis *per accidens*. Unde  
 bene sequitur: *per se* *medicus sanat*; ergo *omnis medicus*  
 20 *sanat*, sed non sequitur: *per accidens* *musicus sanat*; ergo  
*omnis musicus sanat*. 2<sup>o</sup> differunt in hoc quod nulla  
 talis *per se*, habens subiectum positivum, est vere deter-  
 minabilis dicto vel termino negativo; ut hec est im-  
 possibilis: *per se* *homo est non asinus*, *per se* *non currit*,  
 25 etc. Sed propositio de *per accidens* bene recipit: ut  
*per accidens* *homo non sedet*, *per accidens* *non scit logicam*,  
 etc. 3<sup>o</sup> differunt in hoc quod talis propositio de *per se*  
 solum finitas determinaciones recipit; sed talis proposi-  
 cio de *per accidens* recipit infinitas, eum eidem insint  
 30 infinite passiones, tunc eidem infinite *per se* predicationes  
 in sunt, quia tot sunt genera, differentie, vel passiones  
 alicuius subiecti, precise tot *per se* predicationes recipit;  
 et quot *accidencia* eidem *accidunt*, tot predicationes  
*per accidens* recipit. Et certum est quod nulli posset  
 35 unum *accidens* *accidere*, nisi sibi *acciderent* infinita.
- Quarto, patet quomodo non omnis predicatio est *per*  
*se* vel *per accidens*; nam *homo est homo*, et nec *per*  
*se* nec *per accidens*; *animal eciam est homo*; et tamen  
 nec *per se* nec *per accidens*; et de necessitate *homo*  
 40 *est non asinus*, et tamen nec *per se* nec *per accidens*  
*homo est non asinus*, parvus, parum bonus etc., cum

2. That they are  
 opposed in a  
 certain sense,  
 since the second  
 exponent of the  
 one is a denial  
 of the other, an  
 affirmation of  
 possibility.  
 So, as a body  
 may be without  
 quantity as is  
 believed, it is  
 not *per se*.

3. That  
 predication *per*  
*se* and *per*  
*accidens* differ  
 in many things.  
 The first infers  
 a universal  
 affirmative; not  
 so the second.

The first is not  
 properly  
 determined by  
 a negative  
 term; the  
 other is.

The first has  
 only a limited,  
 the second an  
 unlimited  
 number of  
 determinations.  
 There are but a  
 limited amount  
 of genera and  
 differences, and  
 an endless  
 number of  
 accidents.

And 4. that  
 there are some  
 predications  
 which are  
 neither *per se*  
 nor *per*  
*accidens*;

especially where  
the predicate is  
transcendental,  
unless *per se*  
has another  
meaning.

These  
principles give  
the key to  
many  
difficulties.  
Examples.

Both of these  
terms give the  
following  
words a  
confused  
supposition;  
but *per se*  
renders the one  
immediately  
following  
universal; and  
*per accidens*  
not so.  
Nor does this  
follow: *per se*  
*A is B; every*  
*B is C;*  
therefore, *per*  
*se, A is C.*  
*Per se* should  
in such cases  
be repeated in  
the minor.

Every  
proposition  
with *per se*  
implies a  
reduplicative,  
a conditional  
and a necessary  
proposition:  
*Per se A is B;*  
in so far as  
anything is A,  
it is B;  
if A exists, it  
is B; and: A is  
necessarily B.  
Propositions  
with *per se*  
are to be  
opposed by *non*

nullus terminus infinitus vel privativus sit genus, species, differencia, vel passio respectu termini positivi. Et sic est de tali: *homo potest esse, homo intelligitur*, et (ut videtur) de talibus; *homo est*. Nam transcendens et eius passionibus non videntur predicari *per se*. Quod si ipsum equivoce vocetur genus, tunc *per se foret homo ens, unum, intellectum, potens esse, verum*; et sic de ceteris passionibus entis. Sed hec responsio est preter vim vocis.

Et ex iam dictis patet quomodo sophisticandum est cum istis terminis, iam *per se album est coloratum, sed nullum album est per se coloratum; rationale per se est animal, sed non per se rationale est animal; per se hoc est homo, et hoc per se est homo.* | *Hoc, album per accidens, est album, sed non: per accidens hoc album est album.* Unde uterque istorum terminorum, faciendo sensum compositum vel divisum, confundit terminum tam immediate quam mediate sequentem. Sed iste terminus, *per se*, mobilitat terminum immediatum mobilem, et non iste terminus *per accidens*: Unde non sequitur, *per se edificator edificat, iste est edificator, ergo iste edificat*. Sed in terminis accidentalibus non sequitur conclusio cum tali determinacione *per se*, sicut sequitur in terminis specialibus. Nec sequitur a parte predicati, si *per se homo sit animal et omne animal sit quantum*, quod *per se homo sit quantus*, sed bene sequitur quod *homo sit quantus*. Et capiendo minorem de *per se*, sequitur conclusio de *per se*; ut si *homo per se est animal, et per se animal est corpus*, tunc *per se homo est corpus*.

Et patet quomodo ex omni tali proposicione de *per se* secuntur reduplicativa vel talis condicionalis, et propositio de necessario; ut si *per se sapiencia sit bona*, tunc: *in quantum aliquid est sapiencia, illud est homum*; et per consequens; *si est sapiencia, ipsa est bona*. Et: *de necessitate, sapiencia posita, ipsa est bona*. Patet etiam quomodo danda est contradiccio in proposicionibus de *per se*, preponendo negacionem: ut, *non per se homo currit*; quod est necessarium. Sed hoc est impossibile: *per se homo non currit*. Et patet ultimo quomodo tales propositiones debent probari secundum ordinem termi-

10. sophisticandum A. 20. homo est *before* animal A: *ib.* ipse pro  
et *per se* A. 38. proponendo A.



- norum ut, existente isto termino, *per se*, vel isto termino *per accidens*, in primo ordine terminorum communium, debet propositio probari ratione illius; sed precedente alio termino communi, probabitur ratione illius termini  
 5 precedentis. Ut, *album per se est homo, quia hoc per se est homo, cum per se hoc est homo, et hoc est album, ergo, album per se est homo*. Sed impossibile est quod *per se album sit homo*, quia tunc omne album esset homo.
- 10 Ulterius notandum quod propositiones iste habent certas exponentes, ratione illius termini *per*, significantis circumstanciam loci vel temporis; ut, *Sor durabit per horam futuram, si per quamlibet eius partem durabit*; et econtra. Et ad hoc requiritur quod a principio us-  
 15 que ad eius ultimum instans inclusive vel exclusive durabit; et durabit per tempus, si durat per quamlibet eius partem. Et hoc contingit quando est in illo, et nullum erit vel fuit instans illius, quin fuit vel erit in illo. Et isto modo *continue durabo per horam*, eo quod  
 20 in principio istius hore incipiam durare per horam istam, et usque ad finem durabo per istam; et per idem *ero per horam*. Et supposito quod essemus in medio instanti istius hore, certum est quod in infinitis partibus istius hore sum modo, sicut hoc instans est  
 25 infinitarum parcium istius hore medium instans. Sed non quodcunque est in omnibus illis partibus, est per horam; nec quodcunque quod erit per quamlibet eius partem secundum se totam futuram erit per illam, sicut patet per exponentes predictas; quia sic quodlibet  
 30 temporaneum foret per infinita tempora eterna communica-  
 35 videtur dicere quod in aliquo instanti *per totam istam horam Sor erit*, sicut *Sor in quolibet instanti huius hore [erit] per totam istam horam*, et quod quolibet talis convertitur cum universali affirmativa, ut cum talis: *quolibet pars istius hore mensurat adequate partem duracionis*  
 40 *Sortis*. Et si quolibet pars illius situs mensurat adequate partem extensionis Sortis, tunc ratione est per totum

*per se*, setting the negation first.  
 In exposition, the term *per se* or *per accidens* should be proved first or otherwise, according to the order of the terms.

Propositions may be expounded according to the sense given to *per* in the sentence. When it is used to express time, it expresses continuous duration.

Thus if I exist during an hour, I am now in all its infinite parts; but it does not follow that what is in all the parts of an hour exists during that hour.

An eternal lapse of time is ended every instant.

To say: *A will exist during an hour*, means: every part of this hour adequately measures a part of A's existence. It is thus only logically that he exists during the whole hour.

Time and place  
thus stand for  
parts of the  
duration or  
local existence  
of a being.

There are  
fallacies  
concerning  
*until*.

It is said, when  
in the subject,  
to connote  
exclusiveness,  
and  
inclusiveness  
when in the  
predicate.  
But it appears  
to me that,  
wherever  
placed, it may  
signify both.

Yet in some  
cases, *until* may  
signify  
exclusively and  
not  
inclusively, as:  
if A goes  
towards B, and  
dies in the very  
last moment;  
he does not  
touch B, but  
comes  
infinitely near  
to him.  
And he moves  
*until* he meets B,  
exclusively.

*Per* can be  
applied to a  
body moving  
continuously in  
space.

istum situm, et aliter non. Unde iste terminus, *per*, distribuit pro parte significati sui causalis, et non principaliter pro illo significato; et sic, sive per tempus et locum, quia per alicuius temporis quamlibet partem. Unde omne tempus vel locus per quem ens est, adequat sibi entis duracionem vel localem existenciam.

Sed de isto termino, *usque*, 2<sup>m</sup> quod potest connotare circumstanciam exclusivam vel inclusivam, est sophisticacio. Nam, quando ponitur a parte subiecti, dicitur significare circumstanciam exclusivam, ut: *usque ad B punctum Sor movebitur, vel dividet*. Sed quando ponitur a parte predicati, tunc dicitur significare circumstanciam inclusivam; ut: *Sor dubitat usque ad B tempus*, et *movebitur usque ad Platonem*. Videtur tamen michi quod tam a parte subiecti quam a parte predicati potest significare circumstanciam exclusivam et inclusivam, ut: *ego durabo continue usque ad B instans*, et *usque ad B instans durabo*, et sic continue vivam, quousque mors mea venerit. Verumtamen quandocunque mobile vel terminus in fine motus corrumpetur, sic quod ratione talis corrupcionis deficiet contactus vel terminacio inclusiva, tunc a parte subiecti sumendus est iste terminus, *usque*, sinkathegorice; ut, posito quod *Sor movebitur continue versus B fixum*, sic quod in fine illius hore corrumpantur, cadavere suo tunc primo tan gente B fixum, tunc *usque ad B Sor movebitur* et tamen non *movebitur usque ad B*, cum non erit ad B, sed in infinitum propinquius erit B. Ideo *usque ad B* propinquabit. Et sic iste terminus *usque*, sicut iste terminus *infinitum*, cuius significacionem includit, confundit verbum quo ad tempus connotatum, sicut non facit, dicto: *A movebitur usque B*. Ideo solum in talibus refert preponere vel postponere istum terminum *usque*. Sed totum illud est alibi disputatum.

Uterius notandum quod si mobile movebitur per spacium, tunc movebitur motu quo describetur vel describebatur quecunque pars illius spacii; et sic continue movebitur per spacium; quia non continue describet quamecunque partem illius spacii, sed quia continue movebitur motu quo quecunque pars illius spacii describetur vel describebatur. Unde spacium vel via

8. et *pro* est A.  
sicut A.

25. fore *pro* hore (?) A.

31. sicut non facit

vocari potest superficies, vel distancia superficialis, quorum neutrum est corporeum; ut *homo pertransit totam longam viam currens*, ymmo eius partem eque longam cum illa. Ideo dicitur a sophistis quod non  
 5 attenditur quantum ad velocitatem motus, ad magnitudinem spacii, sed ad eius longitudinem, quia lacius mobile describet plus spacii quam danda est partes pertransire, aut transecurrere vel transsaltare parcium, ad gradiencia, currencia, et saltancia. Unde homo  
 10 transit multa que non tetigit, sed continue distetit ab illis per centum milliaria; ut homo transit totum quod directe est sub eo moto, sed avis transvolat aquam et homo transsultat lacum. Sed de istis sufficiens.

This space may be called surface, or superficial distance; but dialecticians say that as for speed the length of the way alone, not the breadth traversed, is to be attended to. And a man may pass many parts of a road which he has not touched.

1. vacari A.    7. spam A.    9. <sup>m</sup> <sup>m</sup> gdiem A.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUMSEXTUM.

Of the  
Infinitely great  
and small.  
How the  
Infinite should  
not be  
expounded.

Not by saying:  
*To some extent,  
and not so  
much, but  
greater still;*  
for then every  
part of  
quantity would  
be infinite, and  
yet a line could  
not be so.  
Nor: *B is  
twice, four  
times as great,  
as A, and so on  
for ever;*  
for B, if twice,  
is not four  
times as great.  
Nor: *more than  
twice, more  
than four  
times . . . and  
so on;* for this  
would  
contradict  
God's  
infinitude.

Sequitur de istis terminis *infinite* et *immediate*, et terminis comparativis pertractandum. Ubi primo notandum quod uterque istorum terminorum potest sumi kathegorice vel sinkathegorice. Kathegorice quando 5 significat pro re infinita vel re ac modo immediato. Sinkathegorice, quando significat exponibiliter, ut post docebitur. Unde iste terminus, *infinite*, non debet sic exponi: *aliquantum et non tantum quin maius*: tum quia sic cuiuslibet quanti infinitum magna foret aliqua pars 10 quantitativa; tum etiam quia infinitum magna est linea, et tamen tanta quod non maior. | Nec debet exponi A 51<sup>b</sup> per terminos proporcionum, ut sic: *in 2<sup>to</sup> magis maius B est quam A, in 4<sup>to</sup> maius, et sic in infinite*; quia antecedens est impossibile cum A existente duplo ad B. 15 Non enim ipsum quadruplum, quia non plus quam duplum. Et preter hoc est expositio insufficiens, cum non exponit talia: *infinite magna est hoc, vel aliquod istorum*. Nec videtur tertia expositio inductiva sufficere qua inducitur exponendum ex talibus, *plus quam duplum,* 20 *plus quam quadruplum, et sic in infinite*; quia infinitum melior est deus quam suprema intelligencia, et tamen non est plus quam in duplo magis bonus illa, quia tunc esset plus quam aliquod in duplo magis bonum illa, et per consequens esset aliquid in duplo melius 25 illa. Et sic invenies in omnibus immediatis in ordine naturali. Est etiam expositio insufficiens, quia non exponit universaliter talia de positivo gradu: *infinite longum est aliquod istorum, infinite bonum, propinquum etc. est hoc*. Et sic de ceteris. 30

1. Cap. deest A.

2. Initial S in red ink A.

6. re ac mo A.

13. mge pro magis A.

15. ans pro antecedens A.

20. expo. § A.

27, 28. exponunt A.

Ideo videtur esse dicendum quod iste terminus, *infinitum*, debet exponi per suam preiacentem, et per universalem negativam exponentem universalem affirmativam secum convertibile. Ut, si *magnum sit hoc et non sit dare gradum magnitudinis finitum, quin hoc excedit illum in magnitudine*, tunc *infinitum magnum est hoc*. Et sic de bono, de veloci, acuto, propinquo, et omni denominatione in qua possibilis est comparacio.

Dissensio tamen est de magnitudine linee, utrum  
 10 infinitum magna sit aliqua, sicut infinitum longa est aliqua. Quod si sic, tunc infinitum magno est aliquid maius, cum quolibet superficies vel magnitudo corporea sit maior linea. Nec sequitur, omne corpus esset infinitum magnum, quia infinitum magna linea maius,  
 15 et nullum magnum est maius linea, iuxta exponentes predictas. Et per idem sequitur *omnem hominem esse infinitum bonum et perfectum*, quia dato animali infinitum perfeccioem, et omnem angulum continue infinitum acutum, quia omni angulo rectilineo plus acutum, etc.  
 20 Nec valet addere in 2<sup>a</sup> exponente quod non est dare magnitudinem finitam sue speciei quin hoc excedit illam, tum quia deficeret in illis que non habent alia cum illis in specie, ut patet in istis: *infinitum bonus vel durabilis, est deus, angelus vel mundus*; tum quia  
 25 deficeret in talibus: *infinitum longum est hoc, vel aliquod corpus*. Stat enim idem esse finitum et infinitum longum, ut patet de superficie interclusa inter duas lineas generativas, et tamen omnem longitudinem finitam sue speciei excedit.

30 In ista materia est alia responsio ponencium continuum componi ex indivisibilibus, et alia hoc negantium. Primi enim dicunt quod nulla superficies nec linea est infinitum magna. Nec sequitur, *est infinitum longa: ergo, est infinitum magna*, sicut quodlibet corpus mathematicum est equale sue totali linee, superficiei, et  
 35 multitudini punctorum; et unum infinitum secundum aliquam denominationem, in quacunque proporcione, reliquo infinito, secundum talem denominationem maius. Et illis est expositio superius posita satis bona; cum  
 40 maxima superficies est linea, sic tamen finite magna, quia equalis mundo.

How it should be expounded:

A is infinitely B; A is B; and nothing is B that A does not exceed in that respect.

Is a line that is infinitely long, infinitely great?

If so, there is something greater than the Infinite: any surface, for instance.

If nothing can be greater than the Infinite, each volume must be infinite. Man is infinitely more perfect than an animal: therefore he is infinite.

If it is said: infinitely great in its species, this could not apply to qualities that have not such species as magnitude has; nor to a body that was infinitely long.

Two replies; one from those that deny, the other from those that admit that the Extended is composed of indivisible elements.

The latter deny that any line is infinitely great. Volumes are equal to their surfaces, lines, and multitude of points: a line is equal to an immense surface, but is yet limited.

22. quia cum A. cum A.

28.  $\widehat{\text{geratas}}$  A; *ib.* tamen non A.

39. cum *pro*

The others say that both lines and surfaces are infinite, but that a volume is infinitely greater. The Infinite could be imaginably decreased until it became finite; and the Infinite also infinitely increased.

Sed alia via dicit quod infinitum magna est tam linea quam superficies; et sic de aliis pernominationibus; et tamen infinitum maius est quodcunque corpus. Et sic, de ymaginabili, | infinitum infinitum minorabitur A 52<sup>a</sup> quousque fuerit infinitum magnum, et B finitum; et 5 infinitum minorabitur quousque fuerit finitum primum, posito quod corpus diminuatur ad linealem magnitudinem generativam, et postmodum proporcionabiliter crescat. Ymmo possibile esset C infinitum in infinitum maiorari, quousque infinitum primum fuerit, posito quod C sit 10 corpus lineale pedale, et crescat successive usque ad finem istius hore ad quantitatem superficiei pedalem quadratam, et exhinc crescat successive usque ad cubitum pedale; in quo casu patet quod infinitum primum erit C. Ymmo, sicut bis infinitum maiorabitur sic in infinitum, 15 erit primum duabus vicibus, quia inmediate post hoc, et inmediate post finem in infinitum parvificabitur; et tamen continue magnificabitur.

The first exposition says that there is no volume that cannot be exceeded by a line; of a surface and a line equally long, the line is infinite, the surface may be finite (in breadth). We can also expound thus, by comparatives: *A is greater than B, and nothing is so much greater than B as A is.* Thus we may know the Infinite through comparison with the Finite. From such a proposition to the assertion of the Infinite, the comparison holds good. It does not always matter whether the term

Tenta superiori expositione, dicit hec via quod non est dare gradum magnitudinis corporee quin aliqua 20 linea excedit illum, et sua magnitudine non fit quod sit maior corpore sed quod sit longior vel stricior; linea enim infinita ratione sue strictitudinis est infinita, ubi superficies eque longa ratione sue habitudinis est solum finita; et sic de corpore, regula superficiei. Et 25 in proposicionibus de comparativo capienda est negativa cum subiecto significante proporcionem; ut, si *maius est A quam B* et non est dare gradum proporcionis finite quin maior sit propositio magnitudinis A ad B, tunc *infinitum maius est A quam B*. Prima tamen re- 30 sponsio videtur rationabilior. Sic ergo per cognicionem finiti cognoscere possumus infinitum; ut, si *omnem gradum finitum magnitudinis magnitudo A excedit, tunc infinitum magnum est A*. Et sic universaliter a tali uni- 35 versali ad proposicionem de infinito tenet consequencia, et econtra. Nec refert respectu verbi de presenti cum predicato singulari vel communi, cuius significati est dare excellentissimum, sive iste terminus, *infinitum*, sumatur kathegorice, ut: *hoc infinitum magnum est hoc, infinitum bonus est homo* etc. Sed in talibus dicitur multum 40

2. p *pro* pernominationibus A.      8. g<sup>er</sup>atam A.      17. p<sup>n</sup>ificab<sup>r</sup> A.  
25. r<sup>a</sup> *pro* regula.      29. p<sup>ro</sup> A.      33. infinitum A.

referre: *infinitum magnum est aliquid istorum, infinitum propinqua est aliqua res michi, infinitum cito erit aliquod instans*, etc. Ibidem enim stat predicatum conclusione et mobilitate.

Infinite is categorical or not, but it does in some cases.

5 De isto termino, *immediate*, dicitur consimiliter quod propositio ratione illius termini exponenda debet exponi per suam preiacentem et per universalem negativam exponentem universalem secum convertibilem. Ut si ante *B Sor fuit*, et non fuit instans ante *B quin* inter illud et *B Sor fuit*, tunc *immediate* ante *B Sor* fuit. Et si post *B Sor erit*, et nullum erit instans post *B quin* inter illud et *B Sor erit*; tunc *immediate* post *B Sor erit*. Non enim sequitur quod *immediate* ante *B fuisti albus*, si ante *B fuisti albus*, et nullum fuit instans ante *B quin* post illud fuisti albus; quia ponatur quod post annum post *B incepisti esse albus* et interim non fuisti albus, et patet quod totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Et per idem non sequitur, post *B eris albus*, et nullum erit instans post *B quin* ante illud eris albus; ergo *immediate* post *B eris albus*; quia cum antecedente stat quod per duos annos *immediate* succedentes *B* non eris albus. Ideo sic loquendo debet addi quod nullum erit instans *B quin* in aliquo instanti inter illud et *B eris albus*. Nec aliquid fuit instans ante *B quin* in aliquo instanti inter illud et *B Sor fuit* albus. Et conformiter conceditur, posito quod *Sor us-*  
A 52<sup>b</sup> *que ad Platonem movebitur* exclusive quod | *immediate usque ad Platonem Sor movebitur*; quia versus Platonem movebitur, et nullus erit gradus propinquitatis finitus quando propius ei movebitur. Ideo *immediate usque ad eum* movebitur.

Of the *Immediate*. To be thus expounded:

*I was immediately before B; i. e. I was before B, and there was no instant before B, at which I was not between it and B.*

*A will be immediately after B; i. e. in like manner. "Between it and B" must be employed; "after it" would not sufficiently determine the time, either for the past, or the future.*

Thus too for movement and near approach.

Et ex istis patent tria. Primo, quod omnis propositio de *immediate* affirmativa convertitur cum universali affirmativa et propositione de infinito, ut si *immediate* ante *B instans fuisti*, tunc *infinitum propinquum ad B instans fuisti* et econtra; et per consequens omnem gradum propinquitatis finitum ante *B instans excessisti*; et sic de ceteris. Secundo patet quod non est idem; *immediate* ante *B fuisti*, et sine medio cum *B fuisti*. Nec sequitur: *infinitum magnum est aliquid istorum*. Et  
40 *tercio* patet quod non, si *immediate* ante hoc fuisti, quod

Every proposition of the *Immediate* can be turned into one of the infinite; infinite propinquity in time or space; and so it implies a passing beyond all finite degrees of propinquity.

This, however, *aliquando fuit ita quod immediate ante hoc es*, vel quod  
 neither implies  
 identity of the  
 two things, nor  
 infinite  
 greatness of  
 either.  
*fuisti immediate ante hoc*. saltem si tempus non com-  
 ponitur ex instantibus. Verumtamen conceditur in casu  
 quod *Sor stetit immediate coram Platone*, sicut *deus est*  
*immediate supra supremam intelligenciam*. et *omnis accio* 5  
*naturalis immediate agit*. Et istum sensum pretendit  
 posicio ponens continuum componi ex indivisibilibus  
 ex utrobique; nam iuxta illam, si *immediate ante B*  
*erit A*, tunc *in instanti immediato ante B* erit *A*; si *in-*  
*finitum parvum est aliquod corpus*, tunc *est dare corpus* 10  
*infinitum parvum*: quod est falsum; quia corpus compo-  
 situm ex duobus non quantis est minimum. Et ultra  
 non refert penes illam, sive isti termini *infinitum* et  
*immediate, usque*, etc. sumantur kathegorice sive sin-  
 kathegorice. Et tantum de istis ad presens sufficiat. 15

5, 6. omnem accionem naturalem A.  
 13. 1<sup>um</sup> pro illam.

7. po<sup>o</sup> pro posicio A.



## CAPITULUM DECIMUMSEPTIMUM.

Uterius pro expositione proposicionum de terminis  
 graduum comparandi supponantur 3<sup>a</sup>. Primo quod tres  
 sunt gradus huiusmodi terminorum; scilicet, positivus,  
 5 comparativus et superlativus, et distincio illorum.  
 Secundo, supponatur quod aliqua sit comparacio proprie  
 dicta: ut puta, comparacio aliquorum in aliqua de-  
 nominatione specifica, ut albedine, longitudine, motu,  
 etc. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel cum termino  
 10 positivo, vel cum termino non positivo. Et primo modo  
 dupliciter; vel quod talis denominacio suscipiat magis  
 et minus, vel non. Si sic, tunc fit comparacio cum  
 isto termino *ita* vel *tante*; ut: *Sor est ita sapiens sicut*  
*Plato*, vel *tante sciens quantum Plato*. Si non, tunc  
 15 dimittitur talis terminus, ut, *Sor est tripedalis sicut*  
*Plato*, *Sor est summe albus sicut Plato*, etc. Si autem  
 fiat comparacio cum termino comparativi aut super-  
 lativi gradus, hoc contingit quotlibet modis variari in  
 comparacione proprie dicta: vel quod fiat comparacio  
 20 ad infinita, vel pro infinitis, in quibus est dare maximum:  
 in quibus magna diversitas respondendi. Si vero fiat  
 comparacio improprie dicta, hoc contingit multis modis;  
 vel in genere, comparando unam speciem ad aliam,  
 aut unam speciem ad genus vel differenciam; vel extra  
 25 genus, comparando ens unius generis ad ens alterius,  
 aut alterum ad transcendens; et ex tali comparacione  
 frequenter gravissima peroritur difficultas. 3<sup>o</sup> supponitur,  
 ubi adverbia vel alia positiva comparativorum adver-  
 biorum vel nominum deficiunt, licitum sit fingere voces  
 30 suppletentes sentencias.

Quibus suppositis, dicitur quod regulariter quelibet  
 proposicio ratione termini positivi gradus exponenda,

Preliminary  
 assumptions.  
 1. The three  
 degrees of  
 comparison.

2. The division  
 into comparison  
 properly and  
 improperly so  
 called;  
 the former  
 either  
 expressed by  
 the positive or  
 not: if by the  
 positive, the  
 thing compared  
 is capable of  
 increase or  
 diminution (and  
 then  
 comparison is  
 indicated by  
*as*, etc.),  
 or not capable,  
 and then *as*  
*well as*, or  
*like* must be  
 used.  
 If by the  
 comparative or  
 superlative,  
 there are many  
 different ways  
 of indicating it.  
 Comparison  
 improperly so  
 called holds  
 between one  
 species, one  
 genus, one  
 being etc., and  
 another.  
 3. It is allowed  
 to coin terms  
 expressing the  
 different  
 degrees, when  
 these terms do  
 not exist.

1. Cap. *deest* MS.

2. Initial U in blue ink MS.

27. *pori* pro

Formula for  
comparison in  
the positive:  
*A is as great  
as B; i. e. A is  
great, and B is  
great, and B is  
greater than  
the other.*

There are  
difficulties in  
expounding:

1. When the  
latter term  
compared  
stands for  
infinite  
individuals  
amongst which  
none is  
supreme.

If *A* is an  
infinite line and  
it is compared  
with an infinite  
number of  
others of all  
lengths, then  
we say:

*A is great, and  
one of these  
(B, C, D . . . )  
is great, and  
neither is  
greater;  
not every one  
of these.*

In the latter  
sense it would  
be wrong to  
conclude: *A is  
as great as one*

*of these  
(B, C, D . . . )  
for it is  
greater.*

We can neither  
conclude that  
*A* is equal to  
the greatest of  
all these,  
nor that *A* is  
greater than the  
greatest;  
for we are  
comparing the  
infinite with  
the indefinitely  
great.

Infinite in  
dimensions or  
in multitude

debet exponi per suas preiacentes, et per negacionem  
excludentem excessum materie comparandi; ut, *Sor est  
aliquantus*, et *Plato est aliquantus*, et *neuter illorum est  
maior reliquo*; ergo, *Sor est | tantus quantus est Plato*. A 53<sup>a</sup>  
Et correspondenter exponende sunt tales; *Sor est ita  
albus sicut Plato, ita velociter currit, ita bene arguit*, etc.  
Et conformiter exponuntur tales proposicione quante: *Sor  
est tante obligatus deo quante est homo, tante est animal  
quam longus est Sor, tam magnus est*, etc.

Difficultas tamen exponendi huiusmodi proposiciones 10  
modo oritur ratione extremi, significantis solum pro in-  
finitis, quorum non est dare excellentissimum, vel ratione  
verbi diversimode connotantis tempus. Exemplum primi:  
captis infinitis lineis, quarum infinitum magna sit aliqua,  
quamvis nulla sit illa, et capta *A* linea infinita, tunc 15  
hoc: *A est tantum quantum est aliquod istorum*, sic  
debet exponi: *A est aliquantum, et aliquod istorum est  
aliquantum, et neutra pars comparatorum est reliqua  
maior*; ergo *A est ita magnum sicut aliquod istorum*.  
Nec videtur michi quod oportet capere quod quodlibet 20  
*istorum sic est aliquantum, quia homo est ita sapiens  
sicut aliquod animal, et deus ita bonus sicut aliquod ens*;  
et sic videtur michi quod tales proposiciones sunt  
false: *A est ita magnum sicut aliquod istorum*, quorum  
infinitum magnum sit aliquod, *deus est ita bonus sicut* 25  
*aliquod istorum*, quorum infinitum bonum sit aliquod;  
quia *A est maius quam aliquod istorum*. Non enim ita  
magnum esset aliquod istorum sicut *A*, nisi sub eodem  
gradu esset aliquod istorum magnum cum *A*. Nec  
sequitur: *infinitum magnum est aliquod istorum et non* 30  
*maius quam infinitum magnum est A*; ergo *non maius  
quam aliquod istorum est A*. Nec sequitur: *maius quam  
aliquod istorum est A, et infinitum magnum est aliquod  
istorum*; ergo *maius quam infinitum magnum est A*. Sed  
bene sequitur quod *infinitum magno maius est A*; quod 35  
est verum, cum *infinitum magnum* est non infinite magnum,  
sed [in] *infinitum*. Multa solum sunt finita, quamvis in-  
finitum multa sint infinitum multa; ut patet de omnibus  
rebus mundi. Finita etiam sunt infinita, ut patet quod  
due linee sunt infinite secundum magnitudinem. Alique 40  
etiam linee infinite secundum multitudinem sunt finite

7. opandi A. 8. obligat A. 11. non pro modo A. 36. infinite pro  
infinitum A. 37. in deest A.

secundum magnitudinem; ut patet de semidyametris circuli. Ideo, quamvis multa infinita sunt plura quam finita aliqua, tamen finita infinite multa sunt plura quam alia infinita finite multa; et sic de multis aliis conclusionibus, tam in continuis quam in discretis.

does not exclude finitude from another point of view.

Et iuxta istam responsionem, quodocunque non est dare excellentissimum gradum comparacionis, neganda est quecunque talis propositio affirmativa penes talem; ut, captis duabus multitudinibus infinitis, quarum prime infinitum magna sit aliqua magnitudo, et 2<sup>e</sup> similiter, cum hoc quod tamen neutra sit aliqua magnitudo infinita, tunc falsum est quod *ita magnum est aliquod prime multitudinis sicut aliquod 2<sup>e</sup>*, aut econtra. Et falsum est quod *ita cito erit instans sicut erit instans*, quod *ita propinquum est aliquid michi sicut est aliquid michi*, *ita magna est aliqua pars quantitativa mei sicut est aliqua pars quantitativa mei*, *ita parvum est aliquid, sicut est aliquid*, *ita magnus erit Sor sicut erit Sor*. Et sic de infinitis de quibus non est dare gradum supremum.

It is evident that such comparisons are absurd, when there is no supreme degree possible. Examples.

Nam secundum concedentes istos terminos, *sicut*, *ita*, *quante*, et ceteros consimiles cum positivo gradus mobilitate terminum, ut | supponitur in presenti: *si ita magnum est aliquod istorum sicut est aliquod istorum*, tunc est dare *aliquod istorum quo nullum istorum est maius*: quod est contra casum. Nec sequitur: *quantumcunque magnum est aliquod istorum, ita magnum est aliquod istorum*: ergo, *ita magnum est aliquod istorum sicut est aliquod istorum*: quia iste terminus *ita*, vel sibi equivalens, confundit terminum sequentem, nisi talis terminus, *sicut*, vel sibi equivalens, precedat non simpliciter. Unde non sequitur: *quantumcunque magnum est aliquod istorum, ita magnum est aliquod istorum*; ergo, *ita magnum est aliquod istorum*. Sed sua subalternata erit talis: *Sub equali gradu magnum est aliquod istorum; sub quo aliquod istorum est magnum*; ubi non est confusio.

We admit that like, as, etc., render distributive the terms that follow; it so, and A (infinite) is as great as one of (B, C, D . . .) one of these must be infinite, which is against the hypothesis. However great one of these may be, one of those is as great: therefore one of these is as great as one of those; is a false conclusion; we must say: is great in an equal degree.

Et in talibus sunt propositiones de comparativo gradu negande, ut: *non senior eris quam eris, nec citius erit instans quam erit instans, nec propinquius ero Sorti*

When to the same difficulty is added the comparative

3. a'q' cū A. aliquod A.

4. aliqua pro alia A.

10. 22<sup>e</sup> A.

17. a'q' pro

18. a'd pro aliquod A.

18. 19. 2<sup>e</sup> pro et sic A.

25. 26. quācūq; A. before aliquod A.

30. n<sup>e</sup> pro vel A.

34. equali A.

35. quo est

degree and the future or past, the comparison must be denied.

As for difference of tense, the verb must be analyzed accordingly:

Ex. *Then I shall be as old as I ever shall be:*  
i. e. *my highest degree of old age will be equal to that highest degree.*

It is necessary in such cases to change the sentence, finding a proper nominative.

But this is not the system followed by those who admit that the continuous is made up of indivisible parts; for they admit that there exists a supreme degree.

To exist immediately before B means with them that at a given instant with no time between, something exists before B.

*quam ero; et sic de aliis. Nec enim ero sibi propinquior quam ero, nec minus propinquus nec eque propinquus; quia non est dare quam propinquus ero ad maximum. Unde tales propositiones de preterito et futuro probari debent, resolvendo verbum ratione temporis connotati, ut: tunc ero ita senex sicut ero; ergo ero sic senex; et ista propositio, ita senex ero sicut ero, probabitur sic: maximus gradus senis quo ero senex erit idem vel equalis maximo gradui quo ero senex; et sic nichil est vel erit ita magnum sicut aliqua pars quantitativa mei est vel erit; nec ita propinquum Sorti sicut ego ero, nec ita cito sicut instans erit. Ideo in omnibus talibus oportet resolvere propositionem per suum rectum debite propositum; ut, si ita magna sit aliqua pars quantitativa mei sicut est aliqua pars quantitativa tui, es equalis michi; tunc, aliqua est ita magna pars quantitativa mei sicut est aliqua pars quantitativa tui; et illa probabitur per resolutionem, ut prius dictum est.*

Aliter tamen sciunt qui ponunt continuum componi ex indivisibilibus; quia ipsi, ut ponitur, dant maximum in propinquitate, in magnitudine parcium quantitativarum, in parvitate: et sic, *ut immediate ante B ero, tunc aliquando, et ita quod sum sine medio ante B:* et sic de similibus. Et sic secundum eos, si *Sor in B erit senior quam unquam ante, tunc erit senior quam immediate ante; non solum quia immediate ante erit, sed quia aliquod "quando" indivisibile erit immediate ante.* Prior tamen responsio habet negare consequentiam; sed oportet capere secundum illam in minori, quod *hoc instans erit ante in quo erit senex*. Et ex isto patet quod omnis affirmativa de positivo gradu infert negativam de comparativo et affirmativam de superlativo, sicut quilibet talis superlativa propositio infert propositiones huiusmodi e converso: ut bene sequitur, *Ita magna est aliqua pars quantitativa mei sicut Sor; ergo, maxima quantitas Sortis et alicuius partis quantitative mei quantitates sunt equales; et per consequens: maxima quantitas Sortis tanta parte non est minor.* Et sic de similibus.

Quecunque ergo propositio, ratione termini comparativi exponenda exponitur communiter per duas preia-

Any proposition in the comparative

centes et universalem negantem paritatem comparatorum in medio comparandi. Ut: si *Sor sit albus et Plato similiter, et Plato non sit tanto gradu albus ut Sor*, tunc *Sor est albius Platone*. Sed quia ista explicatio implicat omnem denominationem habere gradus, vel  
 5 omne excellens esse par suo inferiori, | ideo potest dici quod quilibet talis debet exponi per unicam categoricam, ponentem excessum denominationis antecedentis super denominationem consequentis. Ut, si *gradus magnitudinis*  
 10 *A excedit gradum magnitudinis B*, tunc *A est maius quam B*; et antecedens noscitur, scito penes quid attenditur magnitudo. Et conformiter dicendum est in similibus. Magnitudo enim corporis attenditur penes distanciam a non quanto ad bonum intellectum; et sic  
 15 requiritur ad hoc quod aliqua sint eque magna, quod distent equaliter a non quanto.

Ex isto patet quod affirmacio de positivo fundatur in paritate vel equiparancia, non solum respectu trium suppositorum increatorum, sed respectu sue denominationis, etc. Affirmacio vero de comparativo gradu fundatur, more infamis binarii, super inequalitatem vel disparanciam. Et ideo significanter dicunt grammatici quod omne comparativum presupponit suum positivum, sicut omnis inequalitas ab equalitate procedit. Et ita  
 25 dici potest quod propositio ratione positivi gradus exponi debet per unam preiacentem et universalem negantem excessum unius ad alterum; ut si utrumque comparatorum sit quantum, et neutrum excedit reliquum in esse quanti, tunc unum est ita magnum ut reliquum.  
 30 Et sic affirmacio comparativi gradus creditur esse inter unum et infinita, quorum non est dare maximum gradum denominationis in qua comparantur, nec gradum consequentis denominationis in qua comparantur: ut  
 35 *ego sum maior sed non prior quam aliqua pars quantitativa mei, deus est melior quam res causata, etsi infinitum bona esset aliqua. B instans est cicius quam aliquod*

degree is expounded by a double preiacent and a proposition denying equality:  
*A is more B than C*; i. e. *A is B, and C is B, and C is not so B as A*. But this implies degrees in the quality to be compared; so another form is: *A is more B than C*, i. e. *the degree of B in A exceeds that in C*.  
 Size is measured by the distance of anything from *no quantity*; if two things are equal, they are equally distant from that. Affirmation in the positive must be founded on equality, as in the Holy Trinity; but like the number 2, it is based in the comparative upon inequality. That is why the former is expounded, denying excess, and the latter is believed to take place between one thing and an infinite multitude of others that have no maximum.

7. ca<sup>ca</sup> pro categoricam A. 14. ad bonū int<sup>vm</sup> A. 19. incator<sup>s</sup> pro increatorum A. 21. mo<sup>e</sup> infamis A. 33. communem pro consequentis A. 33, 34. sed non prior ut ego sum maior A.

21. *Infamis binarii*. I have several times found this expression in Wyclif, but could never make out the reason of so strong a term employed for a number.

*instancium ipsum succedencium; ista linea infinita est maior quam aliqua istarum, quarum infinitum magna est aliqua; et sic de similibus. Semper tamen est dare gradum denominacionis antecedentis in tali comparacione; ut non est verum quod maius est aliquod istorum, quorum infinitum magnum est aliquod, quam aliquod reliquorum quorum infinitum magnum est aliquod; quia idem est dicere: maius, vel ita magnum est aliquod istorum; et dicere: aliquod istorum est maius vel sic magnum.* 10

In such comparisons we must always suppose a certain degree of superiority of the antecedent over the consequent; thus there is no comparison between a subject possessing a quality, and another that has it not. And, therefore, it is false to say: *A is whiter than B begins to be; yet we may say: B begins to be less white than A is.*

Notandum tamen quod ad omnem talem comparacionem oportet dare gradum denominacionis tam antecedentis quam consequentis; ut A non esset maius quam aliquod istorum nisi sub aliquo gradu esset aliquod istorum magnum; sicut nullum quantum est maius puncto, quia sub nullo gradu est punctus magnus; nec aliquid est moraliter melius dyabolo, sapiencius lapide, alcus centro; et tales.

Ex hoc patet quod talia sophismata in communibus casibus sunt falsa: *Sor est albior quam Plato incipit esse albus; Sor est infinitum albior quam Plato incipit esse albus. Sor incipit esse albior quam ipsemet vel Plato incipit esse albus. Sor est iunior, quam immediate post hoc erit. Sor est senior quam immediate ante hoc fuit; et sic de similibus. Et tamen conceditur quod Plato incipit esse minus albus quam Sor est albus, Plato in infinitum minus albus erit quam iam est Sor. Plato enim infinitum remisse albus post hoc erit, ut patet per exponentes; sed non infinitum remisse albus vel minus albus quam iam est Sor, immediate post hoc erit, quia non plus quam in 2<sup>10</sup> minus albus quam iam est Sor immediate post hoc erit vel incipiet esse Plato, cum non sit dare gradum quo immediate post hoc erit albus; ideo non plus erit tunc remisse albus quam iam est Sor. Et iuxta hoc conceduntur tales conclusiones negative; nichil potest velocius vel tardius moveri quam* 15 20 25 30 35

Thus nothing can move faster or slower than that which

17. ut pro nec A. 29. in infinitum A. 36. esse velocius A.

20. *Incipit.* Is Wyclif quite consistent? We have seen how, in the XIV<sup>th</sup> Ch. (p. 197, l. 22) he 'adds *entire*, to deny that the instantaneity of beginning takes anything essential away from the quality.' Now he seems to deny that the quality exists at all when it begins to be, though indeed he does not say so explicitly; and further on he gives us a proof of this.

*hoc incipit moveri, quod incipit intendere motum suum a non gradu vel ab aliquo gradu exclusive. Sor ergo nunquam erit albius quam iam Plato incipit esse nec unquam est sciencior vel iunior quam immediate post hoc erit vel quam immediate ante hoc fuit.*

begins to move; nor can any one be whiter than a person beginning to turn white, etc.

Et ratio omnium istorum est, quia non est dare gradum in consequente, cui fieret comparacio. Voco autem antecedens comparacionis, illud comparatum quod primo explicatur, et consequens voco secundo explicatum; ut sic, dicto, *Sor est albius quam Plato immediate post hoc erit*, falsum implicatur; oportet quod certo gradu albus immediate post hoc Plato erit. Unde, si *Sor erit albius quam Plato erit in aliquo istorum*, tunc certo gradu erit Plato albus in aliquo istorum. Et sic est hoc sophisma verum, posito quod Sor et Plato, intensi in albedine, continue mancant eque albi usque ad finem hore, in qua Sor incipiet esse summe albus, et Plato corrumpatur, demonstrando per *ly* "istorum" omnia instancia intrinseca huius hore. Nam *Sor tunc erit albius quam unquam ante; sed non erit tunc albius quam immediate ante*, quia est dare sub equo gradu albus erit immediate ante. Unus tamen reverendus logicus et subtilis tenuit probabiliter oppositum hic dictorum, sicut facerent qui ponerent continuuum componi ex indivisibilibus.

The reason is that the consequent in these cases can have no degrees on which to base a comparison: the consequent being the second and the antecedent the first of the two compared things.

If two persons, A and B, were to have a quality C equally intense until a given instant, when B dies and A begins to have it in a very high degree, A would then have more of C than ever before, but not more than he had immediately before.

As for superlatives, they can be expounded either by prejacents and a negative with a positive term: as: *A is the most B of C's*: i. e. *A is B, and all C's are more or less B, and no C that is not A is as much B as A*; or thus for the last proposition: and no C that is not A is more B than A.

Quecunque autem propositio, ratione termini superlativi gradus exponenda, potest exponi dupliciter, vel per suas preiacentes, et negativam de comparativo gradu, vel per suas preiacentes et negativam cum termino positivo; ut ista: *Sor est fortissimus hominum*, potest sic exponi: *Sor est homo fortis, et homines sunt gradatim fortes, et nemo non Sor est ita fortis ut ille: ergo ille est fortissimus hominum*; vel aliter propter dictas preiacentes, et talem negativam: *nemo non Sor est forcior illo*; et ista expositio est a virtute sermonis remocior, quamvis sit famosior.

Ex istis patet quod tales propositiones sunt false: *Sor est fortissimus lapidum*, cum implicatur ipsum esse lapidem; *deus est fortissimus deorum*, cum implicat multos esse deos; *iste ternarius est maximus ternariorum*,

3. iam incipit before Plato A.  
quo A. 24. poneret A.

1. fcior pro sciencior A.

17. in

For a superlative, the two terms must be of the same denomination: a man cannot be the strongest of stones; and there must be possible gradation in the quality: to say: This is the greatest of three, is absurd.

A superlative must add something to a positive; from: *A is as strong as any man*, it does not follow that *A is the strongest of men*. A fallacy concerning the superlative, depending on the sense of the relative, *quod*.

Writers, and especially orators, often use the superlative for the comparative or positive, and the comparative either for the contrary comparative with *less* (*sweeter for less bitter*), or to comparison. Superlatives and comparatives differ in the former, requiring at least three individuals to make *all*; in the superlative being compared with itself, and in its admitting an equal.

quia implicat ternarios esse gradatim magnos, ut puta unum reliquo maiorem: quod est falsum. Et sic ad comparacionem propriam de superlativo gradu, cum termino habente plura supposita quam duo, requiruntur ad minus tria comparata imparia quo ad denominacionem 5 in qua comparantur; cum comparando duo secundum excessum sit comparativo gradu.

Patet eciam quod propositio de superlativo gradu superaddit proposicionem de positivo gradu: ut non sequitur, *Sor est ita fortis ut homo; ergo, ipse est fortissimus hominum*; quia, posito quod omnis homo esset eque fortis cum Sorte, esset antecedens verum et consequens falsum, cum ad fortissimum requiruntur alia minus forcia, saltem illis positis.

Patet eciam quod falsum est, *B esse maximum istorum*, posito quod A sit tripedale, B bipedale, C pedale; quia sic dicto: *B est magnum istorum quod non est maximum istorum*, refertur iste terminus, *quod*, ad B; sed in secunda proposicione, *nullum istorum est maius B quod non est maximum istorum*, refertur iste terminus, *quod*, non ad B; quia tunc foret propositio A 55<sup>a</sup> falsa; sed refertur ad subiectum. Et sic propter equivocacionem non exponitur hec propositio per has duas.

Patet eciam quod auctores quandoque utuntur figurative superlativo gradu pro comparativo vel positivo; ut rhetores dicunt quemcunque gravem unum esse *reverendissimum*; hoc est, *valde reverendum*; quandoque intelligunt comparativum pro suo contrario privative participato; unum amarum dicunt reliquo dulcius, hoc est, minus amarum; et quandoque per negacionem comparativi, ut *linea est maior puncto*.

6<sup>o</sup> patet quod superlativus differt a comparativo in 3<sup>bus</sup>. Primo in hoc quod affirmativa de tali termino, sicut hoc signum, *omnis* dicitur primo de tribus. 2<sup>o</sup> in hoc quod oportet superlativum esse de numero comparatorum ad ipsum, et 3<sup>o</sup> in hoc quod superlativum compatitur secum par in gradu et opposito modo est de termino comparativi gradus.

Ex istis colligitur quod quilibet terminus alicuius horum 3<sup>um</sup> gradium est subsequenteris termini confusivus; ut positivus terminus confundit cum isto termino *ita* vel cum isto termino *quam*, vel cum isto termino, *quantum*, aut equivalente, ut patet hic: *Sor est ita fortis*



*sicut homo; quam album est aliquid, ita alba est nix;* Each sign  
*quantum dabit aliquis Sorti, tantum dabo ego sibi; et* (as, more &c.)  
*sic de aliis. Probabiliter tamen potest dici quod in* of these three  
*talibus non est confusio, cum iste terminus, ita, denotat* degrees renders  
 5 *gradum; et iste terminus, sicut, similitudinem: ut, Sor* those following  
*est ita albus vel sic albus sicut vel qualiter homo est* it distributive.  
*albus. Et sic: tantum obtulisti tu quantum obtulit aliquis* But as and like  
*homo; quia aliquam rem causatam (ut patet resolutorie);* (ita, sicut) may  
*sed non quantumcunque obtulit aliquis.* perhaps not do  
 10 *significacio est famosior, iuxta quam sequitur quod Sor* so, when  
*non est ita sapiens sicut omnis vel magis sapiens quam* denoting degree  
*omnis homo; quia, cum terminus stet mobiliter, tunc omni* or likeness.  
*homine esset sapiencior: quod est contradiccio. Similiter,* So a man  
*si Sor sit sapientissimus animalium, et hoc sit animal, tunc* cannot be wiser  
 15 *Sor esset eque sapiens vel sapiencior isto; et sic de aliis.* than every man,  
 since this term  
 is taken  
 universally and  
 involves  
 contradiction.

Probabile tamen videtur multis, et plus consonum It is perhaps  
dictis antiquiorum, quod *comparativus gradus sapiencie* preferable to  
*Sortis excedit cuiuslibet hominis gradum sapiencie; et* expound this  
*econtra: si Sor est sapiencior aliquo homine vel homine,* proposition by  
 20 *tunc gradus sapiencie sue excedit simpliciter hominem* saying that  
*vel totam naturam humanam: sed si gradus sapiencie* *wiser than a*  
*Sortis aliquod individuum speciei humane excedit, tunc* *man would*  
*Sortes est sapiencior quodam homine.* meant than  
*Iste tamen modus* some man; and  
*loquendi a sophistis presentis temporis est defectus. Et* *wiser than any*  
 25 *tales evidencie, ut credo, movebant reverendum magistrum* *man, than all*  
*proximo recitatum ad cognoscendum quod Sor est* *human nature.*  
*albior quam Plato incipit esse albus: quia Sor est sapiencior* But this mode  
*omni homine, quamvis nullus sit gradus quo Plato in-* of exposition is  
 30 *cipit esse albus, quia Plato est sapiencior omni homine,* not now in  
*quamvis non sit gradus quo omnis homo est sapiens;* favour.  
*et maior omni corpore, quamvis nullus sit gradus supra* It is probably  
*quem omne corpus est magnum; sed sicut omnis homo* for this reason  
 35 *est sapiens aliquo gradu et omne corpus aliquo gradu* that comparison  
*magnum, sic Plato incipit esse aliquo gradu albus.* between a  
*Videtur tamen michi, salvo indicio meliori, quod talis* quality and its  
 40 *locutio est impropria: Sor est sapiencior omni homine,* beginning has  
*sicut ista: Sor est sapiencior nulla chimera vel non omni* been  
 A 55<sup>b</sup> *animali; nisi forte altero istorum modorum | intelligatur* maintained;  
*aliquo gradu Sor est sapiens, quo quilibet gradus* but I think that  
 to say I is  
 wiser than any  
 man is  
 unmeaning  
 unless  
 understood in  
 the sense of a  
 degree of

1. aliquid A. 9. sicut A. 10, 11. Sor qui non A. 25-30. quamvis — quamvis twice A. 38. inf<sup>m</sup> A.

26. Reverendum magistrum. See p. 223, l. 22.

wisdom, which  
no other man  
surpasses or  
equals.

and then, when  
we say *A is  
whiter than B*  
*begins to be*, we  
imply that this  
*beginning* has a  
certain *degree*  
of intensity.

The superlative  
does not  
render the  
following term  
universal in the  
ordinary way:  
for we cannot  
conclude: *A is  
the wisest of  
men*, therefore,  
he is the wisest  
of these men;  
for this would  
require the  
individual A to  
be one of these,  
like *humanity*  
itself.

Yet it is  
universal:  
*wisest of men*  
means of all  
men.

There are an  
infinite number  
of degrees  
according to  
which the  
quantities of  
terms are  
modified; some  
render both  
subject and  
predicate  
universal, some  
the subject  
only; some  
render them  
confusedly  
universal, etc.

How are these  
comparative  
propositions  
mutually  
expounded?

sapientie hominis est remissior; vel sic: *Sor aliquo gradu est sapiens, et omnis homo est aliquo gradu sapiens, sed non maiori nec pari gradu sapientie Sortis*. Et iste modus loquendi, quamvis sit usitatus, videtur michi esse irracionalis. Et adhuc, admissio isto modo loquendi, deficit similitudo in tali: *Sor est albius quam Plato incipit esse albus*; quia, si esset simile, tunc *Sor intensiori gradu esset albus quam Plato incipit esse albus*: quod implicat Platonem aliquo gradu incipere esse album.

Sed de confusione superlativi, notandum quod confundit alio modo quam negacio vel distribucio; quia non sequitur: *Sor est sapientissimus hominum; isti sunt homines; ergo Sor est sapientissimus istorum*; quia sic *Sor* esset omnis homo et non omnis homo. Nec sequitur: *Sor est sapientissimus omnium hominum, isti sunt homines, ergo Sor est sapientissimus istorum*; quia tunc includeret antecedens repugnanciam sicut primum. Nec stat iste terminus, *omnium hominum* immobiliter quantum ad superlativum gradum precedentem, cum idem est dicere *Sor est sapientissimus hominum* et *Sor est sapientissimus omnium hominum*; et secus est in aliis terminis mobilitatis per alios terminos precedentes. Ideo hoc est concludendum.

Unde aliter capiendum est medium in talibus quam in aliis simpliciter mobilitatis; ut bene sequitur: *Sor est fortissimus hominum* (vel *omnium hominum*, quod idem est): *Plato est homo; ergo, Sor est forcior Platone vel eque fortis cum illo*; et sic de ceteris similibus. Unde secundum qualescunque gradus ymaginabiles est dare terminos confundentes; ut aliqui mobilitant tam subjectum quam predicatum, sicut mere negaciones; aliqui mobilitant solum subjectum et immobilitant predicatum; ut signa universalalia distributiva; aliqui confundunt et mobilitant, ut isti termini *infinitum, immediate, promitto, scio*, et consimiles, aliqui mobilitant mediatos et non immediatos, ut dicciones exclusive et exceptive, et aliqui mobilitant, sed cum supernaturalibus mediis; et superlativi gradus et immediati alii prenarrati.

Sed ulterius dubitatur quomodo propositiones de istis tribus gradibus reciproce se exponunt; ut compara-

2. est *after* gradu *deest* A.  
10. B *pro* se A.

3. spualibz A.

38. pnarrati A.

tivus exponit positivum et econtra: et superlativus  
 equivoce exponitur per utrumque: cum tamen de ratione  
 exponencium sit quod significata primaria istorum sint  
 nociora significato primario exponendi. Sed quantum  
 5 ad illud, dicitur quod diversa sunt diversis hominibus  
 nociora; nec oportet universaliter significata exponencium  
 esse nociora significato primario exponendi. Sed sufficit  
 quod convertantur, et in multis expressius ostendant  
 10 sententiam exponendi; ut, captis duobus quantis regu-  
 laribus, et supposito uno alteri, percipiendo quod  
 neutrum excedit reliquum, concludo ista esse equalia:  
 et sunt tales negaciones communiter facilius nobis note  
 afirmacionibus quas exponunt. Et exhinc, comparando  
 unum istorum ad infinita equalia alteri, expono com-  
 15 pendiose quod ipsum est tantum quantum est aliquod  
 reliquorum, per duas affirmativas et terciam negativam;  
 et sic per negacionem affirmacioni de positivo commu-  
 niter nociori expono per comparativam et superlativam.  
 Quamvis autem simplex sit affirmacio prior et nocior  
 20 negacione, tamen multe negaciones sunt multis affirma-  
 cionibus magis cognoscibiles. Dicitur ergo quod regulariter  
 omnis propositio affirmativa de proprie comparativo  
 A 56<sup>a</sup> presupponit | suum positivum; et ex omni tali compara-  
 tiva sequitur comparativa de termino opposito privative.  
 25 Verbi gracia, *Sor est propria comparacione infinitum*  
*magnus*; et sequitur; *Sor est maior A*; ergo *A est*  
*minus Sor*. Et patet quod mundus est parvus, cum eius  
 medietas sit minor ipso; sed non in comparacione ad  
 mundo mayus, sed in comparacione ad aliud ipso maius  
 30 parvum etc. Deus autem est infinitum melior mundo;  
 corpus, infinitum maius superficie; et tamen nec mundus  
 est infinitum minus bonus deo, cum tunc deus foret  
 parum bonus, nec corpus infinitum magnum, quia non  
 est comparacio proprie dicta. Nec sequitur: *Plato in-*  
 35 *finutum minus albus erit quam est Sor*, ergo *Sor infinitum*  
*maius albus est quam erit Plato*; quia non est affirmativa  
 de proprie comparativo sed de termino infinito. Sequitur  
 eciam: *binarius est duplus ad unitatem*; ergo *unitas est*  
*subdupla ad binarium*, quia eius medietas; sed non  
 40 sequitur quod sic in duplo minus multa sunt; nec

Can. V. g. the  
 comparative  
 and positive  
 expound each  
 other, when the  
 exponents must  
 be better known  
 than what is to  
 be expounded?

It is enough  
 that one can  
 take the place  
 of the other and  
 point out its  
 sense more  
 clearly.

The  
 comparative  
 proper  
 presupposes the  
 positive, and  
 implies another  
 opposite  
 comparative,  
 with less:  
*A is greater*  
*than B; B is*  
*less than A.*  
 Every  
 compared thing  
 is equal to  
 itself; and it  
 greater than  
 another, that  
 other is less  
 than it.

Yet we cannot  
 conclude from  
 the less to the  
 more unless the  
 comparison is  
 proper.  
 We may say:  
*A will be*  
*infinitely less*  
*white than B is;*  
 but not: *B is*  
*infinitely more*

1. positur A.      4. noticota A.      6. notat A.      29. mado A.  
 6. mains A.      30. mado A.      30. mimi A.      30. mmo A.

*white than A*  
*will be, on*  
*account of the*  
*'infinite.'*  
*2 is twice as*  
*many as 1;*  
*so 1 is half 2;*  
*but not half as*  
*many.*

There are many  
 inexact  
 expressions: as  
*two is more*  
*than one,*  
*something is*  
*better than*  
*nothing, one*  
 not being many,  
 nor *nothing*  
 good.

A unit is neither  
 large nor  
 small;  
 nor is every  
 whole larger  
 than its  
 quantitative  
 part, since the  
 smallest  
 possible  
 quantity is  
 composed of  
 two  
 'indivisibles',  
 which are not  
 magnitudes.

The two  
 methods ought  
 to be well  
 known by every  
 dialectician, so  
 that, if he  
 happens to  
 fail in either of  
 the two, he  
 may maintain  
 his position in  
 the other.

binarius est minor unitate aut plurior, sed duplus. Est enim duplus ad aliud, vel quia duo talia continet, vel quia est in duplo maius; et sic abusive dicitur esse proportio maioris inequalitatis duorum ad unum, quia diffinite proportio maioris inequalitatis est comparacio 5 maioris ad minus.

Et ideo sepe ponunt auctores tales comparaciones sub sensibus negativis; ut, *duo est plura quam unum*, sic exponendo: *duo sunt multa, et unum non est multa*. Ymmo, habundancius dicunt quod *aliquid est melius* 10 *quam nichil*, et per consequens *homo est melior chimera*.

Ista tamen videtur figurativa locutio et inconsona sophistice, cum nec unitas sit maior binario, quia non parva vel pauca, nec binario ipsa minor; et per idem proportionem equalitatis nulla est maior vel minor; nec 15 omne totum est maius sua parte quantitativa; quia cum binarius sit sub unico et indivisibili gradu magnitudinis et maximo parvitas, tamen maxima parvitas possibilis constituitur ex duobus indivisibilibus, non tanquam ex suis partibus, cum nulla paucitas habet 20 partes. Nec minima magnitudo habet magnitudines, sed indivisibilia, suas partes. Large ergo loquendo, proportio maioris inequalitatis est comparacio totius ad eius partem quantitativam, vel equivalenter, sicut proportio minoris inequalitatis est habitudo partis quanti- 25 tative ad suum totum, vel equivalenter. Expediit ergo sophiste cognoscere istas duas vias, non solum ad intelligendum auctores, sed, cum prolapsus fuerit in alterutra, ut salvare se posset communiter in reliqua; et tanta de istis gradibus sufficiant pro presenti. 30

3. ab sive A.      12, 13. sophiste' A.      11, 15. proporcionem A.  
 17. uno A.

## CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM.

Sequitur de expositione propositionum cum terminis de plurali. Ubi primo notandum quod tripliciter contingit categoricam esse de terminis de plurali; vel ratione subiecti, vel ratione predicati, vel ratione utriusque.

Sed ratione subiecti hoc est tripliciter: vel quod subiectum sit terminus numeralis, vel appellativus pluralis, vel copulativus, vel distinctivus: ut patet de istis: 4<sup>or</sup> sunt 2<sup>o</sup> et 2<sup>o</sup>. *Duo homines sunt homo, Sor et Plato sunt Sor et Plato.* In quibus omnibus quoad suas probationes est inter sophistas diversitas respondendi. Potest ergo regulariter sustineri quod omnis affirmativa de subiecto de plurali et predicato non numerali termino nec equivalente est inferribilis divisive; ut si, *Sor et Plato currunt, vel sunt albi, etc.* tunc

A 56<sup>b</sup> *tam unus quam alter est currens, vel huiusmodi.*

In istis tamen est maxima difficultas distribuendi, quando predicatum compositum equivalet termino numerali: ut *Sor et Plato ferendo simul A lapidem* non habent partes A lapidis quas appropriate ferunt; sed uterque fert totum lapidem cum alio, et sic quantumlibet grave sufficit quantumlibet debile portativum ferre, saltim cum alio; et sic de calefactione et aliis accidentibus que non specialiter sunt appropriate partibus agencium; ymmo universaliter, quando partes significati predicati de quibus ipsum non est predicabile sunt appropriate partibus significati suppositi, tunc equivalet termino numerali, ut: *Sor et Plato traxerunt navem per tantum spacium*; cum Sor traxit illam per A partem spacii et Plato per B partem eiusdem spacii, que ade-

Of terms in the plural.  
A categorical proposition may have either its subject or its predicate, or both, in the plural.  
1. The subject. Examples. 4 are 2 and 2; two men are human beings, A and B; are A and B.

Every affirmative proposition of which the subject is plural, infers the predicate for each part of the subject, unless the latter be a numeral.  
But when it is equivalent to a numeral (as in the case of A and B, carrying a stone together; or of one body heating another, &c., and in general when the different parts of the subject are related to parts in the predicate) it cannot infer it thus.  
In this way two men may

1. Cap. deest A.      2. Initial S in red ink A.      4. eam A.  
12. *folas pro* sophistas A; *ib.* veritates *pro* diversitas A.      13. sustinere A.  
23. *plam* A.      28. *appom* A.

together do many things that each has not done completely. But when two agents produce an effect, both must produce it, if they have worked at the same time; if not, the first produces another effect, predisposing to the second, and the latter the effect itself. The last drop pierces the stone.

Therefore, it does not follow that what has previously parts of a thing made has made that thing itself.

Others, however, say that when a being, intending to make anything makes a part of it, he really makes it; and then the verb in the present is 'ampliated' to all time.

In this sense all things are said to be present to God.

But sophists, considering this method as too complicated, say that a man does nothing but what he is engaged in at the moment:

quate integrant illud spacium; et sic pertransierunt illud spacium, occiderunt tot homines, sciunt septem artes, etc. dum neutrum illorum sic fecit.

Verumptamen, si duo agencia produxerunt aliquid, utrumque illorum produxit illud: quia vel simul pro-<sup>5</sup> duxerunt continue, et sequitur intentum: vel unum unam partem, et aliud aliam; et tunc illud quod ultimate produxit generat productum. Ymmo primum in casu non fecit productum: ut si A, medietas dati lapidis, fuit generata, A B agente; et, post cessante, B C agens<sup>10</sup> produxit aliam medietatem: tunc dico quod B non fecit illum lapidem, sed C, sicut ultima gutta facit foramen ultimum vel concavitatem, et nulla gutta precedens; sed forte fecerunt alias concavitates, vel disposuerunt ad aliam faciendam. Non ergo sequitur,<sup>15</sup> isti fecerunt A et B, ex quibus integratur: ergo fecerunt C; quia stat A et B fuisse facta nunc ad centum annos, et nunc prius C fieri ex illis. Et sic videtur michi de domo et ceteris aggregatis quo ad suas facciones.

20

Alia tamen est via que dicit quod omne intendens aliquem finem et facit ens quod erit pars numeralis eiusdem facit illud; ut *homo dicit psalterium, facit domum, vadit Romam* et sic de multis, dum infinicies<sup>25</sup> pausabit antequam perfecerit. Et ampliat verbum de presenti ad omne tempus; quia aliter non esset possibile oracionem esse, nec ambulacionem, nec talia aggregata, nisi verbum de presenti esset ampliatum tam pro presentibus [et] preteritis quam futuris, que<sup>30</sup> intendebantur cum aliis pro certo fine. Et ex hac radice credo quod aliqui ponunt omnia que sunt, fuerunt, vel erunt, esse presencia quo ad deum, ampliando hoc verbum *esse* [ad] *existere*, et *fore*. Et sic infinita sunt, que non sunt in hoc instanti: et illud plus concordat cum modo loquendi, quamvis videatur nimis inbrigabile<sup>35</sup> sophistis.

Ideo dicunt ipsi quod homo nichil facit nisi quod ipse est in faciendo, sic quod continuabit faccionem illius completam, si fuerit res absoluta. Et sic non est possibile peregrinando hominem ire ab Anglia ad 40 Romam, scribere versum, dicere psalterium, et sic de

22. *ad* after numeralis A.  
35. inbrigabile A.

29. et deest A.

33. ad deest A.

aliis discretis. Sed illud videtur nimis honerosum. Ideo dicit alia responsio quod dans ultimum complementum domui facit domum, faciendo domum esse, sed non aliquid quod prius partes illius fecit. Wulgus tamen, synodochice loquens, dicit quod quilibet operarius faciens illud quod erit pars domus talis figure facit domum; quod creditur esse falsum. Et conformiter de panno, libro et ceteris artificialibus.

Media autem responsio, quamvis sit habundancior, est michi probabilior. Conceditur tamen | quod isti motores fecerunt istum motum, et nullum illorum movit illud mobile per tempus mensurans illum motum, quamvis quodlibet illorum fecit illum motum. Ponatur enim quod A sit mobile continue motum per diem, sed pro prima medietate movebitur a B et postmodum a C, corrupto B. Tunc patet prima pars cum ultima, ex hoc quod utrumque illorum fecit illum notum, quia hoc *moveri* vel *esse in movendo* per tantum temporis. Et media pars patet ex casu; et sic conceditur C spacium esse pertransitum ab A et B, et nec pertransiebatur ab A nec a B; et sic quantumlibet magnum spacium potest esse quantum licet cito pertransitum, quantumcunque tarde movendo A multis mobilibus: a quolibet tamen illorum mobilium erit totale spacium totaliter pertransitum, et tamen nullum illorum pertransibit illud spacium, nec pertransietur ab aliquo istorum; nec est spacium pertransitum, nisi primo in fine, sic quod manebit in fine. Ex quo patet quod spacium successive corruptum secundum partes ut sunt pertransite, non erit a sic pertranseunte pertransitum, cum incipit non esse proprio instanti applicationis illius pertranseuntis; et per idem nulla pars eius erit pertransita; et sic casus communis est impossibilis. Sed aliquod spacium suppositum erit pertransitum: et conformiter dicitur de calore, vel alio quocumque permanente, successive corrupto vel generato. Non enim generabitur aliquid huiusmodi successive, nisi maneat in fine, secundum totum generatum. Nec in tali casu successive corrumpetur, nec successive erunt partes eius, sed proprio instanti applicationis desinit esse; pro quo instanti erit ita quod corrumpens non aget in hoc nec in aliquam eius partem, sicut nec tanget; sed in

and so he cannot go to Rome, write a verse or say his Breviary.

Another answer is that the last force at work produces the effect, but none of the parts of the effect.

I prefer the second answer, though complicated.

Yet I grant that though no one of a given number of forces has moved a body during the whole time, each has produced the movement.

For instance, if A is moved during a day, by B first, and then, B existing no longer, by C. Thus supposing many moving

bodies, however, small, setting A in motion, the whole space is passed through by them, and yet none of them may pass through the whole.

This principle can be applied to heat, or any permanent source of movement.

subiectum eius aget. Verumptamen corruptetur hoc, id est, faciet hoc desinere esse non per accionem suam, sed per incepcionem accionis sue.

To return to the subject; none of these propositions is true distributively, so that each individual of the four is four, each knows the seven arts, and so on. They can know and not know these arts; men are different from and yet are four. It does not follow that they are not four.

Reddeundo ergo ad propositum, videtur michi quod nulla talis affirmativa verificari poterit divisive; ut *si 5* *4<sup>or</sup> sunt 4<sup>or</sup>*, tunc quodlibet illorum erit unum illorum 4; *si isti sciunt septem artes*, tunc quodlibet illorum scit aliquam septem arcium; et sic de aliis. Nec est inconueniens quod, si sciant septem artes, et ignorent vel dubitent easdem, sicut *4<sup>or</sup> homines differunt a 4<sup>or</sup> et 10* *tamen sunt 4<sup>or</sup>*. Nec sequitur quod isti nesciunt septem artes, vel non sunt 4<sup>or</sup>, vel quod omnia que ignorant nesciunt, aut non sciunt. Pro quo notandum quod illa negacio, nota negans verbum respectu cuius fiunt tales duos sensus, negat utrumque sensum; ut, *si isti non 15* *sunt quatuor*, tunc *non aliquod istorum*, *nec ista simul sunt quatuor*.

Thus it is quite possible for the most opposite attributes to belong at once to this plural subject without contradiction: white and not white, learned and unlearned (though not *two* and *one*;

Ex quo patet quod ista non sunt contradictoria, *isti sunt albi et isti non sunt albi*, cum uno existente albo et reliquo non, foret utrumque falsum: et sic, quamvis 20 scita ab aliquibus sint ignorata vel dubitata ab eisdem, tamen impossibile est quod scita ab aliquibus sint nescita vel non scita ab eisdem, vel sint non scita ab illis, cum sint facta ab illis. Patet ergo quod hoc est falsum: *duo homines sunt unus homo*, quamvis *uterque 25* *illorum sit unus homo*, quia cum subiectum non confunditur, tunc uterque illorum esset ille homo; ymmo per idem omnia essent duo, et per consequens non infinita multa essent, quia non plura quam duo. Patet eciam quod isti amant se, quia in casu reciproce, et 30 odiunt se, quia alternatim. Et per idem occidunt | se, A 57<sup>b</sup> quia alternatim, et per idem occidunt se alternatim, vel reciproce. Et sic pugnant ut vincant se, vel ut vincantur a se ipsis, et ut superentur et ut superent, sed non ut non vincantur. Nec sequitur; *isti odiunt, isti 35* *odiunt se, ergo non amant se*, nec e contra; quia si *non amant se*, tunc *non amant se reciproce*; nec alternatim sequeretur. Nec: *isti intendunt superari a se ipsis; ergo, intendunt ut non superent se ipsos*. Sicut ergo isti 4<sup>or</sup> pugnantes sunt homines victores et homines non 40 victores, iusti et iniusti, homines sedentes et homines

they may love, hate, kill, fight, and conquer each other at the same time.

But we may not conclude that they do not love, hate, etc.; at least their want of love &c. is reciprocal.



non sedentes; sed stantes non sedent. stant; nec sedenti  
affertur non sedencia; et sic quatuor sunt 2<sup>o</sup> et 2<sup>o</sup>, et  
bis duo, sed non semel duo. Et sic, omnia tria sunt  
duo et duo; et licet comunicancia nulla, tamen 2<sup>o</sup>  
5 sunt, 2<sup>o</sup>, et 2<sup>o</sup>.

In a collection  
men may be  
sitting and  
standing; but it  
does not follow  
that those who  
stand sit.

Nec sequitur: *isti duo sunt duo homines et duo*  
*animalia: ergo sunt duo et duo.* Nec sequitur, *iste ter-*  
*narius est par isti ternario: ergo, est par.* Nec sequitur:  
*A et B sunt Sor et Plato, et illi differunt: ergo, A et*  
10 *B differunt.* Sit A. Sor, et B. Plato et Sor; et tunc  
patet quod A est B, et quod hec nugatoria. Ut: qui  
*istorum numerorum (vel isti duo numeri) sunt Sor et*  
*Plato?* et breviter quodocunque termini sinonimi  
copulantur a parte eiusdem extremi est idem iudicium.  
15 Ut: *A et B differunt et sunt Sor et Plato,* quin per  
idem liceret infinities geminare: quod esset omnino  
nugatorium. Hec enim est nugatoria fore Sor et A; et  
sic de similibus.

Other  
examples: two  
men, being two  
animals are not  
two and two;  
nor that *three*  
is even, because  
even with  
another *three*;  
nor that A  
and B, standing,  
A for Socrates,  
B for Socrates,  
and Plato, differ  
as these two  
men do.

Et patet quomodo dicendum est de terminis collectivis.  
20 ut: *iste populus est albus, sapiens, fortis, bonus,* etc.  
Non enim, vere loquendo, *est* populus talis, nisi que-  
libet pars populi sit talis. Ideo sinodochica locutio  
videtur, concedendo populum esse iustum (*propter*  
*maiolem partem iustum*); et sic univoce *dormire,*  
25 *comedere,* etc. propter hoc quod pars eius sic se habet.  
Multa enim sunt locuta in talibus que sunt falsa. Con-  
ceditur ergo quod quilibet homo de populo est pars  
populi, sed nullius hominis pars est pars populi. Predi-  
catum ergo singulare ampliatur ad significacionem  
30 collectivam per subiectum collectivum, sicut est verbum  
singulare, etc. Unde conceditur quod populus est ens,  
et binarius est tantus quantus binarius punctorum, quia  
tot sunt ista, quot sunt illa.

Collective terms  
as A. 2. d.  
*people,* cannot  
properly receive  
predicates,  
unless such  
are true of the  
whole; but they  
may be  
figuratively  
understood of  
the greater  
part.  
Note that  
though a man  
is part of a  
people, no part  
of him is part  
of a people;  
nor, though a dis-  
visible, is any  
part of it.

Et sic binarius est divisibilis et nulla eius pars:  
35 sicut homo emit equum et nullam eius partem; anima  
naturaliter informat hominem et non aliquam eius  
partem, et *unum* est pars numeri et nulla eius pars.

1. sed stantes sed non sedent stant A.      2. aff' *pro* affertur A.  
11. que *pro* qui A      23. *vr* *pro* videtur A.

31. Later, Wyclif seems to have thought otherwise. In De  
Apostasia (p. 96) he quotes the following distich: *Populus est*  
*aliquid; sed populus nihil est.* But that may be an argument *ad*  
*hominem.*

Thus a couple  
of points has  
parts, but not  
extended parts.  
We cannot  
conclude,  
because their  
parts have no  
parts, that the  
whole couple  
has none.

When we say:  
*Thrice three  
are nine*, we  
mean *three*  
taken three  
times: *you were  
twice at  
Oxford*, i. e.,  
once and  
another  
separate time.  
This couple of  
points, though  
quantitatively,  
is not naturally  
divisible.

Other sophisms  
may be  
resolved by this  
means, as that  
concerning  
two written  
propositions  
which are  
necessary, and  
a third,  
combining the  
two, which is  
impossible.

I should have  
dealt with this  
matter at  
greater length,  
had I not  
feared to be  
tedious; but in  
my next work  
all this is more  
fully set forth.

Binarius ergo punctorum habet partes, et caret partibus  
extensis, sed non partibus. Unde non sequitur: *ista  
carent partibus*, vel *sunt minora B binario et ista sunt  
iste binarius*: ergo, *iste binarius sic se habet*; quia equi-  
vocacio est in appposito, ratione termini numeralis 5  
limitantis ad magnitudinem numeri, que est multitudo  
ad partes numerales. Sed terminus numeralis limitat  
ad verbum successivum, limitat ad sensum divisum  
pro vicissitudine; ut: *ter tria sunt novem*, quia *tria et  
tria et tria copulativum sunt novem*. Et: *bis fuisti Oxonie*, 10  
quia semel et alia vice interpollativum copulative; et sic,  
*A et B sunt ista duo puncta*, et tamen *differunt ab  
eisdem punctis*, quia divisim et alternativum; et tamen  
non est ita quod ista puncta non sunt ista, nec iste  
numerus est indivisibilis vel non divisibilis. Nec sequitur, 15  
*ista sunt divisibilia quantitative quo ad molem*: ergo *sunt  
divisibilia*, quia sunt naturaliter indivisibilia, nisi forte  
homo equivocaverit.

Et iuxta tales sensus concedunt quidam tales con-  
clusiones. *Tantum iste sunt |proposiciones scripte*, quarum A 58<sup>a</sup>  
utraque est necessaria; et alia est propositio scripta  
impossibilis, que non est altera illarum, sed tertia que  
non differt ab illis. Et sic de multis aliis in quibus  
oportet diligenter advertere ad nugacionem; ut, posito  
quod *solum hoc vel pars eius sit scriptum*; "*deus est 25  
deus*", quorum primum sit A, secundum B, tertium C,  
quod significet *deum esse B*, tunc videtur tota con-  
clusio patere. Nota tamen quod probabile videtur quod  
A sit de numero aliquorum que non sunt, quia de  
numero communi formaliter dicto quo aliqua numerantur, 30  
quorum unum est et aliud non potest esse; et hoc  
tollit multas probaciones conclusionum.

Totam istam materiam tractarem diffusius, si non  
obstaret prolixitas quam adhuc timeo iuvenibus tediosam.  
Ideo relinquens videre volentibus in superiore opere 35  
meo totum hoc planius pertractatum, huic meo tractatui  
finem pono.

17. indivisibilia pro divisibilia A. 19. excedunt A. 36. tractui A.

*Superiore*. "Next". Just as *proximus* always means "last",  
with Wyclif.

# INDEX.

- Ab aequo*, demonstration, 79.
- Ablatives absolute, equivalent to propositions, 91.
- Adjacent, first, second, and third, 21 *and note*.
- Agreement, possible, between the natural, the fortuitous, the violent, the supernatural, the voluntary and the artificial, 173.
- Allusions to Antichrist in Logica, 35 *and note*, 60, 70, 162.
- Alone, to be; is impossible in a strict sense, 137, 138.
- Amphibology, 98, 99.
- Analogy defined, 35.
- Analysis of subjects containing a genitive: how to be made, 91, 92.
- A posteriori* demonstration, 79.
- A priori* demonstration, 79.
- Argument, an; its definition, 35; divided into Enthymema, Induction, Analogy, and Syllogism, *ib.*; Sorites forgotten, *ib. note*.
- Aristotle 44, 78, 156 *note*, 160.
- Attributes of God: such as are not essential might be wanting, 28.
- Being, different opinions about the extension or breadth of signification of the word, 153.
- Beginning and ending; what they respectively imply, 191; neither God nor the eternal truths ever began to be, 192; they were not, but are, *ib.* To begin is the first *now* of being and the last of not-being; *to end*, conversely, 193; the beginning begins, when the thing begins to be, 194. From beginning to ending the conclusion holds good with opposite terms, 195; beginning and ending are now modal and now categorical, 196; rule concerning these sorts of propositions, 197—200; fallacies solved, 200—202.
- Brunellus, the name of an ass, 97 *and note*; 152 *and note*.
- 'Captio': what it is, 118; examples, 119 solutions, *ib.*
- Case, the, of a merchant, throwing his goods overboard in a storm, as regards his will to do so, 188.
- Categories, 1; are ten in number, three absolute and seven relative, 11; definition of substance, quantity, quality, relation and action, *ib.*; of passion, locality, time, belonging and position, 12; verse containing the ten categories, 12 *note*; in each category there is a first principle which is the standard of all the objects which come under that category, 13.
- Causal propositions: hypotheticals of which the parts are joined by *because*, or the idea of causation, 30.
- Centre, the, is the first principle of position, 13.
- Chance, Wyclif's definition of, excludes a 'toss-up', 172 *note*.
- Chimera, technical meaning of, 164 *note*.
- Collective terms can receive only such predicates as are true of the whole; but some may be understood figuratively as true of the greater number of the individuals which they comprise, 233.
- Comparative propositions: hypotheticals of which the parts are joined by a word signifying comparison, 30; cannot properly be analyzed, 66 *note*.
- Comparison, degrees of, 217; proper or improper, *ib.*; formula for comparison in the positive degree, i. e. the comparison of equality, 218. Difficulties in

- expounding; 1st, when the latter term compared comprises an infinite multitude, none of which is supreme, *ib.*: such comparisons are impossible, for the equality implies that one must be supreme, 219; 2nd, when the aforesaid comparison is modified by the comparative degree (negation of equality) and difference of time, 220; those who admit the theory of indivisible parts making up the Continuous will admit that a supreme degree must exist, 220; how to expound a proposition in the comparative, 221; comparison is impossible unless both terms compared really have the same quality, 222; how to expound superlatives, 223; both terms must be homogeneous, 224; loose meanings given by literary men and orators to the superlative, *ib.*; three differences between the comparative and the superlative, *ib.*; all the signs of comparison generally render the following terms distributive, 225; exceptions to this rule, *ib.*; a peculiarity about the distribution of the term that follows the superlative, 226; mutual exposition of comparatives, *ib.*: it is not useless, since one proposition is put for another, and explains its sense, 227; every comparative implies a positive, and another comparative with *less* and the terms reversed, *ib.*: inexact expressions, and pseudo-comparison, 228.
- Compound and divided senses, the, 24 *and note*; 161 *and note*.
- Conceptualistic position, the, 78 *note*.
- Conditional propositions: hypotheticals of which the parts are united by *if*, 29.
- Consequence, what it is, 42; rules of, 42—49.
- Consequent, the, fallacy of the, 56 *and note*.
- Contingent, different meanings of; modal or substantive sense; including or excluding its contrary; meaning merely a happening, or what takes place by nature, always, in most cases, or in few, 26, 27, 170; the affirmatively contingent and the negatively so, 168; if indifferently contingent (a mere happening) it is indeterminately true or false; if contingent by nature, it is determinately one or the other, 169; three conclusions concerning the naturally contingent, always, in most cases, or in few, 170—175; explanation of the diagram of possibility, contingency, etc., 175; such propositions may be proved *a priori* in four ways, 175, 176.
- Continuous, two contradictory theories concerning the, 195.
- Contradictory propositions, their nature, 20; imply a contradictory supposition of both subject and predicate, 102.
- Contrary propositions, their nature, 18; examples, 19.
- Conversion, its definition, 33; it is either simple, or accidental, *ib.*, or effected by counterposition, 34; mnemonic verses containing these different descriptions of conversion, *ib.*, note on the necessity of counterposition in particular negative propositions, *ib.*
- Conversion illegitimate, of singulars, 86.
- Copulative propositions: hypotheticals of which the parts are joined by *and*, 29; rules concerning them, 56, 57.
- Copulative subject, a; when its two parts are to be understood generally, and when not, 90, 92, 93.
- Corruptible things, the sphere of, 43 *and note*.
- Cripples, 170, 171.
- Couple, a, of points has parts (i. e. the points themselves) but these parts have none, 234.
- De Apostasia*, 253 *note*.
- Death, two instants of, must be granted unless we admit that time consists of indivisible instants, 198.
- Degree is the first principle of the category of quality, 13.
- Demonstration, different sorts of, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, *ab æquo* and *ex opposito*, 79—84.
- Denial, a, ought to bear upon the whole of the proposition, 28.
- Dependency is the first principle of the category of relation, 13.
- Descartes' 'Discours sur la Méthode'; a passages that reminds of it, 179 *and note*.
- Determinate and indeterminate truth or falsehood, theory of, 167; every necessary proposition is determinately true, every impossible one false likewise, *ib.*; contingent propositions may be either one or the other, 168; if one of two

- opposites is determinately true, the other is so likewise, and *vice versa*, 168; all the indetermination depends on something that may happen or not indifferently in the future, *ib.*, and that depends on God, 169.
- Diagram of different degrees of contrariety in propositions, 18, 156.
- Diameter of the world, the, 177 *note*.
- Differ (to) from what is impossible does not imply possibility, 146.
- Difference and otherness, meaning of the words, 121; to differ from does not render the following term universal, *ib.*; propositions containing such verbs have three exponents, one negative and two affirmative, *ib.*; formula, 122; conclusion drawn therefrom, 122—126; that which is not, cannot be otherwise than it is, unless we amplify the signification of Being, 126.
- Different standpoints may render the same proposition true or false, 77.
- Difficulty as to creation and the consequent ending of the non-entity of things, 106, 107; in difficulty the exposition of the universal negative, 102—105. (See Fallacy.)
- Diogenes' proof of movement, 70 *note*.
- Disjunctive propositions: hypotheticals, of which the parts are joined by *or*, 29; rules concerning them, 58, 59.
- Divided and compound sense, the, 24, 161 *and notes*.
- Divine concurrence, doctrine of the, 131 *note*.
- Division of the whole work, 1; of terms into resolvable, explicable, and official, 82; a division that is not exclusive, since the same term may be all three at the same time, 83.
- Enthymema, the, defined, 35.
- Equipollence, what it is, 22; effected by means of negations variously placed, 22, 23.
- Essential (de inesse) propositions defined, 24.
- Eternity, an, expires every instant, 209.
- Examination of this proposition: 'Of any couple of contradictory propositions, one or the other is true', 93.
- Exceptive terms and propositions, which they are, 53, 142; how to expound them (rule and formula), 53, 143; four elements that are in any exceptive proposition, 53, 54, 143; rules, concerning them, 54, 55; all such propositions are universal, 142; the place of the exceptive particle does not matter, *ib.*; 'other,' if used in expounding these propositions, presents very great difficulty, 143; the rule for negative exceptives, 144; non-entities may be excepted just as entities are, *ib.*; rule when the excepted part of the proposition is made up of copulated terms, 145; any proposition may be made absolutely true by adding a clause exceptive of the errors it contains; which is not quite superfluous, *ib.* Every exceptive and its preajacent are subcontraries, 146; objections answered, 146, 147; it is possible to expound exceptives by simple negation or the idea of plurality, 147; an exceptive may except the whole of its own subject, but it then becomes void of contents, 148. Supposition of exceptive terms, 148, 149; any exceptive may be turned into an exclusive or a universal affirmative, having the same sense, 149; difficulties in applying this rule; how solved, 150, 151; we should not exclude exposition by means of the word 'more', 151; some universal negatives cannot be turned into exceptive ones, 155.
- Exclusive terms and propositions, how to expound, 49, 50, 128; rules, concerning them, 51, 52; they have as many species as the categoricals, 128; very much depends on the place of the exclusive particle, *ib.*; general variations proceeding from the subject that may vary in gender, 129, 130, or express quantity, 130; or from the verb and predicate that may vary modally, 130, 131; many such propositions are impossible, 131; instances of other variations, 132; negative exclusives are called pregnant propositions, 132, 133; either 'more' or 'other' may be used to expound them, 133, but such propositions are not always convertible with their exponents, 134; relative terms should be expounded by using 'other', but every exclusive proposition may be expounded by 'more', 134; some authors employ *parely* or *merely*, in-

- stead of *only*, as the exclusive particle, *ib.*; negative propositions with *only* placed after the subject, require peculiar treatment, 140.
- Exclusive particle, the, changes the sense according to its place in the sentence, 135; and the term upon which it bears, 138.
- Existence, the, of a species implies that of at least some individual, 114.
- Ex opposito* demonstration, 80.
- Exposition, the, of a universal proposition can always take the place of its exponents, 83; rule to that effect, 87; modifications of the rule, on what they depend, 88 *et seq.*
- Fallacies that arise in arguments from an inferior to a superior proposition, 45, 46; fallacies concerning predicates that belong to the same subject at different times, 112, 113; how exploded, 114; fallacies in the subject-matter of knowledge; solutions, 180—186; fallacies about *beginning* and *ending*; solutions, 200—202.
- Falsity may be in the truest proposition, if wrongly understood, 77.
- Forms, the changed, of propositions, are often detrimental to truth, 172.
- Formulae of exposition, 40, 50, for the universal affirmative, 60—63; for the verb 'differs', 63; for *beginning* and *ending*, 65; for comparative propositions, 65, 66; for official propositions, 67.
- Fortune and chance; what they are and how they differ, 172.
- Gender, differences of; their importance in Logic, 88.
- God is the first principle of the category Substance, 13.
- God's lordship before the world existed; it does not follow, because he was not then the Lord, that he was then the not-Lord, of all, 100.
- Gradus latitudinis, 71 *and note*.
- Having is the first principle of all belonging, 13.
- Hypothetical propositions, divided into copulative, disjunctive, conditional, causal, comparative local and temporal, 29; definitions of these, 29—33.
- Identity, four sorts of, 10 *and note*.
- Immediate, the (infinitely near, or little as to distance), how to expound it, 215; corresponds with the Infinite in signification, *ib.*, yet it does not imply identity between two things, nor infinite greatness in either, 216.
- Immediatum, the technical sense of, 177, *note*.
- Impossibility, absolute or natural; *quoad nos*, or consistently with God's foreknowledge, 27, 28, 158, 159; primary or secondary, 159; accidental, *ib.*, has all the other distinctions corresponding to 'necessity', *ib.* Exposition of propositions relative to absolute impossibility or necessity, 159, 160; sometimes both these terms are substantives, and then the proposition is categorical, 160; Wyclif's rule to ascertain when it is so, and when modal, 160, 161. (See Necessity, Necessary). Impossible propositions are not explicable, but can be proved in the four usual ways, 163, and also in a fifth, declaring that which the proposition means, to be impossible, 164. The impossible never becomes necessary, but *that which* is the one may become the other, 165; vain fallacies on this subject, *ib.*
- Inchoative cannot be compared with actual quality, 222.
- Induction defined, 35.
- Infamis binarius*, 221 *and note*.
- Inferior and superior propositions, 44, 45.
- Infinite, the, in size and minuteness, 212; how it should not be expounded, *ib.*, how it should, 213; whether an infinite line is infinitely great; two replies, according to the two theories of the Continuous, *ib.*, there may be different kinds of Infinite, v. g. in length alone, or in breadth too, &c. 214.
- Instant, the, is the first principle of time, 13.
- Instant, the, of eternity, 102.
- Knowledge, 1, 177; divisions, 177, 178; actual knowledge requires an act of unhesitating belief in the truth, 179; but this is sufficient, *ib.*, so the vulgar often have knowledge where the learned have not, 179, 180; questions that raise doubts diminish knowledge in so far, 180; and in the exercise called

- 'obligation' we may have to deny our own act of knowledge, *ib.*; but there is a sharp line of demarcation between cognition with and without doubt, *ib.*; the same thing may be known and doubted by the same person, but not in the same way, 187; we know the Universal first of all, *ib.*, 'not to know' is less negative than 'to be unaware', 187, 188; other mental acts are not thus liable to confusion, 188.
- Local propositions: hypotheticals of which the parts are united by the idea of the same place 30, 31, affirmed or denied, 31 *note*.
- Logicae Continuatio*, scope of, 75.
- Logic of the Holy Scriptures, 1, 22 *and note*.
- Ly*, old French for *the*, 15 *and note*.
- Man, a, is at his death, when he is no more, as old as ever he will be, 111.
- Manuscripts, the, notes concerning, 1, 75, 120, 176.
- Mathematical argument, a, 104.
- Mobiliter*, technical meaning of the term, 103 *note*.
- Modal terms and propositions, 24, 156.
- Modalists, 174 *note*.
- Monsters, whether their production is intended by nature, 171; they are believed to be a punishment for the sin of Adam, 170.
- 'Natural' does not necessarily mean according to nature, 173.
- Necessary is not contrary to 'contingent'; it may signify antecedence as a cause, sequence as an effect, or merely concomitance, 157, 158. (See Impossibility.) 'Necessary' may sometimes be understood thus: 'It must be that'; so that a future affirmation may be necessary and yet not exist, 162, 163; the same is true of possibility, 163.
- Necessity, different meanings of; useful, or repugnant with non-existence; absolute or relative; natural, ordained, or merely foreknown, 25, 157; antecedent or consequent, 26, 157; voluntary or constrained, 26, 158.
- Nominalistic position, the, 78 *note*.
- Nothing is the matter out of which God made the world, 105.
- Obligation, a logical exercise: is of two sorts, called position and deposition, 69; its rules, 69, 70, 71; duties of the opponent and the respondent, 71; the latter may grant that he is dead, and must consequently deny that he is actually answering, 71, 72; other examples and modes of answering, 72; the case of 'both hands', *ib.*; the denial that any proposition whatever is put, 72, 73; the admission that 'man is an ass', not real, but apparent, 73; the admission of apparent contradiction in Christ, 73, 74; the difficulty (left unsolved here by Wyclif) of two men whose merits differ only by the amount gained in an indivisible instant of time, 74.
- Ockam, 112.
- Official terms and propositions, their exposition, 67, 68.
- Orders of being, three; actual, potential, and intelligible, 109.
- Ordinate power of God, 19 *and note*.
- Particular affirmative proposition, the, how proved, 107; rule, 108; difficulty in finding a proper verb to serve in the proof, 108, 109; another rule, good for certain cases, 111; such a proposition is convertible with another modal one having the verb always in the present, 113; proof *ab absurdo* and *ex aequo*, 114, 115.
- Particular negative proposition, how proved, 116; may be true, though implying something absurd, if it does not admit it, 116, 117.
- Per se* and *per accidens*, different meanings of, 203, 204; form of exposition of a syncategorical proposition with *per se*, 204, 205; of a proposition with *per accidens*, 206; these terms are not always contradictory, unless taken in the same sense; they may even imply each other, *ib.*; still there is some opposition between them, 207; predication *per se* differs in many things from that *per accidens*, *ib.*; some predications are neither one nor the other, 207, 208; these principles solve many difficulties, 208, 209; *per* may mean continuous duration, 209; or be applied to a body, moving continuously, 210, 211.

- Point, the, is the first principle of locality, 13.
- Prejacent, meaning of, 129.
- Priesthood, logical example, concerning, 3 *note*.
- Primal matter, receptivity of, is the first principle of the category of passion, 13.
- Principle, the, of contradiction, 104.
- Priority, the, of cause and that of sequence, 107.
- Proposition, the; its definition, 14; divided into mental, verbal, written, real, and true, 14, 15; what these are, 15; divided again into categorical and hypothetical, *ib.* (the former being simple or compound, 16); into affirmative or negative, 16; universal, particular, indefinite and singular, 16, 17; what the quality of a proposition is, and what its quantity, 17; technical hexameter containing different properties of propositions, 17 *and note*; propositions and their different degrees of opposition, 18—22; equipollence, 22—24; some propositions are essential, others modal, 24—29; and others hypothetical 29—33; conversion of propositions, 33—35; cannot always, when propounded officially or by analysis, be converted with their primary form, 83, 84.
- Quality and quantity in propositions, 17.
- Quantity, the smallest possible, is composed of at least two indivisible parts, 228.
- Reasoning, 1.
- Relative pronouns vary the meaning of a proposition, 98.
- Repetition, the, of certain official terms in demonstration; its importance, 84.
- Rules of consequence, 42—49.
- Significations, primary and secondary, of words, 76, 77.
- Significations, three, of 'to be', 109; advantages of admitting them, 135.
- Signs may acquire a new meaning in three ways, 77.
- Singular, the, of a universal must coincide with it in form and meaning, 100.
- Sophist, technical sense of the word, 121 *note*.
- Sophistical juggles about the Nothing and the Absurd, 104, 105.
- Soul, the human, is threefold, 101.
- Suarez, 174 *note*.
- Subalternate propositions; their nature, 20 *and note*.
- Subcontrary propositions; their nature, 19.
- Subjects of propositions must be first considered abstractedly, before we judge the truth of the proposition, 84.
- Substance, the meaning of, needs to be widened, but cannot be, unless an accident is a non-being, 154.
- Superior and inferior propositions, 44, 45.
- Supposition, 5 *and note*; can exist only in a proposition, 38; is divided into proper or metaphorical, *ib.*; material or formal, *ib.*; simple (i. e. abstract) or personal, 38, 39; when simple, is adequate or inadequate, 39; when personal, is singular, collective, distributive, or indefinite, *ib.*; simple and personal supposition may go together in the same proposition, 39, 40; but proper nouns must change their sense in order to receive universal supposition, 40; supposition is distributive for the subject, indefinite for the predicate, in any universal affirmative proposition, and universal for both in a universal negative, 40, 41.
- Syllogism, the, defined, 35; its parts, 37, 36; it has 19 modes, classed in three figures, 36; mnemonic verses containing them all, *ib.*, examples of syllogisms in Darii, Baralipon and Cesare, 36, 37; the expository syllogism is much used, but is often inconclusive, 37 *and note*; when both premises are negative or particular, no conclusion is possible, 37.
- Temporal propositions; hypotheticals in which the parts are united by reference to the idea of the same time, 31; but 'the same time' may mean either any time in all temporal duration, or a given shorter lapse of time, or the very same instant, 31, 32.
- Terms, 1, 2; divided into simple and compound, categorical and syncategorical, general (equivocal, transcendental, univocal) or individual, 2; substantial or accidental, 3; vary, according to case or tenses, 3, 4; are universal, particular, common, singular, 4; when univocal and when equivocal, *ib.*; when derived, concrete, abstract, definite, indefinite,



- or privative, 5; when they signify absence, extension, or modification of another term, 6; when independent or otherwise resolvable, 6, 82; when 'officials', 7, 83; when belonging to the first or the second intention or imposition, 7.
- Terms repeated in the same proposition must always be understood in the same sense, 84.
- Terms in the plural, 229; may be subject or predicate, or both, *ib.*; the predicate belongs to each singular that makes up the plural subject, except in certain stated cases, 229, 230; v. g. when several causes work at a given effect, the last cause produces the effect as some say, 230, or rather the verb in the present is amplified and 'makes' implies the whole of the making in time, 230, 231; sophists however deny this, *ib.*; none of these partial propositions concerning a plural subject are true distributively, 232, only collectively, 232, 233.
- Thomists, the, 174.
- Thought is the first principle of the category of action, 13.
- Time and place represent parts of duration or local existence, 210.
- Truth is the correspondence between any proposition and its primary signification, 76; may be contained in false propositions, 77.
- Two men, with the Universal 'Man', make three, 89 *and note*; but not if the universal is left out of the account, 93.
- Ubi (where) may mean anywhere in the world, or two parts of space comprised in a larger one, or a definite space occupied by matter; in the last sense two persons cannot be in the same place, 30, 51.
- Ultimate singulars are perhaps impossible to arrive at, 101.
- Unit, the, is the principle of the category of quantity, 13.
- Universal affirmative propositions, four ways of proving them, 85; cannot be converted with their singulars, *ib.*; exist only when the predicate is distributed, 86, and the subject not compounded, 86, 87; may be proved indirectly, 87; rule for expounding them, 87; variations in the application of the rule depend on the gender of the quantifying sign, 88, or the nature of the subject, 88, 89, if it is disjunct or copulated, etc., 89, 90; if composed with an ablative absolute, 90, 91; if containing a genitive case, 91; analysis of the genitive in a subject, 92; variations in the rule, proceeding from the verb of the proposition, when amplified, or inchoative in meaning, 94, 95; or indicating an intellectual process, 95; difficulties with negative terms in such cases, 95, 96; rule given when the universal affirmative has its verb in the past or the future, 96; sometimes the strict observance of the rule is unnecessary, 97; how to analyze a universal affirmative into its singulars, 97, 98; variations in the exposition, proceeding from the predicate, 98, 99.
- Universal negative propositions, proved in how many ways, 100; how its corresponding singulars are obtained, 101; all the parts of its subject and its predicate are distributed, 102; it can be converted simply, *ib.*; may be proved by showing its contradictory to be false, 104, or by proving the truth of the converted proposition, 105; but it cannot be expounded, 106.
- Universals, 1; the word has three meanings, 8; predicable universals: the genus answers the question, what? for species, 8, 9; the species answers the question, what? for individuals, 9; the difference answers the question, how? *ib.*; the property and the accident, *ib.*
- 'Until', fallacies about, 210.
- Will (to) is an act which implies a logical difficulty; it is possible to will and not to will the same thing at the same time, 188; if one man intends to strike another, and knows he is a priest, he intends to strike a priest, though he may have the contrary wish, 189.

Vindobonae, Carolus Fromme, typogr. C. et R. Aulæ.



## Date Due

1955			
1956			
1957			
1958			
1959			
1960			
1961			
1962			
1963			
1964			
1965			
1966			
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1971			
1972			
1973			
1974			
1975			
1976			
1977			
1978			
1979			
1980			
1981			
1982			
1983			
1984			
1985			
1986			
1987			
1988			
1989			
1990			
1991			
1992			
1993			
1994			
1995			
1996			
1997			
1998			
1999			
2000			
2001			
2002			
2003			
2004			
2005			
2006			
2007			
2008			
2009			
2010			
2011			
2012			
2013			
2014			
2015			
2016			
2017			
2018			
2019			
2020			
2021			
2022			
2023			
2024			
2025			
2026			
2027			
2028			
2029			
2030			
2031			
2032			
2033			
2034			
2035			
2036			
2037			
2038			
2039			
2040			
2041			
2042			
2043			
2044			
2045			
2046			
2047			
2048			
2049			
2050			
2051			
2052			
2053			
2054			
2055			
2056			
2057			
2058			
2059			
2060			
2061			
2062			
2063			
2064			
2065			
2066			
2067			
2068			
2069			
2070			
2071			
2072			
2073			
2074			
2075			
2076			
2077			
2078			
2079			
2080			
2081			
2082			
2083			
2084			
2085			
2086			
2087			
2088			
2089			
2090			
2091			
2092			
2093			
2094			
2095			
2096			
2097			
2098			
2099			
2100			

WELLESLEY COLLEGE LIBRARY



3 5002 03208 2369

BR 75 .W3 14:1

Wycliffe, John, d. 1384

Johannis Wyclari Tractatus de  
logica

